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Pars 3, Cap. 1

Breviloquium · Pars III: De corruptela peccati

Textus Latinus
p. 231

PARS TERTIA.

De corruptela peccati.

Capitulum I. De origine mali in communi.

Praedeterminatis igitur aliquibus breviter de Trinitate Dei et creatura mundi, restat nunc, aliqua breviter tangere de corruptela peccati. De qua in summa tenendum est, quod peccatum non est essentia aliqua, sed defectus et corruptela, qua scilicet corrumpitur modus, species et ordo in voluntate creata1; ac per hoc corruptio peccati est ipsi bono contraria, nec tamen habet esse nisi in bono nec ortum trahit nisi a bono, quod quidem est liberum voluntatis arbitrium; et ipsum nec est summe malum, cum possit velle bonum; nec summe bonum, cum possit declinare in malum.

Ratio autem ad intelligentiam praedictorum haec est: quia primum principium, cum sit ens a se ipso, non ab alio, necesse est, quod sit ens propter se ipsum, ac per hoc summe bonum, nullum prorsus habens defectum. Non est igitur aliquid nec esse potest, quod sit primum et summe malum, quia primum principium dicit summum complementum, et summum malum defectum dicit permaximum. Quoniam igitur primum principium, ut summe ens et completum2, nec deficere potest in essendo nec in operando; nec summe malum est nec aliquod malum est nec aliquo modo malum principiare potest. — Quia tamen omnipotens est, potest bonum de non-esse in esse deducere, etiam sine adminiculo alicuius materiae. Quod et fecit, cum creaturam finxit, cui dedit esse, vivere, intelligere et velle; quae quidem, quia a summo bono fuit secundum triplicis causae habitudinem3; oportuit, quod haberet in sua substantia et voluntate modum, speciem et ordinem. Nata ergo fuit agere opera sua a Deo et secundum Deum et propter Deum, et hoc secundum modum, speciem et ordinem sibi insitum.

Sed quia de nihilo fuit et defectiva, potuit deficere ab agendo propter Deum, ut aliquid faceret propter se, non propter Deum, ac per hoc nec a Deo nec secundum Deum nec propter Deum; et hoc est peccatum, quod est modi, speciei et ordinis corruptivum; quod, quia defectus est, non habet causam efficientem, sed deficientem, videlicet defectum voluntatis creatae4.

Quia vero corruptio est et non nisi boni; et omnis corruptio in re corruptibili est: ideo non est nisi in bono; ac per hoc, cum voluntas libera corrumpat in se ipsa modum, speciem et ordinem, deficiendo a vero bono, peccatum omne in quantum huiusmodi et est a voluntate, sicut a prima origine, et est in voluntate, sicut in proprio subiecto; quod quidem facit voluntas, quando sua defectibilitate, mutabilitate et vertibilitate, spreto bono indeficiente et incommutabili, bono commutabili inhaerescit5.

Ex quibus colligitur, quod « peccatum non est appetitio malarum rerum, sed desertio meliorum »; et ideo in appetitu voluntatis est modi, speciei et ordinis corruptivum, ac per hoc « adeo voluntarium, quod si non est voluntarium, iam non est peccatum ». — His autem praeintellectis, manifeste cadit impietas Manichaeorum6 ponentium summe malum omnium malorum principium primum. Apparet etiam, quae sit mali origo, et quid sit mali subiectum.

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English Translation

PART THREE.

On the corruption of sin.

Chapter I. On the origin of evil in general.

Some things, therefore, having been determined beforehand and briefly concerning the Trinity of God and the creature of the world, it remains now to touch briefly upon some things concerning the corruption of sin. Concerning which this is to be held in summary: that sin is not any essence, but a defect and corruption, by which, namely, mode, species and order are corrupted in the created will1; and through this the corruption of sin is contrary to the good itself, and yet it has being only in the good, nor does it draw its rise except from a good — which good is indeed free will; and free will is neither supremely evil, since it can will the good, nor supremely good, since it can turn aside into evil.

Now the reason for the understanding of the foresaid is this: since the first principle, being a being of itself, not from another, must necessarily be a being for the sake of itself, and through this supremely good, having absolutely no defect. There is not, therefore, nor can there be, anything which is a first and supreme evil, because the first principle bespeaks the highest completion, while the supreme evil bespeaks the very greatest defect. Since therefore the first principle, as supremely being and complete2, can fail neither in being nor in operating; it is neither supremely evil nor is it any evil, nor can it in any way give origin to evil. — Yet because it is omnipotent, it can lead the good from non-being into being, even without the aid of any matter. And this it did when it fashioned the creature, to which it gave to be, to live, to understand and to will; and since these came from the supreme good according to the disposition of a threefold cause3, it was fitting that the creature should have in its substance and will mode, species and order. It was born, therefore, to do its works from God and according to God and for the sake of God, and this according to the mode, species and order implanted in it.

But because it was out of nothing and defectible, it was able to fail in acting for the sake of God, so as to do something for the sake of itself, not for the sake of God, and through this neither from God nor according to God nor for the sake of God; and this is sin, which is destructive of mode, species and order; and sin, because it is a defect, does not have an efficient cause, but a deficient one, namely the defect of the created will4.

But because it is a corruption, and only of a good; and every corruption is in a corruptible thing: therefore it is only in a good; and through this, since the free will corrupts in its very self mode, species and order by failing away from the true good, every sin as such both is from the will, as from its first origin, and is in the will, as in its proper subject; and this indeed the will does when, by its defectibility, mutability and vertibility, spurning the unfailing and unchangeable good, it clings to a changeable good5.

From these things it is gathered that « sin is not the seeking of evil things, but the deserting of better ones »; and therefore in the appetite of the will it is destructive of mode, species and order, and through this « so voluntary that, if it is not voluntary, it is not yet sin ». — And these things having been understood beforehand, the impiety of the Manichees6 manifestly falls, who posit a supreme evil as the first principle of all evils. It also appears what the origin of evil is, and what the subject of evil is.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. 1
    August., XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 9: Mali enim nulla natura est, sed amissio boni mali nomen accepit. Lib. de Natura boni, c. 4: Quod [malum] nihil aliud est quam corruptio vel modi, vel speciei, vel ordinis naturalis. — De hoc cap. cfr. II. Sent. d. 25. p. II. q. 3; d. 34. et 35. per totam. — Superius voci essentia B praefigit natura vel.
    Augustine, City of God XI, c. 9: For evil has no nature, but the loss of good has received the name evil. Book on the Nature of the Good, c. 4: Which [evil] is nothing else than the corruption either of mode, or of species, or of natural order. — On this chapter compare II Sent. d. 25, p. II, q. 3; d. 34 and 35 throughout. — Above, before the word essentia B prefixes natura vel.
  2. 2
    S ut summe ens, ut summe bonum et complementum, qui etiam inferius voci omnipotens praemittit spiritus. Subinde pro deducere plures codd. producere, A reducere, P ducere.
    S reads ut summe ens, ut summe bonum et complementum; and further below it also places spiritus before the word omnipotens. Thereupon, for deducere several codices have producere, A reducere, P ducere.
  3. 3
    Scil. efficientis, formalis seu exemplaris et finalis; cfr. I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. dub. 3.
    Namely, of the efficient, the formal or exemplary, and the final [cause]; cf. I Sent. d. 3, p. I, dub. 3.
  4. 4
    August., XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 7: Nemo igitur quaerat efficientem causam malae voluntatis. Non enim est efficiens, sed deficiens.
    Augustine, City of God XII, c. 7: Let no one, therefore, seek an efficient cause of an evil will. For it is not efficient, but deficient.
  5. 5
    Ut insinuat August., II. de Lib. Arb. c. 19. n. 53. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 35. dub. 6, ubi etiam seq. definitio peccati ab August., de Natura boni, c. 34. et 36, data affertur. Subinde proponitur sententia August., de Vera Relig. c. 14. n. 27; de qua vide supra pag. 188, nota 6.
    As Augustine intimates, On Free Choice II, c. 19, n. 53. Cf. II Sent. d. 35, dub. 6, where also the following definition of sin, given by Augustine in On the Nature of the Good, c. 34 and 36, is adduced. Thereupon there is set forth the opinion of Augustine, On True Religion c. 14, n. 27; on which see above, p. 188, note 6.
  6. 6
    Cfr. II. Sent. d. 1. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. et d. 34. a. 2. q. 1.
    Cf. II Sent. d. 1, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, and d. 34, a. 2, q. 1. ---
Cited by

1 place in the Opera Omnia citesthis question. Derived from Quaracchi’s own apparatus, never tagged by hand.

Whether evil is from the good as from its origin
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 34
Breviloq. p. III. c. 1.

1 further reference addresses the article or printed page this question belongs to, rather than the question itself.

Pars 3, Cap. 2→