Quaest. 4, Art. 2
Quaestiones disputatae de mysterio Trinitatis · Quaestio IV: Utrum trinitas stet cum summa infinitate
Articulus II. Utrum possint stare simul trinitas et infinitas.
Deinde quaeritur, utrum possint simul stare trinitas et infinitas sive immensitas2. Et quod sint incompossibiles, videtur sic.
1. Quia creatura est finita, quidquid est in ea est finitum: ergo cum divinum esse sit immensum, quidquid est in eo est actu infinitum; sed in divinis est numerus sive pluralitas personarum: ergo necesse est, quod se protendat ad infinitatem: non ergo stat in trinitate.
2. Item, cum sit duplex infinitas, scilicet virtualis et numeralis3, impossibile est, divinum esse carere infinitate virtutis: ergo pari ratione, si in Deo ponimus veram pluralitatem, sicut et veram virtutem; ergo necesse est, ipsam habere infinitatem.
3. Item, virtus omnino infinita, cum emanat secundum omnem modum suae potestatis et infinitatis, emanat infinite per omnem modum4; sed divina virtus est sic infinita et secundum omnem modum suae infinitatis emanat in productione personarum: ergo idem quod prius.
4. Item, persona producens duas aut potest plures producere, aut non potest. Si non potest: ergo producendo amittit posse; si vero potest: ergo aut non est summae liberalitatis, aut necesse est producere ita, quod non sit stare.
5. Item, si lux solis esset immensa, generaret ex se infinitos splendores: ergo cum lux aeterna sit immensa, et splendor ex ipsa procedens sit vera persona5; necesse est, ibi esse personarum infinitatem: ergo non stant simul trinitas et infinitas.
6. Item, aut productio personarum attestatur virtuti, aut non. Si non: ergo non debet poni in summe virtuoso; si sic: ergo maior plurificatio maiori virtuti, et maxima maximae, et infinita infinitae: non ergo stat trinitas cum infinitate.
7. Item, si divina virtus esset in sua omnimoda actualitate respectu productionis creaturarum, necesse esset, ipsam producere infinitas creaturas: ergo cum sic sit respectu personarum, necesse est, si est infinita, quod producat infinitas personas.
8. Item, quia divinus intellectus est infinitus, necesse est, ipsum intelligere infinita: ergo cum divinum dicere sit infinitum, necesse est, quod dicat infinita; sed quot sunt dicta, tot sunt verba; quot verba, tot personae: ergo infinitae.
9. Item, ad hoc quod intellectus sit perfectus, non sufficit, quod intelligat se, sed etiam, quod intelligat se intelligere: ergo ad hoc, quod intellectus sit infinitae completionis; necesse est, quod super se reflectatur infinitis reflexionibus; sed intelligendo se generat verbum: ergo secunda reflexione secundum verbum, et sic in infinitum: ergo si est ponere in Deo infinitatem, non ergo trinitatem.
10. Item, aut Deus potest plures tribus personis intelligere, aut non potest. Si non potest: ergo intellectus eius finitus est et limitatus; si potest plures intelligere; sed nihil intelligitur, quod non sit aliquo modo vel in se vel in suo principio proximo vel remoto: ergo necesse est, aut divinum intelligere limitatum esse, aut plures tribus personis ponere circa divinum esse, vel actualiter, vel potentialiter.
Cᴏɴᴛʀᴀ: 1. Summa immensitas non tollit summam perfectionem virtutis producentis, nec per modum naturae, nec per modum voluntatis seu liberalitatis6, igitur nec summam perfectionem productionis; sed perfectio productionis necessario requirit statum sicut a parte principii, ita a parte termini; sed non esset status, si procederet in infinitum: ergo summa infinitas esse divini non ponit infinitatem in personis.
2. Item, infinitas in Deo non tollit perfectionem ordinis — non enim sequitur, quodsi Deus est infinitus, quod propter hoc sit inordinatus — sed ordo perfectionis necessario ponit primum, medium et ultimum7; ubi autem haec sunt, non est innumerabilitas, sed tantum trinitas: ergo etc.
3. Item, infinitas in Deo non tollit perfectionem connexionis, hoc enim facit ad summam dilectionem; sed connexio perfecta non potest esse, nisi una persona immediate procedat ab alia, alioquin non est
germanitas summa; sed haec non procedit ultra ternarium1: ergo etc.
4. Item, immensitas in Deo non tollit perfectionem beatitudinis; sed cuiuslibet personae cognitio est de essentia beatitudinis2: ergo si creatura non potest simul et semel cognoscere personas infinitas, impossibile est, aliquam animam unquam in Deo esse beatam: si ergo stat immensitas cum beatitudinis perfectione, stat cum personarum pluralitate. Sed nulla pluralitas magis competit animae beatificabili quam trinitas: ergo etc.
5. Item, infinitas divini esse non excludit unitatem essentiae; est enim Deus unus et immensus: si ergo magis recedit ab immensitate unitas quam pluralitas quantumcumque parva; si immensitas potest stare cum unitate, multo magis potest stare cum trinitate.
6. Item, immensitas3 divini esse non excludit simplicitatem naturae: si ergo plus repugnat immensitati omnimoda simplicitas quam quantulacumque pluralitas; si infinitas stat cum simplicitate, multo fortius stabit cum trinitate.
7. Item, infinitas divini esse non excludit proprietatem personae, ergo nec veram distinctionem earundem: ergo non ponit confusionem; sed ubi numerositas infinita, ibi confusio; ubi confusio, ibi indistinctio: quodsi hoc non est ponere in esse divino, stat ergo personarum pluralitas in numero finito: ergo trinitati infinitas non repugnat in Deo.
8. Item, infinitas divini esse non excludit causalitatem secundum triplex genus causae, scilicet efficientis, formalis et finalis; nec ponit plures modos causalitatis in Deo infinitas, quae est in ipso: ergo si potest stare cum triplici genere causae, potest etiam pariter stare cum trinitate personae, maxime cum sit correspondentia horum ad invicem secundum appropriationem potentiae, sapientiae et bonitatis, quae respondent tribus personis et triplici modo causandi4.
9. Item, infinitas divini esse non excludit conformitatem Creatoris et creaturae secundum duplicem repraesentationem, scilicet vestigii et imaginis: si ergo in imagine fit repraesentatio distinctionis et originis divinarum personarum, secundum correspondentiam personarum; si in Trinitate essent infinitae personae, deberent in imagine esse infinitae; quodsi hoc est impossibile, restat, quod trinitas personarum non repugnat immensitati divinae5.
10. Item, immensitas divini esse non excludit habitationem Dei in mente per Spiritus sancti donationem6; sed si infinitae essent personae producentes et productae; cum quaelibet persona producens mittat et donet productam, tunc ergo in unius animae gratificatione necesse esset, quod inciderent infinitae personae inter animam gratificatam et personam primo mittentem seu gratificantem. Si ergo non contingit infinita pertransire, impossibile esset, quod anima per gratificationem in primum principium rediret, si esset infinitas personarum: cum ergo immensitas Dei stet cum inhabitatione gratiae, in qua Filius, qui est imago Patris, per Spiritus sancti donum et nexum nos reducit ad Patrem; stat igitur ipsa immensitas circa esse divinum cum trinitate personarum.
Cᴏɴᴄʟᴜsɪᴏ.
In Deo simul stat summa infinitas cum personarum trinitate.
Rᴇsᴘᴏɴᴅᴇᴏ: Dicendum, quod absque dubio simul stant in Deo summa infinitas et personarum pluralitas; et hoc patet sic.
Infinitas ponitur in Deo non per defectum, sed per excessum, excessum, inquam, non superfluitatis, sed perfectionis et nobilitatis7. Quia igitur infinitas in Deo non ponit superfluitatem vel diminutionem, sed summam perfectionem; ideo in emanatione divinarum personarum est ponere immensitatem quantum ad producentem et productum et producendi modum, non autem infinitatem quantum ad numerum. Si enim infinitae secundum numerum essent personae in divinis, haec infinitas necessario induceret defectum, aut superfluitatem. Cum enim sint duo modi nobiles emanandi, per modum naturae et per modum liberalitatis8; aut duae personae his modis emanantes non perfecte caperent totam producentis virtutis immensitatem, et ita essent imperfectae; aut si caperent, aliae superabundarent. Quodsi in divino esse, eo ipso quod immensum est, impossibile est, aliquid esse superfluum aut diminutum: necesse est ponere Deum trinum et immensum.
Rursus, quia infinitas divini esse ponit immensitatem ex parte producentis et producti et modi producendi; sicut divinum esse, quia immensum, non potest esse geminatum, sed unum solum, ita necesse est, in divinis unam solam esse paternitatem, unam solam filiationem, unam solam processionem, et ita unum solum Patrem, unum solum Filium, unum solum Spiritum sanctum; ac per hoc necesse
est ponere Deum immensum et trinum. Sicut autem, si plures essent dii, neuter haberet in se totius immensitatem divinitatis, immo partem omnipotentiae et nobilitatis; ita si plures patres, neuter haberet immensitatem paternitatis; si plures filii, nullus immensitatem filiationis, sed secundum partem. Si enim quilibet haberet totam paternitatis plenitudinem et immensitatem, non posset esse in eis nisi una paternitas, sicut in pluribus personis non potest esse nisi una deitas. Restat igitur, quodsi in divino esse vera est infinitas et vera pluralitas, ut pluralitas per infinitatem protendi non valeat ultra trinitatem, secundum quod asserit pia fides.
Postremo, quia illa infinitas dicit completionem omnimodam, hinc est, quod non excludit perfectionem virtutis, ordinis, connexionis, beatitudinis, repraesentationis et inhabitationis. Et quoniam haec omnia trinitatem necessario dant intelligi in tribus personis, sicut patet ex prius obiectis1; manifestum est, quod summa immensitas in nullo repugnat, sed consonat cum trinitate aeterna. — Et ideo concedendae sunt rationes ad partem istam.
1. Ad illud quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod sicut in creatura, quia finita, quidquid est ibi est finitum, ita debet esse in Deo, quod quidquid est in ipso ratione infinitatis debet esse infinitum; dicendum, quod, sicut iam tactum est, divino esse competit infinitas virtutis et dignitatis, non molis seu numerositatis; et talis infinitas reperitur tam in essentia quam in personis, sive producentibus, sive productis, sive in se ipsis, sive in emanationibus suis; quod totum reperitur perfecte et integre in tribus personis: et ideo non oportet, eas ad infinitatem numerositatis protendi ratione infinitatis esse divini2.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus non potest carere infinitate virtutis etc.; dicendum, quod non est simile de hac infinitate et de illa: quia, cum magnitudo virtutis dicat potius accessum ad simplicitatem quam recessum, multitudo vero numerositatis dicat recessum ab uno et simplici; et Deus et divinum esse sic sit immensum, quod simul cum hoc est simplex et summe unum: hinc est, quod competit sibi infinitas virtutis, non autem numerositatis3 personalis.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod virtus omnino infinita, cum secundum omnem modum potestatis emanat infinite, per omnem modum se diffundit; dicendum, quod cum simul maneat in Deo perfectio cum infinitate, illud veritatem habet de omni modo emanationis et diffusionis, qui competit perfectioni summae; hoc autem est secundum duplicem modum producendi perfectum, scilicet naturae et liberalitatis, quorum utrumque necesse est esse unicum in se ipso, non geminatum nec bis nec ter, nedum procedat in infinitum, quia4 hoc induceret superabundantiam et defectum, sicut in praecedentibus fuit ostensum.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod persona producens duas, aut potest plures producere, aut non; dicendum, quod non posse ultra illas duas producere non dicit potentiae defectum, sed potius complementum: quia in illis duabus productionibus virtus productiva perfectissime et infinitissime se manifestat tum quantum ad immensitatem personarum productarum, tum quantum ad actualitatem ipsarum productionum; quia eodem modo et non aliter virtus generativa et spirativa in Patre actualitatem habet in generando et spirando, per quem modum habuit ab aeterno. Sicut enim splendor continue manat a sole, sic Filius, qui est splendor Patris5, immo multo excellentius continue manat a Patre.
5. 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si lux solis esset immensa, generaret ex se infinitos splendores; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia splendor manans a sole nec est omnino perfectus nec aequatur suae origini; et ideo non capit intra se ex unica productione totam virtutem et claritatem lucis irradiativae, immo secundum gradus approximationis et elongationis secundum plus et minus sapit et capit de plenitudine lucis fontalis. Secus autem est in Filio, qui est verbum Patris et splendor perfectissimus, per omnia Patri aequalis, accipiens a Patre totum, quod Pater habet intra se: et ideo, sicut infinitas lucis aeternae non tollit adaequationem cum splendore aeterno ab ipsa emanante, sic non introducit infinitam splendorum multiplicationem, cum unicus splendor totam illam immensitatem capiat intra se6.
7. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quodsi divina virtus esset in omnimoda sua actualitate respectu creaturarum, quod produceret infinitas etc.; dicendum, quod non est simile, duplici ratione: tum quia creatura finita est, et ideo nulla ex aequo respondet virtuti producenti; tum quia creatura essentialiter distinguitur a producente, et etiam ab aliis creaturis secundum distinctionem in suis principiis intrinsecis et accidentibus coaffixis; non sic autem est in divinis personis, tum quia producta est infinita, sicut producens, tum quia non distinguuntur essentia, sed origine7: et ideo, cum duae tantum sint origines, distinctae et distinctivae, duae tantum sunt et intelligi possunt personae emanantes, in quibus sufficientissime relucet immensitas virtutis fontalis productivae.
8. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod divinus intellectus intelligit infinita, cum sit infinitus; dicendum, quod licet Deus infinita intelligat, se ipso uno omnia comprehendit, quia intelligendo se intelligit omnia; sic etiam, licet dicat multa, uno tamen Verbo omnia dicit. Nam eodem Verbo, quo Pater dicit se, dicit quaecumque dicit1; nam Pater se ipsum intelligendo intellectu completissimo et unico, in quo intellectus adaequatur intelligenti, et e converso, Verbum generat, quod est Patris similitudo per omnia aequalis cum ipso. Unde sicut Pater intelligendo se intelligit quidquid potest intelligere; sic dicendo Verbum dicit quidquid potest dicere et quidquid dici potest in deitate. Unde nec ipse aliud verbum dicere potest, nec aliqua persona in Trinitate, pro eo quod illo dicitur quidquid dici potest. — Et si tu obiicias, quod sicut Deus habet infinitas rationes respectu intelligibilium, quod similiter infinita debet habere verba; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia ratio et idea dicunt respectum et similitudinem intelligibilium creandorum et producendorum seu possibilium produci, quae multiformiter et innumerabiliter sunt possibilia multiplicari; verbum autem dicit respectum ad dicentem et ad primum intellectum et summum principium, cuius est hypostatica similitudo: et ideo nullo modo, nec re nec intellectu, competit ei multitudo, sicut nec primo principio primo et principaliter a se ipso intellecto2.
9. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod intellectus infinitae completionis reflectitur supra se infinitis reflexionibus etc.; dicendum, quod in divino intellectu idem est intelligere et intelligere se intelligere, etsi millies et infinities iteraretur intelligere, pro eo quod in Deo idem est intelligens et intellectum et actus intelligendi; et ideo primus ipse actus, quo se Deus Pater intelligit, est actualissimus et completissimus, sicut et Verbum illi correspondens: et ideo non est necesse ex hoc introducere in divinis verborum pluralitatem. Secus autem est in intellectu creato, cuius actus et operatio differt ab intelligente et intellecto, et ideo multiplicari potest et iterari et numerari magis et magis ex frequenti conversione intellectus super se ipsum intelligentem et super suum intelligere nec non et super alia a se.
10. Ad illud quod obiicitur ultimo, quod aut Deus potest plures personas intelligere, aut non; dicendum, quod non posse plures personas intelligere, hoc potest intelligi dupliciter: aut propter intellectus limitationem in actu intelligendi, aut propter rectitudinem iudicii et impossibilitatem declinandi a via3 veritatis. Primo modo non competit intellectui divino, cum sit immensus, sed secundo modo competit. Unde quod plures personas intelligere non possit, hoc est, quia talis intellectus, licet videatur in intelligendo potens, secundum rem tamen hoc intelligendo declinat a veritate et incidit in errorem. Unde sicut immensitas veritatis est omnino impermixta falsitati, sic et immensitas lucis intelligentis reddit intellectum divinum ab omni errore penitus alienum; propter quod nec aliquid maius se nec alium Deum nec pluralitatem personarum ultra numerum trinum capit divinus intellectus, non quia limitatus, sed quia perfectissime infinitus. — Et ex his patet solutio ad totum.
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Article II. Whether trinity and infinity can stand together.
Next it is asked whether trinity and infinity, or immensity, can stand together2. And that they are incompossible seems to follow thus.
1. Because a creature is finite, whatever is in it is finite: therefore, since the divine being is immense, whatever is in it is actually infinite; but in the divine there is number, or a plurality of persons: therefore it is necessary that this extend itself to infinity: therefore it does not stop at trinity.
2. Again, since infinity is twofold, namely of power and of number3, it is impossible that the divine being should lack infinity of power: therefore by the same reasoning, if we place in God a true plurality, as we do a true power; therefore it is necessary that that plurality too have infinity.
3. Again, a power altogether infinite, when it emanates according to every mode of its own potency and infinity, emanates infinitely through every mode4; but the divine power is infinite in this way, and according to every mode of its infinity it emanates in the production of the persons: therefore the same as before.
4. Again, a person producing two either can produce more, or cannot. If it cannot: then by producing it loses its power; but if it can: then either it is not of the highest liberality, or it must produce in such a way that there is no stopping.
5. Again, if the light of the sun were immense, it would generate out of itself infinite radiances: therefore, since the eternal light is immense, and the radiance proceeding from it is a true person5; it is necessary that there be there an infinity of persons: therefore trinity and infinity do not stand together.
6. Again, either the production of the persons bears witness to power, or it does not. If it does not: then it ought not to be placed in the one supremely powerful; if it does: then a greater multiplication answers to a greater power, and the greatest to the greatest, and an infinite to an infinite: therefore trinity does not stand with infinity.
7. Again, if the divine power were in its every-way actuality with respect to the production of creatures, it would be necessary that it produce infinite creatures: therefore since it is so with respect to the persons, it is necessary, if it is infinite, that it produce infinite persons.
8. Again, because the divine understanding is infinite, it is necessary that it understand infinite things: therefore, since the divine saying is infinite, it is necessary that it say infinite things; but as many as are the things said, so many are the words; as many words, so many persons: therefore infinite persons.
9. Again, for an understanding to be perfect, it does not suffice that it understand itself, but also that it understand itself understanding: therefore for an understanding to be of infinite completeness, it is necessary that it be reflected upon itself by infinite reflections; but by understanding itself it generates a word: therefore by a second reflection a second word, and so on to infinity: therefore if infinity is to be placed in God, trinity is not.
10. Again, either God can understand more persons than three, or he cannot. If he cannot: then his understanding is finite and limited; if he can understand more; but nothing is understood which is not in some way either in itself or in its principle, proximate or remote: therefore it is necessary either that the divine understanding be limited, or that more than three persons be placed about the divine being, either actually or potentially.
Oɴ ᴛʜᴇ ᴄᴏɴᴛʀᴀʀʏ: 1. The highest immensity does not take away the highest perfection of the producing power, neither by way of nature nor by way of will or liberality6, therefore neither the highest perfection of production; but the perfection of production necessarily requires a stopping-point on the side of the term as well as on the side of the principle; but there would be no stopping-point if it proceeded to infinity: therefore the highest infinity of the divine being does not place infinity in the persons.
2. Again, infinity in God does not take away the perfection of order — for it does not follow that if God is infinite he is on that account disordered — but the order of perfection necessarily places a first, a middle and a last7; and where these are, there is no innumerability, but only trinity: therefore etc.
3. Again, infinity in God does not take away the perfection of connection, for this makes for the highest love; but a perfect connection cannot be unless one person proceeds immediately from another, otherwise there is no
highest kinship; but this does not proceed beyond a threefold1: therefore etc.
4. Again, immensity in God does not take away the perfection of beatitude; but the knowledge of each person belongs to the essence of beatitude2: therefore if a creature cannot know infinite persons at once and at one stroke, it is impossible that any soul should ever be beatified in God: if therefore immensity stands with the perfection of beatitude, it stands with a plurality of persons. But no plurality is more fitting to a soul capable of beatitude than trinity: therefore etc.
5. Again, the infinity of the divine being does not exclude the unity of the essence; for God is one and immense: if therefore unity recedes further from immensity than does a plurality, however small; if immensity can stand with unity, much more can it stand with trinity.
6. Again, the immensity3 of the divine being does not exclude the simplicity of the nature: if therefore an every-way simplicity is more repugnant to immensity than a plurality however slight; if infinity stands with simplicity, much more strongly will it stand with trinity.
7. Again, the infinity of the divine being does not exclude the property of a person, therefore neither the true distinction of the persons: therefore it does not place confusion; but where there is infinite numerosity, there is confusion; where there is confusion, there is indistinction: and if this is not to be placed in the divine being, then a plurality of persons stands in a finite number: therefore infinity is not repugnant to trinity in God.
8. Again, the infinity of the divine being does not exclude causality according to the threefold genus of cause, namely efficient, formal and final; nor does the infinity which is in him place several modes of causality in God: therefore if it can stand with the threefold genus of cause, it can equally stand with a trinity of person as well, especially since there is a correspondence of these to one another according to the appropriation of power, wisdom and goodness, which answer to the three persons and to the threefold mode of causing4.
9. Again, the infinity of the divine being does not exclude the conformity of Creator and creature according to a twofold representation, namely of vestige and of image: if therefore in the image there is a representation of the distinction and origin of the divine persons, according to a correspondence of persons; if in the Trinity there were infinite persons, they would have to be infinite in the image; and if this is impossible, it remains that a trinity of persons is not repugnant to the divine immensity5.
10. Again, the immensity of the divine being does not exclude the indwelling of God in the mind through the gift of the Holy Spirit6; but if the persons producing and produced were infinite; since any producing person sends and gives the one produced, then in the making-gracious of a single soul it would be necessary that infinite persons fall between the soul made gracious and the person first sending or making gracious. If therefore it does not happen that infinite things are traversed, it would be impossible that the soul return through grace into the first principle, if there were an infinity of persons: since therefore the immensity of God stands with the indwelling of grace, in which the Son, who is the image of the Father, leads us back to the Father through the gift and bond of the Holy Spirit; that immensity therefore stands about the divine being together with a trinity of persons.
Cᴏɴᴄʟᴜsɪᴏɴ.
In God the highest infinity stands together with a trinity of persons.
I ʀᴇᴘʟʏ: It must be said that without doubt the highest infinity and a plurality of persons stand together in God; and this is clear as follows.
Infinity is placed in God not by defect, but by excess — an excess, I say, not of superfluity, but of perfection and nobility7. Since therefore infinity in God does not place superfluity or diminution, but the highest perfection; therefore in the emanation of the divine persons immensity is to be placed with respect to the producer and the produced and the mode of producing, but not infinity with respect to number. For if the persons in the divine were infinite according to number, this infinity would necessarily introduce defect or superfluity. For since there are two noble modes of emanating, by way of nature and by way of liberality8; either the two persons emanating in these modes would not perfectly take in the whole immensity of the producer's power, and so they would be imperfect; or if they did take it in, the others would superabound. And if in the divine being, by the very fact that it is immense, it is impossible that anything be superfluous or diminished: it is necessary to place God as three and immense.
Again, since the infinity of the divine being places immensity on the side of the producer and of the produced and of the mode of producing; just as the divine being, because immense, cannot be doubled, but is one alone, so it is necessary that in the divine there be one sole paternity, one sole filiation, one sole procession, and thus one sole Father, one sole Son, one sole Holy Spirit; and by this it is necessary
to place God immense and three. But just as, if there were several gods, neither would have in himself the immensity of the whole godhead, but rather a part of the omnipotence and nobility; so if there were several fathers, neither would have the immensity of paternity; if several sons, none would have the immensity of filiation, but only according to a part. For if each one had the whole plenitude and immensity of paternity, there could be in them only one paternity, just as in several persons there can be only one deity. It remains therefore that if in the divine being there is a true infinity and a true plurality, the plurality cannot be extended by infinity beyond trinity, according to what pious faith asserts.
Lastly, because that infinity states an every-way completeness, hence it is that it does not exclude the perfection of power, of order, of connection, of beatitude, of representation and of indwelling. And since all these necessarily give trinity to be understood in three persons, as is clear from what was objected earlier1; it is manifest that the highest immensity is in nothing repugnant to, but consonant with, the eternal trinity. — And therefore the reasons for that side are to be conceded.
1. To what is objected on the contrary, that just as in a creature, because it is finite, whatever is there is finite, so it must be in God that whatever is in him by reason of infinity must be infinite; it must be said that, as has already been touched upon, there belongs to the divine being an infinity of power and of dignity, not of mass or of numerosity; and such an infinity is found as much in the essence as in the persons, whether producing or produced, whether in themselves or in their emanations; all of which is found perfectly and entirely in three persons: and therefore it is not necessary that they be extended to an infinity of numerosity by reason of the infinity of the divine being2.
2. To what is objected, that God cannot lack an infinity of power etc.; it must be said that this infinity and that are not alike: because, since magnitude of power states rather an approach to simplicity than a receding from it, whereas a multitude of numerosity states a receding from the one and the simple; and God and the divine being are immense in such a way that together with this it is simple and supremely one: hence it is that an infinity of power belongs to him, but not one of personal numerosity3.
3. To what is objected, that a power altogether infinite, since according to every mode of potency it emanates infinitely, diffuses itself through every mode; it must be said that, since perfection remains in God together with infinity, that holds true of every mode of emanation and diffusion which belongs to the highest perfection; and this is according to the twofold mode of producing perfectly, namely of nature and of liberality, each of which must be unique in itself, not doubled, neither twice nor three times, much less proceeding to infinity, because4 this would introduce superabundance and defect, as was shown in what precedes.
4. To what is objected, that a person producing two either can produce more, or not; it must be said that not being able to produce beyond those two does not state a defect of potency, but rather its completion: because in those two productions the productive power manifests itself most perfectly and most infinitely, both as regards the immensity of the persons produced and as regards the actuality of the productions themselves; because in the same way and not otherwise the generative and spirative power in the Father has actuality in generating and spirating, in which mode it had it from eternity. For just as radiance continually flows from the sun, so the Son, who is the radiance of the Father5, but far more excellently, continually flows from the Father.
5. 6. To what is objected, that if the light of the sun were immense it would generate out of itself infinite radiances; it must be said that it is not alike: because the radiance flowing from the sun is neither altogether perfect nor equal to its origin; and therefore it does not take into itself from a single production the whole power and clarity of the irradiating light, but rather according to the degrees of nearness and distance it tastes and takes more or less of the fullness of the fontal light. But it is otherwise in the Son, who is the word of the Father and the most perfect radiance, in all things equal to the Father, receiving from the Father the whole of what the Father has within himself: and therefore, just as the infinity of the eternal light does not take away its adequation with the eternal radiance emanating from it, so it does not introduce an infinite multiplication of radiances, since a single radiance takes that whole immensity into itself6.
7. To what is objected, that if the divine power were in its every-way actuality with respect to creatures, it would produce infinite creatures etc.; it must be said that it is not alike, for a twofold reason: both because a creature is finite, and therefore none answers on equal terms to the producing power; and because a creature is essentially distinguished from its producer, and also from other creatures, by a distinction in its intrinsic principles and in the accidents fastened to them; but it is not so in the divine persons, both because what is produced is infinite, as is the producer, and because they are not distinguished by essence, but by origin7: and therefore, since there are only two origins, distinct and distinguishing, there are and can be understood only two emanating persons, in whom the immensity of the fontal productive power shines out most sufficiently.
8. To what is objected, that the divine understanding understands infinite things, since it is infinite; it must be said that although God understands infinite things, he comprehends all things by his one self, because in understanding himself he understands all things; so also, although he says many things, yet by one Word he says all things. For by the same Word by which the Father says himself, he says whatever he says1; for the Father, understanding himself by a most complete and single understanding, in which the understanding is made equal to the one understanding, and conversely, generates the Word, which is the likeness of the Father in all things equal to himself. Hence just as the Father in understanding himself understands whatever he can understand, so in saying the Word he says whatever he can say and whatever can be said in the godhead. Hence neither can he say another word, nor can any person in the Trinity, for the reason that in that Word is said whatever can be said. — And if you object that, just as God has infinite ideas with respect to the intelligibles, so likewise he must have infinite words; it must be said that it is not alike: because reason and idea state a relation and likeness to intelligibles to be created and produced, or possible to be produced, which are in manifold and innumerable ways able to be multiplied; whereas a word states a relation to the one saying and to the first understanding and highest principle, of which it is the hypostatic likeness: and therefore in no way, neither in reality nor in understanding, does multitude belong to it, just as it does not belong to the first principle understood first and principally by itself2.
9. To what is objected, that an understanding of infinite completeness is reflected upon itself by infinite reflections etc.; it must be said that in the divine understanding to understand and to understand oneself understanding are the same, even if to understand were repeated a thousand times and infinitely, for the reason that in God the one understanding and the thing understood and the act of understanding are the same; and therefore that first act by which God the Father understands himself is most actual and most complete, as is also the Word corresponding to it: and therefore it is not necessary on this account to introduce a plurality of words in the divine. But it is otherwise in a created understanding, whose act and operation differs from the one understanding and from the thing understood, and therefore it can be multiplied and repeated and numbered more and more by the frequent turning of the understanding upon itself understanding and upon its own understanding, and also upon things other than itself.
10. To what is objected last, that either God can understand more persons, or not; it must be said that not being able to understand more persons can be understood in two ways: either on account of a limitation of the understanding in the act of understanding, or on account of the rectitude of judgement and the impossibility of turning aside from the way3 of truth. In the first way it does not belong to the divine understanding, since it is immense, but in the second way it does belong. Hence that it cannot understand more persons is because such an understanding, although it seem powerful in understanding, in fact by so understanding turns aside from truth and falls into error. Hence, just as the immensity of truth is altogether unmixed with falsity, so also the immensity of the understanding light renders the divine understanding wholly a stranger to every error; on account of which the divine understanding takes in neither anything greater than itself, nor another God, nor a plurality of persons beyond the number three — not because it is limited, but because it is most perfectly infinite. — And from these things the solution to the whole is clear.
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- 2De hac quaest. cfr. I. Sent. d. 2. q. 3. et 4.On this question compare I Sentences, d. 2, q. 3 and 4.
- 3Vide supra pag. 35, nota 2.See above, p. 35, note 2.
- 4In I. Sent. d. 2. q. 3. arg. 3. ad oppos. dicitur: non tantum producit infinitum intensive, sed etiam extensive. — Pro potestatis G possibilitatis, omisso et infinitatis.In I Sentences, d. 2, q. 3, argument 3 of the opposing series it is said: it produces an infinite not only intensively, but also extensively. — For potestatis G has possibilitatis, omitting et infinitatis.
- 5Hebr. 1, 3: [Qui Filius] cum sit splendor gloriae et figura substantiae eius etc.Hebrews 1:3: "[The Son] who, being the brightness of his glory and the figure of his substance," etc.
- 6De hoc duplici modo productionis cfr. tom. I. pag. 56, nota 6, et de statu in productione vide supra pag. 12, nota 9.On this twofold mode of production compare vol. I, p. 56, note 6, and on the stopping-point in production see above, p. 12, note 9.
- 7Cfr. supra Quaest. de scientia Christi, q. 1. ad 6. — De ratione addita maiori vide supra pag. 82, nota 5.Compare above, the Disputed Questions on the Knowledge of Christ, q. 1, ad 6. — On the reason added to the major see above, p. 82, note 5.
- 1Secundum Richard. a S. Vict., IV. de Trin. c. 2. seqq.According to Richard of St. Victor, On the Trinity IV, c. 2 and following.
- 2Cum tota bonitas, ut dicit S. Bonav., I. Sent. d. 2. q. 3. fundam. 4, quae est substantiale praemium, sit in qualibet personarum. — Ibid. q. 4. fundam. 1. et in corp. ostenditur, quod ad beatitudinem divinam tres personae requiruntur, et quod secundum trinitatem imaginis [animae] summa attenditur creaturae perfectio, scilicet beatitudo. Cfr. infra fundam. 9.Since the whole goodness, as St. Bonaventure says, I Sentences, d. 2, q. 3, fundamentum 4, which is the substantial reward, is in each of the persons. — Ibid., q. 4, fundamentum 1, and in the body it is shown that three persons are required for the divine beatitude, and that it is according to the trinity of the image [of the soul] that the highest perfection of the creature, namely beatitude, is regarded. Compare below, fundamentum 9.
- 3D G H infinitas.D G H read infinitas.
- 4De quo vide I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. dub. 3. seq. et d. 34. q. 3.On which see I Sentences, d. 3, p. I, dubium 3 and following, and d. 34, q. 3.
- 5D restat, quod infinitas personarum repugnat immensitati divinae.D reads restat, quod infinitas personarum repugnat immensitati divinae.
- 6Cfr. I. Sent. d. 14. a. 2. q. 1. — Quod infinitum sit impertransibile, iam occurrit supra pag. 4, nota 2. et pag. 5, nota 7. — Inferius pro inciderent G interciderent.Compare I Sentences, d. 14, a. 2, q. 1. — That an infinite is untraversable has already occurred above, p. 4, note 2, and p. 5, note 7. — Further down, for inciderent G has interciderent.
- 7Vide quaest. praeced.See the preceding question.
- 8Cfr. tom. I. pag. 56, nota 6.Compare vol. I, p. 56, note 6.
- 1Scilicet in fundamentis.Namely in the fundamenta.
- 2Cfr. quaest. praeced. et I. Sent. d. 2. q. 3. ad 1, ubi etiam (in corp. et ad 3. 4.) tres seqq. solutiones insinuantur.Compare the preceding question and I Sentences, d. 2, q. 3, ad 1, where also (in the body and in ad 3 and 4) the three following solutions are intimated.
- 3Ita A B, alii numerositas.So A B; the others read numerositas.
- 4A B omittunt quia.A B omit quia.
- 5Cfr. supra pag. 84, nota 5. — De ipsa solut. vide I. Sent. d. 7. q. 2. et d. 9. q. 4.Compare above, p. 84, note 5. — On the solution itself see I Sentences, d. 7, q. 2, and d. 9, q. 4.
- 6Cfr. I. Sent. d. 7. q. 2. ad 4.Compare I Sentences, d. 7, q. 2, ad 4.
- 7Ut dictum est supra pag. 75, nota 7. ex Richardo a S. Vict.As was said above, p. 75, note 7, out of Richard of St. Victor.
- 1August., XI. Confess. c. 7. n. 9: Verbo Tibi coaeterno simul et sempiterne dicis omnia quae dicis etc. — Paulo inferius pro intellectus adaequatur B intellectum adaequatur (cfr. tom. I. pag. 707, nota 5.).Augustine, Confessions XI, c. 7, n. 9: "By a Word coeternal with thee thou sayest all that thou sayest at once and sempiternally," etc. — A little further down, for intellectus adaequatur B has intellectum adaequatur (compare vol. I, p. 707, note 5).
- 2Vide supra Quaest. de scientia Christi, q. 3. ad 19.See above, the Disputed Questions on the Knowledge of Christ, q. 3, ad 19.
- 3B E regula.B E read regula. ---