Quaest. 4, Art. 1

Quaestiones disputatae de perfectione evangelica · Quaestio IV: De obedientia

Textus Latinus

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Quaestio IV. De obedientia.

Postquam quaesitum est de humilitate et de paupertate et de continentia, restat nunc quarto quaerere de obedientia. Et circa obedientiam tria possunt quaeri.

Primum est, utrum sit consonum iuri naturali, quod homo obediendo subiaceat alteri.

Secundum est, utrum sit consonum evangelicae perfectioni, quod unus astringat se voto ad obediendum alteri.

Tertium est, utrum sit conveniens christianae religioni, quod omnes obediant uni.

Articulus I. Utrum sit consonum iuri naturali, quod homo obediendo subiaceat alteri.

Quantum ad primum⁵ sic proceditur. Videtur, quod sit consonum iuri naturali, quod homo obediat homini.

1. Pietas enim naturalis dictat, parentes esse honorandos⁶; sed honor parentum est in exhibitione reverentiae, exhibitio autem reverentiae est obtemperando et obediendo: ergo etc.

2. Item, lex decalogi scripta in corde hominis dictat per dictamen naturae⁷; sed ipsa hoc praecipit, scilicet parentes honorari: ergo illud est consonum iuri naturali. Hoc autem fit per obsequium obedientiae: ergo etc.

3. Item, ad Ephesios sexto⁸: Filii, obedite parentibus vestris per omnia; sed paternitas et filiatio maxime consonant iuri naturali: ergo et filios parentibus obedire.

4. Item, ius naturae dictat ordinem; sed «ordo est parium dispariumque sua loca cuique tribuens dispositio», ut dicit Augustinus decimo nono de Civitate Dei⁹: si ergo ordo est, quod unus subdatur alteri, et ius naturae dictat ordinem; dictat ergo, quod unus alteri debeat subiici.

5. Item, ius naturae dictat pacem inter domesticos; sed pax in domo est «ordinata imperandi obe-

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diendique concordia¹»: ergo iuri naturae competit imperare et obedire.

6. Item, ius naturale dictat, gradum esse servandum, «quia, si essent omnia aequalia, non essent omnia²»; ubi autem gradus, ibi est superioritas et inferioritas; sed si inferius non subiaceat superiori, non servatur gradus: ergo etc.

7. Item, ius naturae dictat ordinem hierarchicum, qui descendit a summa hierarchia per angelicam usque ad humanam³; sed ordini hierarchico consonat, quod inferior superiori obtemperat: ergo etc.

8. Item, ius naturae dictat «reddere unicuique quod suum est⁴»; sed honor maxime debetur homini stanti seu in statu innocentiae; honor autem exhibetur homini, dum obeditur: ergo etc.

9. Item, de dictamine legis naturae est «quod commune est apud omnes⁵»; sed omnibus commune est regimen et imperium, sive subiectio et obedientia: ergo etc.

10. Item, de dictamine iuris naturalis est, quod homo totus obediat rationi rectae in se⁶: ergo pari ratione ius naturae dictat, quod minus peritus et ignorans obediendo subiaceat magis perito et scienti: ergo videtur, quod homo obtemperet homini, consonum esse iuri naturali.

Sᴇᴅ ᴄᴏɴᴛʀᴀ hoc obiicitur sic. 1. Genesis primo⁷: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram, et praesit piscibus maris etc.; super quo verbo dicit Augustinus decimo nono de Civitate Dei: «Rationalem hominem ad Dei imaginem factum dominari noluit Deus nisi irrationalibus»; sed de dictamine naturae est, quod homo servet institutionem divinam: ergo iuri naturali consonat, quod homo non imperet homini, nec unus obediendo subiaceat alteri.

2. Item, Gregorius⁸: «Omnes homines natura fecit aequales»: ergo ius naturae dictat aequalitatem; sed ubi aequalitas, nulla est ibi superioritas et inferioritas; sed obedientia dicit superioritatem et inferioritatem: ergo etc.

3. Item, vigesima secunda distinctione⁹: «Cum culpa non exigit, omnes secundum rationem humilitatis aequales sumus»; sed in statu naturae institutae nulla fuisset culpa: ergo fuisset aequalitas, ergo nulla fuisset praelatio nec subiectio: ergo etc.

4. Item, ius naturae dictat, dignitatem imaginis esse servandam; sed imago est immediate a Deo et soli Deo subiecta, quia, «nulla interposita natura, a prima Veritate formatur¹⁰»: ergo videtur, hoc, quod homo subiaceat obediendo homini, esse contra dignitatem imaginis.

5. Item, lex naturae dictat, libertatem esse servandam; sed liberum arbitrium aequaliter est in omnibus¹¹: ergo aequaliter libertas in omnibus est servanda. Sed ubi subiectio et obedientia, non aequalis libertas: ergo etc.

6. Item, ius naturae dictat, caritatem esse servandam; sed caritas facit unionem, conformitatem et aequalitatem¹²: ergo privat omnem subiectionem et superpositionem: ergo etc.

7. Item, quod lex naturae dictat semper habet esse perpetuum; sed omnis subiectio et obedientia evacuabitur, quia primae ad Corinthios decimo quinto¹³: Cum evacuaverit principatus etc.; Glossa: «Dum durat mundus, homines hominibus praesunt»: ergo etc.

8. Item, si lex naturae dictat unum correlativorum, dictat et reliquum¹⁴: ergo si dictat esse obediendum, dictat etiam imperandum: ergo sicut potest appeti obedire et subesse sine peccato, pari ratione et appeti poterit imperare et praeesse. Sed hoc est falsum et inconveniens: ergo et illud, ex quo sequitur: ergo lex naturae non dictat imperare, ac per hoc nec etiam obedire.

9. Item, lex naturae dictat, honorem debitum Deo nulli alii esse reddendum¹⁵; sed honor debitus Deo exhibetur obediendo et obtemperando: ergo obedire est soli Deo reddendum, non ergo homini.

10. Item, lex naturalis est impressio facta a lege aeterna¹⁶; sed illa impressio movet animam in

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arduum, se autem subdere alteri obtemperando contrariatur arduo: ergo etc.

CONCLUSIO.

Lex naturalis dictat in generalitate quadam, quod inferior superiori obediendo subiaceat, diverso tamen modo secundum diversas superioritatis et inferioritatis differentias; hoc autem consonat legi scriptae et legi gratiae.

Rᴇsᴘᴏɴᴅᴇᴏ: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod, secundum quod dicit Augustinus in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum¹, lex naturalis est impressio facta in anima a lege aeterna; lex autem aeterna est illa, qua incommutabili permanente, cetera ordinantur. Unde Augustinus, primo de Libero Arbitrio: «Ut breviter aeternae legis notionem, quae impressa est nobis, quantum valeo, verbis explicem: ea est, qua iustum est, ut omnia sint ordinatissima». Sed sicut dicitur decimo nono de Civitate Dei, decimo tertio capitulo: «Ordo est parium dispariumque sua cuique loca tribuens dispositio». Si ergo superioris est praeesse, et inferioris subesse, lex naturalis, quae manat a lege aeterna, naturaliter dictat, quod inferior superiori obediendo subiaceat; et hoc quidem dictat in generalitate quadam, diversimode tamen, secundum quod superioritatis et inferioritatis reperire contingit differentias diversas.

Dicitur enim alter alteri esse superior aut quantum ad originem naturae, aut quantum ad dominium potentiae seu praesidentiae, aut quantum ad regimen providentiae. Prima superioritas competit ipsi naturae ratione sui, quia «natura est vis insita rebus ex similibus similia procreans²»; secunda vero ratione vitii, quia, ut dicit Ambrosius, servitus est poena peccati; tertia autem competit ratione remedii, secundum illud Numerorum vigesimo septimo³: Provideat Deus spirituum universae carnis hominem, qui sit super hanc multitudinem, ne sint sicut oves absque pastore. — Primae superioritati debetur obedientia filialis, secundae obedientia servilis, tertiae vero obedientia iurisdictionalis, quae respicit dignitatem praelationis.

Hinc est igitur, quod lex naturalis dictat obedientiam filialem, sive secundum statum naturae lapsae, sive secundum statum naturae institutae. — Obedientiam autem servilem dictat non simpliciter, sed in statu naturae lapsae ad peccati punitionem, secundum dictamen iuris gentium, quod manat ex ratione et instinctu naturae⁴. — Obedientiam vero iurisdictionalem dictat secundum statum naturae reparabilis seu reparatae, et hoc in statu viae, secundum illud primae ad Corinthios decimo quinto⁵: Cum evacuaverit omnem principatum etc.; Glossa: «Dum durat mundus, Angeli Angelis, homines hominibus praeerunt ad utilitatem viventium; sed omnibus collectis, iam omnis praelatio cessabit, quia necessaria non erit». — Cum igitur secundum triformem differentiam superioritatis triplex sit modus obediendi; primum natura dictat simpliciter, quia universaliter et explicite et secundum omnem statum; secundum autem et tertium implicite et secundum statum determinatum.

Unde quaelibet dictarum obedientiarum consonat legi naturae, nec tantum legi naturae, verum etiam legi gratiae et legi scriptae. — Quia enim lex gratiae considerat naturae ortum, lapsum et remedium; ideo ipsius est approbare triplicem modum et differentiam obedientiae supradictae. Approbat enim obedientiam filialem ad Ephesios sexto⁶: Filii, obedite parentibus vestris in Domino; hoc enim iustum est. Approbat etiam obedientiam servilem, primae ad Timotheum sexto: Quicumque sunt sub iugo servitutis, dominos suos omni honore dignos arbitrentur. Laudat etiam obedientiam iurisdictionalem ad Hebraeos ultimo: Obedite praepositis vestris et subiacete eis; ipsi enim pervigilant etc. — Econtra autem, quia lex scripta erat lex rigoris, non tantum approbat istam triplicem obedientiam, sed etiam punit istius obedientiae transgressores. Punit enim filium contumacem, Deuteronomii vigesimo primo⁷: Si ge-

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nuerit homo filium contumacem et protervum, qui non audiat patris imperium, et coercitus obedire contempserit; apprehendent eum et ducent ad seniores etc. — Punit etiam servum rebellem, Exodi vigesimo primo: Qui percusserit servum vel ancillam virga, si uno die vel duobus supervixerit, non subiacebit damno, quia pecunia illius est. — Punit etiam subditum non obedientem, Deuteronomii decimo septimo: Qui superbierit, nolens obedire sacerdotis imperio, morietur homo ille. — Ex dictis igitur manifeste colligitur, quod obedientia hominis ad hominem consona est legi gratiae et legi scriptae et legi naturae. — Unde rationes, quae ad hanc partem inducuntur, concedendae sunt.

1. 2. 3. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur de auctoritate Augustini, Gregorii et canonis, dicendum, quod in verbis illis non intendunt excludere subiectionem et obedientiam, sed servitutem coactam, quae quidem non fuit nec esse debuit, nisi interveniente reatu peccati tanquam morbo contrario ipsi naturae; in cuius etiam detestationem secundum dictamen rectae naturae subsequi debet punitio servitutis, propter contemptum maiestatis divinae et captivationem libertatis humanae et dehonestationem dignitatis rationalis naturae. Unde licet hoc non dictet natura pro se stante, dictat tamen pro se a statu cadente, secundum quod in praecedentibus dictum est¹.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de dignitate imaginis, iam potest patere responsio: quia, licet huius subiectio non competat imagini formatae, competit tamen imagini deformatae, vel etiam reformandae; sicut videmus in Sacramentis, quod homo reparandus quodam modo subiicitur sensibilibus elementis, licet homini stanti conveniat subiici respectu solius Dei². — Aliter etiam potest dici, quod dupliciter est loqui de imagine: vel in se, vel in relatione ad carnem; et licet ipsa anima ratione sui a solo Deo habeat infundi et illi soli subiici, ratione tamen carnis, quae habet per vim humani ministerii propagari, subiici habet suae origini, sicut proles parenti, ita tamen, quod ex hoc in nullo dignitati imaginis praeiudicium generetur.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod lex naturae dictat, libertatem voluntatis esse servandam etc.; dicendum, quod cum sit libertas a miseria, a culpa et a coactione; libertas a coactione duplex est, scilicet a coactione sufficiente et inducente³. Primam quidem dictat natura esse servandam omnino simpliciter et semper. Secundam autem, scilicet a coactione inducente, non dictat nisi pro eo tempore, in quo quis abutitur libertate; et quia hoc est in statu naturae lapsae: ideo dictat pro hoc tempore, quod improbitas voluntatum restringatur per imperia praesidentium potestatum.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ius naturae dictat, caritatem esse servandam; dicendum, quod sicut ad perfectionem corporis vivi requiritur aequalitas complexionis, in qua omnia membra conformantur, et multiformitas organizationis, in qua membra distinguuntur et ordinantur et secundum variam influentiam alia aliis praeponuntur; sic intelligendum est circa corpus Christi mysticum⁴. Et ideo unitas caritatis non excludit multiformitatem charismatum et discretionem dignitatum et officiorum, secundum quae unum membrum alteri habet subiici et secundum legem praelationis et subiectionis ab altero gubernari.

7. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod illud quod dictatur a natura habet durationem perpetuam; dicendum, quod illud est verum de eo quod natura dictat simpliciter, sed non est verum de eo quod natura dictat pro statu; sicut in statu innocentiae dictabat, omnia esse communia, quod quidem non dictat in natura corrupta⁵. Et ideo propositio illa falsa est, universaliter intellecta.

8. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si lex naturae dictat unum correlativorum, dictat et reliquum; dicendum, quod sicut lex naturae dictat subiectionem, sic et praelationem. Sicut enim dictat, quod quis debet subiici alteri ad obedientiam; sic dictat, quod alter debet praefici alteri per providentiam. Sed ex hoc non sequitur, quod ibi debeat appeti praelatio, sicut appetitur subiectio. Nam appetitus subiectionis consonat humilitati et reverentiae; appetitus vero praelationis degenerat ut plurimum in fastum ambitionis et arrogantiae: ideo, quamvis locus dignitatis recte possit administrari secundum dictamen naturae, non tamen debet appeti propter annexum typum superbiae⁶.

9. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod honor Deo debitus nulli alii est reddendus; dicendum, quod honor debetur Deo, et in propria natura et in imagine sua; honor enim, qui exhibetur homini propter Deum, ad Deum refertur; et ideo quod proprium est Dei, scilicet honor latriae, non debet alteri attribui⁷. Quod autem convenit Deo operanti per ministrum, scilicet gubernatio et regnum et imperium respectu

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subiectorum, non est inconveniens, quod per Deum et propter Deum et secundum Deum alii tribuatur, quia totum refertur ad ipsum secundum rectum ordinem, quem quidem servat in gubernando mundum.

10. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod impressio legis naturalis movet in arduum; dicendum, quod est arduum honoris et arduum virtutis; arduum honoris competit animae secundum statum patriae, arduum virtutis secundum statum viae. Ideo enim aliquis honoratur et excellenter laudatur, quia hoc meruit per arduum et excellens et difficile opus virtutis¹; et quia tale opus est opus humilitatis et obedientiae, quod superbis mentibus est arduum et inaccessibile: ideo consonum est ipsi legi naturae et gratiae, quod homo per opus humilitatis et obedientiae sublevetur ad culmen honoris et felicitatis aeternae.

English Translation

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Question IV. On obedience.

Now that inquiry has been made concerning humility and concerning poverty and concerning continence, it remains now, fourthly, to inquire concerning obedience. And concerning obedience three things can be asked.

The first is whether it is consonant with natural right that man, by obeying, be subject to another.

The second is whether it is consonant with evangelical perfection that one bind himself by vow to obey another.

The third is whether it is fitting to the Christian religion that all obey one.

Article I. Whether it is consonant with natural right that man, by obeying, be subject to another.

As to the first⁵, the procedure is thus. It seems that it is consonant with natural right that man obey man.

1. For natural piety dictates that parents are to be honoured⁶; but the honour of parents consists in the showing of reverence, and the showing of reverence is by complying and obeying: therefore etc.

2. Again, the law of the decalogue, written in the heart of man, dictates through the dictate of nature⁷; but it commands this, namely that parents be honoured: therefore that is consonant with natural right. But this is done through the service of obedience: therefore etc.

3. Again, Ephesians the sixth⁸: Children, obey your parents in all things; but fatherhood and sonship are supremely consonant with natural right: therefore also that sons obey their parents.

4. Again, the right of nature dictates order; but «order is the disposition of equal and unequal things, allotting to each its own place», as Augustine says in the nineteenth book On the City of God⁹: if therefore order is that one be placed under another, and the right of nature dictates order, it dictates therefore that one ought to be subjected to another.

5. Again, the right of nature dictates peace among the members of a household; but peace in a house is «the ordered concord of commanding and

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obeying¹»: therefore it belongs to the right of nature to command and to obey.

6. Again, natural right dictates that rank is to be kept, «because, if all things were equal, all things would not be²»; but where there is rank, there is superiority and inferiority; but if the inferior is not subject to the superior, rank is not kept: therefore etc.

7. Again, the right of nature dictates the hierarchical order, which descends from the highest hierarchy through the angelic as far as the human³; but it is consonant with the hierarchical order that the inferior comply with the superior: therefore etc.

8. Again, the right of nature dictates «to render to each what is his own⁴»; but honour is due most of all to man standing, or in the state of innocence; but honour is shown to a man when he is obeyed: therefore etc.

9. Again, it belongs to the dictate of the law of nature, «what is common among all⁵»; but government and command, or subjection and obedience, are common to all: therefore etc.

10. Again, it belongs to the dictate of natural right that the whole man obey right reason within himself⁶: therefore by a like reason the right of nature dictates that the less skilled and the ignorant, by obeying, be subject to the more skilled and the knowing: therefore it seems that for man to comply with man is consonant with natural right.

Sᴇᴅ ᴄᴏɴᴛʀᴀ, this is objected thus. 1. Genesis the first⁷: Let us make man to our image and likeness: and let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea etc.; on which word Augustine says in the nineteenth book On the City of God: «God did not will that the rational man, made to the image of God, should rule over any but irrational things»; but it belongs to the dictate of nature that man keep the divine institution: therefore it is consonant with natural right that man not command man, nor one, by obeying, be subject to another.

2. Again, Gregory⁸: «Nature made all men equal»: therefore the right of nature dictates equality; but where there is equality, there is no superiority and inferiority; but obedience bespeaks superiority and inferiority: therefore etc.

3. Again, in the twenty-second distinction⁹: «When fault does not require it, we are all equal according to the account of humility»; but in the state of nature as instituted there would have been no fault: therefore there would have been equality, therefore there would have been no prelacy nor subjection: therefore etc.

4. Again, the right of nature dictates that the dignity of the image is to be kept; but the image is immediately from God and subject to God alone, because «it is formed by the first Truth, no nature coming between¹⁰»: therefore it seems that this, that man by obeying be subject to man, is against the dignity of the image.

5. Again, the law of nature dictates that liberty is to be kept; but free choice is equally in all¹¹: therefore liberty is to be kept equally in all. But where there is subjection and obedience, there is not equal liberty: therefore etc.

6. Again, the right of nature dictates that charity is to be kept; but charity makes union, conformity and equality¹²: therefore it removes all subjection and setting-over: therefore etc.

7. Again, what the law of nature dictates always has perpetual being; but all subjection and obedience shall be brought to nought, because of First Corinthians the fifteenth¹³: When he shall have brought to nought principality etc.; the Gloss: «While the world lasts, men are set over men»: therefore etc.

8. Again, if the law of nature dictates one of two correlatives, it dictates the other also¹⁴: therefore if it dictates that one is to obey, it dictates also that one is to command: therefore, just as to obey and to be under can be desired without sin, by a like reason to command and to be over can also be desired. But this is false and unfitting: therefore so is that from which it follows: therefore the law of nature does not dictate commanding, and by this neither obeying.

9. Again, the law of nature dictates that the honour due to God is to be rendered to no other¹⁵; but the honour due to God is shown by obeying and complying: therefore to obey is to be rendered to God alone, therefore not to man.

10. Again, the natural law is an impression made by the eternal law¹⁶; but that impression moves the soul towards

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the arduous, whereas to subject oneself to another by complying is contrary to the arduous: therefore etc.

CONCLUSION.

The natural law dictates, in a certain generality, that the inferior, by obeying, be subject to the superior, yet in a different way according to the different differences of superiority and inferiority; and this is consonant with the written law and with the law of grace.

Rᴇsᴘᴏɴᴅᴇᴏ: For the understanding of what has been said, it is to be noted that, according to what Augustine says in the book of Eighty-three Questions¹, the natural law is an impression made in the soul by the eternal law; and the eternal law is that by which, itself remaining unchangeable, all other things are ordered. Whence Augustine, in the first book On Free Choice: «To set out briefly in words, as far as I am able, the notion of the eternal law which is impressed upon us: it is that by which it is just that all things be most ordered». But as is said in the nineteenth book On the City of God, the thirteenth chapter: «Order is the disposition of equal and unequal things, allotting to each its own place». If therefore it belongs to the superior to be over, and to the inferior to be under, the natural law, which flows from the eternal law, naturally dictates that the inferior, by obeying, be subject to the superior; and this indeed it dictates in a certain generality, yet in diverse ways, according as it happens that diverse differences of superiority and inferiority are found.

For one is said to be superior to another either as to the origin of nature, or as to lordship of power or presidency, or as to government by providence. The first superiority belongs to nature itself by reason of itself, because «nature is a force implanted in things, procreating like things from like²»; but the second by reason of vice, because, as Ambrose says, servitude is the penalty of sin; and the third belongs by reason of remedy, according to that of Numbers the twenty-seventh³: May God of the spirits of all flesh provide a man, that may be over this multitude, lest they be as sheep without a shepherd. — To the first superiority is owed filial obedience, to the second servile obedience, but to the third jurisdictional obedience, which regards the dignity of prelacy.

Hence it is, therefore, that the natural law dictates filial obedience, whether according to the state of nature fallen, or according to the state of nature as instituted. — But servile obedience it dictates not simply, but in the state of nature fallen, for the punishment of sin, according to the dictate of the right of nations, which flows from the reason and instinct of nature⁴. — But jurisdictional obedience it dictates according to the state of nature repairable or repaired, and this in the state of the way, according to that of First Corinthians the fifteenth⁵: When he shall have brought to nought all principality etc.; the Gloss: «While the world lasts, angels will be over angels, men over men, for the benefit of the living; but when all have been gathered, all prelacy will then cease, because it will not be necessary». — Since therefore, according to the threefold difference of superiority, there is a threefold mode of obeying: the first nature dictates simply, because universally and explicitly and according to every state; but the second and third implicitly and according to a determinate state.

Whence each of the said obediences is consonant with the law of nature, and not only with the law of nature, but also with the law of grace and the written law. — For because the law of grace considers the rise, fall and remedy of nature, therefore it belongs to it to approve the threefold mode and difference of obedience described above. For it approves filial obedience in Ephesians the sixth⁶: Children, obey your parents in the Lord: for this is just. It approves also servile obedience, in First Timothy the sixth: Whosoever are under the yoke of servitude, let them count their masters worthy of all honour. It praises also jurisdictional obedience in the last of Hebrews: Obey your prelates, and be subject to them. For they watch etc. — But on the other hand, because the written law was a law of rigour, it not only approves this threefold obedience, but also punishes the transgressors of this obedience. For it punishes the contumacious son, Deuteronomy the twenty-first⁷: If a man

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have a contumacious and unruly son, who will not hear the command of his father, and being corrected, slighteth to obey: they shall take him and bring him to the ancients etc. — It punishes also the rebellious servant, Exodus the twenty-first: He that striketh his servant or handmaid with a rod, if the party survive one day or two, shall not be subject to the loss, because it is his money. — It punishes also the subject who does not obey, Deuteronomy the seventeenth: He that will be proud, refusing to obey the command of the priest, that man shall die. — From what has been said, therefore, it is manifestly gathered that the obedience of man to man is consonant with the law of grace and the written law and the law of nature. — Whence the reasons which are brought forward for this side are to be conceded.

1. 2. 3. To that, then, which is objected first from the authority of Augustine, of Gregory and of the canon, it must be said that in those words they do not intend to exclude subjection and obedience, but coerced servitude, which indeed was not, nor ought to have been, except where the guilt of sin intervened, as a disease contrary to nature itself; in detestation of which also, according to the dictate of right nature, the punishment of servitude ought to follow, on account of the contempt of the divine majesty and the taking captive of human liberty and the dishonouring of the dignity of rational nature. Whence, although nature does not dictate this for itself while standing, it does dictate it for itself as falling from its state, according to what was said in the preceding¹.

4. To that which is objected concerning the dignity of the image, the response can already be plain: because, although subjection of this kind does not belong to the image formed, it belongs nevertheless to the image deformed, or also to be reformed; just as we see in the Sacraments that man, who is to be repaired, is in a certain way subjected to sensible elements, although to man standing it is fitting to be subjected in respect of God alone². — It can also be said otherwise, that one may speak of the image in two ways: either in itself, or in relation to the flesh; and although the soul itself, by reason of itself, is to be infused by God alone and subjected to him alone, yet by reason of the flesh, which is to be propagated through the force of human ministry, it is to be subjected to its origin, as offspring to parent, yet in such a way that from this no prejudice at all is generated to the dignity of the image.

5. To that which is objected, that the law of nature dictates that the liberty of the will is to be kept etc.; it must be said that, since there is liberty from misery, from fault and from coercion, liberty from coercion is twofold, namely from sufficient and from inducing coercion³. The first, indeed, nature dictates is to be kept altogether simply and always. But the second, namely from inducing coercion, it does not dictate except for that time in which someone abuses liberty; and because this is in the state of fallen nature, therefore it dictates for this time that the wickedness of wills be restrained by the commands of presiding powers.

6. To that which is objected, that the right of nature dictates that charity is to be kept; it must be said that, just as for the perfection of a living body there is required an equality of complexion, in which all the members are conformed, and a multiformity of organisation, in which the members are distinguished and ordered and, according to a varied influence, some are set before others; so it is to be understood concerning the mystical body of Christ⁴. And therefore the unity of charity does not exclude the multiformity of charisms and the distinction of dignities and offices, according to which one member is to be subjected to another and, according to the law of prelacy and subjection, to be governed by another.

7. To that which is objected, that what is dictated by nature has perpetual duration; it must be said that this is true of what nature dictates simply, but it is not true of what nature dictates for a state; just as in the state of innocence it dictated that all things be common, which indeed it does not dictate in corrupted nature⁵. And therefore that proposition is false, understood universally.

8. To that which is objected, that if the law of nature dictates one of two correlatives, it dictates the other also; it must be said that, just as the law of nature dictates subjection, so also prelacy. For just as it dictates that one ought to be subjected to another for obedience, so it dictates that another ought to be set over another through providence. But from this it does not follow that prelacy ought there to be desired, as subjection is desired. For the desire of subjection is consonant with humility and reverence; but the desire of prelacy for the most part degenerates into the haughtiness of ambition and arrogance: therefore, although a place of dignity can rightly be administered according to the dictate of nature, yet it ought not to be desired, on account of the pattern of pride annexed to it⁶.

9. To that which is objected, that the honour due to God is to be rendered to no other; it must be said that honour is due to God both in his own nature and in his image; for the honour which is shown to man on account of God is referred to God; and therefore what is proper to God, namely the honour of latria, ought not to be attributed to another⁷. But what befits God working through a minister, namely governance and kingship and command in respect

p. 183

of subjects, it is not unfitting that it be attributed to another through God and on account of God and according to God, because the whole is referred to him according to the right order, which indeed he keeps in governing the world.

10. To that which is objected, that the impression of the natural law moves towards the arduous; it must be said that there is an arduous of honour and an arduous of virtue; the arduous of honour belongs to the soul according to the state of the fatherland, the arduous of virtue according to the state of the way. For someone is honoured and excellently praised for this reason, that he merited it through an arduous and excellent and difficult work of virtue¹; and because such a work is a work of humility and obedience, which to proud minds is arduous and inaccessible: therefore it is consonant with the very law of nature and of grace that man, through the work of humility and obedience, be raised up to the summit of honour and of eternal felicity.

Apparatus Criticus

5
Hic articulus sumtus est ex codd. A D.
This article is taken from codices A D.
6
Cicero, II. Rhetor. c. 54: Natura ius est, quod non opinio genuit, sed quaedam innata vis insevit, ut religionem, pietatem, gratiam... pietas [est], per quam sanguine coniunctis patriaeque benevolis officium et diligens tribuitur cultus. Cfr. ibid. c. 22, et August., 83 Qq. q. 31. n. 1.
Cicero, Rhetoric II [On Invention II], c. 54: Right by nature is that which not opinion has begotten, but a certain innate force has implanted, such as religion, piety, gratitude... piety [is that] through which duty and diligent regard are rendered to those joined to us by blood and to those well-disposed to the fatherland. Compare ibid. c. 22, and Augustine, Eighty-three Questions, q. 31, n. 1.
7
Vide Rom. 2, 14. seq., et III. Sent. d. 37. a. 1. q. 3.
See Rom. 2:14 f., and III Sent. d. 37, a. 1, q. 3.
8
Vers. 1, ubi Vulgata in Domino pro per omnia. Col. 3, 20: Filii, obedite parentibus per omnia. — De minori cfr. Isidor., V. Etymolog. c. 4. n. 1.
Verse 1 [Eph. 6:1], where the Vulgate has in Domino ("in the Lord") for per omnia ("in all things"). Col. 3:20: Children, obey your parents in all things. — On the minor compare Isidore, Etymologies V, c. 4, n. 1.
9
Cap. 13. — Pro maiori cfr. verba August., I. de Lib. Arb. c. 6. n. 15, infra in principio corp. quaest. allegata.
Chapter 13. — For the major compare the words of Augustine, On Free Choice I, c. 6, n. 15, cited below at the beginning of the body of the question.
1
August., XIX. de Civ. Dei, c. 13: Pax domus ordinata imperandi atque obediendi concordia cohabitantium. — De maiori cfr. supra pag. 46, nota 3.
Augustine, On the City of God XIX, c. 13: The peace of a house is the ordered concord of those dwelling together in commanding and obeying. — On the major compare above, p. 46, note 3.
2
Ut ait August., 83 Qq. q. 41, supra pag. 124, nota 5. allegatus. — De notione gradus vide I. Sent. d. 25. dub. 4.
As Augustine says, Eighty-three Questions, q. 41, cited above, p. 124, note 5. — On the notion of rank see I Sent. d. 25, doubt 4.
3
Cfr. Dionys., de Caelest. Hierarch. c. 3. et 4; c. 8. § 2, c. 10; de Ecclesiast. Hierarch. c. 1. et c. 5. § 4. Vide etiam II. Sent. d. 9. Praenotata, et ibid. pag. 28, nota 3.
Compare Dionysius, On the Celestial Hierarchy cc. 3 and 4; c. 8, § 2, c. 10; On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy c. 1 and c. 5, § 4. See also II Sent. d. 9, Praenotata, and ibid. p. 28, note 3.
4
De hac iustitiae definitione cfr. tom. III. pag. 728, nota 1.
On this definition of justice compare tome III, p. 728, note 1.
5
Secundum Boeth., de Divisione: Nam quod apud omnes idem est naturae est etc. Cfr. tom. IV. pag. 14, nota 5. et pag. 436, nota 2.
According to Boethius, On Division: For what is the same among all is of nature etc. Compare tome IV, p. 14, note 5, and p. 436, note 2.
6
Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 2: Agere igitur secundum rectam rationem commune [omnium] est.
Aristotle, Ethics II, c. 2: To act, then, according to right reason is common [to all].
7
Vers. 26. — Verba August. inferius allegati habentur XIX. de Civ. Dei, c. 15.
Verse 26 [Gen. 1:26]. — The words of Augustine cited below are found in On the City of God XIX, c. 15.
8
Libr. XXI. Moral. c. 15. n. 22. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 1007, nota 6.
Morals book XXI, c. 15, n. 22. Compare tome II, p. 1007, note 6.
9
Can. De Constantinopolitana (4.), qui sumtus est ex duabus epistolis Gregorii; verba hic allegata inveniuntur in IX. Epistolarum, epist. 59. (alias 65.).
The canon De Constantinopolitana (4), which is taken from two letters of Gregory; the words cited here are found in Letters IX, letter 59 (otherwise 65).
10
August., 83 Qq. q. 51. n. 2. 4. et de Spiritu et anima (inter opera August.) c. 11. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 45, nota 5.
Augustine, Eighty-three Questions, q. 51, nn. 2, 4, and On the Spirit and the Soul (among the works of Augustine) c. 11. Compare tome II, p. 45, note 5.
11
De quo vide II. Sent. d. 25. p. II. q. 1. — Isidor., V. Etymolog. c. 4. n. 1. ad ius naturale pertinere dicit, quod sit «omnium una libertas».
On which see II Sent. d. 25, p. II, q. 1. — Isidore, Etymologies V, c. 4, n. 1, says that it pertains to natural right that there be «one liberty of all».
12
Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 4. § 15: Amorem... unitivam quandam et concretivam intelligemus virtutem.
Dionysius, On the Divine Names c. 4, § 15: Love... we shall understand as a certain uniting and binding-together power.
13
Vers. 24: Cum evacuaverit omnem principatum etc. — De Glossa, quae est ordinaria apud Strabum et Lyranum, cfr. Haymo, in hunc loc., et Petr. Lombard., II. Sent. d. VI. c. 4. Inferius in corp. quaest. Glossa plenior datur.
Verse 24 [I Cor. 15:24]: When he shall have brought to nought all principality etc. — On the Gloss, which is the ordinary one in Strabo and Lyra, compare Haymo on this place, and Peter Lombard, II Sent. d. VI, c. 4. Below, in the body of the question, the Gloss is given more fully.
14
Quia secundum Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de His quae ad aliquid, relativa simul sunt natura.
Because, according to Aristotle, Categories, the chapter On those things which are toward something, relatives are simultaneous by nature.
15
Cfr. supra pag. 124, nota 2.
Compare above, p. 124, note 2.
16
Psalm. 4, 7: Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, Domine. Cfr. Rom. 2, 14. seq. et Glossa ordinaria ibid.; nec non inferius principium corp. quaest.
Psalm 4:7: "The lumen of thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us." Compare Rom. 2:14 f. and the ordinary Gloss there; and also below, the beginning of the body of the question.
1
Quaest. 53. n. 2, ubi, agens de ablatis ab Israelitis in Aegypto (Exod. 12, 35. seq.), ait: Ex hac igitur ineffabili atque sublimi rerum administratione, quae fit per divinam providentiam, quasi transcripta est naturalis lex in animam rationalem, ut in ipsa vitae huius conversatione moribusque terrenis homines talium distributionum imagines servent. Cfr. q. 51, ubi ostendit, animam humanam, eo ipso quod imago Dei, divinae sapientiae participem esse et ab ipsa Veritate formari. — Seq. loc. est I. de Lib. Arb. c. 6. n. 15.
Question 53, n. 2, where, treating of the things carried off by the Israelites in Egypt (Exod. 12:35 f.), he says: From this ineffable and sublime administration of things, then, which takes place through divine providence, the natural law is as it were transcribed into the rational soul, so that in the very conduct of this life and in earthly morals men may keep images of such distributions. Compare q. 51, where he shows that the human soul, by the very fact that it is the image of God, is a participant of the divine wisdom and is formed by Truth itself. — The following place is On Free Choice I, c. 6, n. 15.
2
Vide supra pag. 63, nota 10. — Seq. sententia Ambrosii colligi potest ex lib. de Elia et ieiunio, c. 5. n. 11, allegato II. Sent. d. 44. a. 2. q. 2. ad 3; II. de Iacob et vita beata, c. 3. n. 12; Epist. 37. n. 6. et 9; Comment. in Epist. ad Phil. 2, 7. (inter opera Ambrosii), ubi dicitur: Servi autem ex peccato fiunt, sicut Cham filius Noe, qui primus merito nomen servi accepit (Gen. 9, 25.), et ad Col. 4, 1. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 44. a. 2. q. 2. fundam. 5, ubi eadem sententia Augustino tribuitur.
See above, p. 63, note 10. — The following opinion of Ambrose can be gathered from the book On Elijah and Fasting, c. 5, n. 11, cited at II Sent. d. 44, a. 2, q. 2, reply to 3; On Jacob and the Happy Life II, c. 3, n. 12; Letter 37, nn. 6 and 9; the Commentary on the Epistle to the Philippians 2:7 (among the works of Ambrose), where it is said: But men become servants from sin, as Cham the son of Noah, who first deservedly received the name of servant (Gen. 9:25), and on Col. 4:1. Compare II Sent. d. 44, a. 2, q. 2, fundamentum 5, where the same opinion is attributed to Augustine.
3
Vers. 16. seq.: Provideat Dominus Deus spirituum omnis carnis... multitudinem hanc... ne sit populus Domini sicut oves etc. — Inferius pro iurisdictionalis D iurisdictionis.
Verse 16 f. [Num. 27:16–17]: May the Lord the God of the spirits of all flesh provide... this multitude... lest the people of the Lord be as sheep etc. — Below, for iurisdictionalis ("jurisdictional") D has iurisdictionis ("of jurisdiction").
4
Iustinian., Institut. imperial. lib. I. tit. 2. lege unica Ius naturale § Ius autem civile a iure gentium distinguitur... quod vero naturalis ratio inter omnes homines constituit, id apud omnes populos peraeque custoditur vocaturque ius gentium, quasi quo omnes gentes utantur. Cfr. ibid. § Ius autem gentium, et Isidor., V. Etymolog. c. 6, ubi ad hoc ius reducuntur captivitates et servitutes.
Justinian, Imperial Institutes book I, title 2, the single law Ius naturale, § Ius autem civile: civil right is distinguished from the right of nations... but what natural reason has established among all men, that is kept equally among all peoples and is called the right of nations, as that which all nations use. Compare ibid., § Ius autem gentium, and Isidore, Etymologies V, c. 6, where captivities and servitudes are traced back to this right.
5
Vers. 24. — In Glossa, de qua vide supra pag. 180, nota 13, textus originalis post viventium addit vel ad deceptionem; ultima propositio quia necessaria non erit non exhibetur a Strabo; habetur tamen apud Petr. Lombard., in hunc loc. — Inferius pro triformem D omnem.
Verse 24 [I Cor. 15:24]. — In the Gloss, on which see above, p. 180, note 13, the original text after viventium ("of the living") adds vel ad deceptionem ("or for deception"); the last proposition, quia necessaria non erit ("because it will not be necessary"), is not given by Strabo; it is found, however, in Peter Lombard on this place. — Below, for triformem ("threefold") D has omnem ("every").
6
Vers. 1. — Seq. locus est I. Tim. 6, 1, ubi Vulgata servi pro servitutis; tertius Hebr. 13, 17.
Verse 1 [Eph. 6:1]. — The following place is I Tim. 6:1, where the Vulgate has servi ("servants") for servitutis ("of servitude"); the third is Heb. 13:17.
7
Vers. 18. seq. Post patris Vulgata addit aut matris. — Seq. locus est Exod. 21, 20. seq.: Qui percusserit servum suum vel ancillam virga, et mortui fuerint in manibus eius, criminis reus est. Sin autem uno... non subiacebit poenae, quia etc. In tertio loco (Deut. 17, 12.) Vulgata post Qui addit autem, et post imperio plures propositiones subiungit.
Verse 18 f. [Deut. 21:18–19]. After patris ("of his father") the Vulgate adds aut matris ("or mother"). — The following place is Exod. 21:20 f.: He that striketh his servant or handmaid with a rod, and they die under his hands, shall be guilty of the crime. But if one... he shall not be subject to the punishment, because etc. In the third place (Deut. 17:12) the Vulgate adds autem ("but") after Qui ("he that"), and after imperio ("command") subjoins several propositions.
1
Cfr. etiam II. Sent. d. 44. a. 2. q. 2. — D bis per se loco pro se.
Compare also II Sent. d. 44, a. 2, q. 2. — D twice has per se ("through itself") in place of pro se ("for itself").
2
Vide IV. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. I. c. 5, et ibid. Comment. p. I. q. 1. in corp. — Superius fide A supplevimus vel etiam reformandae.
See IV Sent., the Master's text, d. I, c. 5, and ibid. the Commentary, p. I, q. 1, in the body. — Above, on the authority of A, we have supplied vel etiam reformandae ("or also to be reformed").
3
Cfr. II. Sent. d. 25. p. II. q. 1. et 4. seq. — Post pauca pro omnino simpliciter A cum [omni?] tempore; de illa divisione cfr. IV. Sent. d. 26. a. 1. q. 3. in corp. Subinde pro Secundam autem, scilicet A Secundam, quae est.
Compare II Sent. d. 25, p. II, q. 1, and 4 ff. — A little after, for omnino simpliciter ("altogether simply") A has cum [omni?] tempore ("with [every?] time"); on that division compare IV Sent. d. 26, a. 1, q. 3, in the body. Next, for Secundam autem, scilicet ("But the second, namely") A has Secundam, quae est ("The second, which is").
4
Vide I. Cor. 12, 12. seqq.
See I Cor. 12:12 ff.
5
Cfr. II. Sent. d. 44. a. 2. q. 2. ad 4. et IV. Sent. d. 26. a. 1. q. 3. in corp.
Compare II Sent. d. 44, a. 2, q. 2, reply to 4, and IV Sent. d. 26, a. 1, q. 3, in the body.
6
Vide Gregor., XVII. Moral. c. 21. n. 31, ubi haec verba Iob 24, 5: Ecce, gigantes gemunt sub aquis, explicat de his qui ceteris praeesse ambiunt.
See Gregory, Morals XVII, c. 21, n. 31, where he explains these words of Job 24:5 [so printed; the verse is Job 26:5]: Behold the giants groan under the waters, of those who seek ambitiously to be over the rest.
7
Cfr. III. Sent. d. 9. a. 1. q. 5.
Compare III Sent. d. 9, a. 1, q. 5.
1
Vide supra pag. 139, nota 4. verba Aristot., qui etiam I. Ethic. c. 12. ait: Laus enim virtutis est.
See above, p. 139, note 4, the words of Aristotle, who also says in Ethics I, c. 12: For praise belongs to virtue. ---