Dist. 34, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 34
ARTICULUS I.
De originali principio mali.
QUAESTIO I.
Utrum malum sit a bono ut ab origine.
Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum malum sit a bono ut ab origine. Et quod sic, videtur:
1. Primo auctoritate Augustini de Libero Arbitrio1, ubi sic ait: Malum est, spreto incommutabili bono, rebus commutabilibus adhaerere, quod facimus libero voluntatis arbitrio.23 Si ergo liberum arbitrium est bonum, cum peccatum sit a libero arbitrio,
peccatum sive malum est a bono.
2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur exemplo. Esto, quod nihil esset nisi libera voluntas, constat, quod ipsa amaret se ipsam et posset se amare immoderate et vitiose; sed talis amor non est sine malitia: ergo tunc peccatum fieret, et non nisi a bono: ergo etc.
3. Item, ratione. Malum est vituperabile in se et vituperabilem reddit actorem4; sed nihil est vituperandum in sua actione, nisi aliquo modo possit facere bene, vel nisi habeat naturalem aptitudinem ad hoc; omne autem tale est bonum: ergo nihil potest malum facere nisi bonum.
4. Item, nullus dicitur facere malum, nisi quia facit quod non debet, aut quia non facit quod debet5: ergo malum omne suo actori est indebitum, et eius oppositum conveniens et debitum; sed omne illud, cui malum est indebitum et oppositum mali conveniens, est bonum: ergo omne illud, a quo fit malum, necesse est esse bonum.
5. Item, si malum est ab aliquo, aut illud est bonum, aut malum. Si bonum, habeo propositum. Si malum, aut illud est ab alio, aut a se ipso. Si ab alio; similiter erit quaerere de illo: ergo si non est abire in infinitum6, stare est in aliquo malo, quod sit a se ipso. Sed contra: omne quod est a se ipso, nullo alio indiget ut sit; et omne tale est sibi sufficiens; et omne quod sibi sufficiens est, omnino habet perfectionem et beatitudinem et in se et a se7; et omne tale est perfecte bonum: ergo impossibile est, quod aliquid sit malum et non sit ab alio. Restat igitur, cum sit stare et non abire in infinitum, quod malum est a bono.
6. Item, si malum est ab aliquo, aut illud, a quo est malum culpae, habet usum rationis, aut non. Si non habet usum rationis: ergo nullo modo potest culpari nec debet; hoc enim patet tam secundum legem naturalem, quam secundum legem civilem, quam etiam legem divinam: habet igitur necessario usum rationis. Sed ratio et eius usus magnum bonum est et nobile8: necesse est igitur, malum a bono esse, si ab aliquo est.
Contra: 1. Matthaei septimo9: Non potest arbor bona fructus malos facere, neque arbor mala fructus bonos facere. Ex hac auctoritate necessario arguitur, quod bonum non potest esse causa mali: ergo si malum est ab aliquo, necesse est, quod sit a malo. — Item, expressius in Glossa10: « Nihil medium, quin causa boni sit bona, et mali mala »: non est ergo malum a bono.
2. Item, hoc videtur per maximam dialecticorum, quae est: « Cuius causa bona, ipsum bonum11 »: si ergo mali causa est bona, ipsum malum est bonum: si igitur hoc est falsum, manifeste patet etc.
3. Item, hoc videtur per propositionem satis probabilem: « Contrariorum contrariae sunt causae12 »: si ergo causa boni est bona, et nullo modo malum causat bonum, ergo videtur, quod nullo modo bonum causet malum, nec quod malum sit a bono.
4. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per propositionem necessariam et probatam: « Quidquid enim est causa causae, est causa causati13 »: si ergo omne bonum causatur a summo bono, si malum est ab aliquo bono, malum est a summo bono; ergo summum bonum facit malum. Sed nihil est perfecte bonum, quod facit malum: si igitur malum est a summo bono, summum bonum non est summum; et hoc est impossibile: ergo etc.
5. Item, aut est ponere primum malum, aut non. Si non, est abire in infinitum in malis: si ergo hoc est impossibile, quia necesse est stare in ordine causarum, necesse est ergo ponere primum malum. Sed primum bonum non est ab alio, immo causa omnium bonorum, eo ipso quod primum14: ergo pari ratione, si est ponere primum malum, videtur, quod illud non sit ab alio, sed causa omnium. Restat igitur, quod malum non sit a bono.
Conclusio.
Malum a bono originem habet.
Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa hoc fuit et est etiam haeresis impiissimi Manichaei. Erravit enim in hoc, quod posuit, quod prima causa mali est malum, non bonum; unde posuit, quod cum homo possit bene facere, possit etiam peccare, duplex est in uno homine anima, quarum una est a Deo bono et semper cupit bona, altera vero a Deo malo et semper cupit mala. Et hinc est, quod in nobis est continua pugna; et omnia mala, quae facimus, oriuntur a principio malo, sicut bona a bono. — Hanc haeresim pessimam valde efficaciter improbat Augustinus in libro de Duabus Animabus, primo per ipsam peccati culpam, secundo per eius oppositum, scilicet poenitentiam.
— « Peccatum enim, ut ibidem15 dicit, est voluntas retinendi vel consequendi quod iustitia vetat et unde liberum est abstinere ». « Voluntas est animi motus, cogente nullo, ad aliquid non amittendum, vel adipiscendum ». Has duas notificationes manifestat, et post ex ipsis, tanquam ex manifestis, praedictum errorem ipse destruit, immo ostendit, quomodo error se ipsum destruit, dum ponit, animam malam non posse bene facere, et tamen principium peccati esse per propriam originem et naturam. Ponit enim, quod peccando non peccet, et ideo subiungit ibidem16: « Quisquis has duas definitiones voluntatis atque peccati veras esse concedit, totam Manichaeorum haeresim brevissimis et paucissimis, sed plane invictissimis ratiunculis sine cunctatione condemnat ».
— Postremo in fine17 libri improbat per oppositum peccati, scilicet ipsam poenitentiam, sic arguens: planum est, quod poenitere de culpa bonum et iustum est; planum etiam, quod est possibile homini — nam ipsi Manichaei hoc suadent — certum est etiam, quod eius est poenitere, qui fecit malum: ergo idem ipsum, quod fuit principium mali, potest esse principium boni. Restat igitur, cum principium boni sit bonum, quod si idem est principium mali, quod potest esse principium boni, malum esse a bono. Haec est deductio Augustini, quamvis non sit series verborum.
Propter has igitur deductiones et consimiles, quae in obiiciendo adductae sunt, reiicienda est procul haeresis praefata, quia non tantum est contra fidem, verum etiam contra rectum iudicium rationis. Dicendum est igitur, sicut dicit fides sana, et Magister in littera18 Sanctorum auctoritatibus manifestat, quod malum a bono habet originem.
Ad obiectorum autem manifestationem intelligendum est, quod malum culpae, de quo est hic sermo, quod quidem consistit circa rationalem creaturam, tripliciter potest circa ipsam consistere et considerari: aut quantum ad exteriorem effectum, aut quantum ad interiorem19, aut quantum ad habitum. Malum enim sive peccatum dicitur aliquando actus exterior, aliquando habitus interior, aliquando actus interior. Unde actus furandi est malus, et voluntas furandi in actu est mala, et habilitatio sive habitualis affectio ad furandum est mala. Secundum igitur quod malum dicitur opus exterius, sic nec est primum in genere entis nec in genere mali, quoniam actus exterior causatur ab actu interiori, et malitia actus exterioris a malitia voluntatis interioris20. — Secundum autem quod malum dicitur malus habitus, similiter nec est primum in genere entis nec in genere mali. Nam malus habitus a malo actu causatur: quia enim mala facimus, mali sumus21. — Secundum autem quod malum dicitur malus actus interior, sic potest esse primum in genere mali, sed non in genere entis. In genere mali potest esse primum, sicut patet in prima deordinatione voluntatis luciferi, ante quam nulla praecesserat malitia; nec tamen potest esse principium in genere entis. Actus enim omnis a potentia procedit, et illa est posterior, tanquam effectus posterior est causa22. Et quoniam potentia illa bona est et de genere bonorum, patet, quod malum originem habet a bono. — Et concedendae sunt rationes hoc ostendentes.
1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de auctoritate Domini in Matthaeo, et de Glossa, dicendum, quod tam textus quam Glossa intelligitur de malo, secundum quod consideratur circa actum exteriorem; et hoc quidem manifestum est per ipsum textum consequentem.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de maxima illa: Cuius causa bona etc.: dicendum, quod illa maxima intelligenda est per se sive secundum se, videlicet si causat in quantum bona, et est bona, secundum quod causat. Hoc non est verum in proposito, quia si concedatur, quod bonum sit principium mali, non tamen conceditur, quod sit principium mali, secundum quod bonum. Quomodo autem debeat ipsum dici origo sive principium, patebit in sequenti problemate.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod contrariorum contrariae sunt causae; dicendum, quod ista propositio habet veritatem, secundum quod intelligitur de contrariis, quorum utrumque est aliqua natura, et in causis agentibus naturaliter et quae sunt ad unum effectum determinatae; aliter manifestum est esse falsum. Nam idem Deus, etiam secundum Manichaeos, fecit calidum et frigidum; et eadem rationalis potentia, secundum Philosophum23, est causa oppositorum. Et ideo non habet locum in malis, quia malum non dicit naturam aliquam, secundum quod malum, et quia est a voluntate, secundum quod libera, quae non est determinata ad alterum contrariorum.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quidquid est causa causae etc.: dicendum, quod contra istam propositionem peccat locus sophisticus secundum accidens24, sicut et contra illam qua dicitur: « Quando alterum de altero praedicatur, de quocumque praedicatur subiectum et praedicatum ». Utraque enim propositio habet intelligi de praedicato et effectu, qui ita convenit uni, quod non est extraneum alteri. Non autem sic est in proposito. Nam etsi bonum est causa mali, hoc non est secundum id quod habet a summo bono, sed ratione defectibilitatis, quam habet de nihilo25.
Ad illud quod ultimo quaeritur, utrum sit ponere primum malum, patet responsio. Dico enim, quod est ponere malum, ante quod non est aliud malum; sed ex hoc non sequitur, quod sit primum ens, immo est ibi consequens26. Arguitur enim cum superlativo, qui habet in se vim distributionis, ab eo quod est in minus, ad illud quod est in plus. Unde sicut non sequitur: est primus homo, ergo est primum ens; sic nec in proposito. Non sic autem est de bono, quia bonum et ens convertuntur. Quia ergo est ponere primum malum in genere mali, ideo non est procedere in infinitum; quia vero non est primum in genere entis, ideo non habet esse a se, sed aliunde; et ita a bono.
I. De malo, quatenus refertur ad divinam voluntatem, iam tractatum est I. Sent. d. 46. q. 2-6, d. 47. q. 3-4. In hac et seq. dist. agitur copiose et profunde de malo in se et quidem de malo culpae; quaeritur autem, quid sit (infra a. 2. q. 3.), unde sit (a. 1. q. 1-3), in quo sit (a. 2. q. 1. 2.) et de effectu eius sive de corruptione, quam facit in ipsa anima (d. 33. a. 1. 2.). De malo vero poenae agitur d. 36. — Antiqui autem Scholastici, ducibus Ss. Augustino et Dionysio, qui vocatur Areopagita, in hac gravissima materia eandem doctrinam profitentur, scilicet quod malum, formaliter sumtum, non sit nisi privatio boni sive carentia boni debiti — quod non sit nisi in bono ut subiecto — quod non sit nisi a bono, non tamen ut causa efficiente, sed ut causa deficiente — et quod non existat aliquod purum malum. Haec principia concise declarantur in Breviloq. p. III. c. 1.
II. Hic et infra a. 2. q. 1. S. Doctor directe et graviter insectatur impiissimum errorem Manichaeorum, ut iam fecit supra d. 1. p. 1. a. 2. q. 1. et dub. 2, d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 1, d. 18. a. 2. q. 2. — Intelligendum autem est, quod bonum dicitur esse causa mali culpae, nec quatenus est bonum (hic ad 2.) nec per se, sed per accidens, nec ut efficiens, sed ut deficiens (cfr. q. 2. et 3.).
III. De tribus huius articuli quaestionibus alii auctores plerumque unica quaestione tractant, vel saltem rem tractandam aliter distribuunt, ut Alex. Hal., qui diffuse de causa mali disputat S. p. II. q. 94. m. 2. a. 1-6. — Scot., hic q. unica et praecipue Report. II. Sent. d. 37. q. 1. n. 12 seqq., q. 2. n. 9. (ubi fuse disputat, quo sensu bonum dicatur esse causa mali per accidens et ut deficiens). — S. Thom., hic a. 3; S. I. q. 49. a. 1; I. II. q. 75. a. 1; S. c. Gent. III. c. 10; de Malo, q. 1. a. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 2. 3. 4; S. p. II. tr. 18. q. 114. m. 1, et p. I. tr. 6. q. 26. m. 2. a. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. 2. 3. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1. 2. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. unica. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica.
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ARTICLE I.
On the original principle of evil.
QUESTION I.
Whether evil is from the good as from its origin.
Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and it is asked, whether evil is from the good as from its origin. And that it is, it seems:
1. First, by the authority of Augustine, On Free Choice1, where he says thus: Evil is, the unchangeable good having been spurned, to cleave to changeable things, which we do by the free choice of the will.23 If therefore free choice is good, since sin is from free choice,
sin or evil is from the good.
2. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow] by example. Suppose that there were nothing but the free will; it is agreed that it would love itself and could love itself immoderately and viciously; but such love is not without malice: therefore then sin would come about, and not except from the good: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, by reason. Evil is blameworthy in itself and renders its agent blameworthy4; but nothing is to be blamed in its action, unless it can in some way do well, or unless it has a natural aptitude for this; but everything of this kind is good: therefore nothing can do evil but the good.
4. Likewise, no one is said to do evil, except because he does what he ought not, or because he does not do what he ought5: therefore all evil is undue to its agent, and its opposite is fitting and due; but everything to which evil is undue and the opposite of evil fitting is good: therefore everything from which evil comes about must necessarily be good.
5. Likewise, if evil is from something, either that thing is good or evil. If good, I have what was proposed. If evil, either it is from another or from itself. If from another, there will likewise be the same to ask about that: therefore if there is not to go to infinity6, a stop must be made in some evil which is from itself. But on the contrary: everything that is from itself needs nothing else in order to be; and everything of this kind is self-sufficient; and everything that is self-sufficient altogether has perfection and beatitude both in itself and from itself7; and everything of this kind is perfectly good: therefore it is impossible that anything be evil and not be from another. It remains therefore, since there is a stop and not a going to infinity, that evil is from the good.
6. Likewise, if evil is from something, either that from which the evil of guilt comes has the use of reason, or not. If it does not have the use of reason: therefore it can in no way be blamed, nor ought it to be; for this is plain both according to the natural law, and according to the civil law, and also according to the divine law: it has therefore necessarily the use of reason. But reason and its use is a great and noble good8: it is necessary therefore that evil be from the good, if it is from anything.
On the contrary: 1. Matthew, seventh [chapter]9: A good tree cannot make bad fruits, nor a bad tree make good fruits. From this authority it is necessarily argued that the good cannot be the cause of evil: therefore if evil is from anything, it is necessary that it be from evil. — Likewise, more expressly in the Gloss10: « Nothing is intermediate, but that the cause of the good is good, and [the cause] of the evil evil »: therefore evil is not from the good.
2. Likewise, this seems [to follow] by the maxim of the dialecticians, which is: « That whose cause is good, is itself good11 »: if therefore the cause of evil is good, the evil itself is good: if therefore this is false, it is manifestly clear etc.
3. Likewise, this seems [to follow] by a sufficiently probable proposition: « Of contraries the causes are contrary12 »: if therefore the cause of the good is good, and in no way does evil cause the good, therefore it seems that in no way does the good cause evil, nor that evil is from the good.
4. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow] by a necessary and proven proposition: « For whatever is the cause of a cause, is the cause of the thing caused13 »: if therefore all good is caused by the highest good, [and] if evil is from some good, evil is from the highest good; therefore the highest good makes evil. But nothing is perfectly good which makes evil: if therefore evil is from the highest good, the highest good is not the highest; and this is impossible: therefore etc.
5. Likewise, either a first evil is to be posited, or not. If not, there is a going to infinity in evils: if therefore this is impossible, because it is necessary to make a stop in the order of causes, it is necessary therefore to posit a first evil. But the first good is not from another, but rather is the cause of all goods, by the very fact that it is first14: therefore by parity of reasoning, if a first evil is to be posited, it seems that it is not from another, but is the cause of all. It remains therefore that evil is not from the good.
Conclusion.
Evil has its origin from the good.
I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it is to be noted that concerning this there was and even now is the heresy of the most impious Manichaeus. For he erred in this, that he posited that the first cause of evil is evil, not good; whence he posited that, since a human can do well and can also sin, there are in one human two souls, one of which is from God the good and always desires goods, the other indeed from a god [who is] evil and always desires evils. And hence it is that in us there is a continual struggle; and all the evils which we do arise from an evil principle, just as goods from the good. — This most wicked heresy Augustine very effectively refutes in the book On the Two Souls, first by the very guilt of sin, secondly by its opposite, namely penitence.
— « For sin, as he says in the same place15, is the will of retaining or pursuing what justice forbids and from which one is free to abstain ». « The will is a motion of the mind, with no one compelling, toward not losing something, or toward acquiring [it] ». These two definitions he sets forth, and afterward from them, as from things manifest, he himself destroys the aforesaid error; rather he shows how the error destroys itself, while it posits that the evil soul cannot do well, and yet is the principle of sin through its own origin and nature. For it posits that in sinning it does not sin, and therefore he adds in the same place16: « Whoever concedes that these two definitions of will and of sin are true, condemns the whole heresy of the Manichaeans without hesitation by the briefest and fewest, but plainly most invincible, little arguments ».
— Finally, at the end17 of the book, he refutes [it] by the opposite of sin, namely by penitence itself, arguing thus: it is plain that to repent of guilt is good and just; it is plain also that it is possible for a human — for the Manichaeans themselves urge this — it is certain also that it is for him to repent who did the evil: therefore the very same thing which was the principle of evil can be the principle of good. It remains therefore, since the principle of good is good, that if the same is the principle of evil which can be the principle of good, evil is from the good. This is the deduction of Augustine, although it is not the [exact] sequence of his words.
Therefore on account of these deductions and similar ones, which have been adduced in objecting, the aforesaid heresy is to be rejected far off, because it is not only against the faith, but also against the right judgment of reason. It must be said therefore, as sound faith says, and the Master in the text18 manifests by the authorities of the Saints, that evil has its origin from the good.
But for the clarification of the objections it must be understood that the evil of guilt, of which the discourse here is, which indeed consists about the rational creature, can consist and be considered about it in three ways: either as to the exterior effect, or as to the interior19, or as to the habit. For evil or sin is called sometimes an exterior act, sometimes an interior habit, sometimes an interior act. Whence the act of stealing is evil, and the will of stealing in act is evil, and the aptitude or habitual affection toward stealing is evil. Therefore insofar as evil is called an exterior work, thus it is not first either in the genus of being or in the genus of evil, since the exterior act is caused by the interior act, and the malice of the exterior act by the malice of the interior will20. — But insofar as evil is called an evil habit, likewise it is not first either in the genus of being or in the genus of evil. For an evil habit is caused by an evil act: for because we do evils, we are evil21. — But insofar as evil is called an evil interior act, thus it can be first in the genus of evil, but not in the genus of being. In the genus of evil it can be first, as is plain in the first disordering of the will of Lucifer, before which no malice had preceded; nor yet can it be a principle in the genus of being. For every act proceeds from a potency, and that is posterior, as the effect is posterior to the cause22. And since that potency is good and of the genus of goods, it is plain that evil has its origin from the good. — And the reasons showing this are to be granted.
1. To that indeed which is objected from the authority of the Lord in Matthew, and from the Gloss, it must be said that both the text and the Gloss are understood of evil, insofar as it is considered about the exterior act; and this indeed is manifest from the text which follows.
2. To that which is objected from that maxim: That whose cause is good etc.: it must be said that that maxim is to be understood per se or in itself, namely if it causes insofar as it is good, and is good insofar as it causes. This is not true in the case at hand, because, even if it be conceded that the good is the principle of evil, yet it is not conceded that it is the principle of evil insofar as it is good. But in what manner it ought to be called its origin or principle, will appear in the following problem.
3. To that which is objected, that of contraries the causes are contrary; it must be said that that proposition has truth insofar as it is understood of contraries, of which each is some nature, and in causes acting naturally and which are determined to one effect; otherwise it is manifestly false. For the same God, even according to the Manichaeans, made hot and cold; and the same rational potency, according to the Philosopher23, is the cause of opposites. And therefore it has no place in evils, because evil does not state any nature, insofar as it is evil, and because it is from the will, insofar as it is free, which is not determined to one of the contraries.
4. To that which is objected, that whatever is the cause of a cause etc.: it must be said that against that proposition there offends the sophistical fallacy of accident24, just as also against that one by which it is said: « When one thing is predicated of another, of whatever the subject [is predicated] the predicate also [is predicated] ». For each proposition is to be understood of a predicate and effect which so belongs to one that it is not foreign to the other. But it is not thus in the case at hand. For although the good is the cause of evil, this is not according to that which it has from the highest good, but by reason of the defectibility which it has from nothing25.
To that which is asked last, whether a first evil is to be posited, the answer is plain. For I say that an evil is to be posited before which there is no other evil; but from this it does not follow that it is a first being, but rather it is therein consequent26. For it is argued with the superlative, which has in itself the force of distribution, from that which is in the lesser to that which is in the greater. Whence just as it does not follow: there is a first man, therefore there is a first being; so neither in the case at hand. But it is not so with the good, because the good and being are convertible. Because therefore a first evil is to be posited in the genus of evil, therefore there is no proceeding to infinity; but because it is not first in the genus of being, therefore it does not have being from itself, but from elsewhere; and so from the good.
I. Of evil, insofar as it is referred to the divine will, it has already been treated in I. Sent. d. 46. q. 2-6, d. 47. q. 3-4. In this and the following distinction it is treated copiously and profoundly of evil in itself and indeed of the evil of guilt; but it is asked what it is (below a. 2. q. 3.), whence it is (a. 1. q. 1-3), in what it is (a. 2. q. 1. 2.) and of its effect or of the corruption which it makes in the soul itself (d. 33. a. 1. 2.). But of the evil of punishment it is treated d. 36. — But the ancient Scholastics, under the lead of Ss. Augustine and Dionysius, who is called the Areopagite, in this very grave matter profess the same doctrine, namely that evil, taken formally, is nothing but the privation of good or the lack of a due good — that it is only in the good as in a subject — that it is only from the good, yet not as from an efficient cause, but as from a deficient cause — and that there exists no pure evil. These principles are concisely declared in the Breviloquium p. III. c. 1.
II. Here and below a. 2. q. 1. the holy Doctor directly and gravely assails the most impious error of the Manichaeans, as he already did above d. 1. p. 1. a. 2. q. 1. and dub. 2, d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 1, d. 18. a. 2. q. 2. — But it must be understood that the good is said to be the cause of the evil of guilt, neither insofar as it is good (here, ad 2.) nor per se, but per accidens, nor as efficient, but as deficient (cfr. q. 2. and 3.).
III. On the three questions of this article other authors for the most part treat in a single question, or at least distribute the matter to be treated otherwise, as Alexander of Hales, who diffusely disputes on the cause of evil, Summa p. II. q. 94. m. 2. a. 1-6. — Scotus, here q. unica and especially Reportata II. Sent. d. 37. q. 1. n. 12 seqq., q. 2. n. 9. (where he disputes at length in what sense the good is said to be the cause of evil per accidens and as deficient). — St. Thomas, here a. 3; S. I. q. 49. a. 1; I. II. q. 75. a. 1; S. c. Gent. III. c. 10; On Evil, q. 1. a. 3. — B. Albert, here a. 2. 3. 4; Summa p. II. tr. 18. q. 114. m. 1, and p. I. tr. 6. q. 26. m. 2. a. 3. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 2. a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 2. q. 1. 2. 3. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 2. a. 1. 2. — Durandus, here q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. unica. — Biel, on this and the following questions, here q. unica.
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- Ad marginem codd. A B C E legitur haec nota: « Ioannes ait: Qui facit peccatum et iniquitatem. Super quem locum dicit Augustinus νόμος Graece, Latine lex est; inde ἀνομία, id est iniquitas, quae est contra legem; unde praevaricantes reputati sunt omnes peccatores terrae, non solum qui scriptam Legem contemnunt, sed etiam qui innocentiam naturalis legis corrumpunt ».In the margin of codd. A B C E is read this note: « John says: Who commits sin [also commits] iniquity [cf. 1 John 3, 4]. On which place Augustine says that νόμος in Greek is lex (law) in Latin; whence ἀνομία, that is, iniquity, which is against the law; whence all the sinners of the earth are reckoned transgressors, not only those who despise the written Law, but also those who corrupt the innocence of the natural law ».
- Edd., excepta 1, in voluntate.The editions, except 1, [read] in voluntate ("in the will").
- Libr. II. c. 19. n. 53: Voluntas autem aversa ab incommutabili et communi bono et conversa ad proprium bonum, aut ad exterius aut ad inferius, peccat... Ita fit, ut neque illa bona, quae a peccantibus appetuntur, ullo modo mala sint, neque ipsa voluntas libera, quam in bonis quibusdam mediis numerandam esse comperimus, sed malum sit aversio eius ab incommutabili bono et conversio ad mutabilia bona etc. Cfr. ibid. III. c. 1. n. 2.Book II. c. 19. n. 53: But the will, turned away from the unchangeable and common good and turned toward a private good, whether toward an exterior or toward an inferior [good], sins... So it comes about that neither those goods which are sought by sinners are in any way evil, nor the free will itself, which we have found is to be numbered among certain middle goods, but the evil is its turning-away from the unchangeable good and its turning toward changeable goods etc. Cfr. ibid. III. c. 1. n. 2.
- Similiter Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 6. de virtute dicit, quod ea « et bonus homo ipse efficietur », et quod « bene opus suum reddet ». — Mox pro possit multi codd. et ed. 1 posset.Similarly Aristotle, II. Ethics c. 6, on virtue says that by it « the man himself is made good », and that « he renders his work well ». — Presently, for possit many codd. and ed. 1 [read] posset.
- Alan. ab Insulis, Theolog. regul., regula 73: Omne peccatum fit aut in committendo quod non oportet, aut omittendo quod oportet. — Subinde pro malum omne codd. I T Z aa bb ee et alii cum edd. 1, 2 malum omni, cod. F malum omnino.Alan of Lille, Theological Rules, rule 73: Every sin comes about either in committing what one ought not, or in omitting what one ought. — Then, for malum omne codd. I T Z aa bb ee and others with edd. 1, 2 [read] malum omni, cod. F malum omnino.
- Cfr. Aristot., II. Metaph. text. 5. seqq. (I. brev. c. 2.), ubi ostenditur, processum in infinitum repugnare in omni genere causarum.Cfr. Aristotle, II. Metaphysics text. 5. seqq. (I. brev. c. 2.), where it is shown that a process to infinity is repugnant in every genus of causes.
- August., 83 Qq. q. 22: Ubi nulla indigentia, nulla necessitas; ubi nullus defectus, nulla indigentia.Augustine, 83 Questions q. 22: Where there is no want, there is no necessity; where there is no defect, there is no want.
- Cfr. supra pag. 525, nota 6. — Mox pro necessario Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 necessarium.Cfr. above p. 525, note 6. — Presently, for necessario the Vatican [edition] with edd. 3, 4 [reads] necessarium.
- Vers. 18.Verse 18.
- Quae sumta est ex Comment. Hieronymi super Matth. 12, 33, et apud Strabum et Lyranum sic sonat: Nihil enim medium, quin boni auctoris bona tantum sint opera, et mali mala.Which is taken from the Commentary of Jerome on Matthew 12, 33, and in Strabo and Lyranus runs thus: For nothing is intermediate, but that the works of a good author are only good, and [those] of an evil [author] evil.
- Hoc axioma cohaeret illis quae Aristot., III. Topic. c. 1, 2, 4. (c. 6.) de locis topicis ex generationibus et corruptionibus profert, quaeque Boeth., II. de Differ. topic. in haec pauciora verba contulit: « Ab effectibus vero et corruptionibus et usibus hoc modo: nam si bona est domus, et constructio domus bona est, et e contrario, si bona est constructio domus, bona est domus... Omnium autem maxima propositio: Cuius effectio bona est, ipsum quoque bonum est, et e converso » etc. Illud quoque hic respiciendum est quod Petr. Hispan., Summul. tract. de Locis topic. (locus de Causa), ait: Si causa efficiens est bona, ipsum quod fit est bonum... cuius causa efficiens non est bona, ipsum quod fit non est bonum. Et e converso tenet locus ab effectu ad causam efficientem, ut domus est bona, ergo sua causa efficiens est bona. — In fine arg. codd. H T Y aa bb ee et alii cum edd. 1, 2 sic: est falsum manifestum, patet etc.This axiom coheres with those things which Aristotle, III. Topics c. 1, 2, 4. (c. 6.) brings forward concerning the topical places from generations and corruptions, and which Boethius, II. On Topical Differences gathered into these fewer words: « From effects indeed and corruptions and uses thus: for if a house is good, the construction of the house also is good, and conversely, if the construction of the house is good, the house is good... But the greatest proposition of all: That whose effecting is good, is itself also good, and conversely » etc. This too is here to be regarded, which Peter of Spain, Summulae tract on the Topical Places (the place from Cause), says: If the efficient cause is good, that which comes about is itself good... that whose efficient cause is not good, that which comes about is itself not good. And conversely the place holds from the effect to the efficient cause, as the house is good, therefore its efficient cause is good. — At the end of the argument codd. H T Y aa bb ee and others with edd. 1, 2 [read] thus: est falsum manifestum, patet etc.
- Aristot., II. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 56. (c. 10.). Cfr. IV. Meteor. text. 41. (c. 7.).Aristotle, II. On Generation and Corruption text. 56. (c. 10.). Cfr. IV. Meteorology text. 41. (c. 7.).
- Alan. ab Insulis, I. de Arte seu articulis cathol. fidei, n. 1.Alan of Lille, I. On the Art or Articles of the Catholic Faith, n. 1.
- Cfr. Liber de Causis, prop. 9. 18. 20. 22.Cfr. the Book of Causes, prop. 9. 18. 20. 22.
- Cap. 11. n. 15. — Seq. textus est ibid. c. 10. n. 14. — Cfr. supra d. 31. a. 1. q. 1. in corp.Chapter 11. n. 15. — The following text is ibid. c. 10. n. 14. — Cfr. above d. 31. a. 1. q. 1. in the body.
- Cap. 12. n. 16. — In testimonio allato pro ratiunculis plures codd., ut F I X Z, cum ed. 1 exhibent minusculis, alii, ut F W bb, cum edd. 2, 3, 4 minusculis. — Aliquantulum prius pro quomodo error codd. H T substituunt quod error.Chapter 12. n. 16. — In the testimony adduced, for ratiunculis several codd., as F I X Z, with ed. 1 give minusculis, others, as F W bb, with edd. 2, 3, 4 minusculis. — A little before, for quomodo error codd. H T substitute quod error.
- Cap. 14. n. 22.Chapter 14. n. 22.
- Hic c. 2. — Cfr. supra d. 1. p. 1. a. 2. q. 1.Here c. 2. — Cfr. above d. 1. p. 1. a. 2. q. 1.
- Codd. F M N (P a secunda manu) hic adiiciunt actum. — Paulo inferius pro habilitatio cod. cc et ed. 1 habilitas. Deinde cod. cc constanter substituit principium in genere pro primum in genere; sed cfr. quod supra exposuimus pag. 94, nota 4.Codd. F M N (P by a second hand) here add actum. — A little below, for habilitatio cod. cc and ed. 1 [read] habilitas. Then cod. cc constantly substitutes principium in genere for primum in genere; but cfr. what we explained above p. 94, note 4.
- Vide infra d. 42. a. 1. q. 1. seq.See below d. 42. a. 1. q. 1. seq.
- Cfr. supra pag. 718.Cfr. above p. 718.
- Aristot., IX. Metaph., text. 19. (VIII. c. 9.): Patet igitur, quod malum non est praeter res; malum namque natura posterius potentia est etc. — Paulo superius cod. bb et ille pro et illa. In nostra lectione illa est ablativus.Aristotle, IX. Metaphysics, text. 19. (VIII. c. 9.): It is plain therefore that evil is not apart from things; for evil is by nature posterior to potency etc. — A little above, cod. bb [reads] et ille for et illa. In our reading illa is ablative.
- Aristot., IX. Metaph. text. 3. et 10. (VIII. c. 2. et 5.).Aristotle, IX. Metaphysics text. 3. and 10. (VIII. c. 2. and 5.).
- De hac fallacia vide tom. I. pag. 58, nota 5. — Testimonium, quod sequitur, depromptum est ex Aristot., de Praedicam. c. 3. (c. 2.), ubi legitur sic: Quando alterum de altero praedicatur ut de subiecto, quaecumque de eo quod praedicatur, dicuntur, omnia etiam de subiecto dicentur; ut homo de homine quodam praedicatur, animal vero de homine: ergo et de quodam homine animal praedicabitur etc.On this fallacy see vol. I. p. 58, note 5. — The testimony which follows is drawn from Aristotle, On the Categories c. 3. (c. 2.), where it is read thus: When one thing is predicated of another as of a subject, whatever things are said of that which is predicated, all are also said of the subject; as man is predicated of a certain man, and animal of man: therefore animal too will be predicated of the certain man etc.
- Ut exponitur in quaest. seq.As is explained in the following question.
- Vide tom. I. pag. 628, nota 1. Ibid. pag. 32, nota 2. etiam indicatur, unde delibatum est illud: « bonum et ens convertuntur », de quo vide etiam Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 6.See vol. I. p. 628, note 1. Ibid. p. 32, note 2. it is also indicated whence that [saying] was drawn: « the good and being are convertible », on which see also Aristotle, I. Ethics c. 6.