Quaest. 3, Art. 2

← Back to Quaestio III: Utrum simul stent trinitas et summa simplicitas

Quaest. 3, Art. 2

Quaestiones disputatae de mysterio Trinitatis · Quaestio III: Utrum simul stent trinitas et summa simplicitas

Textus Latinus

p. 73

Articulus II. Utrum possint simul stare trinitas et summa simplicitas.

Deinde quaeritur circa hoc, utrum simul possint stare trinitas et summa simplicitas. Et quod sint incompossibiles, videtur pluribus rationibus.

1. Simplicius est ens abstractum quam concretum⁵: ergo simplicior est natura nullum habens suppositum, quam natura existens in pluribus hypostasibus; sed trinitas ponit existentiam naturae in pluribus hypostasibus: ergo diminuit de summa simplicitate.

2. Item, simplicius est idem diverso⁶: ergo omne illud, in quo est omnimoda identitas, est simplicius, quam in quo reperitur aliqua quantulacumque diversitas; sed non potest esse trinitas sine quantulacumque diversitate: ergo non potest stare cum summa simplicitate.

3. Item, commune simplicius est proprio, sicut patet, quia proprium implicat in se commune et amplius; sed non potest esse trinitas vera, quin sint

p. 74

trium personarum propria distincta et incommunicabilia¹: ergo impossibile est ponere trinitatem, quin in ea ponatur aliquis recessus a summa simplicitate.

4. Item, omne absolutum est simplicius respectivo, quia, ut dicit Augustinus², « omne relativum est aliquid, excepto eo quod relative dicitur »; unde respectivum includit absolutum; sed non potest esse trinitas personarum sine pluralitate respectuum: ergo etc.

5. Item, omne definiens simplicius est definito; sed natura cadit in ratione personae³: ergo simplicior est semper natura quam persona: ergo non potest ratio personalitatis stare cum summa simplicitate. Sed trinitas non potest esse nisi in personis: ergo trinitas repugnat summae simplicitati.

6. Item, pars semper simplicior est toto; sed trinitatis pars est unitas, et trium personarum una persona: ergo si trinitas ponit veram pluralitatem, et vera pluralitas ponit veram totalitatem, et vera totalitas excludit summam⁴ simplicitatem: ergo a primo, trinitas non potest stare cum summa simplicitate.

7. Item, punctus semper est simplicior continuo, ergo et unitas numero: ergo simplicior est personae unitas quam personarum trinitas; sed quod habet aliquid simplicius se non est summe simplex: ergo impossibile est, trinitatem compati summam simplicitatem.

8. Item, aut persona est aeque simplex, sicut essentia, aut non. Si non: ergo aut persona non est in divinis, aut divinum esse non est simplicissimum; si autem aeque simplex, sicut essentia; sed essentia propter summam simplicitatem non compatitur plures essentias divinas⁵: ergo pari ratione neque persona.

9. Item, aut persona addit aliquid supra naturam secundum esse et intellectum, aut secundum intellectum solum, aut secundum neutrum. Si primo modo: ergo cadit cum⁶ simplicitate summa; si secundo modo: ergo intellectus vanus et falsus est, cui nihil respondet in re; si tertio modo: ergo sicut natura non plurificatur, ita nec persona.

10. Item, aut quidquid convenit personae convenit naturae, et e converso, aut non. Si sic: ergo cum persona distinguatur, distingueretur et natura, et ita non erit ibi summe simplex; si non; sed affirmatio et negatio non sunt verae de eodem et secundum idem⁷: ergo secundum aliud et aliud; quod autem habet hoc, est compositum: ergo etc.

11. Item, aut una persona omnino differt ab alia, aut omnino convenit, aut partim convenit et partim differt. Si omnino convenit: ergo nihil habet proprium, ergo non distinguitur; si autem omnino differt: ergo si una est Deus, altera non est Deus; si partim convenit et partim differt: cum hoc non sit secundum idem, erit compositum⁸.

12. Item, cum una persona communicat alii, aut communicat ei quidquid habet, aut non. Si non: ergo aliquid sui dat et aliquid retinet, ergo est composita et avara. Si quidquid habet: ergo sicut communicat ei suam quidditatem, ita et personalitatem. — Si dicas, quod personalitas non est communicabilis; contra est: quia ita est simplex, sicut natura, ut dicis: ergo sicut natura communicabilis est, ita videtur, quod persona⁹.

13. Item, proprietas personae aut est aliquid, aut nihil. Si nihil: ergo nihil facit, ergo non distinguit illud, in quo est; si aliquid, aut est in essentia, aut non. Si est in essentia; sed proprietas distinguit illud, in quo est: ergo natura et essentia numerantur; quod est contra trinitatem. Si non est in essentia, sed in persona: ergo aliquid secundum rem est in persona, quod non est in essentia: ergo necesse est, quod proprietas faciat personam compositam.

14. Item, proprietas personae est relatio; aut ergo transit in substantiam, sicut alia genera¹⁰, aut non transit. Si transit: ergo sicut substantia non distinguitur nec distinguit, ita nec proprietas: ergo non est trinitas. Si non transit: ergo aliquid ultra substantiam dicit, ergo diminuit de ratione simplicitatis: si ergo non potest esse sine proprietatibus, ergo impossibile est, quod stet cum summa simplicitate.

15. Item, punctus, sicut suis relationibus non componitur, ita nec realiter numeratur: si ergo Deus puncto est simplicior, ergo nullo modo est in eo aliqua realis distinctio.

16. Item, prius est absolutum respectivo¹¹: ergo distinctio secundum proprietatem absolutam ea prior est, quae est secundum respectivam; sed quanto aliquid prius, tanto simplicius: si ergo distinctio secundum absolutas non stat cum summa simplicitate, ergo nec distinctio secundum respectivas.

p. 75

Contra: 1. Contingit reperire aliquid simplex, quia est unum in uno, et aliquid amplius simplex, quia est unum in pluribus multiplicatum; quod est simplicius, quia unum in pluribus, sicut universale¹, sed tamen non summe, quia numeratur: ergo si aliquid esset unum in pluribus non multiplicatum, illud esset simplicissimum; sed hoc attribuendum est divino esse, quod est simplicissimum: ergo trinitas non tollit simplicitatem divinae essentiae.

2. Item, pluralitas naturarum non repugnat simplicitati personae, sicut patet in Christo²: ergo si magis facit ad compositionem naturarum diversitas quam personarum pluralitas, videtur, quod multo fortius pluralitas personarum simplicitatem naturae in nullo diminuat: stat igitur etc.

3. Item, Deus potest creare sine omni suae simplicitatis diminutione: ergo si generare et spirare est actus intrinsecus, multo fortius generat et spirat, manente simplicitate summa. Sed quia generat et spirat, est trinitas: ergo etc.

4. Item, intelligere est actus, qui simplicitati in nullo repugnat, sed magis attestatur et consonat; sed mens quaecumque se intelligendo generat sui similitudinem, quae dicitur verbum a generante distinctum³: ergo sicut cum summa simplicitate stare potest actus intelligendi, ita etiam generatio, et pari ratione productio Spiritus sancti: ergo videtur, quod tota trinitas simul stet cum summa simplicitate.

5. Item, ut dicit Augustinus sexto de Trinitate⁴, « in spiritualibus idem est maius et melius »; sed in beata Trinitate quaelibet persona est optima: ergo non sunt aliquid melius tres quam unum, ergo nec maius. Sed in omni compositione ponitur aliquid additum, quod est aliquo modo amplius: ergo illa summa trinitas nullam omnino ponit compositionem: ergo in nullo repugnat simplicitati.

6. Item, summa simplicitas non excludit, sed includit summam perfectionem; summa perfectio non excludit, sed includit pluralitatem: ergo a primo, summa simplicitas pluralitatem personarum non excludit, sed includit: ergo non repugnat, sed maxime consonat.

7. Item, summa simplicitas non excludit, sed includit summam potentiam et virtutem, quia, sicut supra⁵ probatum est, quanto aliqua virtus magis est unita, tanto magis est infinita; sed summa virtus et actualissima ponit summam et perfectissimam communicationem et productionem, et hoc ponit trinitatem: ergo simul stat necessario trinitas et summa simplicitas.

8. Item, lux dicitur de substantia spirituali et corporali, et spirituali creata et increata secundum quandam proportionem et analogiam; sed productio splendoris materialis nihil diminuit de simplicitate lucis materialis, productio etiam lucis spiritualis, utpote intelligentiae sive verbi a mente, nihil diminuit de simplicitate substantiae intellectivae: ergo productio aeterni Splendoris a Patre nihil diminuit de simplicitate lucis aeternae.

9. Item, simplicitas puncti et unitatis et cuiuslibet principii creati non excludit, sed includit pluralitatem relationum et respectuum, et hoc modo non est imperfectionis, sed perfectionis; sed omne tale est Deo attribuendum: ergo circa Deum non repugnat simplicitas summa et pluralitas relationum. Sed « relatio multiplicat trinitatem », ut dicit Boethius⁶: ergo etc.

10. Item, ubi non est materia et situs, non potest esse separatio: productio ergo abstrahens a ratione situs et materiae non ponit aliquam separationem: ergo stat cum omnimoda indivisione, ergo et cum omnimoda simplicitate. Si ergo tali productione producuntur personae in Trinitate, simul ergo stare potest trinitas cum summa simplicitate.

CONCLUSIO.

Trinitas personarum non tollit summam simplicitatem, nec summa simplicitas excludit trinitatem.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod primum principium simul est trinum et simplicissimum, ita quod nec trinitas tollit summam simplicitatem, nec summa simplicitas excludit trinitatem; et hoc quidem certissime per fidem tenemus.

Ut autem aliquatenus intelligamus, duo oportet hic praenotare: primo, diversos modos distinctionum personalium, secundo, diversos modos attributionum divinarum.

Quantum ad primum intelligendum, quod, sicut dicit Richardus de Trinitate⁷, tribus modis distinguitur persona a persona, scilicet origine tantum, qualitate tantum, origine et qualitate simul. Primus modus est in divinis, secundus in angelicis spiritibus, tertius in hominibus. — Homines enim distinguuntur ab invicem qualitate propter diversitatem accidentium et proprietatum, quibus unum individuum ab altero discernitur⁸; origine vero, quia unus homo ab alio nascitur. — Angeli autem, quia differunt

p. 76

substantiis et proprietatibus formalibus, distinguuntur qualitate; sed quia unus ab alio non procedit, non distinguuntur origine. — Personae autem divinae, quia omnino unum sunt in substantia et forma et nulla habent accidentia, non distinguuntur qualitate, sed sola origine; illa autem origo est ipsius personae non per aliquid aliud, sed per se ipsam, ita quod, sicut Deus se ipso intelligit et est suus intellectus, ita Pater se ipso generat et est ipsa generatio, similiter Filius sua filiatio: si ergo est ibi verissima origo, verissima est personalis distinctio. — Rursus, si persona est sua origo, nulla est omnino in persona compositio, ac per hoc ita simplex est, sicut essentia: est igitur omnimoda secundum rem indifferentia inter personam et essentiam, et personam et proprietatem et essentiam. Unde vere persona est essentia et proprietas, et essentia proprietas et persona, et proprietas persona et essentia¹. Quomodo ergo potest intelligi aliqua compositio in tanta indifferentia? Necesse est igitur in tali distinctione personarum omnimodam intelligere simplicitatem: ex quo ergo impossibile est intelligere aliquam compositionem, non repugnant trinitas personae intellectae et simplicitas summa. — Multum ergo valet ad hoc videndum inspicere modos distinctionum personalium, quos ignorantes haeretici erraverunt.

Rursus, attendendi sunt diversi modi attributionum divinarum. Est enim differentia quantum ad modos essendi et quantum ad modos se habendi et quantum ad rationes intelligendi. — In divinis igitur quantum ad esse vel essentiam non potest reperiri diversitas sive differentia, quia illud esse est unum et simplicissimum; nec etiam quantum ad modum essendi absolutum, quia, sicut in Deo non est aliud ens essentia et esse, sic non est differens esse et sic esse. Et ratio huius est, quia in Deo idem est posse et esse, et non est dicere, quod possit sic et aliter esse. Et ideo, quia modi essendi sunt idem quod essentia, omnia praedicata dicentia modum absolutum transeunt in substantiam, relatione excepta, quae dicit modum essendi respectivum; qui modus dicendi in comparatione ad subiectum transit in substantiam, ut hypostasis sit sua proprietas, ne inducatur compositio; sed manet in comparatione ad terminum, ut vera salvetur distinctio. Differentia enim relationis a subiecto in quo inducit compositionem; sed differentia a termino ad quem non inducit nisi solam distinctionem. Cum ergo in divinis non reperiatur differentia, nec quantum ad essentiam nec quantum ad esse nec quantum ad absolutos modos essendi; reperitur tamen tribus modis praedictis. Differentia namque quantum ad modos essendi² est in personis ad invicem: quia, licet idem esse habeant, tamen alio modo, quia una a se, alia vero ab alio; et haec est tanta diversitas, ut non permittat, unam personam dici de alia. Illi enim modi, sicut prius ostensum est, licet non inducant compositionem, faciunt tamen veram distinctionem.

Differentia vero quantum ad modos se habendi est in personis ad essentiam relatis. Quoniam enim oriri est ipsius personae, non essentiae; ideo persona refertur et se habet ad alteram, essentia non; et hinc est, quod una distinguitur, scilicet persona, et non altera, scilicet essentia. Et ex hac differentia non fit, quod una removeatur ab altera, fit tamen, ut possit aliquid dici de persona, quod non dicitur de essentia, et e converso. Et ex hac differentia nascitur triplex modus dicendi in divinis, scilicet in quid et in quis et in quae, scilicet notio, persona et essentia; et inde est, quod, supposita persona, non supponitur notio nec e converso, et similiter de essentia. Sed ex variatione talium modorum introducitur figura dictionis³ in divinis, sicut patet consideranti.

Differentia vero quantum ad rationes intelligendi est in proprietatibus essentialibus, quae omnino idem sunt, sicut veritas et bonitas; tamen noster intellectus intelligit per diversa et sub alia ratione et alia, et ideo aliter nominat; et haec est minima differentia, quae possit inveniri circa divina, quia magis est ex parte nostri quam Dei. — Stat igitur summa simplicitas non solum cum personali distinctione, sed etiam cum multiformi attributione. Unde concedendae sunt rationes, quae sunt ad hanc partem; ad oppositas vero satis facile est respondere.

1. Ad illud quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod simplicius est ens abstractum quam concretum; dicendum, quod illud veritatem habet in eo, in quo differt forma et suppositum, in quo quidem est abstractio et concretio ex parte rei; in divinis autem proprie non ponitur concretio nisi ex parte nostri. — Similiter quod dicit, quod simplicius est unum non in pluribus quam in pluribus; dicendum, quod illud habet veritatem, ubi aliquid plus est in pluribus quam in uno, sicut est in numero; non sic autem est in proposito, quia ita complete et perfecte est divina essentia et natura in una suarum hypostasum, sicut in tribus⁴.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod simplicius est idem diverso etc.; dicendum, quod est diversitas sive distinctio, quae venit ex additione, sicut illa quae est inter diversas species, quae distinguuntur per diversas differentias additas supra genus; et est distinctio veniens non ex additione, sed ex origine;

p. 77

et haec est in divinis personis, quae distinguuntur ex eo, quod una manat ab altera; et haec nullam ponit compositionem, secundum quod explicatum fuit in principali solutione.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod commune simplicius est proprio; dicendum, quod illud habet veritatem, ubi commune arctatur et contrahitur per proprium; tunc enim ratione arctantis et contrahentis admittit et compositionem et distinctionem, sicut apparet in universali et particulari; hoc autem modo non est reperire commune in divinis, quia essentia, licet sit communis in divinis, non tamen contrahitur nec arctatur nec distinguitur in personis¹.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne absolutum simplicius est respectivo; dicendum, quod respectivum est duplex: quoddam, quod dicit respectum ad aliud diversum secundum essentiam; quoddam, quod non dicit respectum nisi ad aliquid sibi consubstantiale. Primo modo respectivum includit quandam dependentiam, ac per hoc et defectum dicit a simplicitate summa; secundo modo non dicit aliquam dependentiam nec defectum a simplicitate summa, maxime quando ipsum suppositum est sua proprietas, qua refertur; et hoc modo ponitur respectus in proprietatibus divinarum personarum, non primo modo, et ita nulla ex hoc introducitur compositio. — Et si obiiciatur, quod « relativum omne est aliquid, excepto eo quod relative dicitur »; dicendum: si primo modo intelligatur, quod veritatem habet non solum ex parte rationis intelligendi, verum etiam ex parte rei; si secundo modo intelligatur, veritatem habet ex parte rationis intelligendi, quia Pater praeter rationem relationis importat hypostasim, quae tamen non est aliud a sua proprietate personali.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne definiens simplicius est definito; dicendum, quod illud veritatem habet de definitione formali et in recto, ubi definientia sunt partes essentiales, constituentes ipsum definitum. Non sic autem est in proposito: tum quia personae divinae, proprie loquendo, definiri non habent; tum etiam, quia natura non cadit in definitione personae in recto; tum etiam, quia definitio illa potius respicit intentionem nominis personae et naturae, secundum quod venit in intellectu nostro, quam respiciat ipsam secundum esse suum proprium, quod nec comprehendi habet nec definiri propter summam simplicitatem et immensitatem esse divini².

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod pars semper est simplicior toto; dicendum, quod verum est. Sed quod assumit, quod trinitatis pars est una personarum, falsum est, quia omne totum dicit aliquid maius quam sua pars. Ut autem saepe dictum est, nihil maius est in tribus personis quam in una; quaelibet enim personarum est summe ens et vera et bona; ideo licet trinitas in divinis ponat rationem pluralitatis, non tamen ponit propter hoc rationem verae totalitatis³.

7. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod punctus est semper simplicior continuo, et unitas numero; dicendum, quod veritatem habet de numero vero, qui est aggregatio diversarum unitatum; sed non talis numerus est in trinitate divinarum personarum, pro eo quod non est ibi aggregatio multarum unitatum, sicut nec entitatum nec veritatum, sed est eiusdem unitatis replicatio circa alium et alium; et hoc importat ipsum vocabulum, quod dicitur trinitas, id est unitas trium⁴.

8. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aut persona est aeque simplex, sicut essentia, aut non; dicendum, quod est aeque simplex secundum rem. — Et quod obiicit ultra, quod essentia propter summam simplicitatem non compatitur alias essentias; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia, si essent plures essentiae divinae, esset ibi convenientia et differentia essentialis; convenientia, inquam, quia quaelibet esset Deus; differentia vero, quia plures, et hoc non posset esse sine additione et compositione⁵. Non sic autem est in pluralitate personarum: quia, sicut ostensum est, non distinguuntur ad invicem per aliquam additionem realem, sed solum per originem naturalem; et ideo simplicitas essentiae excludit pluralitatem essentiae, et pluralitas personae non excludit unitatem essentiae divinae nec excludit simplicitatem personae.

9. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aut persona addit aliquid supra essentiam secundum rem et intellectum etc.; dicendum, quod secundum intellectum addit, quia in intellectu vero personae clauditur intellectus naturae et proprietatis et hypostasis. Unde intellectus eius compositus est, ita tamen, quod sicut nulla est compositio, sic etiam nulla est additio a parte rei. — Et si obiiciatur, quod intellectus iste est falsus; dicendum, quod falsum est: quia ex parte rei aliquid ei respondet; nam in divinis vere sunt illa tria, scilicet natura et proprietas et hypostasis distincta per proprietatem suam; sunt tamen omnino unum in ipsa per simplicitatem summam, ad quam quia non potest intellectus noster pertingere, intelligit et nominat sub differenti ratione et sub quadam compositione, quam non ponit circa ipsam rem, sed circa se ipsum intelligentem, sicut habitum fuit in praecedenti problemate⁶.

p. 78

10. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod affirmatio et negatio non sunt vera de eodem et secundum idem; dicendum, quod non solummodo impedit contradictionem, quod aliqua dicantur de eodem non secundum idem, verum etiam, quod non dicantur ad idem. Et quia persona referri habet et comparari ad aliam, natura vero non: hinc est, quod aliquid potest attribui uni, quod non attribuitur alteri; nec tamen ex hoc sequitur, quod sit in eis compositio vel diversitas secundum essentiam vel esse; sufficit enim, quod sit solum secundum se habere¹.

11. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aut una persona omnino convenit cum alia, aut partim convenit, partim differt; dicendum, quod persona cum altera convenit secundum essentiam, differt autem secundum proprietatem; proprietas autem illa comparata ad essentiam est tantum modus essendi, qui est idem quod essentia, secundum id quod est, quia essentia est ipsa proprietas, differt autem secundum id ad quod; et quia compositio venit secundum id in quo, distinctio secundum id ad quod: ideo differentia, quae est inter proprietatem et essentiam, talis est, quae sufficit ad distinctionem, nullam tamen inducit compositionem.

12. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aut una persona communicat alii quidquid habet, aut non; dicendum, quod communicat ei quidquid habet communicabile, et hoc est essentia vel natura; personalitas autem sive respectus, qui est in persona illa, potius dicit rationem distinguentis quam communicabilis; et ideo, licet hoc non communicet, perfecta tamen est ibi communicatio, quia cum communicatione manet salva distinctio.

13. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aut proprietas personae est aliquid, aut nihil; dicendum, quod proprietas personae, formaliter et proprie loquendo, est ad aliquid; et illud ad aliquid comparari habet et ad divinam essentiam et ad personam, quam distinguit, et ad personam, a qua distinguit. Per comparationem ad personam, a qua distinguit, vere res est, quia realiter ab illa differt, sicut et realiter distinguitur per paternitatem Pater a Filio; per comparationem autem ad personam, in qua est, seu etiam ad ipsam essentiam, modus tantum est, qui non ponit aliquam compositionem circa Deum, quia, sicut prius ostensum fuit, non differt in Deo esse et sic esse sive modus essendi, sicut non differt « vivere et beate vivere² ».

14. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod proprietas personae aut transit in substantiam, aut non; dicendum, quod relatio duplicem dicit respectum, scilicet ad subiectum in quo et ad extremum³ ad quod. Primo modo transit, sicut et alia genera, secundo modo manet. Et quia ipsa praeter alia genera dicit comparationem ut ad alterum; hinc est, quod omnia dicuntur transire in substantiam, ipsa non transeunte, non quia ipsa aliquo modo dicat aliquid, quod non sit essentia, sed quia competit sibi ad aliquid dici, ad quod essentia non habet dici nec referri. Unde absque dubio essentia est illud ad, sed non est illud, ad quod est illud ad; et ideo salva est ibi distinctio et nulla compositio.

15. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod punctus propter suam simplicitatem suis relationibus nec componitur nec numeratur; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia relationes puncti sunt ad extra, sed relationes personales sunt ad intra; ideo, quamvis punctus possit dici principium et finis respectu diversarum linearum, nulla tamen hypostasis simul potest dici Pater et Filius, quia nulla potest sibi ipsi esse nascendi principium.

16. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod prius est absolutum quam respectivum: ergo et distinctio secundum proprietatem absolutam prior, quam ea quae est secundum proprietatem respectivam; dicendum, quod illud non valet: quia omnis distinctio includit aliquem respectum⁴; et praeterea, distinctio illa, quae minus recedit a prima et summa unitate, illa quidem est prior; haec autem distinctio est illa, in qua non plurificatur unitas, et talis non potest esse essentialis, sed relati      Unde dici potest, vel quod ratio illa non con        aut quod propositio illa veritatem habet de respectivo, quod aliquam importat dependentiam. Hoc autem genus respectivi non ponitur circa distinctionem aeternarum personarum; et ideo non facit recedere a ratione simplicissimi, sicut nec a ratione primi et absolutissimi, sicut ex praehabitis elucescit.

---

English Translation

p. 73

Article II. Whether trinity and the highest simplicity can stand together.

Next it is asked concerning this, whether trinity and the highest simplicity can stand together. And that they are incompossible seems to follow from several reasons.

1. An abstract being is simpler than a concrete one⁵: therefore a nature having no supposit is simpler than a nature existing in several hypostases; but trinity posits the existence of the nature in several hypostases: therefore it takes something away from the highest simplicity.

2. Likewise, the same is simpler than the diverse⁶: therefore everything in which there is identity in every way is simpler than that in which some diversity, however slight, is found; but there cannot be trinity without diversity, however slight: therefore it cannot stand with the highest simplicity.

3. Likewise, the common is simpler than the proper, as is plain, because the proper implies in itself the common and something more; but there cannot be a true trinity unless

p. 74

the properties of the three persons are distinct and incommunicable¹: therefore it is impossible to posit trinity without positing in it some falling away from the highest simplicity.

4. Likewise, everything absolute is simpler than the relative, because, as Augustine says², « every relative is something, apart from that which is said relatively »; whence the relative includes the absolute; but there cannot be a trinity of persons without a plurality of relations: therefore, etc.

5. Likewise, everything defining is simpler than the defined; but nature falls within the account of person³: therefore nature is always simpler than person: therefore the account of personality cannot stand with the highest simplicity. But trinity cannot exist save in persons: therefore trinity is repugnant to the highest simplicity.

6. Likewise, the part is always simpler than the whole; but unity is a part of trinity, and one person a part of the three persons: therefore if trinity posits a true plurality, and a true plurality posits a true totality, and a true totality excludes the highest⁴ simplicity: therefore from the first, trinity cannot stand with the highest simplicity.

7. Likewise, a point is always simpler than a continuum, and therefore unity than number: therefore the unity of a person is simpler than the trinity of persons; but that which has something simpler than itself is not supremely simple: therefore it is impossible that trinity should be compatible with the highest simplicity.

8. Likewise, either person is equally simple as essence, or not. If not: then either person is not in the divine, or the divine being is not most simple; but if it is equally simple as essence; yet essence, on account of the highest simplicity, is not compatible with several divine essences⁵: therefore by the same reasoning neither is person.

9. Likewise, either person adds something over nature according to being and understanding, or according to understanding alone, or according to neither. If in the first way: then it falls together with⁶ the highest simplicity; if in the second way: then the understanding is empty and false, to which nothing corresponds in reality; if in the third way: then just as nature is not pluralized, so neither is person.

10. Likewise, either whatever belongs to person belongs to nature, and conversely, or not. If so: then, since person is distinguished, nature too would be distinguished, and thus there will not be there what is supremely simple; if not; but affirmation and negation are not true of the same thing and according to the same⁷: therefore according to one thing and another; but that which has this is composite: therefore, etc.

11. Likewise, either one person differs wholly from another, or agrees wholly, or agrees in part and differs in part. If it agrees wholly: then it has nothing proper to itself, and therefore it is not distinguished; but if it differs wholly: then if one is God, the other is not God; if it agrees in part and differs in part: since this is not according to the same, it will be composite⁸.

12. Likewise, when one person communicates with another, either it communicates to it whatever it has, or not. If not: then it gives something of its own and retains something, and therefore it is composite and grudging. If whatever it has: then just as it communicates to it its own quiddity, so also its personality. — If you say that personality is not communicable; on the contrary: because it is as simple as nature, as you say: therefore just as nature is communicable, so it seems that person is⁹.

13. Likewise, the property of a person is either something or nothing. If nothing: then it does nothing, and therefore does not distinguish that in which it is; if something, either it is in the essence or not. If it is in the essence; but the property distinguishes that in which it is: then nature and essence are numbered; which is against trinity. If it is not in the essence, but in the person: then something according to the thing is in the person which is not in the essence: therefore it must be that the property makes the person composite.

14. Likewise, the property of a person is a relation; therefore either it passes over into substance, as the other genera do¹⁰, or it does not pass over. If it passes over: then just as substance is not distinguished and does not distinguish, so neither does the property: therefore there is no trinity. If it does not pass over: then it expresses something beyond substance, and therefore takes something away from the account of simplicity: if therefore there cannot be a trinity without properties, then it is impossible that it should stand with the highest simplicity.

15. Likewise, just as a point is not composed by its relations, so neither is it really numbered: if therefore God is simpler than a point, then in no way is there in him any real distinction.

16. Likewise, the absolute is prior to the relative¹¹: therefore that distinction which is according to an absolute property is prior to that which is according to a relative one; but the prior a thing is, the simpler it is: if therefore a distinction according to absolutes does not stand with the highest simplicity, then neither does a distinction according to relatives.

p. 75

On the contrary: 1. It happens that we find something simple, because it is one in one, and something more simple, because it is one multiplied in many; and this is simpler, because it is one in many, as the universal is¹, yet not supremely so, because it is numbered: therefore if something were one in many without being multiplied, that would be most simple; but this is to be attributed to the divine being, which is most simple: therefore trinity does not take away the simplicity of the divine essence.

2. Likewise, a plurality of natures is not repugnant to the simplicity of a person, as is plain in Christ²: therefore if a diversity of natures makes more for composition than a plurality of persons does, it seems that much more strongly a plurality of persons takes nothing away from the simplicity of the nature: it stands, therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, God can create without any diminution of his own simplicity: therefore if to generate and to spirate is an intrinsic act, much more strongly does he generate and spirate while the highest simplicity remains. But because he generates and spirates, there is trinity: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, to understand is an act which is in no way repugnant to simplicity, but rather attests to it and is consonant with it; but any mind whatever, by understanding itself, generates a likeness of itself, which is called the word distinct from the one generating³: therefore just as the act of understanding can stand with the highest simplicity, so also can generation, and by the same reasoning the production of the Holy Spirit: therefore it seems that the whole trinity stands together with the highest simplicity.

5. Likewise, as Augustine says in the sixth book on the Trinity⁴, « in spiritual things the greater is the same as the better »; but in the blessed Trinity every person is best: therefore three are not anything better than one, and therefore not greater either. But in every composition something added is posited which is in some way more: therefore that highest trinity posits no composition whatever: therefore it is in no way repugnant to simplicity.

6. Likewise, the highest simplicity does not exclude but includes the highest perfection; and the highest perfection does not exclude but includes plurality: therefore from the first, the highest simplicity does not exclude but includes a plurality of persons: therefore it is not repugnant, but most consonant.

7. Likewise, the highest simplicity does not exclude but includes the highest power and strength, because, as was proved above⁵, the more united any strength is, the more infinite it is; but the highest and most actual strength posits the highest and most perfect communication and production, and this posits trinity: therefore trinity and the highest simplicity necessarily stand together.

8. Likewise, light is predicated of spiritual and of corporeal substance, and of spiritual substance created and uncreated, according to a certain proportion and analogy; but the production of a material splendour takes nothing away from the simplicity of the material light, and the production of a spiritual light also — namely of an intelligence or of a word from a mind — takes nothing away from the simplicity of the intellective substance: therefore the production of the eternal Splendour from the Father takes nothing away from the simplicity of the eternal light.

9. Likewise, the simplicity of a point and of unity and of any created principle whatever does not exclude but includes a plurality of relations and respects, and in this way it is not a mark of imperfection but of perfection; but everything of this kind is to be attributed to God: therefore in God the highest simplicity and a plurality of relations are not repugnant. But « relation multiplies the trinity », as Boethius says⁶: therefore, etc.

10. Likewise, where there is no matter and situation, there can be no separation: therefore a production abstracting from the account of situation and of matter posits no separation: therefore it stands with undividedness in every way, and therefore with simplicity in every way. If therefore the persons in the Trinity are produced by such a production, then trinity can stand together with the highest simplicity.

CONCLUSION.

The trinity of persons does not take away the highest simplicity, nor does the highest simplicity exclude trinity.

I respond: It must be said that the first principle is at once threefold and most simple, so that neither does trinity take away the highest simplicity, nor does the highest simplicity exclude trinity; and this indeed we hold most certainly by faith.

But that we may understand it in some measure, two things must be noted beforehand here: first, the diverse modes of personal distinctions; second, the diverse modes of divine attributions.

As to the first it is to be understood that, as Richard says in On the Trinity⁷, person is distinguished from person in three modes, namely by origin alone, by quality alone, and by origin and quality together. The first mode is in the divine, the second in the angelic spirits, the third in men. — For men are distinguished from one another by quality, on account of the diversity of accidents and properties by which one individual is discerned from another⁸; but by origin, because one man is born of another. — Angels, however, because they differ

p. 76

in substances and in formal properties, are distinguished by quality; but because one does not proceed from another, they are not distinguished by origin. — But the divine persons, because they are wholly one in substance and in form and have no accidents, are not distinguished by quality, but by origin alone; and that origin belongs to the person itself not through anything else, but through the person itself, so that, just as God understands by himself and is his own understanding, so the Father generates by himself and is generation itself, and likewise the Son is his own filiation: if therefore there is there a most true origin, the personal distinction is most true. — Again, if the person is its own origin, there is no composition whatever in the person, and thereby it is as simple as the essence: there is therefore an undifferentiatedness in every way according to the thing between person and essence, and between person and property and essence. Whence truly person is essence and property, and essence is property and person, and property is person and essence¹. How then can any composition be understood in so great an undifferentiatedness? It is necessary, therefore, in such a distinction of persons to understand simplicity in every way: since therefore it is impossible to understand any composition, the trinity of the persons understood and the highest simplicity are not repugnant. — Much therefore avails toward seeing this: to look into the modes of personal distinctions, in ignorance of which the heretics erred.

Again, the diverse modes of divine attributions are to be attended to. For there is a difference in respect of the modes of being, and in respect of the modes of being related, and in respect of the accounts of understanding. — In the divine, therefore, in respect of being or essence no diversity or difference can be found, because that being is one and most simple; nor even in respect of the absolute mode of being, because, just as in God essence and being are not another being, so to be and to be thus are not different. And the reason for this is that in God to be able and to be are the same, and it cannot be said that he could be otherwise than thus. And therefore, since the modes of being are the same as the essence, all predicates expressing an absolute mode pass over into substance, relation excepted, which expresses a relative mode of being; and this mode of speaking, in comparison to the subject, passes over into substance, so that the hypostasis is its own property, lest composition be introduced; but it remains in comparison to the term, so that a true distinction may be preserved. For a difference of relation from the subject in which introduces composition; but a difference from the term to which introduces nothing but distinction alone. Since therefore in the divine no difference is found, neither in respect of the essence nor in respect of the being nor in respect of the absolute modes of being; it is nevertheless found in the three modes just named. For a difference in respect of the modes of being² is in the persons with regard to one another: because, although they have the same being, yet they have it in another mode, since one is from itself and another from another; and this is so great a diversity that it does not permit one person to be predicated of another. For those modes, as was shown before, although they do not introduce composition, nevertheless make a true distinction.

But a difference in respect of the modes of being related is in the persons as related to the essence. For since to arise belongs to the person, not to the essence, therefore the person is referred and is related to another, while the essence is not; and hence it is that one is distinguished, namely the person, and not the other, namely the essence. And from this difference it does not come about that one is removed from the other, but it does come about that something can be said of the person which is not said of the essence, and conversely. And from this difference there arises a threefold mode of speaking in the divine, namely in what, and in who, and in which, namely notion, person, and essence; and hence it is that, when person is supposited, notion is not supposited, nor conversely, and likewise of essence. But from the variation of such modes a figure of diction³ is introduced in the divine, as is plain to one who considers.

But a difference in respect of the accounts of understanding is in the essential properties, which are wholly the same, as truth and goodness are; yet our understanding understands them through diverse things and under one account and another, and therefore names them differently; and this is the least difference that can be found concerning divine things, because it is more on our side than on God's. — The highest simplicity, therefore, stands not only with a personal distinction, but also with a manifold attribution. Whence the reasons which are on this side are to be conceded; and to those on the opposite side it is easy enough to reply.

1. To that which is objected first on the contrary side, that an abstract being is simpler than a concrete one: it must be said that this holds true in that in which form and supposit differ, in which indeed there is abstraction and concretion on the side of the thing; but in the divine, concretion is not properly posited except on our side. — Likewise as to what he says, that one not in many is simpler than one in many: it must be said that this holds true where something is more in many than in one, as is the case in number; but it is not so in the matter proposed, because the divine essence and nature is as completely and perfectly in one of its hypostases as in three⁴.

2. To that which is objected, that the same is simpler than the diverse, etc.: it must be said that there is a diversity or distinction which comes from addition, as that which is between diverse species, which are distinguished by diverse differences added over the genus; and there is a distinction coming not from addition but from origin;

p. 77

and this is in the divine persons, which are distinguished by the fact that one flows from another; and this posits no composition, according to what was explained in the principal solution.

3. To that which is objected, that the common is simpler than the proper: it must be said that this holds true where the common is restricted and contracted by the proper; for then, by reason of what restricts and contracts, it admits both composition and distinction, as appears in the universal and the particular; but the common is not to be found in the divine in this way, because the essence, although it is common in the divine, is nevertheless not contracted nor restricted nor distinguished in the persons¹.

4. To that which is objected, that everything absolute is simpler than the relative: it must be said that the relative is twofold: one which expresses a respect toward something diverse according to essence; another which expresses a respect only toward something consubstantial with itself. In the first way the relative includes a certain dependence, and thereby expresses also a defect from the highest simplicity; in the second way it expresses no dependence nor defect from the highest simplicity, especially when the supposit itself is its own property, by which it is referred; and in this way respect is posited in the properties of the divine persons, not in the first way, and thus no composition is introduced from this. — And if it be objected that « every relative is something, apart from that which is said relatively »: it must be said that if it be understood in the first way, it holds true not only on the side of the account of understanding, but also on the side of the thing; if it be understood in the second way, it holds true on the side of the account of understanding, because the Father, beyond the account of relation, implies a hypostasis, which nevertheless is not other than his own personal property.

5. To that which is objected, that everything defining is simpler than the defined: it must be said that this holds true of a formal definition and in the direct case, where the defining terms are the essential parts constituting the defined thing itself. But it is not so in the matter proposed: both because the divine persons, properly speaking, are not to be defined; and also because nature does not fall within the definition of person in the direct case; and also because that definition regards rather the intention of the name of person and of nature, according as it comes into our understanding, than that it regards the thing itself according to its own proper being, which can neither be comprehended nor defined on account of the highest simplicity and immensity of the divine being².

6. To that which is objected, that the part is always simpler than the whole: it must be said that this is true. But what he assumes, that one of the persons is a part of the trinity, is false, because every whole expresses something greater than its part. But as has often been said, there is nothing greater in three persons than in one; for each of the persons is supremely being and true and good; therefore, although trinity in the divine posits the account of plurality, it does not on this account posit the account of a true totality³.

7. To that which is objected, that a point is always simpler than a continuum, and unity than number: it must be said that this holds true of number in the true sense, which is an aggregation of diverse unities; but number of this sort is not in the trinity of the divine persons, for the reason that there is not there an aggregation of many unities, just as there is not of entities nor of truths, but there is a replication of the same unity about one and another; and this is what the very word which is called trinity imports, that is, the unity of three⁴.

8. To that which is objected, that either person is equally simple as essence, or not: it must be said that it is equally simple according to the thing. — And as to what he objects further, that essence on account of the highest simplicity is not compatible with other essences: it must be said that the case is not alike, because if there were several divine essences, there would be there an essential agreement and difference; agreement, I say, because each would be God; but difference, because they are several, and this could not be without addition and composition⁵. But it is not so in a plurality of persons: because, as has been shown, they are not distinguished from one another by any real addition, but only by natural origin; and therefore the simplicity of the essence excludes a plurality of the essence, while the plurality of the person does not exclude the unity of the divine essence, nor does it exclude the simplicity of the person.

9. To that which is objected, that either person adds something over the essence according to the thing and to understanding, etc.: it must be said that it adds according to understanding, because in the true understanding of person there is enclosed the understanding of nature and of property and of hypostasis. Whence the understanding of it is composite, yet in such a way that, just as there is no composition, so also there is no addition on the side of the thing. — And if it be objected that this understanding is false: it must be said that it is false to say so, because on the side of the thing something corresponds to it; for in the divine those three truly are, namely nature and property and hypostasis distinguished by its own property; yet they are wholly one in the thing itself through the highest simplicity, and because our understanding cannot attain to it, it understands and names under a differing account and under a certain composition, which it posits not about the thing itself but about itself as understanding, as was established in the preceding problem⁶.

p. 78

10. To that which is objected, that affirmation and negation are not true of the same thing and according to the same: it must be said that it not only prevents contradiction that things be said of the same thing not according to the same, but also that they be not said toward the same. And because a person has to be referred and compared to another, whereas a nature has not: hence it is that something can be attributed to the one which is not attributed to the other; nor nevertheless does it follow from this that there is in them composition or diversity according to essence or being; for it is enough that it be only according to being related¹.

11. To that which is objected, that either one person agrees wholly with another, or agrees in part and differs in part: it must be said that a person agrees with another according to essence, but differs according to property; and that property, compared to the essence, is only a mode of being, which is the same as the essence according to that which it is, because the essence is the property itself, but differs according to that toward which it is; and because composition comes according to that in which, and distinction according to that toward which: therefore the difference which is between property and essence is such as suffices for distinction, yet introduces no composition.

12. To that which is objected, that either one person communicates to another whatever it has, or not: it must be said that it communicates to it whatever it has that is communicable, and this is the essence or nature; but personality, or the respect which is in that person, expresses rather the account of what distinguishes than of what is communicable; and therefore, although it does not communicate this, nevertheless the communication there is perfect, because along with the communication the distinction remains preserved.

13. To that which is objected, that the property of a person is either something or nothing: it must be said that the property of a person, formally and properly speaking, is toward something; and that toward something has to be compared both to the divine essence and to the person which it distinguishes and to the person from which it distinguishes. By comparison to the person from which it distinguishes, it truly is a thing, because it really differs from that person, just as the Father is really distinguished from the Son by paternity; but by comparison to the person in which it is, or also to the essence itself, it is only a mode, which posits no composition about God, because, as was shown before, in God to be and to be thus, or the mode of being, do not differ, just as « to live and to live blessedly² » do not differ.

14. To that which is objected, that the property of a person either passes over into substance or does not: it must be said that a relation expresses a twofold respect, namely to the subject in which and to the extreme³ toward which. In the first way it passes over, as the other genera do; in the second way it remains. And because it, beyond the other genera, expresses a comparison as toward another; hence it is that all things are said to pass over into substance while it itself does not pass over — not because it in any way expresses something which is not the essence, but because it belongs to it to be said toward something, toward which the essence has not to be said nor referred. Whence without doubt the essence is that toward, but it is not that toward which that toward is; and therefore the distinction is preserved there, and there is no composition.

15. To that which is objected, that a point, on account of its simplicity, is neither composed nor numbered by its relations: it must be said that the case is not alike, because the relations of a point are toward the outside, whereas the personal relations are toward the inside; therefore, although a point can be called a beginning and an end with respect to diverse lines, nevertheless no hypostasis can at once be called Father and Son, because none can be to itself the principle of being born.

16. To that which is objected, that the absolute is prior to the relative: therefore also a distinction according to an absolute property is prior to that which is according to a relative property: it must be said that this does not hold, because every distinction includes some respect⁴; and moreover, that distinction which recedes less from the first and highest unity is indeed the prior one; and this distinction is that in which unity is not pluralized, and such a distinction cannot be essential but relati [sic] Whence it can be said either that that reasoning does not con [sic] or that that proposition holds true of the relative which implies some dependence. But this kind of relative is not posited about the distinction of the eternal persons; and therefore it does not make anything recede from the account of what is most simple, just as neither from the account of what is first and most absolute, as is clear from what has gone before.

---

Apparatus Criticus

5
Quod praeter formam sive naturam includit suppositum. — Cfr. de hac quaest. I. Sent. d. 2. q. 2. et d. 8. p. II. q. 1; Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 5. m. 2.
Because the supposit includes something beyond the form or nature. — On this question compare I Sentences, d. 2, q. 2, and d. 8, p. II, q. 1; Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. I, q. 5, m. 2.
6
Cfr. Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 16. (IV. c. 9.).
Compare Aristotle, Metaphysics V, text 16 (IV, c. 9).
1
Vide supra pag. 65, nota 3. et pag. 67, nota 1.
See above, p. 65, note 3, and p. 67, note 1.
2
Libr. VII. de Trin. c. 1. n. 2: Omnis essentia, quae relative dicitur, est etiam aliquid, excepto relativo. — Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 6: Quod vero per se est et substantia prius eo natura est, quod est ad aliquid [i. e. relativum]; esse enim hoc appendix quaedam videtur atque accidens eius quod est.
Book VII On the Trinity, c. 1, n. 2: "Every essence which is said relatively is also something, apart from the relative." — Aristotle, Ethics I, c. 6: "But that which is per se and substance is by nature prior to that which is toward something [i.e. the relative]; for this being seems to be a kind of appendage and an accident of that which is."
3
Vide supra pag. 65, nota 3. definitionem personae a Boethio datam.
See above, p. 65, note 3, for the definition of person given by Boethius.
4
G veram et summam.
G reads true and highest.
5
Ut ostensum est supra q. 2. a. 1. — In fine arg. G supplet plures personas.
As was shown above, q. 2, a. 1. — At the end of the argument G supplies several persons.
6
Videtur esse substituendum a pro cum, E in.
It seems that a is to be substituted for cum; E reads in.
7
Aristot., II. Elench. c. 5. (c. 25.): Nam contraria et opposita et affirmationem et negationem simpliciter quidem impossibile inesse eidem. Cfr. I. Prior. c. 42. (c. 40.) et IV. Metaph. text. 15. seqq. (III. c. 4.).
Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations II, c. 5 (c. 25): "For it is simply impossible that contraries and opposites, and affirmation and negation, should be in the same thing." Compare Prior Analytics I, c. 42 (c. 40), and Metaphysics IV, text 15 and following (III, c. 4).
8
Pro erit [A B erunt] compositum G erit compositio.
For erit [A B erunt] compositum, G reads erit compositio.
9
B ita etiam videtur, quod personalitas.
B reads thus it also seems, that personality.
10
Scil. praedicamentorum v. g. quantitas, qualitas etc. Cfr. August., V. de Trin. c. 8. n. 9. seqq., et Boeth., de Trin. c. 4. seqq.
Namely of the predicaments, e.g. quantity, quality, etc. Compare Augustine, On the Trinity V, c. 8, n. 9 and following, and Boethius, On the Trinity, c. 4 and following.
11
Cfr. supra nota 2. et pag. 46, nota 9. — De propos. quanto aliquid prius, tanto simplicius, cfr. Aristot., XI. Metaph. c. 1. (X. c. 1.).
Compare above, note 2, and p. 46, note 9. — On the proposition the prior a thing is, the simpler it is, compare Aristotle, Metaphysics XI, c. 1 (X, c. 1).
1
Vide supra pag. 66, nota 2. — Superius pro simplex, quia A G bis simplex, quod.
See above, p. 66, note 2. — Above, for simplex, quia, A G twice read simplex, quod.
2
Cfr. III. Sent. d. 6. a. 1. q. 2.
Compare III Sentences, d. 6, a. 1, q. 2.
3
Vide supra pag. 34, nota 6.
See above, p. 34, note 6.
4
Cap. 8. n. 9: In iis enim, quae non mole magna sunt, hoc est maius esse quod est melius esse.
C. 8, n. 9: "For in those things which are not great in bulk, to be greater is to be better."
5
Art. 1. fundam. 6. et de scientia Christi q. 6. in corp. — Lib. de Causis, propos. 17.
Article 1, fundamentum 6, and On the Knowledge of Christ, q. 6, in the body. — Book of Causes, proposition 17.
6
Libr. de Trin. c. 6.
The book On the Trinity, c. 6.
7
Libr. IV. c. 13. seq. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 587, nota 7; tom. II. pag. 103, nota 6. et pag. 104, nota 5.
Book IV, c. 13 and following. Compare vol. I, p. 587, note 7; vol. II, p. 103, note 6, and p. 104, note 5.
8
Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Specie: Individua autem dicuntur huiusmodi, quoniam ex proprietatibus consistit unumquodque eorum, quarum collectio nunquam in alio eadem erit etc.
Porphyry, On the Predicables, the chapter On Species: "Individuals, however, are so called because each of them consists of properties whose collection will never be the same in another," etc.
1
Cfr. I. Sent. d. 26. q. 1. seqq., d. 33. per totam et d. 34. q. 1. seq., ubi etiam de seqq. modis essendi. — Superius post sicut essentia B addit et proprietas.
Compare I Sentences, d. 26, q. 1 and following; d. 33 throughout; and d. 34, q. 1 and following, where the following modes of being are also treated. — Above, after sicut essentia, B adds et proprietas.
2
Ita A, alii existendi.
So A; the others read existendi.
3
Vide Aristot., I. Elench. c. 3. (c. 4.), ubi de hac et aliis fallaciis in dictione. — De suppositione personae et notionis cfr. tom. I. pag. 576, nota 1.
See Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations I, c. 3 (c. 4), where this and the other fallacies in diction are treated. — On the supposition of person and of notion compare vol. I, p. 576, note 1.
4
Cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 1. ad 1. et 3.
Compare I Sentences, d. 8, p. II, q. 1, replies 1 and 3.
1
Vide I. Sent. d. 19. p. II. q. 2.
See I Sentences, d. 19, p. II, q. 2.
2
Cfr. I. Sent. d. 25. a. 1. et 2; d. 34. q. 1. — Avicenna, Metaph. tr. 8. c. 4: Primus igitur non habet genus, et ideo non habet differentiam; quia enim non habet genus, non habet differentiam; ideo non habet definitionem.
Compare I Sentences, d. 25, a. 1 and 2; d. 34, q. 1. — Avicenna, Metaphysics, tr. 8, c. 4: "The First, therefore, has no genus, and therefore has no difference; for because it has no genus, it has no difference; therefore it has no definition."
3
Vide I. Sent. d. 19. p. II. q. 1. Ibid. q. 4. insinuatur solutio seq.
See I Sentences, d. 19, p. II, q. 1. In the same place, q. 4, the following solution is intimated.
4
Cfr. supra q. 2. a. 2. ad 16. et Quaest. de scientia Christi, q. 3. ad 8. — Isidor., VII. Etymolog. c. 4. n. 1: Trinitas appellata, quod fiat totum unum ex quibusdam tribus, quasi triunitas. — Superius pro vero A illo.
Compare above, q. 2, a. 2, reply 16, and the Disputed Questions on the Knowledge of Christ, q. 3, reply 8. — Isidore, Etymologies VII, c. 4, n. 1: "It is called trinity because one whole is made out of certain three, as it were a tri-unity." — Above, for vero, A reads illo.
5
Vide supra q. 2. a. 1. fundam. 7.
See above, q. 2, a. 1, fundamentum 7.
6
Cfr. etiam I. Sent. d. 34. q. 1. — In principio solut. vocibus intellectu vero A B E interserunt nominis.
Compare also I Sentences, d. 34, q. 1. — At the beginning of the solution A B E insert nominis between the words intellectu vero.
1
Cfr. supra q. 2. a. 2. ad 5.
Compare above, q. 2, a. 2, reply 5.
2
Ut docet August., XIII. Confess. c. 3. n. 4, supra pag. 68, nota 3. allatus. — De hac solut. vide I. Sent. d. 33. q. 2, ubi etiam seq. solut. exhibetur.
As Augustine teaches, Confessions XIII, c. 3, n. 4, cited above at p. 68, note 3. — On this solution see I Sentences, d. 33, q. 2, where the following solution is also set out.
3
G terminum (sic etiam habetur I. Sent. d. 33. q. 2. in corp.). Inferius vocibus ipsa non B interserit tamen.
G reads terminum (so too it stands in I Sentences, d. 33, q. 2, in the body). Below, B inserts tamen between the words ipsa non.
4
Distinctio siquidem generatim est negatio unius respectu alterius; distincta enim dicimus quorum unum non est alterum. Distinctio opponitur identitati i. e. convenientiae rei cum se ipsa vel unitati plurium in entitate. Aristot., V. Metaph. text 16. (IV. c. 9.): Identitas unitas quaedam essentiae est aut plurium, aut cum ut pluribus utatur, ut puta cum dicat ipsum sibi ipsi idem; ut duobus enim ipso utitur.
For distinction in general is the negation of one with respect to another; for we call those things distinct of which one is not the other. Distinction is opposed to identity, that is, to the agreement of a thing with itself or to the unity of several in entity. Aristotle, Metaphysics V, text 16 (IV, c. 9): "Identity is a certain unity of the being either of several things, or when one uses a thing as several — as, for instance, when one says that a thing is the same as itself; for one uses it as two." ---