Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 34, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 34

Textus Latinus

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QUAESTIO II.

Utrum peccatum sit a voluntate, ut efficiente vel deficiente.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum malum sit a bona causa, utpote a voluntate, ut efficiente vel deficiente. Et quod sic, videtur:

Fundamenta.

1. Primo per Augustinum in Enchiridio¹, ubi ait sic: « Nemo quaerat causam malae voluntatis; non enim habet causam efficientem, sed deficientem ».

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2. Item, hoc videtur per illud quod dicitur a Dionysio de Divinis Nominibus²: « Malum est praeter naturam et causam »: sed constat, quod non vult dicere, quod malum non sit ab aliquo, vult ergo dicere, quod non est ab alio tanquam a vere causante et efficiente: ergo si aliquo modo est, restat, quod sit tanquam a deficiente.

3. Item, ratione videtur. Sicut se habet effectus ad actum efficientem, ita defectus ad ipsum deficere; sed verus effectus non potest educi in esse nisi a causa ut efficiente: ergo nec defectus nisi a deficiente. Sed « malum est defectus circa naturam », sicut dicit Augustinus³: ergo etc.

4. Item, omne perfectum est a causa perfecta, ergo omne deficiens a causa deficiente; sed malum opus dicitur malum propter defectum alicuius debitae circumstantiae: ergo malum est a causa deficiente.

5. Item, facere et deficere opponuntur, similiter construere et destruere opponuntur: ergo sicut construere est facere, ita destruere est deficere. Sed in malum exire est aliquod bonum corrumpere, quia non dicitur malum, nisi quod nocet vel adimit aliquid de bono⁴: igitur in malum exire est deficere.

6. Item, omnis efficientia est a primo et summo efficiente⁵; sed malum nullo modo est a Deo: ergo nullo modo procedit ab aliquo ut principio effectivo.

Contra: 1. Dionysius de Divinis Nominibus⁶: Ad oppositum. « Anima est causa mali, sicut ignis calefieri »; sed ignis est causa calefieri per modum efficientis: ergo etc.

2. Item, omne illud quod prius potest esse, quam sit, habet causam efficientem; sed malum prius potest esse, quam sit: ergo etc. Maior et minor manifestae sunt.

3. Item, respectu illius res magis iudicatur causa efficiens, respectu cuius est magis sufficiens; sed voluntas nostra magis sufficit ad malum quam ad bonum⁷: ergo magis debet dici causa efficiens mali quam boni: si ergo bonum est a voluntate ut efficiente, malum consimiliter erit.

4. Item, si voluntas est causa mali, secundum quod deficiens, aut defectus ille est poena, aut culpa. Si poena: ergo poena ante culpam⁸. Si culpa — loquamur igitur de prima culpa — aut igitur est a voluntate, secundum quod deficiens, aut non. Si sic: ergo ante primam culpam est culpa. Si non: ergo si primum malum non est a voluntate ut deficiente, videtur, quod nullum malum.

5. Item, si malum primum est a voluntate ut deficiente, aut ergo defectu naturali, aut praeternaturali. Si defectu naturali: ergo naturaliter et semper est principium mali, cum semper habeat hunc defectum in se. Si defectu praeternaturali: aut est contractus, aut inflictus, aut voluntarie acquisitus. Nullo istorum modorum potest poni in voluntate luciferi et hominis primi: ergo etc.

6. Item, si malum est a voluntate deficiente, aut in quantum deficit a summo bono, aut in quantum deficit a bono, quod debet habere. Si in quantum deficit a summo bono: ergo cum talis defectus est in omni creatura, in omni reperietur peccatum. Si in quantum deficit a bono, quod debet habere; sed nullus a tali bono deficit, nisi privetur merito alicuius culpae: ergo nullo modo prima culpa a voluntate deficiente esse potest.

(Quaestio incidens.) Est igitur quaestio: quae est ratio sive dispositio circa voluntatem, ratione cuius sit causa proxima et immediata ipsius mali? Non enim videtur esse causa, quia est ens, nam hoc convenit⁹ omni enti; nec quia de nihilo, quia hoc convenit tam voluntati bonae quam malae; nec etiam quia volens, per eandem rationem; nec quia volens malum, quoniam velle malum est primum peccatum, et velle malum est primum malum: si ergo idem non est ratio sui vel causa¹⁰, voluntas non dicetur causa mali, quia volens malum.

Conclusio.

Malum esse a voluntate ut deficiente, tripliciter recte intelligi potest.

Respondeo: (Conclusio generalis.) Dicendum, quod absque dubio malum sive peccatum est a voluntate ut deficiente, sicut expresse dicit Augustinus, et concordat Dionysius. (Explicatur.) Ad cuius intelligentiam notandum est, quod cum aliquis effectus dicitur esse a causa aliqua sub dispositione vel conditione superadiecta¹¹, hoc potest

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intelligi tripliciter: aut ita quod illa dispositio dicit aliquid praeambulum ad illum effectum, aut quia dicit aliquid annexum, aut quia dicit illum eundem effectum ut informans et denominans suum principium effectivum. Primo modo lumen dicitur esse a sole lucente; lucere enim est actus praeambulus ad illuminare. Secundo modo dicitur lumen esse a sole calefaciente; calor enim concomitatur lumen. Tertio modo dicitur lumen esse a sole illuminante; cum enim dico solem illuminare, et lumen esse a sole, idem influxus dicitur, aliter tamen et aliter importatus secundum diversam comparationem. — Per hunc modum intelligendum est in proposito, quod cum dicitur, quod malum est a voluntate deficiente, hoc potest intelligi tripliciter.

(Triplex defectus in voluntate.) Propter quod notandum, quod triplex defectus reperitur circa voluntatem; unus quidem naturalis, alius culpabilis, et tertius poenalis. Naturalem defectum voco ipsam defectibilitatem, quae inest voluntati hoc ipso, quod¹² ex nihilo; defectum culpabilem voco ipsum peccatum; defectum poenalem, illud damnum sive nocumentum sive laesionem, quae consequitur ad illud.

(His concludens ones speciales.) De quolibet horum defectuum praedictus sermo veritatem habet. Nam malum culpae est a voluntate deficiente defectu naturali, ita quod ille defectus praeambulus est ad culpam; nunquam enim voluntas posset in volendo bonum deficere, nisi vanitatem et defectibilitatem in se haberet¹³. Similiter malum est a voluntate deficiente defectu poenali, ita quod ille defectus est culpae annexus; nunquam enim est dedecus peccati sine decore iustitiae¹⁴. Verum est etiam, quod malum culpae est a voluntate deficiente defectu culpabili, non tamen alia culpa, sed eadem, diversimode comparata; eadem enim est culpa, qua deformatur voluntas et eius interior actio. Unde sic conceditur, malum esse a voluntate deficiente, sicut actus a substantia agente¹⁵.

(Corollaria.) Cum igitur triplex sit defectus circa voluntatem, ratione cuius malum dici potest a voluntate deficiente, quorum unus, scilicet naturalis, est praeambulus ad defectum culpae, alter vero, id est poenalis, est consequens et annexus; defectus poenalis inseparabiliter consequitur defectum culpabilem; impossibile enim est, esse « dedecus peccati, sicut dicit Augustinus¹⁶, sine decore vindictae ». Defectus autem culpabilis non sequitur necessario nec inseparabiliter ad defectum naturalem. Unde non necessario sequitur, si alicubi sit defectus naturalis, quod ibi sit culpa; voluntas enim non hoc ipso peccat, quia ex nihilo, sed hoc ipso, quod est ex nihilo, est potens deficere; hoc ipso quod voluntas est, potens est servare rectitudinem iustitiae; hoc ipso vero, quod voluntas est ex nihilo, potens est, quantum est de se, illam deserere; et ita defectus ille circa voluntatem reddit eam ad peccandum possibilem.

(Ad quaestionem incidentem.) Si autem tu quaeras, quid faciat ipsam voluntatem exire in peccatum, et quae sit dispositio ipsius immediata respectu culpae; dicendum, quod nulla superadditur dispositio; sed ipsa voluntas, quae est domina sui actus et libera, potest se ipsam convertere ad illud, ad quod vult et sicut vult; et si indebite se convertat, tunc peccat, nulla superinducta nova dispositione a parte voluntatis, quae sit praeambula ad ipsam culpam. Unde sicut ille qui stat rectus, posset statim, si vellet, sine nova dispositione adveniente dimittere se cadere; sic voluntas, recta consistens et in ordine ad ultimum finem, potest illum¹⁷ exire; et exitus ille peccatum est. — Ex dictis igitur patet, qualiter malum est a voluntate deficiente; et ex his manifesta est responsio ad omnia, quae in contrarium obiecta sunt.

Solutio oppositorum.

1. Ad illud quod primo obiicitur, quod anima est causa mali, sicut ignis calefieri; dicendum, quod non est similitudo quantum ad modum causandi specialem, sed generalem. In generali modo causandi est convenientia, quia utrumque se habet in ratione causae efficientis; sed in speciali est differentia, quia ignis est causa per modum naturae et necessitatis, anima vero per modum libertatis; ille per modum positionis et vere efficientis, ista per modum privationis et deficientis.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod malum potest prius esse, quam sit etc.; dicendum, quod malum eo modo, quo habet esse, eo modo habet et fieri; et quoniam malum privatio est et defectus, sicut patebit inferius¹⁸; hinc est, quod sicut malum esse non est aliquid vere esse, sic nec malum effici est vere ab aliquo fieri ut efficiente, sed ut deficiente.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima magis potest in malum; dicendum, quod sufficientia in deficiendo non est sufficientia simpliciter, sed secundum quid sufficientia et simpliciter insufficientia; et ideo ex tali sufficientia inferre veram efficientiam est paralogismus secundum quid et simpliciter¹⁹.

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Prima enim propositio intelligitur de sufficientia simpliciter, sicut patet inspicienti.

4. 5. 6. Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum ille defectus sit culpa, vel poena; et utrum sit naturalis, vel praeternaturalis; et iterum respectu cuius; iam patet responsio. Omnibus enim his modis, ut dictum est, potest accipi. Prout autem accipitur pro defectu naturali, qui inest creaturae ex hoc, quod de nihilo, non notatur ibi conditio defectus tanquam causa proxima et immediata ipsius peccati, ut prius dictum est. Prout autem accipitur pro culpa, non notatur, quod antecedat, sed quod voluntatem denominat. Nunquam enim est deformis actus a voluntate, quin voluntas deformetur. Prout accipitur pro poena, non notatur praecedere, sed concomitari. — Et per hoc illa tria patent et alia, quae quaeruntur consequenter.

Scholion

I. Solutio huius (2.) gravissimae quaestionis fundatur in distinctione triplicis defectus voluntatis. De primo defectu, scil. naturali, cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. 1. a. 2. q. 2. ad 7. 8. De hoc defectu dicit ad mentem nostri Doctoris S. Thom. (hic a. 3. ad 4.): « Unus (defectus), qui est potentialis causa mali, scilicet ex nihilo; ex hoc enim, quod ex nihilo est, potest deficere peccando secundum vertibilitatem electionis. Non tamen iste defectus est actualis causa mali, quia sequeretur, quod voluntas semper deficeret, sicut crus claudum semper claudicat ». Ibidem etiam quoad alium defectum, qui est in actu voluntatis, idem consentit doctrinae S. Bonaventurae (ad quaest. incidentem) his verbis: « Illius autem defectus, qui est in actu voluntatis, non oportet, quod sit causa aliquis alius defectus, in voluntate praeexistens actu; quia sic in infinitum iretur; sed ipsamet voluntas secundum se considerata illius defectus causa est » etc.

II. Praeter auctores in praecedente scholio laudatos de 2. quaest. specialiter tractant: Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 4. Sequentem (3.) quaest. alii magistri tantum tangunt sub titulo, utrum bonum sit causa mali per se, an per accidens. Nam, ut dicit Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 2. a. 1.), « aliquid per se est causa eius quod est ab ipso praeintentum; per accidens vero, quod est praeter intentionem ». De hoc agit S. Thom., S. c. Gent. III. c. 4.

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English Translation

QUESTION II.

Whether sin is from the will, as from an efficient or a deficient [cause].

Secondly it is asked, whether evil is from a good cause, namely from the will, as from an efficient or a deficient [cause]. And that it is, it seems:

Fundamenta.

1. First, by Augustine in the Enchiridion¹, where he says thus: « Let no one seek the cause of an evil will; for it has not an efficient cause, but a deficient one ».

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2. Likewise, this seems [to follow] by what is said by Dionysius On the Divine Names²: « Evil is beside nature and beside cause »: but it is agreed that he does not mean that evil is not from anything, he means therefore that it is not from another as from a truly causing and efficient [cause]: therefore if it is in any way [at all], it remains that it is as from a deficient [cause].

3. Likewise, it seems [to follow] by reason. As the effect stands to the efficient act, so the defect [stands] to the deficient itself; but a true effect cannot be drawn into being except by a cause as efficient: therefore neither a defect except by a deficient [cause]. But « evil is a defect about nature », as Augustine says³: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, everything perfect is from a perfect cause, therefore everything deficient from a deficient cause; but an evil work is called evil on account of the defect of some due circumstance: therefore evil is from a deficient cause.

5. Likewise, to do and to fail are opposed, likewise to construct and to destroy are opposed: therefore just as to construct is to do, so to destroy is to fail. But to go forth into evil is to corrupt some good, since nothing is called evil except what harms or takes away something of good⁴: therefore to go forth into evil is to fail.

6. Likewise, all efficiency is from the first and highest efficient [cause]⁵; but evil is in no way from God: therefore it in no way proceeds from anything as from an effective principle.

On the contrary: 1. Dionysius On the Divine Names⁶: To the opposite. « The soul is the cause of evil, as fire of [the becoming] hot »; but fire is the cause of [the becoming] hot by the mode of an efficient [cause]: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, everything that can be before it is has an efficient cause; but evil can be before it is: therefore etc. The major and minor are manifest.

3. Likewise, that thing is the more judged the efficient cause with respect to which it is the more sufficient; but our will is the more sufficient for evil than for good⁷: therefore it ought the more to be called the efficient cause of evil than of good: if therefore the good is from the will as efficient, evil will likewise be [so].

4. Likewise, if the will is the cause of evil, insofar as it is deficient, either that defect is punishment, or guilt. If punishment: therefore punishment before guilt⁸. If guilt — let us then speak of the first guilt — either then it is from the will, insofar as it is deficient, or not. If so: therefore before the first guilt there is guilt. If not: therefore if the first evil is not from the will as deficient, it seems that there is no evil [at all].

5. Likewise, if the first evil is from the will as deficient, then either by a natural defect, or by a praeternatural [one]. If by a natural defect: therefore it is naturally and always a principle of evil, since it always has this defect in itself. If by a praeternatural defect: either it is contracted, or inflicted, or voluntarily acquired. In none of these ways can it be posited in the will of Lucifer and of the first human: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, if evil is from a deficient will, either insofar as it fails from the highest good, or insofar as it fails from the good which it ought to have. If insofar as it fails from the highest good: therefore, since such a defect is in every creature, in every [creature] sin will be found. If insofar as it fails from the good which it ought to have; but no one fails from such a good unless he be deprived [of it] by the merit of some guilt: therefore in no way can the first guilt be from a deficient will.

(An incidental question.) There is therefore a question: what is the ground or disposition about the will, by reason of which it is the proximate and immediate cause of evil itself? For it does not seem to be the cause because it is a being, for this belongs⁹ to every being; nor because [it is] from nothing, since this belongs to a good will as much as to an evil one; nor again because [it is] willing, by the same account; nor because [it is] willing evil, since to will evil is the first sin, and to will evil is the first evil: if therefore the same is not the ground or cause of itself¹⁰, the will will not be called the cause of evil because it is willing evil.

Conclusion.

That evil is from the will as deficient can rightly be understood in three ways.

I respond: (A general conclusion.) It must be said that without doubt evil or sin is from the will as deficient, as Augustine expressly says, and Dionysius agrees. (It is explained.) For the understanding of which it is to be noted that, when some effect is said to be from some cause under a disposition or condition superadded¹¹, this can

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be understood in three ways: either so that that disposition states something praeambulary to that effect, or because it states something annexed, or because it states that same effect as informing and denominating its effective principle. In the first way light is said to be from the shining sun; for to shine is an act praeambulary to to illuminate. In the second way light is said to be from the warming sun; for heat accompanies light. In the third way light is said to be from the illuminating sun; for when I say the sun illuminates, and light is from the sun, the same influx is meant, yet [it is] imported in one way and in another according to the diverse comparison. — In this manner it is to be understood in the matter proposed, that, when it is said that evil is from a deficient will, this can be understood in three ways.

(A threefold defect in the will.) On account of which it is to be noted that a threefold defect is found about the will; one indeed natural, another culpable, and a third penal. The natural defect I call defectibility itself, which is in the will by this very fact, that¹² it is from nothing; the culpable defect I call sin itself; the penal defect, that loss or harm or injury which follows upon it.

(Concluding from these the special [conclusions].) Of each of these defects the aforesaid discourse holds truth. For the evil of guilt is from the will deficient by a natural defect, in such a way that that defect is praeambulary to guilt; for the will could never fail in willing the good, unless it had vanity and defectibility in itself¹³. Likewise evil is from the will deficient by a penal defect, in such a way that that defect is annexed to guilt; for never is there the disgrace of sin without the beauty of justice¹⁴. It is true also that the evil of guilt is from the will deficient by a culpable defect, yet not by another guilt, but by the same, compared in diverse ways; for it is the same guilt by which the will and its interior action are deformed. Whence it is thus conceded that evil is from the will deficient, just as the act [is] from the acting substance¹⁵.

(Corollaries.) Since therefore there is a threefold defect about the will, by reason of which evil can be called [as] from a deficient will, of which one, namely the natural, is praeambulary to the defect of guilt, but the other, that is the penal, is consequent and annexed; the penal defect inseparably follows the culpable defect; for it is impossible that there be « the disgrace of sin, as Augustine says¹⁶, without the beauty of vindication ». But the culpable defect does not follow necessarily nor inseparably upon the natural defect. Whence it does not necessarily follow, if anywhere there is a natural defect, that there be guilt; for the will sins not by this very fact, that it is from nothing, but by this very fact, that, being from nothing, it is able to fail; by this very fact, that it is a will, it is able to keep the rectitude of justice; but by this very fact, that the will is from nothing, it is able, so far as is in itself, to desert it; and so that defect about the will renders it capable of sinning.

(To the incidental question.) But if you ask what makes the will go forth into sin, and what is its immediate disposition with respect to guilt; it must be said that no disposition is superadded; but the will itself, which is mistress of its own act and free, can convert itself toward that to which it wills and as it wills; and if it convert itself unduly, then it sins, with no new disposition superinduced on the part of the will which is praeambulary to guilt itself. Whence just as he who stands upright could at once, if he willed, without a new disposition supervening, let himself fall; so the will, standing upright and in order toward the ultimate end, is able to go forth from it¹⁷; and that going-forth is sin. — From what has been said, therefore, it is plain in what manner evil is from a deficient will; and from these things is manifest the response to all the things which have been objected to the contrary.

Solution of the opposing [arguments].

1. To that which is first objected, that the soul is the cause of evil, as fire of [the becoming] hot; it must be said that there is no likeness as to the special mode of causing, but [only] the general. In the general mode of causing there is agreement, since each stands in the account of an efficient cause; but in the special there is difference, because fire is a cause by the mode of nature and necessity, but the soul by the mode of liberty; the former by the mode of position and of a truly efficient [cause], the latter by the mode of privation and of a deficient [cause].

2. To that which is objected, that evil can be before it is etc.; it must be said that evil, in the manner in which it has being, in that manner has also its coming-to-be; and since evil is a privation and a defect, as will appear below¹⁸; hence it is that, just as to be evil is not truly to be something, so neither is to be made evil truly to be made by anything as efficient, but [only] as deficient.

3. To that which is objected, that the soul is the more able [to incline] toward evil; it must be said that sufficiency in failing is not sufficiency simply, but sufficiency in a certain respect and simply insufficiency; and therefore to infer true efficiency from such sufficiency is a paralogism from a certain respect to the simple¹⁹.

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For the first proposition is understood of sufficiency simply, as is plain to one who inspects [it].

4. 5. 6. To that which is asked, whether that defect be guilt, or punishment; and whether it be natural, or praeternatural; and again with respect to what; the response is now plain. For in all these ways, as has been said, it can be taken. But insofar as it is taken for the natural defect, which is in the creature from this, that it is from nothing, there is not noted there the condition of the defect as the proximate and immediate cause of sin itself, as was said before. But insofar as it is taken for guilt, it is not noted that it precedes, but that it denominates the will. For never is the act deformed by the will, but that the will be deformed. Insofar as it is taken for punishment, it is not noted to precede, but to accompany. — And by this those three things are plain, and the others which are asked consequently.

Scholion

I. The solution of this (2nd) most grave question is founded in the distinction of a threefold defect of the will. Of the first defect, namely the natural, cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. 1. a. 2. q. 2. ad 7. 8. Of this defect St. Thomas says, in accord with the mind of our Doctor (here a. 3. ad 4.): « One [defect], which is the potential cause of evil, namely from nothing; for from this, that it is from nothing, it can fail by sinning according to the vertibility of choice. Yet this defect is not the actual cause of evil, because it would follow that the will always failed, as a lame leg always limps ». In the same place too, as to the other defect, which is in the act of the will, he [St. Thomas] agrees with the doctrine of S. Bonaventure (on the incidental question) in these words: « But of that defect which is in the act of the will, it is not required that the cause be some other defect, pre-existing in act in the will; because thus there would be a going to infinity; but the will itself, considered in itself, is the cause of that defect » etc.

II. Besides the authors praised in the preceding scholion, on the 2nd question specially treat: Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 2. a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 2. q. 4. The following (3rd) question other masters only touch under the title, whether the good is the cause of evil per se, or per accidens. For, as Petrus a Tarantasia says (here q. 2. a. 1.), « something is per se the cause of that which is pre-intended by it; but per accidens [the cause] of that which is beside intention ». Of this St. Thomas treats, S. c. Gent. III. c. 4.

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Apparatus Criticus

Cap. 23. n. 8. sententialiter. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. Fere ad verbum autem habetur ista sententia XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 7, ubi sic legitur: Nemo igitur quaerat efficientem causam malae voluntatis. Non enim est efficiens, sed deficiens.
Chapter 23. n. 8, in substance. Cfr. here the text of the Master, c. 3. Almost word for word this sentence is had in XII. On the City of God, c. 7, where it reads thus: Let no one then seek the efficient cause of an evil will. For it is not efficient, but deficient.
Cap. 4. § 32, ubi iuxta abbatem Vercellensem legitur: Malum ergo est praeter viam, praeter intentionem, praeter naturam, praeter causam (ed. Argent. 1502). — Paulo inferius cod. aa a voluntate, cod. bb a natura pro a vere.
Chapter 4. § 32, where, according to the abbot of Vercelli, it reads: Evil therefore is beside the way, beside intention, beside nature, beside cause (ed. Argentina 1502). — A little below cod. aa [reads] a voluntate, cod. bb a natura for a vere.
Libr. II. de Morib. Manich. c. 5. n. 7. seq.; Contra Secundin. Manich. c. 11. et 17. seq.; Enchirid. c. 13. n. 4. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 4. et infra a. 2. q. 1. seqq.
Book II. On the Morals of the Manichaeans c. 5. n. 7. seq.; Against Secundinus the Manichaean c. 11. and 17. seq.; Enchiridion c. 13. n. 4. Cfr. here the text of the Master, c. 4. and below a. 2. q. 1. seqq.
August., VII. Confess. c. 12. n. 18; II. de Morib. Manich. c. 3. n. 5. et c. 8. n. 11; I. Contra Adversar. Legis et Proph. c. 5. n. 7; XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 3. Cfr. lit. Magistri, hic c. 4.
Augustine, VII. Confessions c. 12. n. 18; II. On the Morals of the Manichaeans c. 3. n. 5. and c. 8. n. 11; I. Against the Adversary of the Law and the Prophets c. 5. n. 7; XII. On the City of God, c. 3. Cfr. the text of the Master, here c. 4.
Epist. II. Cor. 3, 5: Non quod sufficientes simus cogitare aliquid a nobis quasi ex nobis, sed sufficientia nostra ex Deo est. — Minor probatur I. Sent. d. 46. q. 2. Cfr. etiam infra d. 36. a. 3. q. 1. seq. et d. 37. a. 2. q. 1. — Pro efficientia edd., excepta 1, efficacia.
Epistle, II Cor. 3, 5: Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God. — The minor is proved I. Sent. d. 46. q. 2. Cfr. also below d. 36. a. 3. q. 1. seq. and d. 37. a. 2. q. 1. — For efficientia the editions, except 1, [read] efficacia.
Cap. 4. § 30: Nunquid ergo anima causa est malorum, sicut ignis causa est caloris? (Vercellens.).
Chapter 4. § 30: Is the soul then the cause of evils, as fire is the cause of heat? (Vercelli [version]).
Cfr. supra d. 28. a. 2. q. 3.
Cfr. above d. 28. a. 2. q. 3.
Quod secundum Augustinum impossibile est; de quo vide supra pag. 432, nota 4.
Which according to Augustine is impossible; on which see above p. 432, note 4.
Codd. T bb cc et nonnulli alii cum edd. 1, 2 conveniet, codd. Y aa conveniret, cod. O nam sic conveniret.
Codd. T bb cc and several others with edd. 1, 2 [read] conveniet, codd. Y aa conveniret, cod. O nam sic conveniret.
Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 47. (c. 4.): Generat autem nihil ipsum se ipsum. Cfr. August., de Immort. animae, c. 8. n. 14. — Cod. T principium peccati pro primum peccatum.
Aristotle, II. On the Soul, text. 47. (c. 4.): But nothing generates its very self. Cfr. Augustine, On the Immortality of the Soul, c. 8. n. 14. — Cod. T [reads] principium peccati for primum peccatum.
Codd. F aa cum ed. 1 superaddita.
Codd. F aa with ed. 1 [read] superaddita.
Cod. cc et ed. 1 post quod subiiciunt est.
Cod. cc and ed. 1 after quod add est.
Cfr. August., II. de Lib. Arb. c. 20. n. 54; XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 6. et 8.
Cfr. Augustine, II. On Free Choice c. 20. n. 54; XII. On the City of God, c. 6. and 8.
Vide supra pag. 770, nota 1. — Paulo inferius post non tamen cod. N interserit est.
See above p. 770, note 1. — A little below, after non tamen cod. N inserts est.
Cfr. August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 1. n. 2; Contra Secundin. Manich. c. 13. seqq.; et infra d. 33. a. 1. q. 2. — Cod. T omittit sic, pro quo cod. F non.
Cfr. Augustine, III. On Free Choice c. 1. n. 2; Against Secundinus the Manichaean c. 13. seqq.; and below d. 33. a. 1. q. 2. — Cod. T omits sic, for which cod. F [reads] non.
Libr. III. de Lib. Arb. c. 13. n. 44. Vide supra pag. 770, nota 1. — Paulo inferius pro alicubi sit codd. T V ee et alii cum ed. 1 alicui sit, cod. aa alicui insit.
Book III. On Free Choice c. 13. n. 44. See above p. 770, note 1. — A little below, for alicubi sit codd. T V ee and others with ed. 1 [read] alicui sit, cod. aa alicui insit.
Scil. ordinem. — Codd. K ee et ed. 1 in illum. Aliquanto superius inter verba posset statim cod. aa interiicit tamen.
Namely, the order. — Codd. K ee and ed. 1 [read] in illum. Somewhat above, between the words posset statim cod. aa inserts tamen.
Art. 2. q. 3. et d. 35. per totam.
Art. 2. q. 3. and d. 35. throughout.
De hac fallacia cfr. Aristot., I. Elench. c. 4. (c. 5.). — Paulo superius pro sed secundum quid sufficientia et simpliciter insufficientia cod. cc et ed. 1 sed secundum quid; sufficientia autem secundum quid est simpliciter insufficientia. Dein pro efficientiam Vat. sufficientiam, edd. 1, 2, 3 cum nonnullis codd., ut H aa, efficaciam. Vide infra lit. Magistri, d. XXXV. c. 6.
On this fallacy cfr. Aristotle, I. Sophistical Refutations c. 4. (c. 5.). — A little above, for sed secundum quid sufficientia et simpliciter insufficientia cod. cc and ed. 1 [read] sed secundum quid; sufficientia autem secundum quid est simpliciter insufficientia. Then for efficientiam the Vatican [edition reads] sufficientiam, edd. 1, 2, 3 with several codd., as H aa, efficaciam. See below the text of the Master, d. XXXV. c. 6.

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