Quaest. 2, Art. 1
Quaestiones disputatae de mysterio Trinitatis · Quaestio II: Utrum possit simul stare trinitas personarum cum naturae unitate
Quaestio II. Utrum possit simul stare trinitas personarum cum naturae unitate.
Supposito, quod Deum esse trinum sit verum credibile, quaeritur consequenter, utrum simul possit stare trinitas personarum cum naturae unitate1. Et circa hoc duo quaeruntur.
Primum est, utrum divinum esse sit summe unum.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum summa unitas naturae possit esse cum trinitate personarum.
Articulus I. Utrum divinum esse sit summe unum.
Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod divinum esse sit summe unum. Et quod ita sit, satis intonat fides et Scriptura divina, Exodi vigesimo2: Deus tuus, Deus unus est; et Deuteronomii trigesimo secundo: Videte ergo, quod ego sim solus, et non sit alius Deus praeter me; et David in Psalmo: Non erit in te Deus recens, neque adorabis Deum alienum; et hoc satis praedicat Scriptura divina. — Et hoc ipsum intentandum est rationibus demonstrare. Omnium enim mens ratione utentium supponit, Deum esse, quo maius et melius nihil excogitari possit, ac per hoc excellentissimum natura et potestate, sapientia et bonitate, influentia et causalitate. Si enim in aliquo horum pateretur defectum, iam non esset summus, ac per hoc non esset Deus. Supponantur ergo ista sex sicut vera et certissima.
1. Ex parte sublimitatis naturae arguitur sic. Sublimius est quod omnibus superfertur, quam quod non; ergo si omnibus superferri non potest competere nisi uni3, impossibile est, Deum esse nisi unum, immo etiam nec intelligere. Nam si plures intelliguntur, ponitur ex hoc, quod idem ipse superferatur alii, et e converso; ergo si uterque est Deus, neuter est Deus: aut ergo Deus non est, aut si est, unus est.
2. Ex parte omnipotentiae sic. Omnipotens vere est non solum qui omnia potest, sed etiam a quo est omne posse; sed omnia posse et omnem potentiam causare non potest nisi uni soli competere — si enim pluribus competeret, neutri conveniret — si ergo omnipotentia convenit Deo, impossibile est, Deum esse nisi unum, immo etiam nec intelligere: quia, si uterque est omnipotens, uterque potest facere, ut nihil possit omne aliud posse: ergo si uterque est omnipotens, neuter est omnipotens4.
3. Ex parte summae sapientiae arguitur sic. Summe sapientis est omnia nosse5: si ergo plures essent dii, aut uterque alterum ignoraret, et ita neuter esset summe sapiens, immo vere insipiens; aut nosset, et hoc vel per speciem, vel per essentiam vel per se ipsum. Sed si per speciem vel per essentiam, aliquid reciperet ab alio et informaretur; si per se ipsum, esset illius principium, ac per hoc aut ipse, aut ille non esset Deus. Ergo summa sapientia non permittit, plures deos esse, immo etiam nec aestimare, quia, si plures cogitantur, aut habent ndem sapientiam, aut diversas. Si diversas: ergo vel altera superfluit, vel utraque imperfecta est; si eandem: cum unaquaeque sit summa sapientia ergo non habebunt iam diversam naturam: ergo iam non sunt duo.
4. Ex parte summae bonitatis sic. Summum bonum est summe amandum et propter se: si ergo plura sunt summe bona, ergo aut unum amat alterum propter se, aut non. Si non: ergo neutrum est bonum; si sic: ergo unum beatificat alterum: ergo
neutrum est summum: ergo impossibile est, quod sit summum bonum multiplicatum; immo etiam hoc est contra intellectum, quia utrumque aut est maius bonum, aut non; si non: ergo alterum superfluit; si sic: ergo neutrum est summum. Ergo si intelliguntur esse plura summe bona, intelliguntur non esse summe bona1.
5. Ex parte influentiae arguitur sic. Deus influit in omnes res perfectissime: ergo dat totum esse, non partem2; sed si essent plures dii, aut unus nihil daret, et ita non esset Deus; aut uterque partem, aut nihil daret, et ita neuter esset Deus; aut uterque idem daret, et tunc uterque simul esset in eodem per essentiam et potentiam et praesentiam; et quia hoc sequitur ad summam influentiam: ergo vel unus esset in altero, vel uterque circumscriptus, et ita neuter esset Deus.
6. Ex parte summae causalitatis arguitur sic. Deus est causa prima, ultima et perfectissima, ac per hoc causa, in qua status est per omnem modum, et secundum rationem efficiendi, exemplandi et finiendi3: ergo si plures dii essent, uterque ad alterum reduceretur: ergo neuter esset primus, ultimus et perfectissimus, ac per hoc neuter esset Deus.
7. Ex parte omnium praedictorum sic arguitur: quia, si plures dii essent, aut omnino convenirent in omnibus conditionibus praedictis, aut omnino differrent, aut partim convenirent et partim differrent. Si omnino convenirent: ergo non essent plures dii; si omnino differrent: ergo si unus esset Deus, alter non esset Deus; si vero partim sic et partim non: ergo in quolibet esset aliquid et aliquid: ergo neuter simplex, ac per hoc neuter Deus. — Ex his arguitur, quod divinum esse non potest multiplicari nec re nec aestimatione.
Ad oppositum arguitur primo contra rationes praedictas:
1. Quoniam non videntur verum concludere. Cum enim Deum esse unum sit articulus, in quo erraverunt pagani, idololatrae et infideles et haeretici, qui omnes habent usum rationis; non solum potest cogitari, sed etiam aestimari et credi, quod plures sint dii; aut si non potest contrarium aestimari, non est articulus fidei.
2. Item, non videntur necessario concludere: quoniam eisdem rationibus potest probari, quod non sint in divino esse plures personae, sicut patet pertractanti, sive ex parte sublimitatis naturae, sive potentiae, sive sapientiae, sive bonitatis, sive influentiae, sive causalitatis. Quodsi rationes procedant ex eisdem mediis ad concludendum falsum, non ergo necessario concludunt.
3. Item, si ex praedictis rationibus necessario convincitur et probatur, Deum esse unum; cum « fides non habeat meritum, cui humana ratio praebet experimentum4 »: ergo meritum fidei evacuari videtur: ergo aut erunt fragiles, aut inutiles.
Ex se ipsis obiicitur contra ipsas:
4. Et primo ex sublimitate. Maioris sublimitatis est superferri rebus similis naturae quam dissimilis, et rebus magnis quam parvis: si ergo creatura non est consimilis naturae cum Deo et comparatione Dei quasi nihil est, non intelligitur Deus summus et excellentissimus, si superfertur solum esse creato. Ad divinam igitur videtur spectare excellentiam, ponere plures naturas increatas, et iterum unam supra ceteras.
5. Ex parte omnipotentiae sic. « Perfectae potestatis est, ut dicit Hilarius5, id naturam posse facientis, quod potest significare sermo dicentis »; et rursum, ratio dictat, quod tanta virtus in tantum, et maior in maius, et maxima in maximum; sed Deus omnipotentissimus est: ergo cum nos possimus significare, plures deos esse, potest Deus facere, quod sint; et cum possit minus facere esse, potest maius et maximum: ergo potest facere aliud a se tantum, quantus est ipse: consonat ergo omnipotentiae, plures deos esse.
6. Ex parte sapientiae sic: quia competit summae sapientiae aliud a se nosse, et tanto perfectior est sapientia, quanto perfectius est cognoscibile: si ergo nihil est perfectum omnino nisi6 ens, quod est Deus, et divina sapientia novit aeternaliter aliud a se, et hoc cognitione perfectissima; videtur, quod aeternaliter fuerit aliud a Deo, quod tamen esset Deus: ergo divina sapientia non privat, sed ponit plures divinas essentias.
7. Ex parte bonitatis arguitur sic. « Bonum est maxime diffusivum », et « plura bona paucioribus sunt eligenda7 »; utraque harum est per se vera; sed summa diffusio divini esse non potest esse in creatura: est ergo in aliam naturam increatam, qua posita, melior est tota divina essentia, propter hoc quod erunt plura bona. Ergo si omne melius est Deo attribuendum ratione summae bonitatis, videtur, quod summa bonitas non excludat, sed exigat plures divinas naturas.
8. Ex parte influentiae summae sic. Perfectio influentiae exigit necessario, quod influentia non sit
sine divina essentia, praesentia et potentia: ergo pari ratione multiplicari non potest sine multiplicatione essentiae et potentiae et praesentiae: ergo cum sint multae influentiae divinae, multae sunt et essentiae.
9. Ex parte causalitatis sic. Causa prima est perfectissima, est prima et immediata, ergo et propria; sed multiplicato effectu, necesse est, multiplicari causam proximam et propriam1: ergo necesse est, quod multiplicatio ponatur in causa prima, cum multitudo ponatur et sit in effectibus causatis ab ipsa.
10. Item, ex omnibus obiicitur contra omnes: quia perfectissima sublimitas in natura et potentia, sapientia et bonitate, influentia et causalitate est ratio ponendi multitudinem in effectibus causatis: ergo si idem non est causa oppositorum2, videtur, quod potius ducant ad ponendum multitudinem quam unitatem ex parte efficientis, et sic potius esse ad oppositum quam ad propositum.
CONCLUSIO.
Deum esse unum est verum non tantum credibile, sed etiam intelligibile.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod hoc verum, Deum esse unum, est verum non tantum credibile, verum etiam intelligibile; quoniam est necessarium et certum non solum ex testimonio Scripturae et illustratione gratiae, quod reperitur in fide; sed etiam certum est ex se et ex testimonio creaturae3. — Ex se ergo: quoniam divinum esse propter singularem sublimitatem et sublimem singularitatem omnimodam habet unitatem. Cum enim Deus omnem perfectionem in se habeat, et hoc in summo termino et excellentissimo, non solum ex sublimitate naturae et sapientiae, potestatis et bonitatis et influentiae et causalitatis convincitur esse unus, immo ex omnibus suis conditionibus et proprietatibus nobilibus, quae sibi attribuuntur in summo. Unde omnes conditiones attestantur unitati essentiae summae.
Ex testimonio etiam creaturae: quoniam omnis creatura, sicut habet naturalem bonitatem, sic et convincitur habere unitatem. « Nihil enim potest esse, nisi sit unum », ut dicit Boethius4 et Augustinus, et docet sensus et intellectus. Sicut ergo omnis creatura per suam bonitatem clamat, in Deo esse veram bonitatem et summam; sic per suam unitatem clamat, omnium causam esse in se unam. — Nec huic testimonio obviat rerum diversitas. Omnis enim rerum diversitas intra unam universitatem est comprehensa, quae in se quidem est finita et limitata et perfecta5. Hoc autem non esset, nisi illa pluralitas reduceretur ad aliquid, in quo esset status; ac per hoc necessarium est, omnia reduci ad unum finem ultimum et unum principium primum, alioquin esset abire in infinitum. Testificatur igitur ipsa rerum universitas, Deum esse unum; unde, sicut unius circumferentiae impossibile est esse nec rationabiliter excogitare nisi unum centrum, a quo fluunt lineae et ad quod reducuntur sicut ad terminum; sic in uno universo non est ponere nec intelligere nisi unum Deum et solum.
Est igitur hoc necessarium et notum, et adeo notum, quod nullus dubitat de hoc habens rationis usum, si sciat, « quid est quod per nomen dicitur6 ». Si enim per hoc nomen Deus significatur omnium rerum principium primum et summum; cum in hoc claudatur universitas omnis, qui hoc intelligit per consequens dicit, Deum esse unum. Unde sicut principia sunt per se nota, quia statim sciuntur per terminorum notitiam7; sic omni intelligenti terminorum significatum indubitanter certum est, Deum esse unum.
Multi tamen erraverunt circa deorum numerum; ignorantia enim significati peperit deceptionem circa suppositum, et hoc introduxit haeresim de pluralitate deorum. Quia enim homines sunt opinati, illud esse Deum, quod superexcedit humanum posse, aut humanum scire, et hoc viderunt posse daemones; ideo crediderunt, eos esse deos; et erraverunt et excaecati sunt et incurvati ad idolorum cultum; quod quidem est absurdissimum, nec mirum, quia « parvus error in principio magnus est in fine8 ». Ab hoc errore eripit philosophia, sed multo melius fides christiana; quae communiter in hoc concurrunt, quod divinum esse sit summe unum. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes, quae hoc ostendunt, quia verum concludunt et per medium necessarium.
1. Ad illud quod obiicitur de conclusionis falsitate, per hoc quod plures sunt opinati, plures esse
deos; iam patet responsio: quia aliter utuntur supposito et significato huius termini Deus, quam habet eius institutio; et ideo non est ibi contradictio. Unde sicut hoc nomen Deus secundum propriam institutionem non habet plurale, licet habeat, secundum quod accipitur nuncupative1; sic et in proposito intelligendum est; et quia propter mentis excaecationem falsum frequenter accipiebatur pro vero, ideo fuit necessaria fidei illuminatio. — Posset tamen dici, quod Deum esse unum habet probari per rationem, in quantum eius unitas consideratur absolute; sed necessaria est fidei illuminatio, in quantum comparatur ad personarum pluralitatem.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod similiter possent concludere de personis; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia in omnibus personis una est natura et potentia et sapientia et bonitas et influentia et causalitas; non sic autem esset, si essent diversae naturae divinae; et ideo nihil repugnant iis plures personae.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod evacuatur fidei meritum; dicendum, quod hoc verum esset, si solum propter rationes huic vero assentiretur; nunc autem, dum non assentitur propter rationes principaliter, sed propter ipsam veritatem, ideo potest habere meritum propter fidelem assensum. Nihil enim prohibet, secundum alium et alium respectum et considerationem idem esse scitum et creditum2.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de sublimitate respectu magnorum et consimilium; dicendum, quod illud haberet locum, si divinae sublimitati accresceret aliquid ex aliorum subiectione; hoc autem non habet veritatem, quia ita sublimis est Deus in se ipso et solus existens, sicut si dominaretur mille mundis. — Praeterea, hoc non esset ei ad sublimitatem, si aliquid consimilis naturae haberet conditionem servilem; unde etsi talis sublimitas aliquo modo videatur facere ad exaltationem, tamen secundum veritatem facit ad depressionem.
5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de potestate, dicendum, quod utrumque verbum potest intelligi de eo quod quidem posse est potentiae. Nam quoddam posse potius est infirmitatis quam sublimitatis; posse namque habere naturam aequalem a se differentem, hoc dignitatis est potentiae limitatae, ac per hoc repugnat omnipotentiae; ideo, licet possit sermone dici, non tamen Deo attribui; nec secundum quantitatem huius possibilis attenditur quantitas divinae virtutis, sed secundum dignitatem actus proprii, qui est immensus, secundum quod potentia est immensa3.
6. Ad illud quod obiicitur de sapientia, quod cognoscit aliud; dicendum, quod licet Deus aliud a se cognoscat aeternaliter, et hoc competat summae sapientiae; non tamen competit ei scire aliud per aliud, sed per se; et hoc non potest nisi aliud4, quod natum est ab ipso Deo procedere, quod est in ipso sicut in principio causante. Nam etsi malum cognoscatur a Deo, hoc est per ideam boni sibi oppositi5. Unde ad perfectionem divinae cognitionis non requiritur, quod cognoscibile sit ens actu; nec requiritur, quod sit ens summum, cum cognoscat terrena nobilissime et optime per se ipsum. Illud autem locum habet in scientia, quae ortum habet a rebus, qualem scientiam Deus non habet.
7. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod summo bono competit summa diffusio et bonorum multitudo; dicendum, quod summa diffusio in aliquid extra non competit, secundum quod summum dicitur simpliciter; sed intra competit summa communicatio. Non enim debet esse nisi unum summum bonum, quod quidem non potest accrescere ex multitudine bonorum. Unde quod dicitur, quod summum bonum est summe diffusivum; intelligendum est, quod veritatem habet, secundum quod illud summe determinat diffusivum ratione potentiae, non ratione actus6. Et quod dicitur, quod plura bona magis eligenda; dicendum, quod habet veritatem in bonis finitis, quorum unum addit ad aliud, et quorum unicuique aliquid deficit de bono, quod suppletur per bonum adiunctum.
8. Ad illud quod obiicitur de influentia, quod non potest esse sine Deo, ergo nec multiplicari; dicendum, quod illud non valet nec est simile: quia de perfectione agentis est, quod non possit effectus esse sine eius praesentia, quia totaliter pendet ab illo, et agens nobilius agit immediate agendo quam per medium7; non sic autem est de numero et multitudine. Hoc enim non est de perfectione agentis, ut multiplicetur secundum multitudinem effectuum, sed potius eius contrarium, scilicet quod unum in se manens sit causa diversorum.
9. Ad illud quod obiicitur de causa proxima et immediata, quod multiplicatur; dicendum, quod illud habet veritatem in causa agente per modum naturae, cuius etiam virtus est arctata, et sic est causa propria, quod non universalis. Prima autem causa agit per modum artis et voluntatis in creaturarum productione; propterea est causa liberrima et ad nihil arctata et simul universalis et propria, quia quid-
quid nobilitatis est in creatura, necessario oportet quod ponatur in creatrice essentia1.
10. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod illa sunt media ad probandum multitudinem et diversitatem; dicendum, quod non probant quamcumque diversitatem in creaturis, sed diversitatem cum ordine et connexione et inclinatione ad unitatem2, et ita diversitatem in unitate, et ratione illius unitatis inferunt in causa unitatem; nec tamen sunt via ad opposita, quia unitas in causa non repugnat multitudini in causatis, sicut patet in unitate, a qua procedunt infinitae species numerorum. Sic etiam summa sapientia et potentia et bonitas, licet sint unum, quia tamen non sufficienter manifestantur per unum effectum; ideo diversitatem inferunt in effectibus causatis ab ipsa. — Et sic patet responsio ad omnia obiecta.
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Question II. Whether the trinity of persons can stand together with unity of nature.
Granted that it is a credible truth that God is three, it is next asked whether the trinity of persons can stand together with unity of nature1. And about this two things are asked.
The first is, whether the divine being is one in the highest degree.
Secondly it is asked, whether the highest unity of nature can be together with a trinity of persons.
Article I. Whether the divine being is one in the highest degree.
About the first the procedure is as follows, and it is shown that the divine being is one in the highest degree. And that it is so, faith and divine Scripture sound out plainly enough, Exodus twenty2: Thy God, God is one; and Deuteronomy thirty-two: See ye therefore that I alone am, and there is no other God besides me; and David in the Psalm: There shall be no new god in thee, neither shalt thou adore a strange god; and divine Scripture preaches this plainly enough. — And this same thing is to be attempted by demonstration from reasons. For the mind of all who use reason supposes God to be that than which nothing greater and better can be thought out, and thereby most excellent in nature and power, in wisdom and goodness, in inflowing and causality. For if he suffered a defect in any of these, he would already not be highest, and thereby would not be God. Let these six, therefore, be supposed as true and most certain.
1. On the side of the sublimity of nature the argument runs thus. That which is borne above all things is more sublime than that which is not; therefore if to be borne above all things cannot belong except to one3, it is impossible for God to be more than one, nay, it is impossible even to understand it. For if several are understood, it is thereby posited that the same one is borne above the other, and conversely; therefore if each is God, neither is God: either therefore God is not, or, if he is, he is one.
2. On the side of omnipotence, thus. He is truly omnipotent who not only can do all things, but from whom also is every being-able; but to be able to do all things and to cause every power cannot belong except to one alone — for if it belonged to several, it would suit neither — if therefore omnipotence suits God, it is impossible for God to be more than one, nay, it is impossible even to understand it: because, if each is omnipotent, each can bring it about that nothing should have every other being-able: therefore if each is omnipotent, neither is omnipotent4.
3. On the side of the highest wisdom the argument runs thus. It belongs to one supremely wise to know all things5: if therefore there were several gods, either each would be ignorant of the other, and so neither would be supremely wise, but rather truly unwise; or he would know him, and this either through a species, or through his essence, or through himself. But if through a species or through his essence, he would receive something from the other and be informed by it; if through himself, he would be that other's principle, and thereby either he himself, or the other, would not be God. Therefore the highest wisdom does not allow that there be several gods, nay, it does not even allow the supposing of it, because, if several are thought of, they either have the s[sic]ame wisdom, or different ones. If different: then either the one is superfluous, or both are imperfect; if the same: since each one is the highest wisdom, therefore they will not now have a different nature: therefore they are not now two.
4. On the side of the highest goodness, thus. The highest good is to be loved in the highest degree and for its own sake: if therefore there are several things supremely good, then either the one loves the other for its own sake, or not. If not: then neither is good; if so: then the one beatifies the other: therefore
neither is highest: therefore it is impossible that the highest good be multiplied; nay, this is even against understanding, because either one of them is the greater good, or not; if not: then the one is superfluous; if so: then neither is highest. Therefore if several things are understood to be supremely good, they are understood not to be supremely good1.
5. On the side of inflowing the argument runs thus. God flows into all things most perfectly: therefore he gives the whole being, not a part2; but if there were several gods, either one would give nothing, and so would not be God; or each would give a part, or nothing, and so neither would be God; or each would give the same, and then each would be simultaneously in the same thing by essence and by power and by presence; and since this follows upon the highest inflowing: therefore either the one would be in the other, or each would be circumscribed, and so neither would be God.
6. On the side of the highest causality the argument runs thus. God is the first, last and most perfect cause, and thereby a cause in which there is a stopping-point in every mode, and according to the account of efficiency, of exemplarity and of finality3: therefore if there were several gods, each would be led back to the other: therefore neither would be first, last and most perfect, and thereby neither would be God.
7. On the side of all the foregoing the argument runs thus: because, if there were several gods, either they would agree altogether in all the aforesaid conditions, or they would altogether differ, or they would partly agree and partly differ. If they agreed altogether: then they would not be several gods; if they differed altogether: then if one were God, the other would not be God; but if partly so and partly not: then in each there would be something and something: therefore neither would be simple, and thereby neither would be God. — From these things it is argued that the divine being cannot be multiplied either in reality or in estimation.
To the opposite it is argued, first against the aforesaid reasons:
1. Because they do not seem to conclude what is true. For since that God is one is an article in which pagans, idolaters, unbelievers and heretics have erred, all of whom have the use of reason; it can not only be thought, but also supposed and believed, that there are several gods; or, if the contrary cannot be supposed, it is not an article of faith.
2. Again, they do not seem to conclude necessarily: because by the same reasons it can be proved that there are not several persons in the divine being, as is plain to one who works it through, whether on the side of the sublimity of nature, or of power, or of wisdom, or of goodness, or of inflowing, or of causality. But if the reasons proceed from the same middle terms to conclude something false, then they do not conclude necessarily.
3. Again, if by the aforesaid reasons it is necessarily established and proved that God is one; since "faith has no merit where human reason supplies the proof4": then the merit of faith seems to be voided: therefore either they will be feeble, or useless.
From themselves it is objected against them:
4. And first from sublimity. It is of greater sublimity to be borne above things of like nature than of unlike, and above great things than above small: if therefore the creature is not of a nature like God's and is as nothing in comparison with God, God is not understood to be highest and most excellent, if he is borne above created being only. It seems therefore to pertain to the divine excellence to posit several uncreated natures, and again one above the rest.
5. On the side of omnipotence, thus. "It belongs to perfect power," as Hilary says5, "that the nature of the doer be able to do what the speech of the speaker can signify"; and again, reason dictates that so great a power reaches so far, and a greater to a greater, and the greatest to the greatest; but God is most omnipotent: therefore since we can signify that there are several gods, God can bring it about that there be; and since he can make a lesser thing to be, he can make a greater and a greatest: therefore he can make something other than himself as great as he himself is: it is consonant with omnipotence, therefore, that there be several gods.
6. On the side of wisdom, thus: because it belongs to the highest wisdom to know something other than itself, and wisdom is the more perfect the more perfect the knowable is: if therefore nothing is altogether perfect except6 the being which is God, and the divine wisdom knows eternally something other than itself, and this by a most perfect cognition; it seems that there was eternally something other than God which nevertheless would be God: therefore the divine wisdom does not exclude, but posits, several divine essences.
7. On the side of goodness the argument runs thus. "The good is in the highest degree diffusive of itself," and "more goods are to be chosen than fewer7"; each of these is true of itself; but the highest diffusion of the divine being cannot be in a creature: it is therefore into another uncreated nature, and once that is posited the whole divine essence is better, for this reason, that there will be more goods. Therefore if everything better is to be attributed to God by reason of the highest goodness, it seems that the highest goodness does not exclude but requires several divine natures.
8. On the side of the highest inflowing, thus. The perfection of inflowing necessarily requires that the inflowing not be
without the divine essence, presence and power: therefore by parity of reasoning it cannot be multiplied without a multiplication of essence and of power and of presence: therefore since the divine inflowings are many, the essences too are many.
9. On the side of causality, thus. The first cause is most perfect, it is first and immediate, therefore also proper; but when the effect is multiplied, the proximate and proper cause must necessarily be multiplied1: therefore it is necessary that multiplication be posited in the first cause, since multitude is posited and is in the effects caused by it.
10. Again, from all of them it is objected against all: because the most perfect sublimity in nature and power, in wisdom and goodness, in inflowing and causality is the ground for positing multitude in the effects caused: therefore if the same thing is not the cause of opposites2, it seems that they lead rather to positing multitude than unity on the side of the efficient cause, and so are rather for the opposite than for the proposition.
CONCLUSION.
That God is one is a truth not only credible, but also intelligible.
I answer: It must be said that this truth, that God is one, is a truth not only credible but also intelligible; because it is necessary and certain not only from the testimony of Scripture and the illumination of grace, which is found in faith; but it is also certain from itself and from the testimony of the creature3. — From itself, then: because the divine being, on account of its singular sublimity and sublime singularity, has unity in every mode. For since God has every perfection in himself, and this in the highest and most excellent degree, he is established to be one not only from the sublimity of nature and of wisdom, of power and of goodness and of inflowing and of causality, but rather from all his conditions and noble properties which are attributed to him in the highest degree. Whence all the conditions bear witness to the unity of the highest essence.
From the testimony of the creature also: because every creature, just as it has natural goodness, so also is established to have unity. "For nothing can be, unless it be one," as Boethius says4 and Augustine, and as sense and understanding teach. As therefore every creature by its goodness cries out that in God there is true and highest goodness; so by its unity it cries out that the cause of all things is in itself one. — Nor does the diversity of things stand against this testimony. For all diversity of things is comprehended within one universe, which in itself is finite and limited and perfect5. But this would not be so unless that plurality were led back to something in which there were a stopping-point; and thereby it is necessary that all things be led back to one last end and one first principle, otherwise there would be a going off to infinity. The very universe of things testifies, therefore, that God is one; whence, just as of one circumference it is impossible that there be, or be reasonably thought out, more than one centre, from which the lines flow and to which they are led back as to their term; so in one universe there is no positing or understanding of more than one and only God.
This, therefore, is necessary and known, and so far known that no one having the use of reason doubts of it, if he knows "what it is that is said by the name6". For if by this name God is signified the first and highest principle of all things; since in this the whole universe is enclosed, whoever understands this says consequently that God is one. Whence, just as principles are known of themselves, because they are known at once through knowledge of the terms7; so to everyone who understands the signification of the terms it is indubitably certain that God is one.
Many, nevertheless, have erred about the number of the gods; for ignorance of the signification gave birth to deception about the thing signified, and this introduced the heresy of a plurality of gods. For because men supposed that to be God which exceeds human power or human knowing, and they saw that demons could do this; therefore they believed them to be gods; and they erred and were blinded and bent down to the worship of idols; which indeed is most absurd, and no wonder, since "a small error in the beginning is a great one in the end8". From this error philosophy rescues us, but much better the Christian faith; and they concur in common in this, that the divine being is one in the highest degree. — Whence the reasons which show this are to be granted, because they conclude what is true and through a necessary middle term.
1. To that which is objected about the falsity of the conclusion, on the ground that many have supposed that there are several
gods; the answer is already clear: because they use the supposit and signification of this term God otherwise than its institution has it; and therefore there is no contradiction there. Whence, just as this name God according to its proper institution has no plural, although it has one according as it is taken by way of naming1; so it is to be understood in the case before us; and because, through the blinding of the mind, the false was frequently taken for the true, therefore the illumination of faith was necessary. — It could nevertheless be said that that God is one can be proved by reason, in so far as his unity is considered absolutely; but the illumination of faith is necessary in so far as it is compared to the plurality of persons.
2. To that which is objected, that they could conclude likewise about the persons; it must be said that it is not alike: because in all the persons the nature is one, and the power and the wisdom and the goodness and the inflowing and the causality; but it would not be so if there were diverse divine natures; and therefore several persons are in no way repugnant to these.
3. To that which is objected, that the merit of faith is voided; it must be said that this would be true if one assented to this truth only on account of the reasons; but as it is, since one does not assent principally on account of the reasons, but on account of the truth itself, therefore he can have merit on account of his faithful assent. For nothing prevents the same thing from being known and believed according to one respect and consideration and another2.
4. To that which is objected about sublimity in respect of great and like things; it must be said that this would hold if something accrued to the divine sublimity from the subjection of others; but this has no truth, because God is as sublime in himself and existing alone as if he ruled a thousand worlds. — Moreover, it would not make for his sublimity if something of like nature had a servile condition; whence, even though such sublimity may seem in some way to make for exaltation, yet in truth it makes for lowering.
5. To that which is objected about power, it must be said that either expression can be understood of that being-able which indeed belongs to power. For a certain being-able is rather of weakness than of sublimity; for to be able to have a nature equal to oneself and differing from oneself, this is of the dignity of a limited power, and thereby is repugnant to omnipotence; therefore, although it can be said in speech, it cannot be attributed to God; nor is the quantity of the divine power measured according to the quantity of this possible thing, but according to the dignity of its proper act, which is immense, according as the power is immense3.
6. To that which is objected about wisdom, that it knows something other; it must be said that although God knows eternally something other than himself, and this belongs to the highest wisdom; nevertheless it does not belong to him to know something other through something other, but through himself; and this cannot be except something other4 which is born to proceed from God himself, which is in him as in a causing principle. For even if evil is known by God, this is through the idea of the good opposed to it5. Whence for the perfection of divine cognition it is not required that the knowable be a being in act; nor is it required that it be the highest being, since he knows earthly things most nobly and best through himself. But that has its place in the science which takes its rise from things, which science God does not have.
7. To that which is objected, that the highest diffusion and a multitude of goods belong to the highest good; it must be said that the highest diffusion into something outside does not belong to it, according as highest is said simply; but within, the highest communication does belong to it. For there ought not to be more than one highest good, which indeed cannot be increased from a multitude of goods. Whence, as to what is said, that the highest good is diffusive in the highest degree; it must be understood that it holds true according as that word in the highest degree determines "diffusive" by reason of power, not by reason of act6. And as to what is said, that more goods are more to be chosen; it must be said that this holds true in finite goods, of which one adds to another, and to each of which something of good is lacking, which is supplied by the good adjoined.
8. To that which is objected about inflowing, that it cannot be without God, therefore neither can it be multiplied; it must be said that this does not hold and is not alike: because it is of the perfection of an agent that the effect cannot be without its presence, since it depends wholly on it, and a nobler agent acts by acting immediately rather than through a medium7; but it is not so with number and multitude. For this is not of the perfection of an agent, that it be multiplied according to the multitude of its effects, but rather its contrary, namely that one thing remaining in itself be the cause of diverse things.
9. To that which is objected about a proximate and immediate cause, that it is multiplied; it must be said that this holds true of a cause acting after the manner of nature, whose power moreover is confined, and so is a proper cause, not a universal one. But the first cause acts after the manner of art and of will in the production of creatures; therefore it is a most free cause, confined to nothing, and at once universal and proper, because what-
ever of nobility is in the creature must necessarily be posited in the creating essence1.
10. To that which is objected, that those are middle terms for proving multitude and diversity; it must be said that they do not prove just any diversity in creatures, but a diversity with order and connection and inclination toward unity2, and so a diversity in unity, and by reason of that unity they infer unity in the cause; nor yet are they a way to opposites, because unity in the cause is not repugnant to multitude in the things caused, as is plain in unity, from which proceed the infinite species of numbers. So too the highest wisdom and power and goodness, although they are one, yet because they are not sufficiently manifested through one effect; therefore they infer diversity in the effects caused by it. — And thus the answer to all the objections is plain.
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- 1Septem quaestionibus, quae sequuntur atque copiosissime et sapientissime de miris ss. Trinitatis mysteriis tractant, probatur et exponitur quod paucis verbis auctor dicit in suo Breviloquio (p. I. c. 2.): Trinitas personarum non excludit ab essentia divina summam unitatem, simplicitatem, immensitatem, aeternitatem, incommutabilitatem, necessitatem et etiam primitatem; quin potius includit summam fecunditatem, caritatem, liberalitatem, aequalitatem, germanitatem, conformitatem et inseparabilitatem; quae omnia sana fides intelligit esse in beata Trinitate.In the seven questions which follow, and which treat most copiously and most wisely of the wondrous mysteries of the most holy Trinity, there is proved and expounded what the author says in a few words in his Breviloquium (p. I, c. 2): the trinity of persons does not exclude from the divine essence the highest unity, simplicity, immensity, eternity, unchangeableness, necessity and even primacy; nay rather it includes the highest fecundity, charity, liberality, equality, kinship, conformity and inseparability; all of which a sound faith understands to be in the blessed Trinity.
- 2Vers. 2. seq.: Ego sum Dominus Deus tuus.. Non habebis deos alienos coram me. Verba sumta sunt ex Deut. 6, 4: Dominus Deus noster, Dominus unus est. — Seq. locus est Deut. 32, 39; tertius vero Ps. 80, 10. — Cfr. de hac quaest. I. Sent. d. 2. q. 1.Verses 2 f.: "I am the Lord thy God.[sic] Thou shalt not have strange gods before me." The words are taken from Deut. 6:4: "The Lord our God is one Lord." — The passage following is Deut. 32:39; the third is Ps. 80:10. — On this question cf. I Sent. d. 2, q. 1.
- 3Aristot., V. Topic. c. 3. (c. 5.): Quod per superabundantiam dicitur uni soli convenit. Cfr. ibid. VII. c. 1. — De ipso arg. cfr. Damasc., I. de Fide orthod. c. 5, et Richard. a S. Vict., II. de Trin. c. 6.Aristotle, Topics V, c. 3 (c. 5): "What is said by way of superabundance belongs to one alone." Cf. ibid. VII, c. 1. — On the argument itself cf. Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, c. 5, and Richard of St Victor, De Trinitate II, c. 6.
- 4Cfr. Richard. a S. Vict., I. de Trin. c. 25. et II. c. 15. — Superius ex A B posuimus omnem potentiam, dum alii habent omnipotentiam.Cf. Richard of St Victor, De Trinitate I, c. 25, and II, c. 15. — Above, following A B, we have printed omnem potentiam, while the others have omnipotentiam.
- 5Aristot., I. Metaph. c. 2: Opinamur, sapientem maxime omnia, ut possibile est, scire.Aristotle, Metaphysics I, c. 2: "We hold that the wise man knows all things, so far as is possible."
- 1Cfr. Richard. a S. Vict., II. de Trin. c. 19.Cf. Richard of St Victor, De Trinitate II, c. 19.
- 2Vide Libr. de Causis, propos. 1. — De modis essendi per essentiam etc. cfr. I. Sent. d. 37. p. I. a. 3. q. 2.See the Book of Causes, proposition 1. — On the modes of being by essence, etc., cf. I Sent. d. 37, p. I, a. 3, q. 2.
- 3Probat Aristot. II. Metaph. text. 5. seqq. (I. brevior, c. 2.), in omni genere causarum debere esse statum.Aristotle proves, Metaphysics II, text 5 ff. (the shorter Book I, c. 2), that in every genus of causes there must be a stopping-point.
- 4Gregor., II. Homil. in Evang. homil. 26. n. 1.Gregory, Homilies on the Gospels, Book II, homily 26, n. 1.
- 5Libr. V. de Trin. n. 5. Textus originalis possit pro potest. — De seq. propos. cfr. Aristot., VII. Phys. text. 35. seqq. (c. 5.) et VIII. text. 79. seqq. (c. 10.). — Circa finem arg. vocibus facere aliud A B E G interserunt quod, et pro quantus A quantum, G quantum vel quantus.De Trinitate, Book V, n. 5. The original text has possit for potest. — On the proposition following cf. Aristotle, Physics VII, text 35 ff. (c. 5) and VIII, text 79 ff. (c. 10). — Near the end of the argument A B E G insert quod into the words facere aliud, and for quantus A has quantum, G quantum vel quantus.
- 6Ita E G; alii sicut.So E G; the others have sicut.
- 7Prima propos. est secundum Dionys., de Caelest. Hierarch. c. 4. § 1. et de Div. Nom. c. 4. § 1. seq.; secunda sumta est ex Aristot., III. Topic. c. 2. — Pro eligenda legendum esse videtur praeeligenda, vel magis eligenda.The first proposition is according to Dionysius, On the Celestial Hierarchy c. 4 § 1 and On the Divine Names c. 4 § 1 f.; the second is taken from Aristotle, Topics III, c. 2. — For eligenda it seems that one should read praeeligenda, or magis eligenda.
- 1Quia sunt relativa, quae sunt simul natura. Cfr. supra pag. 13, nota 5. 6. — In fine arg. post effectibus cum D G H omisimus et, quod alii habent.Because they are relatives, which are simultaneous by nature. Cf. above, p. 13, notes 5 and 6. — At the end of the argument, after effectibus, we have with D G H omitted et, which the others have.
- 2Aristot., II. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 56. (c. 10.): Idem enim et similiter se habens semper idem natum est facere... contrariorum enim contrariae causae.Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption II, text 56 (c. 10): "For what is the same and stands in the same way is always born to produce the same... for of contraries the causes are contrary."
- 3Codd. contra contextum Scripturae (cfr. paulo inferius).The codices, against the context, have Scripturae (cf. a little below).
- 4Libr. III. de Consol. prosa 11. et lib. de Unitate et uno. — August., II. de Moribus Manich. c. 6. n. 8. (cfr. 83 Qq. q. 18.).The Consolation, Book III, prose 11, and the book On Unity and the One. — Augustine, On the Morals of the Manichees II, c. 6, n. 8 (cf. the 83 Questions, q. 18).
- 5Vide August., Enchirid. c. 10. n. 3, ubi docet, a Deo uno et trino creata esse « omnia, et nec summe nec aequaliter nec immutabiliter bona, sed tamen bona etiam singula, simul vero universa valde bona [Gen. 1, 31.]; quia ex omnibus consistit universitatis admirabilis pulcritudo ». Aristot., XII. Metaph. text. 52-56. (XI. c. 10.), ubi tractat de ordine universi et docet, quomodo omnia ordinantur in Deum tanquam in ultimam finalem causam, principium omnium et optimum simpliciter: « Ad unum namque coordinata sunt omnia (text. 52.)... Entia nolunt male gubernari; non est bonum pluralitas principatuum: unus ergo princeps » (text. 56.). — Aliquanto inferius pro universitas B G diversitas.See Augustine, Enchiridion c. 10, n. 3, where he teaches that by the one and triune God there were created "all things, and they are good neither in the highest degree nor equally nor unchangeably, but good nevertheless even singly, while all together they are very good [Gen. 1:31]; because out of them all consists the admirable beauty of the universe." Aristotle, Metaphysics XII, text 52–56 (XI, c. 10), where he treats of the order of the universe and teaches how all things are ordered to God as to the last final cause, the principle of all things and the best simply: "For all things are coordinated to one (text 52)... Beings do not wish to be badly governed; a plurality of rulers is not good: one prince, therefore" (text 56). — Somewhat lower, for universitas B G have diversitas.
- 6Cfr. supra pag. 50, nota 7. — Inferius secuti sumus E, alii addunt dicit ante intelligit et ponunt dupliciter pro dicit.Cf. above, p. 50, note 7. — Below we have followed E; the others add dicit before intelligit and put dupliciter for dicit.
- 7Secundum Aristot., I. Poster. c. 3: Principium scientiae esse quoddam dicimus, in quantum terminos cognoscimus.According to Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I, c. 3: "We say that there is a certain principle of science, in so far as we know the terms."
- 8Vide supra pag. 23, nota 2.See above, p. 23, note 2.
- 1Bernard., Homil. I. super Missus est, n. 2: Aliter quippe Christus fortitudo vel virtus Dei dicitur, aliter Angelus [Gabriel i. e. fortitudo Dei]. Angelus enim tantum nuncupative, Christus autem etiam substantive. Christus Dei virtus [I. Cor. 1, 24.] et dicitur et est... Angelus vero fortitudo Dei appellatus est, vel quod huiusmodi meruerit praerogativam officii... vel quia virginem natura pavidam... confortare deberet etc. — Cfr. I. Sent. d. 4. q. 3. et d. 23. a. 2. q. 3.Bernard, Homily I on Missus est, n. 2: "For in one way Christ is called the strength or the power of God, in another way the Angel [Gabriel, that is, the strength of God]. For the Angel is so only by way of naming, but Christ also substantively. Christ both is called and is the power of God [I Cor. 1:24]... but the Angel was called the strength of God, either because he had merited such a prerogative of office... or because he was to strengthen a virgin timid by nature," etc. — Cf. I Sent. d. 4, q. 3, and d. 23, a. 2, q. 3.
- 2Ut ostenditur III. Sent. d. 24. a. 2. q. 3.As is shown in III Sent. d. 24, a. 2, q. 3.
- 3Cfr. Richard. a. S. Vict., I. de Trin. c. 21; vide etiam I. Sent. d. 42. q. 2. — Post secundum G addit quod dicitur.Cf. Richard of St Victor, De Trinitate I, c. 21; see also I Sent. d. 42, q. 2. — After secundum G adds quod dicitur.
- 4Intellige: nisi illud (tale) aliud, quod etc.Understand: except that (such) other, which, etc.
- 5Vide I. Sent. d. 36. a. 3. q. 1. (pro sibi, quod praebet B, A E G sive). — De seqq. cfr. ibid. d. 39. a. 2. q. 2.See I Sent. d. 36, a. 3, q. 1 (for sibi, which B offers, A E G have sive). — On what follows cf. ibid. d. 39, a. 2, q. 2.
- 6Cfr. I. Sent. d. 43. q. 3. ad 3.Cf. I Sent. d. 43, q. 3, ad 3.
- 7Vide I. Sent. d. 37. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. et II. Sent. d. 37. a. 1. q. 2. — Pro ab illo A B ab illa.See I Sent. d. 37, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, and II Sent. d. 37, a. 1, q. 2. — For ab illo A B have ab illa.
- 1Cfr. I. Sent. d. 40. dub. 7. et d. 45. a. 2. q. 2.Cf. I Sent. d. 40, dubium 7, and d. 45, a. 2, q. 2.
- 2Ita correximus codices, qui corrupte habent futurum.Thus we have corrected the codices, which corruptly have futurum. ---