Quaest. 3, Art. 1
Quaestiones disputatae de mysterio Trinitatis · Quaestio III: Utrum simul stent trinitas et summa simplicitas
Quaestio III. Utrum simul stent trinitas et summa simplicitas.
Consequenter quaeritur, utrum simul stent trinitas et summa simplicitas; et circa hoc quaeruntur duo.
Primum est, utrum divinum esse sit simplicissimum. Secundo, utrum simul stent trinitas et summa simplicitas.
Articulus I. Utrum divinum esse sit simplicissimum.
Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod divinum esse sit simplicissimum.
1. Augustinus, secundo Confessionum2: «Te simplicius nihil reperitur»: ergo est simplex in termino, ergo et in summo, ergo est simplicissimum.
2. Item, decimo tertio Confessionum3: «Tu solus simplex es, cui non est aliud vivere, et aliud bene vivere»: idem ergo est in Deo esse et bene esse; sed in quo sunt haec eadem, nulla est compositio, sed summa simplicitas: ergo etc.
3. Item, omne simpliciter primum est simplicissimum; sed divinum esse est huiusmodi: ergo etc. Maior probatur: quia compositum est posterius componente, et simplex prius composito4: causa ergo praedicati est in subiecto in praedicta propositione: ergo est vera per se. Minor est manifesta, quia Deus est ens a se ipso, nam si aliunde haberet esse, iam illud esset sibi Deus, non ipse. Et rursus, si est stare et non est abire in infinitum, necesse est ponere, ens quoddam esse primum omnium.
4. Item, omne simpliciter necessarium est simplicissimum; sed divinum esse est simpliciter necessarium: ergo etc. Maiorem probant Avicenna et Algazel in suis Metaphysicis5; nam simpliciter necessarium est omnino independens et incorruptibile: omne autem compositum dependet a componentibus et in illa, quantum est de sui natura, est resolubile. Minor est manifesta, quia altera pars contrarietatis nobilior attribuenda est Deo: ergo cum nobilius sit simpliciter necessarium quam possibile sive contingens; videtur etc.
5. Item, omne nobilissimum est simplicissimum; sed divinum esse est huiusmodi: ergo etc. Minor est manifesta; maior probatur, quia nobilissimo sunt attribuendae conditiones nobilitatis in summo, alioquin non esset nobilissimum; sed simplicitas est conditio spectans ad nobilitatem, ut patet: ergo necesse est, quod ponatur esse in Deo omnino in summo.
6. Item, omne potentissimum est simplicissimum; divinum esse est potentissimum: ergo etc.
Minor manifesta est, quia ideo dicitur Deus, quia omnipotens. Maior probatur, quia «virtus unita plus est infinita», secundum quod dicitur in libro de Causis1: ergo virtus infinitissima est unitissima, ergo simplicissima; sed non est virtus simplicissima nisi etiam substantia sit talis: ergo etc.
7. Item, omne, quod est quidquid habet, est simplicissimum2; sed Deus est quidquid habet: ergo etc. Maior patet, quia si esset compositio aliqua, neutrum illorum esset alterum. Minor patet per inductionem et rationem: quia Deus habet sapientiam, aut igitur est sapientia, aut non, et sic de aliis, exceptis relativis. Si est sapientia, habeo propositum; si non; et est sapiens sapientia: ergo est sapiens alio, quam sit ipse: ergo si ab alio habet sapientiam, ab alio etiam habet perfectionem: ergo non est Deus etc.
8. Item, omne perfectissimum est simplicissimum; sed divinum esse est huiusmodi: ergo etc. Minor manifesta est, quia nulla conditio magis est consona divino esse quam perfectio. Maior probatur: quia perfectius est quod ipsum totum et secundum se totum est perfectio, quam id quod habet in se aliquid perfectibile; sed omne compositum vel componibile habet in se aliquid perfectibile: ergo impossibile est, quod aliquid sit summe perfectum, nisi etiam sit simplicissimum: ergo idem quod prius.
9. Item, omne compositum est mutabile: ergo a destructione consequentis3, omne immutabile est simplex, et simpliciter immutabile est omnimode simplex; sed divinum esse est omnino immutabile, quia nec in melius nec in aequale nec in peius mutari potest, cum sit omnino summum bonum: ergo divinum esse est simplicissimum.
10. Item, quanto aliquid magis est simplex, magis est unum; sed divinum esse summe est unum, sicut fuit in praecedentibus ostensum4: ergo necesse est, divinum esse simpliciter esse simplicissimum.
Contra: 1. Anselmus5: Quidquid competit Deo competit ei in summo; sed divinum esse differt ab esse creato: ergo summe differt. Sed quanto aliquid pluribus differentiis differt, tanto magis differt et tanto magis est compositum: ergo necesse est, divinum esse summe esse compositum.
2. Item, simplicius est esse omnino abstractum a supposito quam concretum; sed divinum esse non est abstractum, sed concretum6 cum supposito, quia in divino esse est vera deitas et vera hypostasis deitatem habens: ergo etc. — Si dicas, quod differunt sola ratione; aut rationi illi respondet aliquid rei, aut nihil: si aliquid, habeo propositum; si nihil: ergo totum vanum et falsum.
3. Item, quod nobilitatis est in creatura attribuendum et Creatori7; sed creatura, quanto magis composita, tanto magis accedit ad conditionem nobilitatis; sicut patet in homine, qui est perfectissimus creaturarum, quae sunt in universo, qui etiam est Dei imago: videtur ergo etc.
4. Item, in formis ordinatis forma, quae se habet ex additione, est actualior, sicut patet in forma generis et speciei, quia actualior est forma speciei; sed quod se habet ex additione est compositum: ergo compositio attestatur maiori actualitati et completioni. Cum igitur divinum esse sit actualissimum et completissimum: ergo est compositissimum.
5. Item, proprietates divini esse sunt unitas et veritas et bonitas: aut ergo idem est veritas quod substantia, aut non. Si omnino idem: ergo veritas non est magis proprietas substantiae quam e converso, quod absurdum est; si non omnino idem: ergo aliquid addit: ergo est aliqua compositio.
6. Item, aut est idem veritas et bonitas, aut non. Si idem: ergo vestigium bonitatis est vestigium veritatis, quod falsum est; si vero aliquo modo differunt: ergo illud, in quo sunt, aliquo modo est compositum. — Si dicas, quod ratione differunt; quaeritur tunc, quid subsit illi rationi.
7. Item, actus diversificantur per obiecta8; sed anima ad Deum sub ratione veri convertitur per cognitionem, sub ratione boni per dilectionem: si ergo illa sunt obiecta formalia, et isti actus sunt formaliter differentes; videtur etc.
8. Item, in divino esse est potentia, sapientia et voluntas; aut ergo aliquid plus dico per haec tria quam per unum illorum, aut non. Si non: ergo qui dicit, Deum habere solum potentiam, nihil detrahit Deo, quod falsum est; si aliquid plus, et illud totum est in Deo: ergo et compositio.
9. Item, aut potentia est scientia, aut non. Si non: ergo in divino esse sunt diversa; si sic: ergo scire est posse. Sed Deus scit mala: ergo potest mala; sed hoc absurdum est: restat igitur, quod sit aliud: ergo videtur, quod sit compositum.
10. Item, divina voluntas est arctativa9 potentiae; non enim facit Deus omnia, quae scit et
potest, sed solum quae vult; nihil autem est arctativum sui ipsius: ergo aliud et aliud sunt potentia et sapientia et voluntas: ergo divina natura est composita.
11. Item, nihil omnino simplex participatur secundum maius et minus; sed divinum esse participatur secundum maius et minus et a viatoribus et a Beatis, qui participant et vident ipsum in se: ergo impossibile est, quod sit omnino simplex.
12. Item, nihil omnino simplex est habens multiformem operationem, quia «idem, manens idem, semper est natum facere idem1»; et iterum, actio multiformis aut est ipsum agens, et sic non est simplex; aut non, et sic adhuc non est simplex; sed Deus habet operationem multiformem, scilicet creare et gubernare et remunerare: ergo etc. — Si dicas, quod differunt ratione effectuum; contra: non est actio ab effectu, sed potius e converso: ergo diversificatur illa potius secundum diversitatem actionum quam secundum varietatem effectuum.
13. Item, nihil omnino simplex simul exercet operationes omnino disparatas et infinitas, quia simplex, ad quod se convertit, totaliter convertit se2, et ad actionem infinitam nulla virtus sufficit minor infinita; sed Deus simul creat animam unius et iustificat animam alterius, quae sunt actiones disparatae et infinitae: ergo etc.
14. Item, nihil omnino simplex est multiforme in specie sive assimilatione; sed in divino esse est pluralitas rationum idealium, quia «alia ratione conditus est homo, et alia equus3»: ergo divinum esse non est simplicissimum. — Si dicas, quod pluralitas idearum est pluralitas respectuum; contra: similitudo aliquorum attenditur non secundum respectum, sed secundum formam: si ergo ideae dicuntur similitudines in mente divina, et nihil idem et secundum idem habet similitudinem ad diversa; necesse est igitur, compositionem esse in arte divina et sapientia.
CONCLUSIO.
Divinum esse est simplicissimum.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod divinum esse est simplicissimum. — Ad cuius rei evidentiam duo oportet intueri4, scilicet perfectionem conditionum divinarum et modos considerationum nostrarum.
Si consideramus modos divinarum conditionum, divinum esse, eo ipso quo est primum, est simplicissimum. Nam eo ipso quo est primum, omnia ab ipso fluunt, et eo ipso quo fluunt ab ipso, ad ipsum recurrunt et reducuntur tanquam ad finem ultimum; et ex hoc habet, quod sit alpha et omega, primus et novissimus, principium et finis5. Quia ergo haec, quae maxime videntur distantia, concurrunt in omnimode unum; necesse est, ipsum divinum esse esse perfectissimum, quasi quendam intelligibilem circulum; necesse est etiam, esse simplicissimum.
Tripliciter enim aliquid deficit a summa simplicitate: aut quia compositum ex aliis, aut quia compositum alii, aut quia componibile in aptitudine. Divinum autem esse ex hoc, quod est primum, non est compositum ex aliis, nihil enim habet prius ante se; ex hoc, quod est perfectissimum, non est compositum alii, perfectum enim non venit ad constitutionem tertii; ex hoc autem, quod ultimum, cetera ad ipsum ordinantur sicut ad terminum quietativum: et ita ipsum est absolutissimum, ac per hoc non solum caret compositione actuali, verum etiam possibili; et sic esse simplicissimum convenit6 Deo vere et proprie, non enim est haec tria in aliquo alio reperire. — Competit etiam perfecte ex hac triplici conditione. Quia enim est perfectissimum, habet omnes conditiones nobilitatis; quia vero ultimum et optimum, propter quod sunt omnia, omnes illas conditiones habet in summo; quia primum, in quo nulla diversitas, necesse est, quod omnes sint in ipso unum et sic simplicissimum per exclusionem omnis compositionis et inclusionem omnis perfectionis. Sunt ergo in Deo omnes conditiones nobilitatis, scilicet potentia et sapientia et voluntas, bonitas, veritas et unitas, esse, vivere et intelligere et cetera similia vere, perfecte et summe sub propria et perfecta ratione; sunt tamen unum adeo, ut nullam inducant compositionem nec minuant de simplicitate. — Quod clare non videt, nisi qui similiter intelligit circa divinum esse summam simplicitatem cum summa immensitate; quod qualiter possit capi, in consequentibus7 poterit indagari, sed nunc tanquam certum et indubitabile debet supponi, ut simplicitatem divinam recte intelligamus secundum exigentiam divinarum conditionum.
Oportet etiam videre diversos modos nostrarum considerationum. — Cum enim ad considerationem necessario concurrant tria, scilicet intelligens, res intellecta et medium sive ratio intelligendi; aliquis modus potest tripliciter attribui nostro intellectui: aut ita, quod illum modum ponat circa rem, et tunc est verus, si in re illa reperitur, ut
spiritualiter intelligit spiritualia; aut ita, quod ponit illum modum circa se, ut cum abstracte intelligit coniuncta, et tamen non est mendax, quia, sicut dicit Philosophus1, «abstrahentium non est mendacium»; aut cum ponit circa rationem, per quam intelligit, ut cum multipliciter intelligit unum per multa. — Sciendum est igitur, quod intellectus noster omnem intellectum rei complete resolvit in intellectum eius quo est et quod est, et quando intelligit rem compositam, tunc illam resolutionem ponit circa se et circa rem; quando vero rem simplicem omnino, tunc ponit illam non circa rem, sed circa se, quia aliter non potest intelligere. Unde intellectus noster, cum Deum intelligit, omnino intelligit, quod in ipso est omnis simplicitas et nulla compositio, nulla concretio, tamen intelligit per modum quo est et quod est; nec tamen est falsus, quia non ponit modum illum circa rem, nec vanus, quia revera aliquid respondet ex parte Dei, licet non diversum. Vere enim est in Deo essentia et suppositum, sed tamen sunt unum; vere voluntas et potentia, tamen non sunt plura, sed cognoscuntur per plura. — Et hinc est, «quod verius est, quam intelligatur, et verius intelligitur, quam dicatur», ut dicit Augustinus2. Propterea a divino esse intelligendo deficit omnis intellectus, et tamen nihilominus intellectus fidelis circa ipsum non intelligit nisi unum, cum unum intelligit multiformiter, abstractum concrete, simplex complexe, immensum finite, aeternum temporaliter, quia, ut dictum est, modos istos non attribuit ipsi intelligibili, sed sibi intelligenti vel rationi intelligendi. Fatetur igitur intellectus verus proprio lumine rationis, divinum esse omnino simplicissimum. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes, quae hoc ostendunt.
1. Ad illud quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod divinum esse summe differt ab esse creato; dicendum, quod verum est; sed quod ultra infertur: ergo pluribus differentiis differt; dici potest, quod illud non sequitur, quia prima genera3 summe differunt, et tamen se ipsis differunt. Differentiae etiam immediate dividentes ipsum genus se ipsis differunt, et tamen maxime a se ipsis distant. — Et si obiicias, quod quanto aliqua in pluribus conveniunt, tanto magis sunt similia: ergo quanto aliqua pluribus differunt, tanto magis sunt differentia; dici potest, quod divinum esse pluribus differentiis differt ab esse creato, quae quidem pluralitatem ponunt et realem differentiam ex parte creaturae, non tamen ex parte Dei, quia, quae in creatura sunt per multiformitatem et differentiam realem multo perfectius reperiuntur in Deo per simplicissimam identitatem, sicut patet ex his quae iam dicta sunt et infra dicentur.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod simplicius est esse omnino abstractum a supposito quam concretum; dicendum, quod duplex est suppositum: unum, quod addit supra naturam, alterum vero, quod non addit. De primo supposito, quod aliquid addit supra naturam contrahens et distinguens, veritatem habet; sed hoc modo non ponimus suppositum esse in divinis, quia non est ibi distinctio per additionem aliquam factam circa naturam, sed per originem unius personae ab alia; unde non est ibi concretio secundum realem inhaerentiam, sed solum secundum nostram intelligentiam. — Et si obiiciat, quod aut illi intelligentiae respondet aliquid ex parte rei, aut nihil; iam patet responsio, quod aliquid respondet. Est enim in divinis vere natura et vere suppositum, id est deitas et habens deitatem; unde licet intellectus hoc intelligat per modum cuiusdam differentiae, non tamen est falsus, quia modum illum ponit circa se vel circa rationem intelligendi, non autem circa rem, quam intelligit; aut si ponatur, ponitur aliqua differentia realis inter suppositum et naturam, et talis est, quod compositionem nullam inducit, sicut melius in sequenti quaestione patebit4.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quidquid nobilitatis est in creatura, attribuendum est Creatori; dicendum, quod est nobilitas simpliciter, et est nobilitas secundum quid. Illud autem, quod in creatura dicit nobilitatem simpliciter, proprie et vere attribuendum est creatrici essentiae; quod autem dicit nobilitatem cum diminutione, illud non convenit Deo attribui5. Cum ergo dicitur, quod maior compositio in creatura facit ad perfectionem nobilitatis, sicut patet in homine; dicendum, quod ista est nobilitas diminuta, quae venit ex multorum aggregatione, quia quod non potest in se habere per unum habet per plura; et ideo talis nobilitas non est attribuenda divino esse, quod quidem est nobilissimum in fine nobilitatis perfectae.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in formis ordinatis forma, quae se habet ex additione, est actualior; dicendum, quod est actualitas in genere, et est actualitas extra genus. Actualitas autem in genere est actualitas permixta potentiae, quae quidem
potentia salvatur in natura generis et ad actum reducitur per superadditionem differentiae distinguentis et specificantis; et de hac actualitate habet praemissa propositio veritatem. — Est etiam praeter hoc actualitas extra genus, quae nihil habet admixtum de potentia, et talis est actus purus; et ideo non est ibi ponere unum additum alteri, sicut actus additur potentiae praeiacenti; et talis actualitas ponitur in Deo: et ideo non sequitur, quod ponatur aliqua additio sive compositio1.
Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod summum bonum se habet ex additione ad bonum; dicendum, quod per additionem se habet ex parte intellectus, quia in intellectu summi boni clauditur intellectus boni; non autem se habet per additionem ex parte rei: tum quia bonum creatum et increatum non communicant in aliqua natura communi; tum etiam, quia summum bonum maioris simplicitatis est, quam sit ipsa communis intentio, quae significatur nomine boni; tum etiam, quia summum bonum excedit omne creatum bonum excessu improportionali. Unde cum bonum dicitur de bono creato et increato, hoc non est nisi per quandam analogiam, quia omnis bonitas creata manat a bonitate increata tanquam a causa prima; unde posterior illa ac per hoc deficiens a simplicitate summa; illa vero tanquam prima, hoc ipso quia prima, est simplicissima. Unde sicut conditio simplicitatis addita super ens, utpote cum dico ens simplex, non ponit compositionem aliquam circa ipsum; sic nec summitas circa bonum2.
5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod proprietates divini esse sunt unitas, veritas, bonitas; dicendum, quod veritas dicitur proprietas divini esse, quia, quantum est de se, dicit modum entis; sed quia in divino esse non differt esse et posse3, ideo non differt esse et sic esse, quia non potest sic et aliter esse. Et propterea, quia idem est ibi esse et modus essendi, ideo nulla est ibi compositio; quia vero modus essendi est proprietas ipsius entis, et non e converso: hinc est, quod unitas, veritas et bonitas dicuntur esse proprietates divinae essentiae; non autem essentia dici potest proprietas veritatis seu bonitatis vice versa, quia non nominat modum essendi, sicut et illa.
6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aut idem est in Deo veritas et bonitas, aut non; dicendum est, quod, quantum est ex parte principalis significati seu rei per haec nomina intellectae, idem dicunt circa esse divinum, quia non alio est Deus bonus et alio verus, sed eo ipso bonus, quo verus. Quantum autem est ex parte rationis intelligendi, secundum quam intellectus4 a creaturis ascendit ad intelligentiam Creatoris; sic differentia est: quia, cum veritas et bonitas increata intelligatur per creatam, et haec in creaturis habeant aliquo modo differentiam; ideo ista aliquo modo dicuntur distingui ex parte rationum intelligendi, licet idem sint ex parte rei; nec tamen est ibi falsitas vel error in intelligendo, quia haec vere et perfectissime sunt in Deo, licet non diversificentur realiter inter se, sicut in esse creato. Et hoc satis clarum est, si intelligatur illud quod dictum est in solutionis principio de multiplici nostrae considerationis modo.
7. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod actus diversificantur per obiecta; iam patet responsio: quia, etsi illa sint idem secundum rem in Deo, dicuntur tamen diversificari secundum rationem intelligendi ex parte nostra. Unde sicut illis respondet alia et alia proprietas repraesentativa in vestigio creaturae repraesentantis, quia non est idem bonitas et veritas in natura creata; sic respondet ei alia et alia potentia in imagine apprehendente, in intellectiva et affectiva, quia tam in vestigio5 quam in imagine sunt aliqua per diversitatem, correspondentia tamen aliquibus in Deo, quae habent omnimodam identitatem secundum rem.
8. Ad aliud, quod obiicitur, quod aut potentia et sapientia et voluntas plus dicunt quam unum aliquod horum, aut nihil; dicendum, quod explicite aliquid plus dicunt, sed implicite unum eorum clauditur in reliquo; non enim potest esse summa potentia, ubi non sit voluntas et sapientia; et ideo, si unum absque altero Deo attribuatur, diminute attribuitur; non quia sint realiter differentia, sed quia hoc ipso, quod ponuntur per impossibile separari, ponuntur etiam per impossibile diversificari; et ideo sicut diversificari nequeunt, sic separari non possunt.
9. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aut potentia est scientia, aut non; dicendum, quod dupliciter est loqui de potentia et scientia: aut secundum principale significatum, aut secundum connotatum. Idem ergo sunt secundum rem et principalem significationem, differunt autem secundum connotationem; non enim est idem aliquid esse Deo scibile et possibile, sicut non est idem sciri et fieri. Possibile enim nominat quid, ut est in ratione emanantis vel emanabilis; scibile autem, ut in ratione praesentis apud intellectum cognoscentis; et quoniam in Deo non est aliud, quo est potens, et aliud, quo est sciens, quia se ipso competit ei utrumque: ideo, licet ista diversificentur connotatione, sunt tamen idem secundum rem.
10. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod voluntas est arctativa potentiae; dicendum, quod tripliciter est loqui de potentia et voluntate: aut quantum ad
affectum1, aut quantum ad effectum, aut quantum ad respectum. Primo modo habent identitatem et aequalitatem, quia quidquid vult Deus potest velle, vel quidquid potest vult posse. Ultimo modo habent inaequalitatem, quia potentia dicitur respectu possibilium, et voluntas respectu volitorum, et plura sunt possibilia quam volita. Medio autem modo aequalitatem habent, scilicet quantum ad effectum, quia, licet potentia ad plura se extendat quam voluntas, quia tamen Deus nihil facit, nisi quod vult, aequari dicuntur voluntas et potentia quantum ad effectum: et ideo voluntas dicitur esse arctativa potentiae, non ratione eius quod sunt, sed ratione eius ad quod comparantur.
11. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nihil omnino simplex participatur secundum plus et minus; dicendum, quod dupliciter dicitur aliquid participari, scilicet secundum formam, sicut genus participatur a speciebus2; vel secundum influentiam, sicut causa participatur a suis effectibus. Primo modo habet propositio veritatem; hoc autem modo non dicitur divinum esse participari secundum plus et minus, sed solum secundo modo; et hoc non ponit diversitatem in ipso participato, sed in eo, per quod fit illa participatio, scilicet in aliquo dono creato.
12. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nihil omnino simplex habet multiformem operationem; dicendum, quod operatio dicitur et ipsum opus operans et opus operatum, sive actus activus et effectus productus. Primo igitur modo operatio Dei est idem quod ipse Deus, et ideo non multiplicatur ratione sui in se, sed ratione effectus producti ex parte creaturae. Primo igitur modo habet propositio veritatem, secundo vero non: quia quanto aliquid simplicius, tanto potentius, ac per hoc tanto magis est principium effectuum multiformium3.
13. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nihil omnino simplex convertit se simul ad operationes disparatas et infinitas; dicendum, quod simplex contingit esse aliquid duplici modo: uno modo, in quo simplicitas excludit immensitatem; alio modo, in quo includit. De primo habet praedicta propositio veritatem, de secundo vero minime, pro eo quod infinitum, eo quod infinitum divinum esse est infinitissime infinitum, simul se ad omnia quantacumque et qualiacumque convertere potest absque coarctatione, cum nullam prorsus admittat limitationem.
14. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod nihil omnino simplex est multiforme in specie vel in assimilatione; dicendum, quod est multiformitas secundum rationem informandi et secundum rationem exprimendi. Primo modo competit multiformitas ei quod habet intra se diversarum formarum naturas; et sic non potest stare cum summa simplicitate. Secundo modo competit multiformitas ei quod habet in se multarum formarum ideas, et hoc modo stat cum summa simplicitate. Sicut enim simplicissimum sua summa actualitate habet summam virtutem, qua omnia potest distincte et plene efficere; sic et summam veritatem, qua omnia potest aeternaliter repraesentare, sicut melius patuit supra in quaestione de rationibus aeternis4.
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Question III. Whether trinity and the highest simplicity stand together.
Next it is asked whether trinity and the highest simplicity stand together; and concerning this two things are asked.
The first is whether the divine being is most simple. Second, whether trinity and the highest simplicity stand together.
Article I. Whether the divine being is most simple.
Concerning the first the procedure is thus, and it is shown that the divine being is most simple.
1. Augustine, Confessions II2: "Nothing more simple than you is found": therefore it is simple in the ultimate term, therefore also in the highest degree, therefore it is most simple.
2. Likewise, Confessions XIII3: "You alone are simple, for whom it is not one thing to live and another to live well": therefore in God to be and to be well are the same; but in that in which these are the same, there is no composition, but the highest simplicity: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, everything simply first is most simple; but the divine being is of this sort: therefore etc. The major is proved: because the composite is posterior to what composes it, and the simple is prior to the composite4: therefore the cause of the predicate is in the subject in the aforesaid proposition: therefore it is true of itself. The minor is manifest, because God is a being from himself, for if he had being from elsewhere, that would then be God to him, and not he himself. And again, if there is a stopping-place and there is no going on to infinity, it is necessary to posit that some being is first of all.
4. Likewise, everything simply necessary is most simple; but the divine being is simply necessary: therefore etc. The major Avicenna and Algazel prove in their Metaphysics5; for what is simply necessary is altogether independent and incorruptible: but every composite depends on the things that compose it, and is resoluble into them so far as its own nature goes. The minor is manifest, because the nobler side of a contrariety is to be attributed to God: therefore since it is nobler to be simply necessary than possible or contingent; it seems etc.
5. Likewise, everything most noble is most simple; but the divine being is of this sort: therefore etc. The minor is manifest; the major is proved, because to what is most noble the conditions of nobility are to be attributed in the highest degree, otherwise it would not be most noble; but simplicity is a condition pertaining to nobility, as is evident: therefore it is necessary that it be posited to be in God altogether in the highest degree.
6. Likewise, everything most powerful is most simple; the divine being is most powerful: therefore etc. The
minor is manifest, because he is called God precisely because he is omnipotent. The major is proved, because "a power united is more infinite," according to what is said in the Book of Causes1: therefore a power most infinite is most united, therefore most simple; but there is no power most simple unless the substance too be such: therefore etc.
7. Likewise, everything which is whatever it has is most simple2; but God is whatever he has: therefore etc. The major is evident, because if there were some composition, neither of them would be the other. The minor is evident by induction and by reason: because God has wisdom, therefore either he is wisdom, or not, and so of the rest, relatives excepted. If he is wisdom, I have what I proposed; if not; then he is wise by wisdom: therefore he is wise by something other than what he himself is: therefore if he has wisdom from another, from another also he has perfection: therefore he is not God, etc.
8. Likewise, everything most perfect is most simple; but the divine being is of this sort: therefore etc. The minor is manifest, because no condition is more consonant with the divine being than perfection. The major is proved: because that is more perfect which is itself as a whole and according to its whole self a perfection, than that which has in itself something perfectible; but every composite or composable thing has in itself something perfectible: therefore it is impossible that anything be supremely perfect unless it be also most simple: therefore the same as before.
9. Likewise, every composite is mutable: therefore, by the destruction of the consequent3, everything immutable is simple, and what is simply immutable is in every way simple; but the divine being is altogether immutable, since it can be changed neither for the better nor for the equal nor for the worse, being altogether the highest good: therefore the divine being is most simple.
10. Likewise, the more simple a thing is, the more it is one; but the divine being is supremely one, as was shown in what precedes4: therefore it is necessary that the divine being be simply most simple.
Contra: 1. Anselm5: Whatever belongs to God belongs to him in the highest degree; but the divine being differs from created being: therefore it differs supremely. But the more differences a thing differs by, the more it differs and the more it is composite: therefore it is necessary that the divine being be supremely composite.
2. Likewise, being altogether abstracted from a supposit is more simple than concrete being; but the divine being is not abstract, but concrete6 with a supposit, because in the divine being there is a true deity and a true hypostasis having the deity: therefore etc. — If you say that they differ by account alone; then either something of the thing corresponds to that account, or nothing: if something, I have what I proposed; if nothing: therefore the whole is empty and false.
3. Likewise, what belongs to nobility in the creature is to be attributed also to the Creator7; but the more composite a creature is, the more it approaches the condition of nobility; as is evident in man, who is the most perfect of the creatures that are in the universe, who is also the image of God: it seems therefore etc.
4. Likewise, in ordered forms the form that stands by addition is more actual, as is evident in the form of the genus and of the species, because the form of the species is more actual; but what stands by addition is composite: therefore composition witnesses to greater actuality and completeness. Since therefore the divine being is most actual and most complete: therefore it is most composite.
5. Likewise, the properties of the divine being are unity and truth and goodness: either therefore truth is the same as substance, or not. If altogether the same: therefore truth is no more a property of substance than the reverse, which is absurd; if not altogether the same: therefore it adds something: therefore there is some composition.
6. Likewise, either truth and goodness are the same, or not. If the same: therefore the vestige of goodness is the vestige of truth, which is false; but if in some way they differ: therefore that in which they are is in some way composite. — If you say that they differ by account; it is then asked what underlies that account.
7. Likewise, acts are diversified by their objects8; but the soul is turned to God under the account of the true by knowledge, and under the account of the good by love: if therefore those are formal objects, then these acts are formally different; it seems etc.
8. Likewise, in the divine being there is power, wisdom and will; either therefore by these three I say something more than by one of them, or not. If not: therefore whoever says that God has power only takes nothing away from God, which is false; if something more, and that whole is in God: therefore there is composition too.
9. Likewise, either power is knowledge, or not. If not: therefore in the divine being there are diverse things; if so: therefore to know is to be able. But God knows evils: therefore he is able to do evils; but this is absurd: it remains therefore that it is something else: therefore it seems that it is composite.
10. Likewise, the divine will is restrictive9 of the power; for God does not do all the things which he knows and is
able to do, but only those which he wills; but nothing is restrictive of its own self: therefore power and wisdom and will are one thing and another: therefore the divine nature is composite.
11. Likewise, nothing altogether simple is participated according to more and less; but the divine being is participated according to more and less both by wayfarers and by the Blessed, who participate in it and see it in itself: therefore it is impossible that it be altogether simple.
12. Likewise, nothing altogether simple has a multiform operation, because "the same thing, remaining the same, is always born to do the same1"; and again, a multiform action either is the agent itself, and so it is not simple; or not, and so it is still not simple; but God has a multiform operation, namely to create and to govern and to reward: therefore etc. — If you say that they differ by account of the effects; on the contrary: the action is not from the effect, but rather the reverse: therefore it is diversified rather according to the diversity of the actions than according to the variety of the effects.
13. Likewise, nothing altogether simple exercises at once operations altogether disparate and infinite, because the simple, to whatever it turns itself, turns itself wholly2, and to an infinite action no power less than infinite suffices; but God at once creates the soul of one and justifies the soul of another, which are disparate and infinite actions: therefore etc.
14. Likewise, nothing altogether simple is multiform in species or in assimilation; but in the divine being there is a plurality of ideal accounts, because "by one account man was made, and by another the horse3": therefore the divine being is not most simple. — If you say that the plurality of the ideas is a plurality of respects; on the contrary: the likeness of things is attended to not according to respect, but according to form: if therefore the ideas are called likenesses in the divine mind, and nothing that is the same and according to the same has a likeness to diverse things; it is necessary therefore that there be composition in the divine art and wisdom.
CONCLUSION.
The divine being is most simple.
I respond: It must be said that the divine being is most simple. — For the evidence of this, two things must be looked at4, namely the perfection of the divine conditions and the modes of our considerations.
If we consider the modes of the divine conditions, the divine being, by the very fact that it is first, is most simple. For by the very fact that it is first, all things flow from it, and by the very fact that they flow from it, they run back and are led back to it as to their last end; and from this it has that it is alpha and omega, the first and the last, the beginning and the end5. Since therefore these things, which seem most distant, converge into what is in every way one; it is necessary that the divine being itself be most perfect, as a kind of intelligible circle; it is necessary also that it be most simple.
For in three ways something falls short of the highest simplicity: either because it is composed out of others, or because it is composed with another, or because it is composable in aptitude. But the divine being, from the fact that it is first, is not composed out of others, for it has nothing prior before itself; from the fact that it is most perfect, it is not composed with another, for the perfect does not come to the constituting of a third; from the fact, moreover, that it is last, the rest are ordered to it as to a term that brings rest: and so it is itself most absolute, and through this it lacks not only actual composition but also possible; and thus to be most simple belongs6 to God truly and properly, for it is not possible to find these three in anything else. — It belongs to him also perfectly, from this threefold condition. For because it is most perfect, it has all the conditions of nobility; because it is last and best, on account of which all things are, it has all those conditions in the highest degree; because it is first, in which there is no diversity, it is necessary that they all be one in it, and thus most simple by the exclusion of all composition and the inclusion of all perfection. There are therefore in God all the conditions of nobility, namely power and wisdom and will, goodness, truth and unity, being, living and understanding and the rest of the like, truly, perfectly and in the highest degree under their proper and perfect account; yet they are so one that they introduce no composition nor lessen anything of the simplicity. — Which he does not see clearly, unless he likewise understands concerning the divine being the highest simplicity together with the highest immensity; and how this can be grasped will be able to be searched out in what follows7, but for now it must be supposed as certain and indubitable, so that we may rightly understand the divine simplicity according to the requirement of the divine conditions.
We must also see the diverse modes of our considerations. — For since to a consideration three things necessarily converge, namely the one understanding, the thing understood, and the medium or account of understanding; some mode can be attributed in three ways to our understanding: either so that it puts that mode about the thing, and then it is true if it is found in that thing, as when it understands spiritual things
spiritually; or so that it puts that mode about itself, as when it understands abstractly things that are joined, and yet it is not lying, because, as the Philosopher says1, "there is no lie in abstracting"; or when it puts it about the account by which it understands, as when it understands in many ways what is one by many. — It must be known therefore that our understanding resolves every understanding of a thing completely into the understanding of its quo est ("that by which it is") and its quod est ("that which is"), and when it understands a composite thing, then it puts that resolution about itself and about the thing; but when it understands a thing altogether simple, then it puts it not about the thing, but about itself, because otherwise it cannot understand. Hence our understanding, when it understands God, altogether understands that in him there is every simplicity and no composition, no concretion, yet it understands by way of quo est and quod est; nor yet is it false, because it does not put that mode about the thing, nor is it empty, because in truth something corresponds on God's side, though not something diverse. For truly there is in God essence and supposit, yet they are one; truly will and power, yet they are not many, but are known through many. — And hence it is that "he is more truly than he is understood, and is more truly understood than he is spoken," as Augustine says2. For this reason every understanding falls short in understanding the divine being, and yet nonetheless the faithful understanding concerning it understands nothing but one, since it understands the one multiformly, the abstract concretely, the simple complexly, the immense finitely, the eternal temporally, because, as has been said, it attributes those modes not to the intelligible itself, but to itself understanding, or to the account of understanding. The true understanding therefore confesses, by the proper lumentr. of reason, that the divine being is altogether most simple. — Hence the reasons which show this are to be granted.
1. To that which is objected first on the contrary, that the divine being supremely differs from created being; it must be said that this is true; but as to what is further inferred: therefore it differs by several differences; it can be said that this does not follow, because the first genera3 supremely differ, and yet they differ by themselves. Differences too that immediately divide the genus itself differ by themselves, and yet are maximally distant from themselves. — And if you object that the more things agree in more respects, the more they are alike: therefore the more things differ in more respects, the more they are different; it can be said that the divine being differs from created being by several differences, which indeed posit plurality and a real difference on the side of the creature, yet not on the side of God, because the things that are in the creature by multiformity and real difference are found far more perfectly in God by a most simple identity, as is evident from the things which have already been said and will be said below.
2. To that which is objected, that being altogether abstracted from a supposit is more simple than concrete being; it must be said that a supposit is twofold: one which adds something over the nature, the other which does not add. Of the first supposit, which adds something over the nature, contracting and distinguishing it, it holds true; but in this way we do not posit a supposit to be in the divine, because there there is no distinction by any addition made about the nature, but by the origin of one person from another; hence there is no concretion there according to real inherence, but only according to our understanding. — And if it be objected that either something corresponds on the side of the thing to that understanding, or nothing; the answer is already evident, that something does correspond. For there truly is in the divine a nature and truly a supposit, that is deity and what has the deity; hence although the understanding understands this by way of a certain difference, it is not on that account false, because it puts that mode about itself or about the account of understanding, and not about the thing which it understands; or if it be posited, there is posited some real difference between the supposit and the nature, and it is such that it introduces no composition, as will better appear in the following question4.
3. To that which is objected, that whatever belongs to nobility in the creature is to be attributed to the Creator; it must be said that there is a nobility simply, and there is a nobility in a certain respect. But that which in the creature says nobility simply is properly and truly to be attributed to the creating essence; but what says nobility with a diminution, that does not befit being attributed to God5. When therefore it is said that greater composition in the creature makes for the perfection of nobility, as is evident in man; it must be said that this is a diminished nobility, which comes from the aggregation of many things, because what a thing cannot have in itself through one it has through many; and therefore such nobility is not to be attributed to the divine being, which indeed is most noble at the term of a perfect nobility.
4. To that which is objected, that in ordered forms the form which stands by addition is more actual; it must be said that there is an actuality in a genus, and there is an actuality outside a genus. But actuality in a genus is an actuality mixed with potency, which
potency is preserved in the nature of the genus and is brought to act by the superaddition of a distinguishing and specifying difference; and of this actuality the premised proposition holds true. — But there is besides this an actuality outside a genus, which has nothing of potency mixed in, and such is pure act; and therefore there is no positing there of one thing added to another, as act is added to a pre-lying potency; and such actuality is posited in God: and therefore it does not follow that any addition or composition is posited1.
To that which is objected, that the highest good stands by addition to the good; it must be said that it stands by addition on the side of the understanding, because in the understanding of the highest good the understanding of the good is enclosed; but it does not stand by addition on the side of the thing: both because created and uncreated good do not communicate in any common nature; and also because the highest good is of a greater simplicity than is the common intention itself which is signified by the name good; and also because the highest good exceeds every created good by a disproportionate excess. Hence when good is said of created and uncreated good, this is only by a certain analogy, because every created goodness flows from the uncreated goodness as from a first cause; hence that one is posterior and through this falls short of the highest simplicity; but that other, as first, by the very fact that it is first, is most simple. Hence just as the condition of simplicity added over being, as when I say simple being, does not posit any composition about it; so neither does highestness about the good2.
5. To that which is objected, that the properties of the divine being are unity, truth, goodness; it must be said that truth is called a property of the divine being because, so far as it is of itself, it says a mode of being; but because in the divine being there is no difference between being and being able3, therefore there is no difference between being and being thus, because it cannot be thus and otherwise. And therefore, because there being and the mode of being are the same, therefore there is no composition there; but because the mode of being is a property of being itself, and not the reverse: hence it is that unity, truth and goodness are said to be properties of the divine essence; but essence cannot be called a property of truth or of goodness the other way round, because it does not name a mode of being, as those do.
6. To that which is objected, that either truth and goodness are the same in God, or not; it must be said that, so far as it is on the side of the principal thing signified, or of the thing understood through these names, they say the same about the divine being, because it is not by one thing that God is good and by another that he is true, but by the very same thing by which he is true he is good. But so far as it is on the side of the account of understanding, according to which the understanding4 ascends from creatures to the understanding of the Creator; thus there is a difference: because, since uncreated truth and goodness are understood through the created, and these in creatures have some difference; therefore those are said in some way to be distinguished on the side of the accounts of understanding, though they are the same on the side of the thing; nor yet is there falsity or error in the understanding, because these are truly and most perfectly in God, though they are not really diversified among themselves, as in created being. And this is clear enough if what was said at the beginning of the solution about the manifold mode of our consideration is understood.
7. To that which is objected, that acts are diversified by their objects; the answer is already evident: because, although those are the same in reality in God, they are yet said to be diversified according to the account of understanding on our side. Hence just as one and another representative property corresponds to them in the vestige of the representing creature, because goodness and truth are not the same in created nature; so one and another power corresponds to it in the apprehending image, in the intellective and the affective, because both in the vestige5 and in the image there are some things by way of diversity, corresponding nevertheless to some things in God which have an identity in every way according to reality.
8. To the other thing which is objected, that either power and wisdom and will say more than any one of them, or nothing; it must be said that explicitly they say something more, but implicitly one of them is enclosed in the other; for there cannot be the highest power where there is not will and wisdom; and therefore, if one is attributed to God apart from the other, it is attributed diminishedly; not because they are really different, but because by the very fact that they are posited as separated by an impossibility, they are posited also as diversified by an impossibility; and therefore, just as they cannot be diversified, so they cannot be separated.
9. To that which is objected, that either power is knowledge, or not; it must be said that there are two ways of speaking of power and knowledge: either according to the principal thing signified, or according to the connotation. They are therefore the same according to the thing and the principal signification, but they differ according to connotation; for it is not the same for something to be knowable to God and possible, just as to be known and to be made are not the same. For the possible names something as it is in the account of what emanates or can emanate; but the knowable, as in the account of what is present to the understanding of the knower; and since in God there is not one thing by which he is powerful and another by which he is knowing, because by his very self both belong to him: therefore, although these are diversified by connotation, they are yet the same according to the thing.
10. To that which is objected, that the will is restrictive of the power; it must be said that there are three ways of speaking of power and will: either as regards
affection1, or as regards effect, or as regards respect. In the first way they have identity and equality, because whatever God wills he can will, or whatever he can he wills to be able. In the last way they have inequality, because power is said with respect to possible things, and will with respect to willed things, and possible things are more than willed things. But in the middle way they have equality, namely as regards effect, because, although the power extends to more things than the will, yet since God does nothing except what he wills, the will and the power are said to be equal as regards effect: and therefore the will is said to be restrictive of the power, not by reason of that which they are, but by reason of that to which they are compared.
11. To that which is objected, that nothing altogether simple is participated according to more and less; it must be said that something is said to be participated in two ways, namely according to form, as a genus is participated by its species2; or according to influence, as a cause is participated by its effects. In the first way the proposition holds true; but in this way the divine being is not said to be participated according to more and less, but only in the second way; and this does not posit a diversity in the participated thing itself, but in that through which that participation comes about, namely in some created gift.
12. To that which is objected, that nothing altogether simple has a multiform operation; it must be said that operation is said both of the work working and of the work worked, that is, of the active act and of the effect produced. In the first way, therefore, God's operation is the same as God himself, and therefore it is not multiplied by reason of itself in itself, but by reason of the effect produced on the side of the creature. In the first way, therefore, the proposition holds true, but not in the second: because the more simple a thing is, the more powerful, and through this the more it is a principle of multiform effects3.
13. To that which is objected, that nothing altogether simple turns itself at once to disparate and infinite operations; it must be said that a thing happens to be simple in two ways: in one way, in which simplicity excludes immensity; in another way, in which it includes it. Of the first the aforesaid proposition holds true, but of the second not at all, for the reason that the infinite — by the fact that the infinite divine being is infinitely infinite — can turn itself at once to all things, however many and of whatever sort, without restriction, since it admits absolutely no limitation.
14. To that which is objected last, that nothing altogether simple is multiform in species or in assimilation; it must be said that there is a multiformity according to the account of informing and according to the account of expressing. In the first way multiformity belongs to that which has within itself the natures of diverse forms; and thus it cannot stand together with the highest simplicity. In the second way multiformity belongs to that which has in itself the ideas of many forms, and in this way it stands together with the highest simplicity. For just as the most simple, by its highest actuality, has the highest power, by which it can produce all things distinctly and fully; so also the highest truth, by which it can represent all things eternally, as appeared better above in the question on the eternal accounts4.
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- 2Cap. 6. n. 13: Te simplicius quidquam non reperitur. — Dictio simplex in termino est secundum Gilbert. Porret., de Sex Principiis, c. ult.; et significat superlativum (simplicissimus). — De hac quaest. cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 1. seq.C. 6, n. 13: "Nothing more simple than you is found." — The expression simple in the ultimate term is from Gilbert of Poitiers, On the Six Principles, last chapter; and it signifies the superlative (most simple). — On this question compare I Sentences, d. 8, p. II, q. 1 and following.
- 3Cap. 3. n. 4: Solus simpliciter es... et aliud beate vivere.C. 3, n. 4: "You alone simply are... and another to live blessedly."
- 4Cfr. supra pag. 12, nota 9. et pag. 47, nota 5.Compare above, p. 12, note 9, and p. 47, note 5.
- 5Avicenna, Metaph. tr. 1. c. 8. et tr. 8. c. 4. seqq.; Algazel., I. Philos. tr. 2. c. de Esse possibile et esse debitum: Si pendet [esse], vocamus illud possibile; si vero non pendeat, vocamus debitum per se, quod est necessarium per se; de quo duodecim dicenda sunt: primum quod non est accidens... quod non est corpus; et hoc duobus modis: uno, quod omne corpus divisibile est secundum quantitatem in partes: igitur totalitas eius pendet ex partibus eius... et idcirco non potest concedi, necesse esse componi ex partibus (ed. an. 1506 fol. 27).Avicenna, Metaphysics, tr. 1, c. 8, and tr. 8, c. 4 ff.; Algazel, Philosophy I, tr. 2, the chapter On possible being and due being: "If [being] depends, we call it possible; but if it does not depend, we call it due of itself, which is necessary of itself; concerning which twelve things are to be said: first, that it is not an accident... that it is not a body; and this in two ways: first, that every body is divisible according to quantity into parts: therefore its totality depends on its parts... and for that reason it cannot be granted that necessary being is composed of parts" (ed. of the year 1506, fol. 27).
- 1Propos. 17.Proposition 17.
- 2Secundum August., XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 10. n. 2, et Boeth., in lib. Quomodo substantiae in eo, quod sint, bonae sint etc., ac de Trin. c. 2. — De probatione minoris vide August., VII. de Trin. c. 1. n. 1. seqq. — Inferius pro esset compositio aliqua A B essent aliqua composita [componentia ?]According to Augustine, City of God XI, c. 10, n. 2, and Boethius, in the book How substances are good in that they are etc., and On the Trinity, c. 2. — On the proof of the minor see Augustine, On the Trinity VII, c. 1, n. 1 ff. — Below, in place of esset compositio aliqua, A B have essent aliqua composita [componentia?]
- 3Boeth., III de Differentiis topic.: Posito antecedenti, comitari quod subsequitur; perempto consequenti, perimi quod antecedit.Boethius, On Topical Differences III: "The antecedent being posited, what follows accompanies it; the consequent being destroyed, what precedes it is destroyed."
- 4Quaest. 2. a. 1. — De maiori vide supra pag. 63, nota 5.Question 2, art. 1. — On the major see above, p. 63, note 5.
- 5Monolog. c. 16: Sed palam est, quia quodlibet bonum summa natura sit, summe illud est. Illa igitur est summa essentia, summa vita etc.Monologion, c. 16: "But it is plain that, whatever good the highest nature is, it is that in the highest degree. That therefore is the highest essence, the highest life," etc.
- 6Pro concretum, quod praebet G, substituit B est, et in pro cum.In place of concretum, which G offers, B substitutes est, and in for cum.
- 7Cfr. Anselm., Monolog. c. 15. — Inferius pro perfectissimus G perfectissima.Compare Anselm, Monologion, c. 15. — Below, in place of perfectissimus, G has perfectissima.
- 8Secundum Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 33. (c. 4.); cfr. tom. II. pag. 561, nota 3.According to Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 33 (c. 4); compare tom. II, p. 561, note 3.
- 9D H arctatio divinae.D H have arctatio divinae.
- 1Aristot., II. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 56. (c. 10.); cfr. supra pag. 61, nota 2.Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption II, text 56 (c. 10); compare above, p. 61, note 2.
- 2Vide tom. III. pag. 311, nota 1.See tom. III, p. 311, note 1.
- 3August., 83 Qq. q. 46. n. 2. Vide supra Quaest. de scientia Christi, q. 3. arg. 1. ad oppos. — De similitudine vide supra pag. 9, nota 1. definitionem ex Boethio allatam.Augustine, Eighty-three Questions, q. 46, n. 2. See above, the Disputed Question on the Knowledge of Christ, q. 3, arg. 1 on the opposite side. — On likeness see above, p. 9, note 1, the definition adduced from Boethius.
- 4Ita A B G, sed E intendi alii interveniri.So A B G, but E has intendi, others interveniri.
- 5Apoc. 1, 8. Verba primus et novissimus habentur ibid. v. 17. — Superius pro eo ipso, quo G ter eo ipso, quod.Revelation 1:8. The words the first and the last are found in the same place, v. 17. — Above, in place of eo ipso, quo, G has three times eo ipso, quod.
- 6A B G competit. Inferius pro Quia enim est A Quia enim per se.A B G have competit. Below, in place of Quia enim est, A has Quia enim per se.
- 7Quaest. 4. a. 1. — Superius pro perfecta A vera.Question 4, art. 1. — Above, in place of perfecta, A has vera.
- 1Libr. II. Phys. text. 18. (c. 2.). — De seq. distinctione quo est et quod est cfr. I. Sent. d. 19. p. II. q. 4; d. 23. a. 1. q. 3. et d. 27. p. I. q. 3.Physics II, text 18 (c. 2). — On the following distinction of quo est and quod est compare I Sentences, d. 19, p. II, q. 4; d. 23, a. 1, q. 3, and d. 27, p. I, q. 3.
- 2Libr. VII. de Trin. c. 4. n. 7: Verius enim cogitatur Deus, quam dicitur, et verius est, quam cogitatur. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 23. dub. 2. et d. 34. q. 2. in corp.On the Trinity VII, c. 4, n. 7: "For God is more truly thought than he is spoken, and he more truly is than he is thought." Compare I Sentences, d. 23, doubt 2, and d. 34, q. 2, in the body.
- 3Scil. decem praedicamenta: substantia, quantitas etc. « Neque enim, ut ait Porphyr. de Praedicab. c. de Specie, est commune unum genus omnium ens, nec omnia eiusdem generis sunt... sed posita sint... prima decem genera, quasi prima decem principia. Et si omnia quis entia vocet, aequivoce, inquit, [Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 17. et VII. text. 15. sive IV. c. 12. et VI. c. 4.] nuncupabit ». — Superius ex A E G posuimus ultra, alii ultimo.That is, the ten categories: substance, quantity, etc. "For neither, as Porphyry says in On the Predicables, the chapter On Species, is being one common genus of all things, nor are all things of the same genus... but let there be posited... ten first genera, as it were ten first principles. And if anyone should call them all beings, he will name them, he says, equivocally [Aristotle, Metaphysics V, text 17, and VII, text 15, or IV, c. 12, and VI, c. 4]." — Above, following A E G, we have printed ultra, others ultimo.
- 4Cfr. etiam I. Sent. d. 25. a. 1. q. 2. ad 1. et d. 34. q. 1. — D H aut si ponitur, aliqua... et naturam, talis est etc.Compare also I Sentences, d. 25, a. 1, q. 2, ad 1, and d. 34, q. 1. — D H have aut si ponitur, aliqua... et naturam, talis est etc.
- 5Vide Anselm., Monolog. c. 15. — De seqq. cfr. II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. ad 8.See Anselm, Monologion, c. 15. — On what follows compare II Sentences, d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, ad 8.
- 1Cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 4, et Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 21. (IV. c. 16.).Compare I Sentences, d. 8, p. II, q. 4, and Aristotle, Metaphysics V, text 21 (IV, c. 16).
- 2Vide I. Sent. d. 22. q. 3. ad 1. — Ipsa obiecto supra tantum implicite invenitur. — Superius posuimus unde posterior pro non posterior, quod codd. perperam exhibent.See I Sentences, d. 22, q. 3, ad 1. — The objection itself is found above only implicitly. — Above, we have printed unde posterior for non posterior, which the codices wrongly exhibit.
- 3Aristot., III. Phys. text. 32. (c. 4.): Posse enim ab ipso esse nihil differt in perpetuis. — De ipsa solut. cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4. pro parte negat. — Circa finem solut. voci essentia H praemittit divina.Aristotle, Physics III, text 32 (c. 4): "For in everlasting things being able differs in nothing from being itself." — On this solution compare I Sentences, d. 8, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, ad 4, on the negative side. — Towards the end of the solution H prefixes divina to the word essentia.
- 4A B G H intelligens.A B G H have intelligens.
- 5G addit creaturae.G adds creaturae.
- 1A B E G H effectum; insuper codd. erronee omittunt unum divisionis membrum, scil. vel affectum, vel effectum. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 45. a. 1. q. 2. in fine, ubi eadem distinctio habetur: Dicendum enim, quod est loqui de his [voluntate, potentia et sapientia] quantum ad affectum sive actum et quantum ad effectum et quantum ad obiectum. Si quantum ad actum; sic est ibi omnimoda aequalitas etc. Cfr. etiam supra Quaest. de scientia Christi, q. 1. in corp. et ad 11.A B E G H have effectum; moreover the codices erroneously omit one member of the division, namely either affectum or effectum. Compare I Sentences, d. 45, a. 1, q. 2, at the end, where the same distinction is found: "For it must be said that there is a speaking of these [will, power and wisdom] as regards affection or act, and as regards effect, and as regards object. If as regards act, then there is in them equality in every way," etc. Compare also above, the Disputed Question on the Knowledge of Christ, q. 1, in the body and ad 11.
- 2Aristot., IV. Topic. c. 1: Terminus autem eius quod est participare, est suscipere participati rationem; manifestum igitur, quoniam species quidem participant genera, genera autem non; nam species suscipit generis rationem, genus autem speciei non.Aristotle, Topics IV, c. 1: "But the definition of to participate is to receive the account of what is participated; it is clear therefore that species do indeed participate genera, but genera do not participate species; for the species receives the account of the genus, but the genus does not receive that of the species."
- 3Vide I. Sent. d. 43. q. 3. ad 1; II. Sent. d. 37. a. 1. q. 1. ad 2. — Lib. de Causis, propos. 17: Omnis vis unita plus est infinita quam virtus multiplicata. — A effectivum multiforme. Superius post Dei A G addunt in se, E in se ipsa.See I Sentences, d. 43, q. 3, ad 1; II Sentences, d. 37, a. 1, q. 1, ad 2. — Book of Causes, proposition 17: "Every united force is more infinite than a multiplied power." — A has effectivum multiforme. Above, after Dei, A G add in se, E in se ipsa.
- 4Quaest. de scientia Christi, q. 2. seq.The Disputed Question on the Knowledge of Christ, q. 2 and following.
- tr.Translator’s note: lumen stands untranslated and lux is rendered "light", a distinction Bonaventure keeps and English does not have: lux is light at its source, lumen the light given off and had. The article has just granted that our understanding cannot think the divine being at all except under the modes of quo est and quod est; the lumen of reason is then what it has been given of its own, by which it can still confess the truth even while falling short of it. "By the light of reason" is an English commonplace and would pass as one, where the Latin names a definite thing the understanding has received. ---