Quaest. 4, Art. 1

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Quaest. 4, Art. 1

Quaestiones disputatae de mysterio Trinitatis · Quaestio IV: Utrum trinitas stet cum summa infinitate

Textus Latinus

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Quaestio IV. Utrum trinitas stet cum summa infinitate.

Consequenter quaeritur, utrum trinitas stet cum summa infinitate; et circa hoc quaeruntur duo.

Primum est, utrum divinum esse sit infinitissimum.

Secundum est, utrum stent simul trinitas et summa infinitas.

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Articulus I. Utrum divinum esse sit infinitissimum.

Quantum ad primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod divinum esse sit infinitissimum:

1. Primo per fidei confessionem in Symbolo¹: « Immensus Pater, immensus Filius, immensus Spiritus sanctus, et tamen non tres immensi, sed unus immensus », ergo una est in eis immensitas: ergo ratione essentiae convenit eis.

2. Item, Damascenus²: « Credendum est, unum Deum immortalem, aeternum, incircumscriptum »: si ergo ista non conveniunt nisi infinito simpliciter, patet etc.

3. Item, tertio Regum octavo³: Si caelum et caeli caelorum te capere non possunt, quanto magis domus haec, quam aedificavi? Si ergo esse Dei a nullo potest contineri et a nullo circumscribi, fatendum est, omnino habere rationem infiniti.

4. Item, Damascenus, libro primo, capitulo quarto⁴: « Infinitus est Deus et incomprehensibilis, et hoc solum est eius comprehensibile, scilicet eius infinitas et incomprehensibilitas ».

5. Item, Augustinus, undecimo de Civitate Dei⁵: « Omnis infinitas quodam ineffabili modo Deo finita est »; sed omne, cui infinita sunt finita, est simpliciter infinitum: si ergo divinum esse est huiusmodi, ergo habet omnimodam infinitatem.

6. Item, ratione: communis animi conceptio est⁶, Deum esse quo nihil maius excogitari potest, nec a se nec ab alio; sed omni finito potest aliquid maius excogitari: ergo vere et proprie divinum esse habet conditionem infiniti.

7. Item, omni finito potest intelligi per duplicationem aliquid aequari; sed divino esse nihil potest aequari, quantumcumque intelligatur duplicari⁷: ergo necesse est, divinum esse infinitum esse omnimoda infinitate.

8. Item, omne bonum finitum per additionem alicuius alterius boni habet multiplicari; sed summum bonum non potest multiplicari nec re nec intellectu per aliquid additum⁸: ergo non est bonum finitum; et est finitum vel infinitum: ergo etc.

9. Item, idem est Dei entitas et aeternitas; sed aeternitas est infinita, quia caret principio et fine⁹: ergo et entitas est infinita; sed si entitas est infinita, et esse: ergo a primo, esse divinum est omnino infinitum, etiam secundum se ipsum.

10. Item, idem est Deo posse et esse propter summam simplicitatem¹⁰; sed divinum posse est infinitum, cum sit omnipotens et possit super extrema in infinitum distantia, ut patet in productione de nihilo: ergo divinum esse simpliciter est infinitum.

11. Item, posse et sapere Dei est infinitum, quia non est dare tot possibilia vel scibilia, quin possit plura: ergo pari ratione, cum Deus nunquam sit in tot creaturis, quin possit esse in pluribus; necesse est, quod divinum esse ut esse sit infinitum.

12. Item, Deus est causa rerum nobilissima secundum rationem efficiendi, exemplandi et finiendi; sed pro summa nobilitate sic est causa efficiens, quod ineffecta; sic exemplaris, quod inexemplata: ergo sic finiens, quod infinita: ergo sicut divinum esse est ineffectum, ita et infinitum.

13. Item, principium omnis limitationis est materia vel aliquid materiale¹¹; sed divinum esse, cum sit actus purus, est carens omni conditione materiae: ergo caret omni limitatione et finitate: ergo est infinitum simpliciter.

Contra:

1. Infinitum dicitur privative respectu finiti, sicut iniustum respectu iusti; sed semper habitus, si vere habitus est, nobilior est privatione: ergo finiti conditio nobilior quam infiniti; sed quod nobilius est semper debet Deo attribui: ergo etc.

2. Item, in rebus creatis infinitas venit ex parte materiae, finitas vero ex parte formae; sed « Deus est forma absque materia », ut dicit Boethius¹²: ergo

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videtur, quod nihil omnino habeat de ratione infinitatis, sed quod sit finitissimum in se.

3. Item, nihil removetur vere ab aliquo, quod essentialiter convenit eidem; sed Deus est finis complens et terminans appetitum mentis nostrae¹: ergo nullo modo potest esse infinitum divinum esse, nec per abnegationem finis, ut est terminus, nec in quantum complementum.

4. Item, « finitum et infinitum sunt passiones quantitatis² »; sed in Deo non est ponere veram quantitatem, ergo nec veram infinitatem: si autem ponitur aliqua quantitas, haec est virtutis, quae respicit potentiam, non essentiam: ergo nihil est dicere essentiam infinitam.

5. Item, idem est infinitum et immensum; sed immensum dicitur per recessum a mensura et a modo: ergo idem est infinitum et carens modo sive immoderatum; sed quod caret modo caret specie et pulcritudine: ergo cum hoc non competat divino esse, patet etc.

6. Item, omne infinitum dicitur per oppositionem ad minimum et per recessum ab eo; sed minimum est simplicissimum in unoquoque genere³: ergo infinitum dicit recessum a simplicitate. Sed divinum esse est simplicissimum: ergo non est infinitum.

7. Item, nullum infinitum finit, quia oppositum non est causa oppositi, et « nihil dat alteri quod non habet⁴ »; sed Deus omnia finit tanquam finis perfectissimus: ergo Deus non est infinitus, ergo nec quantum ad esse nec quantum ad aliquid sui.

8. Item, nihil est infinitum simpliciter, quod est finitum summae veritati, quae iudicat de omnibus, prout sunt⁵; sed Deus est finitus sibi, alioquin se ipsum excederet: ergo divinum esse non est infinitum secundum rem: ergo etc.

9. Item, si Deus posset unum solum, ita quod non alia, divinum posse⁶ diceretur finitum: cum ergo consimilis sit ratio de posse et esse, et divinum esse non sit nisi unum solum; sequitur, quod divinum esse sit finitum.

10. Item, unitas est maxime finita in se, cum sit principium totius mensurationis secundum numerum⁷: si ergo divinum esse est unum, ergo mensuratum, ergo finitum.

11. Item, magis est finitum omne, quod est hoc et determinatum, quam omne, quod non est hoc, sed commune et indeterminatum; sed esse commune, utpote esse universale, est finitum: ergo cum divinum esse sit proprium et determinatum, ipsum erit maxime finitum.

12. Item, omne, quod est separatum ab aliquo secundum locum, est finitum secundum existentiam localem: ergo pari ratione omne, quod est separatum secundum esse, est finitum secundum existentiam naturalem; sed divinum esse maxime separatum est ab omnibus secundum esse, cum hoc competat motori primo et completissimo⁸: ergo divinum esse finitum est secundum existentiam naturalem.

13. Item, in divinis illud est verum, quod propter summam simplicitatem quae dicuntur in abstracto dicuntur in concreto, et e converso: si ergo a fine dicitur aliquid finitum, et haec est vera et propria: Deus est finis; ergo et haec: Deus est finitus: ergo haec est falsa, quod sit infinitus.

14. Item, omne comprehensibile est finitum; sed omne simplex est comprehensibile: ergo omne simplex est finitum; sed divinum esse est simplex: ergo finitum. Minor probatur, quia omne, quod totum cognoscitur, comprehenditur; sed cum cognoscitur simplex, totum cognoscitur, cum non habeat partem et partem⁹, et necessario est finitum non solum in se, sed etiam nobis.

15. Item, aut aliquid Dei est finitum, aut nihil; si nihil Dei finitum: ergo cum a finito non cognoscatur aliquid nisi sub ratione finiti, nihil ergo Dei cognoscitur a nobis: ergo nunquam erimus beati. Sed hoc est inconveniens perpessimum: ergo aliquid Dei est finitum. Aut ergo est dare ibi aliquid et aliquid, aut necesse est dicere, quod nihil Dei sit in se finitum¹⁰: ergo nulla ratione Deus dicendus est esse infinitus.

Conclusio

Divinum esse et posse, quia est summe simplex, est infinitum, quatenus infinitum abnegat terminum circa quantitatem virtutis.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod in quaestione, in qua est multiplicitas nominis, prius oportet secundum artem distinguere quam aliquid asserere vel negare¹¹. Intelligendum igitur, quod infinitum dicitur dupliciter,

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scilicet privative et negative. Secundum quod dicitur privative, sic privat actum et relinquit aptitudinem; et hoc modo dicitur infinitum, quod est natum finiri, non tamen est finitum, et sic sonat in incompletionem. — Secundum autem quod dicitur negative, sic simpliciter removet finem sive finitatem; sed hoc dupliciter habet intelligi secundum duplicem acceptionem finis. Dicitur enim finis-terminus, finis-complementum; et ideo infinitum dicitur dupliciter: vel per abnegationem finis-complementi, et sic malum dicitur infinitum¹; vel per abnegationem finis-termini, et hoc dupliciter potest esse secundum duplicem terminum. Est enim terminus secundum quantitatem materialem, et est terminus secundum quantitatem spiritualem; prima dicitur quantitas molis, secunda quantitas virtutis. Infinitum igitur per abnegationem termini circa quantitatem molis semper dicit aliquam incompletionem aliquo modo, vel actu, vel potentia, quia dicit recessum a simplicitate. Talis enim quantitas non simul stat cum simplicitate in eodem et secundum idem, et tale infinitum nunquam est actu, sed solum potentia, actu autem finitum². Infinitum vero per abnegationem termini circa quantitatem virtutis non dicit aliquam imperfectionem, sed summam perfectionem, quia non repugnat simplicitati, immo non potest esse nisi in summe simplici; et tali modo Scripturae auctoritas et fidei confessio ponunt infinitatem sive immensitatem in ipso Deo simplicissimo.

Divinum igitur esse eo ipso est infinitum, quo est summe simplex et simpliciter summum. — Quia enim est summe simplex, ideo unitum est summe in se et in suo posse; et quia summe in se unitissimum, ideo nihil habet contrahens, nihil limitans, nihil determinans et nihil claudens in genere, ac per hoc extra omnia et supra omnia³. — Quia rursus unitissimum est respectu posse, ideo idem est in eo omnino esse et posse, et ideo, ubicumque est suum esse, et suum posse; et ubi est esse, est centrum et origo et fons ipsius posse; et ubi est fons et origo et centrum ipsius posse, semper ultra potest; et ideo, ubicumque potest, semper amplius et ultra potest, ac per hoc posse et simul esse necesse est infinitatem habere. Cui concordat illud de Causis⁴: « Omnis virtus unita plus est infinita » etc. Non ergo haec infinitas simplicitati repugnat, immo est ei consona mirabili et inseparabili concordia.

Amplius, quia simpliciter summum, necesse est esse omnino immensum. Hoc ipso nihil potest ei aequari, nec intensione nec duplicatione, sicut dicit Augustinus in libro octavo⁵ de Trinitate; et necesse est, ipsum habere in se infinitam nobilitatem et bonitatem; cum bonum finitum, quantumcumque sit, per duplicationem finitorum aliquoties contingat et reddi et aequari, ut dicit. — Quia etiam simpliciter summum, nihil potest maius, nihil melius esse nec excogitari. Omni autem finito potest supergredi aestimatio; si enim intelligitur habere terminum, intelligitur ultra illud aliquid saltem cogitari posse. Ac per hoc, si divinum esse, quia summe simplex est, pariter est simpliciter summum; necesse est consequenter, ipsum dicere omnino infinitum, ut rationes concludunt. Non enim est dare, quod sit finitum essentia et infinitum potentia, ut aliqui dixerunt⁶; haec enim in Deo omnino unum sunt, et infinitas in uno necessario ponit et claudit infinitatem in alio, cum ad nihil possit se extendere unum sine alio. — Et rursus, cum in spiritualibus idem sit maius et melius; cum aequalis bonitatis sit essentia et potentia, necessario et aequalis erit infinitatis.

Ex hoc verbo possumus manuduci ad intelligendum, quomodo simplicitas non repugnat immensitati. Si enim, ut dicit Augustinus⁷, « idem est ibi maius et melius »; sicut potest intelligi, quod summe simplex sit optimum, ita potest et maximum; sicut etiam intelligi potest, quod summe simplex sit summe potens, sic intelligi potest, quod sit simplicissimum et infinitissimum; sicut intelligi potest, quod sit omnibus praesens per potentiam, sic et per essentiam; et sicut omnia comparata ad divinam potentiam quasi nihil possunt, sic omnia comparata ad essentiam quasi minimum sunt. — Unde respectu divini esse mundus iste

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totus est sicut quid minimum. Et hoc est quod dicitur Sapientiae undecimo¹: Quoniam sicut momentum staterae, sic est ante te orbis terrarum, et sicut gutta roris antelucani, quae descendit in terram; et Isaiae quadragesimo: Ecce gentes quasi stilla situlae et quasi momentum staterae reputatae sunt; et post: Omnes gentes quasi non sint, sic sunt coram eo et quasi nihilum et inane reputatae sunt. — Concedendum est igitur, quod non solum divinum posse, immo etiam divinum esse infinitum est, sicut ostendunt rationes ad hanc partem inductae.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod infinitum dicitur privative; dicendum, quod, sicut iam dictum est, licet infinitum in creatura dicat privationem respectu finiti secundum rem² et modum dicendi; tamen, prout ponitur in Deo, verissimam dicit positionem secundum rem, et maiorem, quam hoc quod est finitum, dicit completionem; non enim dicitur per privationem complementi, sicut iam patuit, sed per privationem limitationis et coarctationis, quae defectum dicunt a statu perfectissimi complementi. Et ideo illa ratio non concludit.

2. Ad illud autem quod obiicitur, quod infinitas venit ex parte materiae; dicendum, quod illud est verum, secundum quod infinitas fundatur super quantitatem molis, quae quidem trahit originem ex parte principii materialis; secus autem est, quando fundatur supra quantitatem virtutis, quia virtus activa originem trahit a forma; hoc autem modo ponitur infinitas in Deo, non modo praemisso. Et ideo non procedit illa obiectio³.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus est finis, ergo non est infinitus; dicendum, quod Deus est finis finiens, non finis finitus, quia finis est non ut terminus rei intra, sed ut omnem appetitum rei beatificabilis terminans: non ergo opponitur infinitas fini finienti, sed solum fini finito ut termino intrinseco. Et ideo non procedit illa obiectio.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod finitum et infinitum sunt passiones quantitatis; dicendum, quod licet in Deo non sit quantitas molis, est tamen quantitas virtutis; haec autem quantitas virtutis non solum attenditur in potentia operante extra, sed etiam quantitas virtutis dicitur excellentia valoris sive in absolutis, sive in respectivis; unde circa omne illud potest poni, circa quod ponitur gradus excellentiae respectu alterius; tale autem est non solum divinum posse, verum etiam divinum esse. Et ideo ratio infinitatis utrique competere habet⁴.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod infinitum et immensum dicunt recessum a medio et a modo; dicendum, quod in natura limitata recessus a modo et medio defectum dicit; sed in natura, quae est supra omnem limitem coarctantem, nullum prorsus dicit defectum: quia, secundum Augustinum⁵, « Deus est modus sine modo »; quod quidem dicitur, quia sua immensitas est sibi modus, quae nullius mensurae limitibus coarctatur; et hoc modo carentia modi non inducit carentiam speciei seu pulcritudinis, sed potius excellentiam utriusque.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod infinitum dicitur per oppositionem ad minimum; dicendum, quod verum est de infinito fundato super quantitatem repugnantem simplicitati, sicut est quantitas molis, non autem de eo quod fundatur super quantitatem virtutis, quia hoc summe consonat, sicut dictum est.

7. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nullum infinitum finit; dicendum, quod infinitum, secundum quod privat rationem complementi, non finit finitate complementi; infinitum, etiam secundum quod privat rationem termini, non finit ut terminus intra, finire tamen potest ut complens et beatificans; quia appetitus rei beatificabilis nunquam quietatur nisi in re, quae habet bonitatem immensam, ubi nihil potest appetere ultra⁶.

8. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nihil est infinitum, quod est finitum summae veritati; dicendum, quod aliquid esse finitum summae veritati dupliciter potest intelligi: uno modo, quia summa veritas iudicat, illud esse finitum summae veritati, et hoc modo habet propositio illa veritatem; alio modo, quia non excedit summae veritatis iudicium, quod quia in se immensum est, omnem immensitatem in se comprehendere potest; et hoc modo non sequitur, quod illud quod est finitum sibi, sit finitum simpliciter, immo est ibi sophisma secundum quid et simpliciter⁷.

9. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si Deus posset unum solum, ita quod non alia, divinum posse diceretur finitum; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia potentia est ad extra et ad effectus creatos, qui

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finiti sunt; unde si non posset nisi in unum solum, sequeretur, quod potentia eius non extenderetur¹ nisi ad finitum, ac per hoc, quod esset finita. Secus autem est de divino esse, quia illud absolutum est et quasi ad intra; et licet sit unum solum, illud tamen unum immensum est, tum quia illud esse nullam habet intra se limitationem, tum quia est fons omnis esse, tum quia nihil potest esse sine divino esse. Unde quia divina essentia in omnibus est, sicut divina potentia, et si per impossibile ponerentur infinita esse, Deus in omnibus illis esset: hinc est, quod divinum esse infinitatem habet in se, sicut et posse.

10. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod unitas est maxime finita etc.; dicendum, quod illud habet veritatem de illa unitate, quae constitutionem rei sive numeri intrat ad modum partis, termini vel complementi; et haec est unitas aggregabilis, quae iuncta cum alia inducit numerositatem maiorem, et talis originem trahit a limitatione, quam forma attribuit ipsi materiae: et ideo ipsa est principium mensurandi in genere quantitatis discretae². Sed non talis est unitas divina: quia ipsa nec constitutionem alterius partis intrare potest, cum sit perfectissima, nec aliunde trahit originem, cum sit prima; ideo nec limitata est nec mensurata, sed potius immensa, quia nec coarctans nec coarctata, nec ab alio nec a se ipsa.

11. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod magis est finitum quod est hoc; dicendum, quod hoc aliquid proprie dicitur per distinctionem ab eo quod est quale quid³; et illud est hic et nunc, quia contractionem habet loci et temporis. Ad individuationem enim rei existentis in genere necessario concomitantur accidentales proprietates, quarum collectionem in alio non est reperire. Non sic autem est de divino esse; licet enim divinum esse dicatur hoc propter summam completionem et discretionem ab omni alio esse, ipsum tamen non est in genere; ideo nec dicitur fieri hoc per contractionem sive per additionem vel materiae, vel proprietatis essentialis, vel accidentalis; et ideo sic est hoc, quod non contrahitur ad hic et nunc, sed est semper et ubique multo excellentius quam aliquod universale, quod ab esse particulari dependet et ratione illius aliquam admittit contractionem. Et ideo, licet esse universale sit finitum, tamen nihil impedit, quin divinum esse sit infinitum.

12. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne, quod est separatum ab aliquo secundum locum, est finitum; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia quod separatur ab aliquo secundum locum, sic separatur ab eo, quod non est in illo, et ideo hoc ipso contractum et limitatum et finitum est; quod autem separatur secundum differentiam essentialem ab aliquo, nihilominus potest esse in illo; sicut Deus essentialiter distinguitur a creatura, nihilominus tamen in omni creatura est potentialiter, praesentialiter et essentialiter; et ideo ex tali modo separationis formarum non potest inferri finitas et limitatio, sicut ex modo separationis secundum situm⁴.

13. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in divinis abstracta dicuntur concrete, et e converso; dicendum, quod abstractum eius quod est finitum, quod dicitur concrete, est finitas, non finis; nam concretum sumtum a fine non dicitur finitum, sed finiens, sicut finitum dicitur a finitate; et ideo ratio illa non valet.

14. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne comprehensibile finitum; dicendum, quod divinum esse non est comprehensibile virtuti finitae, licet sit simplex⁵, pro eo quod simplicitas et immensitas radicantur super idem in eo quod habet infinitatem secundum quantitatem virtualem, sicut prius ostensum est; et ideo, sicut non potest cognosci secundum partem et partem, quia est summe simplex, sic nec potest totaliter comprehendi propter summam immensitatem.

15. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod aut aliquid Dei est finitum, aut nihil; dicendum, quod quidquid est Dei tanquam in Deo existens — cum sit ipse Deus, non pars Dei — necessario tenet rationem infiniti; quia tamen « omne, quod recipitur in aliquo, non recipitur per modum recepti, sed per modum recipientis⁶ », et virtus creati intellectus finita

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est: hinc est, quod cognoscit ipsum finite, et ex hoc ipso in ipso beatificari habet. Nec tamen iste intellectus falsus est, quia modum finitatis ponit circa se cognoscentem et circa suam cognitionem, non autem circa Deum cognitum, cum ipsum intelligat infinitum, licet minime comprehendere valeat infinitatem ipsius, sicut in quaestione de comprehensione animae Christi¹ plenius fuit ostensum.

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English Translation

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Question IV. Whether trinity stands together with the highest infinity.

Next it is asked whether trinity stands together with the highest infinity; and concerning this two things are asked.

The first is whether the divine being is most infinite.

The second is whether trinity and the highest infinity stand together.

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Article I. Whether the divine being is most infinite.

As to the first, the procedure is as follows, and it is shown that the divine being is most infinite:

1. First, by the confession of faith in the Creed¹: "The Father is immense, the Son is immense, the Holy Spirit is immense, and yet there are not three immense ones but one immense one" — therefore there is one immensity in them: therefore it belongs to them by reason of the essence.

2. Again, the Damascene²: "It must be believed that God is one, immortal, eternal, uncircumscribed": if therefore these belong to nothing but what is infinite without qualification, the conclusion is plain.

3. Again, III Kings, chapter 8³: If heaven and the heaven of heavens cannot contain thee, how much less this house which I have built? If therefore the being of God can be contained by nothing and circumscribed by nothing, it must be granted that it has altogether the character of the infinite.

4. Again, the Damascene, book one, chapter four⁴: "God is infinite and incomprehensible, and this alone is comprehensible of him, namely his infinity and incomprehensibility."

5. Again, Augustine, City of God XI⁵: "Every infinity is in some ineffable way made finite to God"; but everything to which infinite things are finite is infinite without qualification: if therefore the divine being is of this sort, it has infinity in every mode.

6. Again, by reasoning: it is a common conception of the mind⁶ that God is that than which nothing greater can be thought, neither by himself nor by another; but something greater can be thought than every finite thing: therefore truly and properly the divine being has the condition of the infinite.

7. Again, to every finite thing something can be understood to be made equal by doubling; but nothing can be made equal to the divine being, however much it be understood to be doubled⁷: therefore the divine being must be infinite with infinity in every mode.

8. Again, every finite good can be multiplied by the addition of some other good; but the highest good cannot be multiplied, either in reality or in understanding, by anything added⁸: therefore it is not a finite good; and it is either finite or infinite: therefore etc.

9. Again, God's entity and his eternity are the same; but eternity is infinite, because it lacks beginning and end⁹: therefore his entity too is infinite; but if the entity is infinite, so also is the being: therefore from the first, the divine being is altogether infinite, even according to itself.

10. Again, in God to be able and to be are the same, on account of the highest simplicity¹⁰; but the divine power is infinite, since he is omnipotent and can reach across extremes infinitely distant, as is plain in production out of nothing: therefore the divine being is without qualification infinite.

11. Again, God's power and knowing are infinite, because there are no so many possible or knowable things that he could not do more: therefore by parity of reasoning, since God is never in so many creatures that he could not be in more, the divine being as being must be infinite.

12. Again, God is the most noble cause of things according to the account of efficient, exemplary and final causality; but by reason of his highest nobility he is so an efficient cause as to be uneffected, so an exemplar as to be unexemplified: therefore so a finisher as to be infinite: therefore just as the divine being is uneffected, so also it is infinite.

13. Again, the principle of all limitation is matter or something material¹¹; but the divine being, since it is pure act, lacks every condition of matter: therefore it lacks all limitation and finitude: therefore it is infinite without qualification.

On the contrary:

1. The infinite is said privatively with respect to the finite, as the unjust with respect to the just; but a habit, if it is truly a habit, is always more noble than a privation: therefore the condition of the finite is more noble than that of the infinite; but what is more noble ought always to be attributed to God: therefore etc.

2. Again, in created things infinity comes from the side of matter, finitude from the side of form; but "God is form without matter," as Boethius says¹²: therefore

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it seems that he has nothing at all of the character of infinity, but that he is most finite in himself.

3. Again, nothing is truly removed from anything which belongs to it essentially; but God is the end that completes and terminates the appetite of our mind¹: therefore the divine being can in no way be infinite, neither by the denial of an end as it is a terminus, nor as it is a completion.

4. Again, "the finite and the infinite are properties of quantity²"; but true quantity is not to be posited in God, therefore neither true infinity: and if some quantity is posited, this is quantity of power, which regards the power and not the essence: therefore it is nothing to speak of an infinite essence.

5. Again, the infinite and the immense are the same; but the immense is so called by a receding from measure and from mode: therefore the infinite is the same as what lacks mode, that is, the immoderate; but what lacks mode lacks species and beauty: therefore, since this does not belong to the divine being, the conclusion is plain.

6. Again, everything infinite is so called by opposition to the least and by a receding from it; but the least is what is most simple in each genus³: therefore the infinite states a receding from simplicity. But the divine being is most simple: therefore it is not infinite.

7. Again, no infinite thing finishes, because an opposite is not the cause of its opposite, and "nothing gives to another what it does not have⁴"; but God finishes all things as the most perfect end: therefore God is not infinite, and therefore neither as to his being nor as to anything of his.

8. Again, nothing is infinite without qualification which is finite to the highest truth, which judges of all things as they are⁵; but God is finite to himself, otherwise he would exceed himself: therefore the divine being is not infinite in reality: therefore etc.

9. Again, if God could do one thing only, so that he could not do others, the divine power⁶ would be called finite: since therefore the account of power and of being is alike, and the divine being is nothing but one alone, it follows that the divine being is finite.

10. Again, unity is most of all finite in itself, since it is the principle of all measuring according to number⁷: if therefore the divine being is one, it is measured, and therefore finite.

11. Again, everything which is this and determinate is more finite than everything which is not this but common and indeterminate; but common being, as universal being, is finite: therefore since the divine being is proper and determinate, it will be most of all finite.

12. Again, everything which is separated from something according to place is finite according to local existence: therefore by parity of reasoning everything which is separated according to being is finite according to natural existence; but the divine being is most of all separated from all things according to being, since this belongs to the first and most complete mover⁸: therefore the divine being is finite according to natural existence.

13. Again, in divine things this is true, that on account of the highest simplicity what is said in the abstract is said in the concrete, and conversely: if therefore something is called finite from an end, and this is true and proper: God is an end; then this too: God is finite: therefore this is false, that he is infinite.

14. Again, everything comprehensible is finite; but everything simple is comprehensible: therefore everything simple is finite; but the divine being is simple: therefore it is finite. The minor is proved, because everything which is known as a whole is comprehended; but when a simple thing is known, it is known as a whole, since it does not have part and part⁹, and it is necessarily finite not only in itself but also to us.

15. Again, either something of God is finite, or nothing; if nothing of God is finite, then, since by a finite power nothing is known except under the character of the finite, nothing of God is known by us: therefore we shall never be blessed. But this is a most intolerable absurdity: therefore something of God is finite. Either then there is something and something to be granted there, or it must be said that nothing of God is finite in itself¹⁰: therefore on no account is God to be called infinite.

Conclusion

The divine being and power, because it is in the highest degree simple, is infinite, inasmuch as "infinite" denies a terminus with respect to the quantity of power.

I answer: For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that in a question in which there is a multiplicity in the term, one must, according to the art, distinguish before asserting or denying anything¹¹. It must therefore be understood that "infinite" is said in two ways,

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namely privatively and negatively. According as it is said privatively, it takes away the act and leaves the aptitude; and in this way that is called infinite which is of a nature to be finished and yet is not finished, and thus it sounds toward incompletion. — But according as it is said negatively, it simply removes end or finitude; but this can be understood in two ways, according to the twofold acceptation of "end." For there is end-as-terminus and end-as-completion; and therefore "infinite" is said in two ways: either by the denial of end-as-completion, and thus evil is called infinite¹; or by the denial of end-as-terminus, and this can be so in two ways according to a twofold terminus. For there is a terminus according to material quantity, and a terminus according to spiritual quantity; the first is called quantity of mass, the second quantity of power. The infinite, therefore, taken by the denial of a terminus with respect to quantity of mass always states some incompletion in some way, either in act or in potency, because it states a receding from simplicity. For such quantity does not stand together with simplicity in the same thing and in the same respect, and such an infinite is never in act but only in potency, while in act it is finite². But the infinite taken by the denial of a terminus with respect to quantity of power states no imperfection but the highest perfection, because it is not repugnant to simplicity — indeed it cannot exist except in what is in the highest degree simple; and it is in this way that the authority of Scripture and the confession of faith posit infinity or immensity in God himself, who is most simple.

The divine being, therefore, is infinite by the very fact that it is in the highest degree simple and without qualification highest. — For because it is in the highest degree simple, it is therefore in the highest degree united in itself and in its power; and because it is in the highest degree most united in itself, it therefore has nothing contracting it, nothing limiting it, nothing determining it and nothing enclosing it in a genus, and by this it is outside all things and above all things³. — Because again it is most united in respect of power, therefore to be and to be able are in it altogether the same, and therefore wherever its being is, there also is its power; and where the being is, there is the centre and origin and font of the power itself; and where the font and origin and centre of the power itself is, it can always go further; and therefore, wherever it can act, it can always act more and beyond, and by this both power and at once being must have infinity. With this agrees that saying of the Book of Causes⁴: "Every power that is united is more infinite," etc. This infinity, then, is not repugnant to simplicity; rather it is consonant with it in a wonderful and inseparable concord.

Further, because it is without qualification highest, it must be altogether immense. By this very fact nothing can be made equal to it, neither by intensification nor by doubling, as Augustine says in book eight⁵ of On the Trinity; and it must have in itself infinite nobility and goodness, since a finite good, however great it be, happens through the doubling of finite things sometimes both to be rendered and to be equalled, as he says. — Because it is also without qualification highest, nothing can be or be thought greater or better. But estimation can go beyond every finite thing; for if it is understood to have a terminus, it is understood that something beyond it can at least be thought. And by this, if the divine being, because it is in the highest degree simple, is equally without qualification highest, it must consequently be called altogether infinite, as the arguments conclude. For it is not to be granted that it is finite in essence and infinite in power, as some have said⁶; for these are in God altogether one, and infinity in the one necessarily posits and includes infinity in the other, since the one cannot extend itself to anything without the other. — And again, since in spiritual things the greater and the better are the same, then, since essence and power are of equal goodness, they will necessarily be of equal infinity as well.

From this word we can be led by the hand to understand how simplicity is not repugnant to immensity. For if, as Augustine says⁷, "the greater and the better are there the same," then, just as it can be understood that what is in the highest degree simple is best, so it can also be understood to be greatest; and just as it can be understood that what is in the highest degree simple is in the highest degree powerful, so it can be understood that it is most simple and most infinite; and just as it can be understood to be present to all things by power, so also by essence; and just as all things compared to the divine power can do as it were nothing, so all things compared to the essence are as it were the least. — Whence in respect of the divine being this whole world

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is as something least. And this is what is said in Wisdom, chapter 11¹: Because as the weight of the balance, so is the whole world before thee, and as a drop of the morning dew that falleth down upon the earth; and in Isaiah, chapter 40: Behold the nations are as a drop of a bucket, and are counted as the smallest grain of a balance; and afterward: All nations are before him as if they had no being at all, and are counted to him as nothing and vanity. — It must therefore be granted that not only the divine power but also the divine being is infinite, as the arguments brought forward for this side show.

1. To that which is objected, that infinite is said privatively: it must be said that, as has already been said, although the infinite in a creature states a privation with respect to the finite according to the thing² and to the manner of speaking, nevertheless, as it is posited in God, it states a most true position according to the thing, and it states a completion greater than what is finite does; for it is not said by the privation of completion, as has already appeared, but by the privation of limitation and constriction, which state a defect from the state of most perfect completion. And therefore that argument does not conclude.

2. But to that which is objected, that infinity comes from the side of matter: it must be said that this is true according as infinity is founded upon quantity of mass, which indeed draws its origin from the side of the material principle; but it is otherwise when it is founded upon quantity of power, because active power draws its origin from form; and it is in this way that infinity is posited in God, not in the way premised. And therefore that objection does not go through³.

3. To that which is objected, that God is an end, therefore he is not infinite: it must be said that God is a finishing end, not a finished end, because he is an end not as a terminus within a thing, but as terminating every appetite of a thing capable of beatitude: infinity is therefore not opposed to a finishing end, but only to a finished end as to an intrinsic terminus. And therefore that objection does not go through.

4. To that which is objected, that the finite and the infinite are properties of quantity: it must be said that although in God there is no quantity of mass, there is nevertheless quantity of power; and this quantity of power is not only attended to in a power operating outwardly, but quantity of power is also called excellence of worth, whether in absolute things or in relative ones; whence it can be posited about everything about which a degree of excellence with respect to another is posited; and such is not only the divine power but also the divine being. And therefore the character of infinity has to belong to both⁴.

5. To that which is objected, that the infinite and the immense state a receding from the mean and from mode: it must be said that in a limited nature a receding from mode and mean states a defect; but in a nature which is above every constricting limit it states no defect at all: because, according to Augustine⁵, "God is a mode without mode"; and this is said because his immensity is a mode to himself, an immensity which is constricted by the limits of no measure; and in this way the lack of mode does not induce a lack of species or of beauty, but rather the excellence of both.

6. To that which is objected, that the infinite is said by opposition to the least: it must be said that this is true of an infinite founded upon a quantity repugnant to simplicity, such as quantity of mass, but not of that which is founded upon quantity of power, because this is in the highest degree consonant with it, as has been said.

7. To that which is objected, that no infinite thing finishes: it must be said that the infinite, according as it takes away the character of completion, does not finish by the finitude of completion; and the infinite, even according as it takes away the character of terminus, does not finish as a terminus within, yet it can finish as completing and beatifying; because the appetite of a thing capable of beatitude is never brought to rest except in a thing which has immense goodness, where it can desire nothing beyond⁶.

8. To that which is objected, that nothing is infinite which is finite to the highest truth: it must be said that something's being finite to the highest truth can be understood in two ways: in one way, because the highest truth judges that thing to be finite to the highest truth, and in this way that proposition holds true; in another way, because it does not exceed the judgment of the highest truth, which, since it is immense in itself, can comprehend every immensity in itself; and in this way it does not follow that what is finite to itself is finite without qualification — rather there is there the sophism of in a certain respect and without qualification⁷.

9. To that which is objected, that if God could do one thing only, so that he could not do others, the divine power would be called finite: it must be said that the case is not alike, because power is outward and toward created effects, which

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are finite; whence if he could act upon one thing alone, it would follow that his power did not extend¹ except to the finite, and by this that it was finite. But it is otherwise with the divine being, because that is absolute and as it were inward; and although it is one alone, that one is nevertheless immense — both because that being has no limitation within itself, and because it is the font of all being, and because nothing can be without the divine being. Whence, since the divine essence is in all things, as the divine power is, and if per impossibile infinite beings were posited, God would be in all of them: hence it is that the divine being has infinity in itself, just as the power does.

10. To that which is objected, that unity is most of all finite, etc.: it must be said that this holds true of that unity which enters into the constitution of a thing or of a number after the manner of a part, a terminus or a completion; and this is aggregable unity, which, joined with another, induces a greater numerosity, and such unity draws its origin from the limitation which form attributes to matter itself: and therefore it is the principle of measuring in the genus of discrete quantity². But the divine unity is not of this sort: because it can neither enter into the constitution of another part, since it is most perfect, nor does it draw its origin from elsewhere, since it is first; therefore it is neither limited nor measured, but rather immense, because it is neither constricting nor constricted, neither by another nor by itself.

11. To that which is objected, that what is this is more finite: it must be said that this something is properly so called by distinction from what is a what of such a kind³; and that is here and now, because it has a contraction of place and time. For upon the individuation of a thing existing in a genus there necessarily follow accidental properties, a collection of which is not to be found in another. But it is not so with the divine being; for although the divine being is called this on account of its highest completion and its discreteness from every other being, it is nevertheless not in a genus; therefore neither is it said to become this by contraction or by the addition either of matter, or of an essential property, or of an accidental one; and therefore it is this in such a way that it is not contracted to here and now, but is always and everywhere, far more excellently than any universal, which depends upon particular being and by reason of that admits some contraction. And therefore, although universal being is finite, nothing prevents the divine being from being infinite.

12. To that which is objected, that everything which is separated from something according to place is finite: it must be said that the case is not alike, because what is separated from something according to place is separated from it in such a way that it is not in it, and therefore by this very fact is contracted and limited and finite; but what is separated from something according to an essential difference can nonetheless be in it — as God is essentially distinguished from a creature, and nevertheless is in every creature potentially, presentially and essentially; and therefore from such a mode of the separation of forms finitude and limitation cannot be inferred, as they can from the mode of separation according to position⁴.

13. To that which is objected, that in divine things abstract terms are said concretely, and conversely: it must be said that the abstract of what is finite, which is said concretely, is finitude, not end; for the concrete taken from "end" is not called finished but finishing, as finite is said from finitude; and therefore that argument is not valid.

14. To that which is objected, that everything comprehensible is finite: it must be said that the divine being is not comprehensible to a finite power, although it is simple⁵, for this reason, that simplicity and immensity are rooted upon the same thing in that it has infinity according to virtual quantity, as was shown before; and therefore, just as it cannot be known part by part, because it is in the highest degree simple, so neither can it be totally comprehended, on account of its highest immensity.

15. To that which is objected last, that either something of God is finite, or nothing: it must be said that whatever is of God as existing in God — since it is God himself, not a part of God — necessarily holds the character of the infinite; because, however, "everything which is received in something is received not after the manner of the thing received but after the manner of the receiver⁶," and the power of the created understanding is finite

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— hence it is that it knows him finitely, and by this very fact is to be beatified in him. Nor is that understanding false, because it places the mode of finitude about the knower itself and about its own knowing, and not about God as known, since it understands him to be infinite, although it is in no way able to comprehend his infinity, as was shown more fully in the question on the comprehension of the soul of Christ¹.

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Apparatus Criticus

1
Athanasiano. — De hac quaest. vide I. Sent. d. 43. q. 1. et 2.
The Athanasian [Creed]. — On this question see I Sentences, d. 43, q. 1 and 2.
2
Libr. I. de Fide orthod. c. 8. Textus originalis plura interserit.
On the Orthodox Faith, book I, c. 8. The original text inserts more.
3
Vers. 27: Si enim caelum etc.
Verse 27: For if heaven etc.
4
Vide supra pag. 33, nota 10.
See above, p. 33, note 10.
5
Cap. 18. Cfr. supra Quaest. de scientia Christi, q. 1. in corp.
Chapter 18. Compare above, the Disputed Questions on the Knowledge of Christ, q. 1, in the body.
6
Boeth., in lib. Quomodo substantiae in eo, quod sint, bonae sint etc., ait: Communis animi conceptio est enuntiatio, quam quisque probat auditam.
Boethius, in the book How Substances Are Good in That They Are, etc., says: "A common conception of the mind is a statement which anyone approves once he has heard it."
7
Cfr. infra pag. 81, nota 5. Augustini sententia.
Compare below, p. 81, note 5, the opinion of Augustine.
8
Vide supra q. 3. a. 1. ad 4.
See above, q. 3, a. 1, reply 4.
9
Richard. a S. Vict., II. de Trin. c. 4: Sempiternum namque esse videtur quod caret initio et fine; aeternum, quod caret utroque et omni mutabilitate; et quamvis forsitan neutrum sine altero invenitur, recte tamen... distinguitur.
Richard of St. Victor, On the Trinity II, c. 4: "For that seems to be everlasting which lacks beginning and end; that eternal, which lacks both and all mutability; and although perhaps neither is found without the other, they are nevertheless rightly... distinguished."
10
Vide supra pag. 72, nota 3.
See above, p. 72, note 3.
11
Cfr. II. Sent. d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. fundam. 3. — Minor ostensa est I. Sent. d. 19. p. II. q. 3.
Compare II Sentences, d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, fundamentum 3. — The minor was shown in I Sentences, d. 19, p. II, q. 3.
12
Libr. de Trin. c. 2: Divina substantia sine materia forma est. — De maiori cfr. tom. I. pag. 360, nota 5. — Inferius pro finitissimum A B finitissimus.
On the Trinity, c. 2: "The divine substance is form without matter." — On the major compare vol. I, p. 360, note 5. — Below, for finitissimum, A B read finitissimus.
1
Vide IV. Sent. d. 49. p. I. q. 1. seq.
See IV Sentences, d. 49, p. I, q. 1 and following.
2
Averroes, in I. Phys. Aristot. text. 15. (c. 2.). Vide tom. I. pag. 768, nota 7.
Averroes, on Aristotle's Physics I, text 15 (c. 2). See vol. I, p. 768, note 7.
3
Cfr. Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 12. et X. text. 3. seqq. (IV. c. 6. et IX. c. 1.).
Compare Aristotle, Metaphysics V, text 12, and X, text 3 and following (IV, c. 6, and IX, c. 1).
4
Secundum Aristot., II. Elench. c. 3. (c. 22.). — De prima ratione addita, in qua voci oppositi A praemittit sui, cfr. supra pag. 11, nota 5.
According to Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations II, c. 3 (c. 22). — On the first added reason, in which A prefixes sui to the word oppositi, compare above, p. 11, note 5.
5
Vide supra Quaest. de scientia Christi, q. 1. arg. 2. ad oppos.
See above, the Disputed Questions on the Knowledge of Christ, q. 1, argument 2 of the opposing series.
6
Ita A E, alii esse.
So A E; the others read esse.
7
Cfr. supra nota 3. loci Aristotelis.
Compare above, note 3, on the passage of Aristotle.
8
Vide Aristot., XII. Metaph. text. 41. (XI. c. 7.), et Lib. de Causis, propos. 20: Causa prima regit res creatas omnes, praeter quod commisceatur cum eis.
See Aristotle, Metaphysics XII, text 41 (XI, c. 7), and the Book of Causes, proposition 20: "The first cause rules all created things, without being mingled with them."
9
Cfr. supra Quaest. de scientia Christi, q. 6. arg. 9. ad oppos. — Mox pro necessario est D G H necesse est esse.
Compare above, the Disputed Questions on the Knowledge of Christ, q. 6, argument 9 of the opposing series. — Shortly after, for necessario est, D G H read necesse est esse.
10
Ita B G, alii perperam infinitum.
So B G; the others wrongly read infinitum.
11
Aristot., II. Elench. c. 2. (c. 17.), praemisso, quod ad propositiones, quae vel aequivocationem vel amphibologiam continent, respondendum sit dividendo, subinde ait: Manifestum, quoniam nulli eorum quae aequivoca sunt, convenit respondere simpliciter. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 6. dub. 1, ubi haec sententia Philosopho tribuitur. — Verba S. Bonav. Ad praedictorum intelligentiam usque in ipso Deo simplicissimo tom. I. pag. 769, nota 7. iam exhibuimus ex cod. M (qui est in bibliotheca Montis-Cassini) tanquam additamentum; ex quo novum arg. insinuatur pro genuitate huius quaestionis. Cfr. etiam Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 6. m. 1.
Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations II, c. 2 (c. 17), having premised that to propositions which contain either equivocation or amphiboly one must reply by distinguishing, then says: "It is plain that to none of the things which are equivocal is it fitting to reply without qualification." Compare I Sentences, d. 6, dubium 1, where this opinion is attributed to the Philosopher. — The words of St. Bonaventure from Ad praedictorum intelligentiam down to in ipso Deo simplicissimo we have already set out at vol. I, p. 769, note 7, from codex M (which is in the library of Monte Cassino), as an additamentum; from which a new argument is intimated for the genuineness of this question. Compare also Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. I, q. 6, m. 1.
1
Cfr. tom. II. pag. 811, nota 4. — De quantitate molis et virtutis vide supra pag. 35, nota 2.
Compare vol. II, p. 811, note 4. — On quantity of mass and of power see above, p. 35, note 2.
2
Vide Aristot., III. Phys. text. 56. seqq. (c. 6.).
See Aristotle, Physics III, text 56 and following (c. 6).
3
Gregor., II. Moral. c. 12. n. 20: Quia enim ipse manet intra omnia, ipse extra omnia, ipse supra omnia, ipse infra omnia; et superior est per potentiam et inferior per sustentationem, exterior per magnitudinem et interior per subtilitatem; sursum regens, deorsum continens; extra circumdans, interius penetrans; nec alia ex parte superior, alia inferior... sed unus idemque totus ubique praesidendo sustinens, sustinendo praesidens etc.
Gregory, Moralia II, c. 12, n. 20: "For he himself remains within all things, himself outside all things, himself above all things, himself beneath all things; and he is higher by power and lower by sustaining, outer by magnitude and inner by subtlety; ruling from above, containing from below; surrounding from outside, penetrating from within; nor is he higher in one part and lower in another... but one and the same, whole everywhere, sustaining by presiding and presiding by sustaining," etc.
4
Propos. 17.
Proposition 17.
5
Cap. 2. n. 3: Non est enim certe [Deus] nec terra nec caelum... Nec si augeas imaginatione cogitationis lucem solis, quantum potes, sive quo sit maior, sive quo sit clarior, millies tantum aut innumerabiliter, neque hoc est Deus. Nec sicut cogitantur Angeli... nec si omnes, cum sint millia millium [Dan. 7, 10. et Apoc. 5, 11.], in unum collati unus fiant, nec tale aliquid Deus est... Ecce vide, si potes, o anima... Deus veritas est. — Posuimus in libro octavo, quod D E G omittunt et pro quo A B in libro primo.
Chapter 2, n. 3: "For certainly [God] is neither earth nor heaven... Nor, if you increase in the imagination of thought the light of the sun, as much as you can, whether that it be greater or that it be brighter, a thousand times over or innumerably, is this God. Nor is he as the Angels are thought of... nor, if all of them, being thousands of thousands [Dan. 7:10 and Apoc. 5:11], gathered into one should become one, is God any such thing... Behold, see, if you can, O soul... God is truth." — We have put in book eight, which D E G omit and for which A B read in book one.
6
Vide I. Sent. d. 43. q. 2. in corp.
See I Sentences, d. 43, q. 2, in the body.
7
Libr. VI. de Trin. c. 8. n. 9. Cfr. supra pag. 75, nota 4.
On the Trinity, book VI, c. 8, n. 9. Compare above, p. 75, note 4.
1
Vers. 23. Vulgata bis tanquam pro sicut. — Seq. locus est Isai. 40, 15. et 17. In fine ultimi loci Vulgata addit ei. — De praesentia per essentiam et potentiam cfr. I. Sent. d. 37. p. I. a. 3. q. 2.
Verse 23. The Vulgate has tanquam twice for sicut. — The following passage is Isaiah 40:15 and 17. At the end of the last passage the Vulgate adds ei. — On presence by essence and by power compare I Sentences, d. 37, p. I, a. 3, q. 2.
2
D secundum esse.
D reads secundum esse.
3
Cfr. I. Sent. d. 19. p. II. q. 3. ad 4.
Compare I Sentences, d. 19, p. II, q. 3, reply 4.
4
Vide I. Sent. d. 43. q. 2. ad 1.
See I Sentences, d. 43, q. 2, reply 1.
5
Libr. de Natura boni, c. 3: Deus itaque supra omnem creaturae modum est, supra omnem speciem, supra omnem ordinem; nec spatiis locorum supra est, sed ineffabili et singulari potentia, a quo omnis modus, omnis species, omnis ordo. Ibid. c. 22: Deus autem nec modum habere dicendus est, ne finis eius dici putetur. Nec ideo tamen immoderatus est, a quo modus omnibus tribuitur rebus, ut aliquo modo esse possint. Nec rursus moderatum oportet dici Deum, tanquam ab aliquo modum acceperit. Si autem dicamus eum summum modum, forte aliquid dicimus, si tamen in eo quod dicimus summum modum intelligamus summum bonum. Omnis enim modus, in quantum modus est, bonus est etc. Cfr. etiam supra pag. 15, nota 3, quae fusius exponuntur IV. de Gen. ad lit. c. 3. n. 7. seq.
On the Nature of the Good, c. 3: "God, therefore, is above every mode of the creature, above every species, above every order; and he is not above by intervals of place, but by ineffable and singular power, from whom is every mode, every species, every order." Same work, c. 22: "But God must not be said to have a mode, lest he be thought to be spoken of as having an end. Nor is he on that account immoderate, he from whom mode is bestowed on all things, that they may be able to be in some mode. Nor again ought God to be called moderated, as though he had received mode from another. But if we call him the highest mode, perhaps we say something, provided that in saying highest mode we understand the highest good. For every mode, inasmuch as it is a mode, is good," etc. Compare also above, p. 15, note 3, matters which are set out more fully in On Genesis to the Letter IV, c. 3, n. 7 and following.
6
Cfr. I. Sent. d. 43. q. 2. ad 4. Ibid. ad 3. et 2. insinuantur duae seqq. solut. — D H ut nihil possit appetere ultra.
Compare I Sentences, d. 43, q. 2, reply 4. In the same place, replies 3 and 2, the two following solutions are intimated. — D H read ut nihil possit appetere ultra.
7
Vide supra Quaest. de scientia Christi, q. 1. ad 2. et I. Sent. d. 19. p. I. q. 1. ad 3. — De fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter vide tom. III. pag. 258, nota 2.
See above, the Disputed Questions on the Knowledge of Christ, q. 1, reply 2, and I Sentences, d. 19, p. I, q. 1, reply 3. — On the fallacy of in a certain respect and without qualification see vol. III, p. 258, note 2.
1
Ita A G, alii egrederetur.
So A G; the others read egrederetur.
2
Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Quanto: Est autem [quantum] discretum quidem, ut numerus et oratio; continuum vero, ut linea... Partium etenim numeri nullus est communis terminus, ad quem copulantur partes eius; ut quinque, si sunt denarii partes, ad nullum terminum communem copulantur quinque, sed semper discreta sunt... Linea vero continua est; est enim sumere communem terminum punctum, ad quem partes eius copulentur etc. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 19. p. II. q. 4.
Aristotle, Categories, the chapter On Quantity: "But [quantity] is discrete, as number and speech; continuous, as a line... For of the parts of a number there is no common terminus at which its parts are joined; as five, if they are parts of ten, are joined at no common terminus, but are always discrete... But a line is continuous; for it is possible to take a common terminus, a point, at which its parts are joined," etc. Compare I Sentences, d. 19, p. II, q. 4.
3
Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Substantia: In primis igitur substantiis [i. e. singularibus] indubitabile et verum est, quod hoc aliquid significant; individuum enim et unum numero est quod significatur. In secundis vero substantiis [i. e. speciebus vel generibus] videtur quidem similiter propter appellationis figuram hoc aliquid significare, quando quis dixerit hominem vel animal; non tamen verum est, sed magis quale aliquid significant... non autem simpliciter quale quid... quemadmodum album... qualem enim quandam substantiam significant. — Subinde respiciuntur proprietates singularis sive individui per oppositionem ad universale, de quo Aristot., I. Poster. c. 24. (c. 31.) ait: Neque enim hoc aliquid est neque nunc neque ubi; neque enim utique esset universale; quod enim semper est et ubique universale dicimus esse. Cfr. Boeth., de Trin. c. 1. — Definitionem individui a Porphyrio datam vide supra pag. 75, nota 8. — Quod Deus non sit in determinato genere, ostensum est I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 4. — Inferius cum E posuimus concomitantur, alii communicantur A comitantur. Deinde pro sive per A B nec per.
Aristotle, Categories, the chapter On Substance: "In the first substances [i.e. singulars], therefore, it is indubitable and true that they signify this something; for what is signified is an individual and one in number. But in the second substances [i.e. species or genera] it seems likewise, because of the form of the appellation, to signify this something, when someone says 'man' or 'animal'; yet it is not true, but rather they signify a something of such a kind... not, however, simply a what of such a kind... as 'white' does... for they signify a substance of a certain sort." — Then the properties of the singular or individual are regarded by opposition to the universal, of which Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I, c. 24 (c. 31), says: "For it is neither this something nor now nor somewhere; for otherwise it would not be universal; for we say that to be universal which is always and everywhere." Compare Boethius, On the Trinity, c. 1. — For the definition of the individual given by Porphyry see above, p. 75, note 8. — That God is not in a determinate genus was shown in I Sentences, d. 8, p. II, q. 4. — Below, with E, we have put concomitantur; the others read communicantur, A comitantur. Then, for sive per, A B read nec per.
4
Cfr. I. Sent. d. 37. p. II. a. 1. q. 1.
Compare I Sentences, d. 37, p. II, a. 1, q. 1.
5
Vide supra Quaest. de scientia Christi, q. 6.
See above, the Disputed Questions on the Knowledge of Christ, q. 6.
6
Cfr. Lib. de Causis, propos. 10. 20. 24, et supra pag. 41, nota 2.
Compare the Book of Causes, propositions 10, 20, 24, and above, p. 41, note 2.
1
Quaest. de scientia Christi, q. 6.
Disputed Questions on the Knowledge of Christ, q. 6. ---