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Dist. 25, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 3

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 25

Textus Latinus
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Articulus Unicus. Quaestio III. Utrum liberum arbitrium, secundum quod liberum, possit in malum.

Tertio quaeritur de libero arbitrio in comparatione ad obiectum, et est quaestio, utrum liberum arbitrium, secundum quod liberum, possit in malum. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. De nullo vituperatur quis nec laudatur, nisi de illo quod est a libero arbitrio, secundum quod liberum; sed de peccato et malo vituperatur quis et punitur: ergo peccatum est a libero arbitrio, secundum quod liberum: ergo liberum arbitrium potest in peccatum, secundum quod liberum, et in malum.

2. Item, actus liberi arbitrii, secundum quod liberum, est eligere: sed liberum arbitrium de se, cum est gratia destitutum, habet eligere malum; bonum autem non eligit nisi per auxilium gratiae: ergo liberum arbitrium, quantum est de se, plus habet obiectum malum quam bonum.

3. Item, potestates rationales sunt ad opposita, secundum quod huiusmodi; sed liberum arbitrium, secundum quod liberum, est potestas rationalis: ergo est ad opposita, quantum est de sui natura. Sed non est ad opposita, quae sunt dulce et amarum, verum et falsum, et consimilia: ergo ad opposita, quae sunt bonum et malum: ergo malum est obiectum liberi arbitrii, secundum quod liberum.

4. Item, liberum arbitrium potest facere malum, aut igitur se ipso, aut alio. Si alio, quaero: mediante quo? et non est dare; tunc enim esset quaerere, utrum illud esset liberum, aut non; et si non esset liberum, iam in opere suo nec esset laudabile nec vituperabile, et ita nec peccare posset. Si autem esset liberum: ergo vel erit abire in infinitum, vel est dare, quod liberum arbitrium se ipso peccat1. Si igitur se ipso potest in malum, et se ipso est liberum: ergo liberum arbitrium, secundum quod liberum, habet pro obiecto ipsum malum.

Sed contra: 1. Anselmus de Libero Arbitrio2: «Quod libertati appositum eam minuit, et separatum auget, non est libertas nec pars libertatis»; sed potestas peccandi est huiusmodi, ut dicit: et ex hoc concluditur, quod potestas peccandi nec est libertas

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nec pars libertatis. Si igitur malum non est obiectum nisi potestatis peccandi, liberum arbitrium, secundum quod liberum, non habet pro obiecto malum.

2. Item, posse peccare plus dicit impotentiam quam potentiam, et plus dicit defectum quam complementum3; sed «liberum arbitrium, secundum quod liberum, est sub Deo potentissimum»: ergo liberum arbitrium, secundum quod liberum, non habet obiectum malum sive peccatum.

3. Item, si malum est obiectum liberi arbitrii, secundum quod liberum: ergo ubicumque est libertas arbitrii, est potestas ad malum: ergo vel in Deo est potestas ad malum, vel in ipso non est liberum arbitrium; quod si utrumque horum est impossibile et contra Augustinum4, restat etc.

4. Item, liberum arbitrium nunquam facit nec appetit malum nisi sub ratione boni5; sed vinum, quia non appetitur nisi sub ratione dulcis, ipsum per se non est appetibile, sed dulce: si ergo malum non appetitur, nisi in quantum apparet bonum, solum bonum est obiectum liberi arbitrii.

5. Item, unaquaeque potentia est completior, cum coniuncta est suo obiecto mediante actu, quam cum non est coniuncta: ergo si malum esset obiectum liberi arbitrii, secundum quod liberum, liberum arbitrium esset completius, cum exiret in malum. Sed hoc est falsum6: manifestum ergo etc.

6. Item, si malum esset obiectum liberi arbitrii, secundum quod liberum, ergo insufficienter definiretur ab Anselmo7, cum dicitur: «Potestas servandi rectitudinem». Si tu dicas, quod bonum est obiectum per se, et malum per accidens; hoc non solvit, quia non sufficienter definit medicinam qui dicit, eam esse scientiam sani, nisi addat eius oppositum, licet medicina sit scientia sani per se, et aegri per accidens.

Conclusio

Obiectum liberi arbitrii tum secundum communem rationem, tum prout est in creaturis, per se est bonum, ita ut ipsum non, nisi quatenus est deficiens, eligat malum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod de libero arbitrio est loqui dupliciter: aut secundum communem rationem, secundum quam reperitur in Creatore et in creatura; et sic obiectum eius est bonum et aequum, malum vero non est obiectum; nisi quis dicat, hoc esse obiectum, quia liberum arbitrium illud respuit et detestatur; hic autem vocatur obiectum illud, quod intendit liberum arbitrium per actum proprium, sive quod efficit. — Alio modo contingit loqui de libero arbitrio, secundum quod reperitur in creatura; et sic est loqui de ipso dupliciter: aut in quantum liberum, aut in quantum deficiens. Si in quantum liberum, sic natum est exire in actum aequitatis susceptibilem et aequitate informatum. Si autem loquamur de ipso, in quantum deficiens, sic liberum arbitrium, in quantum arbitrium liberum, potest et exit in actum deliberativum; quia deficiens, exit in actum deformatum, et ita in malum. Sic ergo patet, quod liberum arbitrium, secundum quod liberum est, habet obiectum bonum et exit in bonum, non in malum, sicut rationes ad secundam8 partem inductae ostendunt. Nihilominus tamen, in quantum cum libertate habet defectibilitatem, potest in malum, ita quod malitia non est obiectum liberi arbitrii nec a libero arbitrio, secundum quod liberum, sed secundum quod deficiens. Actus autem substratus, cum sit deliberativus, exit a libero arbitrio, secundum quod liberum9. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum obiectum.

Ad argumenta:

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Ad 1. Quod enim obiicitur, solis operibus liberi arbitrii deberi laudem et vituperium; hoc non solum verum est de his quae liberum arbitrium respiciunt, secundum quod liberum, sed etiam secundum quod defectivum. Sic enim opus ab eo veniens est vituperio dignum ratione deformitatis, quae non habet causam efficientem, sed deficientem, sicut infra10 manifestabitur.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod liberum arbitrium de se eligit malum; dicendum, quod etsi11 sufficiat ad eligendum malum, pro eo quod facilius est deficere quam proficere; non tamen ad illud ordinatur principaliter, quoniam hoc non convenit ei secundum naturae propriae complementum, sed potius secundum propriae naturae defectum. Praeterea, etsi de se eligat malum, nunquam tamen eligit malum, nisi in quantum apparet esse bonum.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod rationales potestates sunt ad opposita; dicendum, quod etsi verum sit in rationalibus potestatibus defectibilibus et creatis, non tamen est verum in rationalibus potestatibus, in quibus non potest esse defectus. Absit enim, quod illud philosophicum12 verbum sit verum, quo dicitur, quod «Deus potest prava agere»; hoc enim est contra veritatem et contra Augustinum, sicut in primo libro13 ostensum fuit et inferius suo loco ostendetur. Quod enim dicuntur rationales potestates esse ad opposita, hoc non est, quia sunt rationales, sed quia sunt deficientes; maxime, si in eiusmodi oppositis intelligatur, quorum unum est privatio alterius, sicut se habent bonum et malum. Et ita ex hoc non sequitur, quod liberum arbitrium, secundum quod liberum, possit ad malum.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod liberum arbitrium se ipso potest in malum; dicendum, quod etsi se ipso possit, non tamen potest se ipso sufficiente14, sed potius se ipso deficiente; se ipso enim potest deficere, nec oportet aliud intervenire ad hoc, quod exeat in malum.

Scholion

I. Pelagiani contendebant, indifferentiam voluntatis ad eligendum bonum et malum esse de essentia libertatis; contra quos communiter catholici auctores cum Ss. Augustino, Anselmo et Magistro tenent, libertatem contrarietatis, scilicet quae eligit inter bonum et malum, nec de essentia nec de perfectione libertatis esse, sed tantum defectum eiusdem, ex defectibilitate creaturae ortum. Unde S. Thom. (S. I. q. 62. a. 8. ad 3.) docet: «Quod liberum arbitrium diversa eligere possit, servato ordine finis, hoc pertinet ad perfectionem libertatis eius; sed quod eligat aliquid divertendo ab ordine finis, quod est peccare, hoc pertinet ad defectum libertatis» (cfr. idem hic q. unic. a. 1. ad 2; de Verit. q. 24. a. 7. in corp.). Patet autem, quanti momenti sit haec doctrina ad solvendas multas quaestiones.

II. Hanc quaestionem alii commentatores Magistri tantum paucis verbis tangunt; sub aliis titulis fusius de ea loquuntur Alex. Hal., S. q. 72. m. 2. a. 2. § 1, a. 3. § 1; B. Albert., II. Sent. d. 24. a. 6. quaestiunc. incid.; Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 5. dub. lat. 1.

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English Translation

Article Unique. Question III. Whether free choice, insofar as it is free, can tend toward evil.

Thirdly there is an inquiry concerning free choice in relation to its object, and the question is whether free choice, insofar as it is free, can tend toward evil. And that it can, seems [to follow].

1. No one is blamed or praised except for that which is from free choice, insofar as it is free; but a person is blamed and punished for sin and evil: therefore sin is from free choice, insofar as it is free: therefore free choice, insofar as it is free, can tend toward sin and toward evil.

2. Likewise, the act of free choice, insofar as it is free, is to choose: but free choice of itself, when it is destitute of grace, has [the power] to choose evil; whereas it does not choose the good except by the help of grace: therefore free choice, so far as concerns itself, has evil for its object more than the good.

3. Likewise, rational powers are directed to opposites, insofar as they are such; but free choice, insofar as it is free, is a rational power: therefore it is directed to opposites, so far as concerns its own nature. But it is not directed to the opposites that are sweet and bitter, true and false, and the like: therefore to the opposites that are good and evil: therefore evil is the object of free choice, insofar as it is free.

4. Likewise, free choice can do evil, either therefore by itself, or by another. If by another, I ask: by means of what? and none can be given; for then one would have to ask whether that [other] were free or not; and if it were not free, then in its work it would be neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy, and so it could not even sin. But if it were free: then either there will be an infinite regress, or it must be granted that free choice sins by itself1. If therefore it can tend toward evil by itself, and is free by itself: therefore free choice, insofar as it is free, has evil itself for its object.

On the contrary: 1. Anselm, On Free Choice2: «What, when added to liberty, diminishes it, and when separated increases it, is neither liberty nor a part of liberty»; but the power of sinning is of this sort, as he says: and from this it is concluded that the power of sinning is neither liberty

nor a part of liberty. If therefore evil is not the object except of the power of sinning, free choice, insofar as it is free, does not have evil for its object.

2. Likewise, to be able to sin bespeaks impotence rather than power, and bespeaks defect rather than completion3; but «free choice, insofar as it is free, is the most powerful thing under God»: therefore free choice, insofar as it is free, does not have evil or sin for its object.

3. Likewise, if evil is the object of free choice, insofar as it is free: then wherever there is freedom of choice, there is the power to evil: therefore either there is in God a power to evil, or in Him there is not free choice; but if each of these is impossible and contrary to Augustine4, the rest follows, etc.

4. Likewise, free choice never does nor desires evil except under the aspect of the good5; but wine, since it is not desired except under the aspect of the sweet, is not desirable in itself, but [only] the sweet: if therefore evil is not desired except insofar as it appears good, the good alone is the object of free choice.

5. Likewise, every power is more complete when it is conjoined to its object by means of an act than when it is not conjoined: therefore if evil were the object of free choice, insofar as it is free, free choice would be more complete when it went forth into evil. But this is false6: it is manifest therefore, etc.

6. Likewise, if evil were the object of free choice, insofar as it is free, then it would be insufficiently defined by Anselm7, when it is said: «The power of preserving rectitude». And if you say that the good is the object per se, and evil per accidens; this does not solve it, for he does not sufficiently define medicine who says that it is the science of the healthy, unless he add its opposite, although medicine is the science of the healthy per se, and of the sick per accidens.

Conclusion

The object of free choice, both according to its common notion and as it is in creatures, is per se the good, so that it does not choose evil except insofar as it is deficient.

I respond: It must be said that free choice can be spoken of in two ways: either according to its common notion, according to which it is found in the Creator and in the creature; and thus its object is the good and the equitable, while evil is not its object — unless someone should say that this is its object, because free choice rejects and detests it; but here that is called its object which free choice intends through its proper act, or which it effects. — In another way it happens to speak of free choice as it is found in the creature; and thus it can be spoken of in two ways: either insofar as it is free, or insofar as it is deficient. If insofar as it is free, it is then naturally apt to go forth into an act capable of equity and informed by equity. But if we speak of it insofar as it is deficient, then free choice, insofar as it is free choice, can and does go forth into a deliberative act; for since it is deficient, it goes forth into a deformed act, and so into evil. So therefore it is plain that free choice, insofar as it is free, has the good for its object and goes forth into the good, not into evil, as the arguments adduced for the second8 part show. Nevertheless, insofar as together with liberty it has defectibility, it can tend toward evil, in such a way that malice is not the object of free choice nor [does it come] from free choice, insofar as it is free, but insofar as it is deficient. But the underlying act, since it is deliberative, goes forth from free choice insofar as it is free9. — And by this the reply to the first objection is plain.

To the arguments:

To 1. As to the objection that praise and blame are owed to the works of free choice alone; this is true not only of those things which free choice regards insofar as it is free, but also insofar as it is defective. For thus the work coming from it is worthy of blame by reason of the deformity, which has not an efficient cause but a deficient one, as will be shown below10.

To 2. As to the objection that free choice of itself chooses evil; it must be said that although it suffices11 for choosing evil — because it is easier to fail than to advance — yet it is not principally ordered to it, since this does not belong to it according to the completion of its proper nature, but rather according to the defect of its proper nature. Moreover, although of itself it may choose evil, nevertheless it never chooses evil except insofar as it appears to be good.

To 3. As to the objection that rational powers are directed to opposites; it must be said that although this is true of defectible and created rational powers, it is nevertheless not true of rational powers in which there can be no defect. For far be it that that philosophical12 saying should be true, by which it is said that «God can do depraved things»; for this is against the truth and against Augustine, as was shown in the first book13 and will be shown below in its place. For that rational powers are said to be directed to opposites is not because they are rational, but because they are deficient; especially if it be understood of those opposites of which one is the privation of the other, as the good and evil stand. And thus from this it does not follow that free choice, insofar as it is free, can tend toward evil.

To 4. As to the objection that free choice can tend toward evil by itself; it must be said that although it can [do so] by itself, nevertheless it cannot [do so] by itself as sufficient14, but rather by itself as deficient; for by itself it can fail, nor is it necessary that anything else intervene in order that it go forth into evil.

Scholion

I. The Pelagians contended that the indifference of the will to choosing good and evil belongs to the essence of liberty; against whom the Catholic authors commonly, together with Saints Augustine, Anselm, and the Master, hold that the liberty of contrariety — namely that which chooses between good and evil — belongs neither to the essence nor to the perfection of liberty, but is only a defect of it, arising from the defectibility of the creature. Hence St. Thomas (Summa I, q. 62, a. 8, ad 3) teaches: «That free choice can choose diverse things, the order to the end being preserved, pertains to the perfection of its liberty; but that it should choose something by turning aside from the order to the end, which is to sin, pertains to the defect of liberty» (cf. the same here, q. unic., a. 1, ad 2; de Veritate q. 24, a. 7, in the body). And it is plain of how great moment this doctrine is for solving many questions.

II. Other commentators of the Master touch this question only in a few words; under other titles they speak of it more at length: Alexander of Hales, Summa q. 72, m. 2, a. 2, § 1, a. 3, § 1; Bl. Albert, II Sent. d. 24, a. 6, incidental little question; Giles of Rome, here q. 1, a. 5, Latin dub. 1.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 1. n. 1. seqq. et c. 17. n. 47. seqq.
    Augustine, On Free Choice III, c. 1, nn. 1ff. and c. 17, nn. 47ff.
  2. Cap. 1: An putas, quod additum minuit et separatum auget libertatem id aut libertatem esse aut partem libertatis?... Potestas ergo peccandi, quae addita voluntati minuit eius libertatem, et, si dematur, auget, nec libertas est nec pars libertatis.
    [Anselm, On Free Choice] c. 1: Do you think that what, when added, diminishes liberty, and when separated increases it, is itself either liberty or a part of liberty?... Therefore the power of sinning, which, added to the will, diminishes its liberty, and, if it be taken away, increases it, is neither liberty nor a part of liberty.
  3. Cfr. August., II. de Lib. Arb. c. 20. n. 54, et XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 7. — De minori, quae Bernardo tribuitur, cfr. supra pag. 115, nota 6.
    Cf. Augustine, On Free Choice II, c. 20, n. 54, and City of God XII, c. 7. — On the minor [premise], which is attributed to Bernard, cf. above p. 115, note 6.
  4. Libr. XXII. de Civ. Dei, c. 30. n. 3. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1.
    City of God XXII, c. 30, n. 3. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 1.
  5. Cfr. supra pag. 517, nota 1. — In minori plures codd. cum Vat. et ed. 1 pro vinum substituunt vitium. Sed iam Aristot., II. Topic. c. 2. (c. 3.), ait: Est enim desiderium huius aut ut finis, ut sanitatis, aut ut eorum quae sunt ad finem, ut medicinae conficiendae, aut ut eorum quae sunt secundum accidens, ut in vino amicum dulce, non quia vinum, sed quia dulce est; nam per se dulce [aliquis] desiderat, vinum autem per accidens; si enim austerum fit, non amplius desiderat; per accidens ergo desiderabat.
    Cf. above p. 517, note 1. — In the minor [premise] several codices, together with the Vatican edition and ed. 1, substitute vitium (vice) for vinum (wine). But already Aristotle, Topics II, c. 2 (c. 3), says: For the desire of this is either as of an end, like health, or as of the things that are toward the end, like the preparing of medicine, or as of the things that are accidental, as in wine [one desires] the sweet friend, not because it is wine, but because it is sweet; for one desires the sweet per se, but the wine per accidens; for if it become sour, one desires it no longer; therefore one was desiring it per accidens.
  6. Aristot., IX. Metaph. text. 19. (VIII. c. 9.) docet, quod in bonis actus magis sit honorabilis quam potentia, at in malis magis valeat potentia. — Vat. et codd. 2, 3, 4 coniungunt hoc arg. cum sequente, omissis omnino verbis liberum arbitrium esset completius usque ad illa verba ergo insufficienter etc.
    Aristotle, Metaphysics IX, text 19 (VIII, c. 9), teaches that in good things the act is more honorable than the power, but in evil things the power has greater force. — The Vatican edition and codices 2, 3, 4 join this argument with the following, omitting entirely the words free choice would be more complete down to those words therefore insufficiently, etc.
  7. Dialog. de lib. arb. c. 3. — Propositio seq. illustratur illis verbis Aristot., II. Moral. Eudem. c. 11. (c. 10.): Neque enim aequaliter sanitatis morbique eadem est scientia, sed illius quidem iuxta naturam, huius autem praeter naturam. Sic et voluntas secundum quidem naturam boni est, praeter naturam vero mali; et vult natura quidem bonum, praeter naturam vero et ex mentis quadam eversione malum.
    [Anselm,] Dialogue on Free Choice c. 3. — The following proposition is illustrated by those words of Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics II, c. 11 (c. 10): For the science of health and of disease is not equally the same, but that of the former is according to nature, that of the latter beside nature. So too the will is by nature [a will] of the good, but beside nature of evil; and it wills by nature the good, but beside nature and by a certain perversion of mind the evil.
  8. Fere omnes codd. cum tribus primis edd. primam; perperam.
    Nearly all the codices, together with the first three editions, read first [part]; wrongly.
  9. Cfr. infra d. 34. a. 1. q. 2. seqq., d. 37. a. 1. q. 1. et a. 2. q. 1. Illustratur haec distinctio duorum in una actione communiter exemplo igniti gladii, vulnus adustum facientis, quod a Damasceno, III. de Fide orthod. c. 19, ita proponitur: Igniti gladii incisam unam ustionem atque inustam sectionem dicimus, et tamen sectionem distinctam ab ustione esse nec non alius aliusque naturae asserimus, ignis nempe ustionem, ac ferri sectionem (ed. Migne). — Paulo superius pro substratus Vat. abstractus (!); cod. B verbo substratus addit tantummodo.
    Cf. below d. 34, a. 1, q. 2ff., d. 37, a. 1, q. 1 and a. 2, q. 1. This distinction of two [things] in one action is commonly illustrated by the example of the red-hot sword inflicting a burned wound, which is set forth thus by [John] Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith III, c. 19: We say that the cut of a red-hot sword is one burning and one unburnt cutting, and yet we assert that the cutting is distinct from the burning and of one and another nature, namely the burning belonging to the fire, and the cutting to the iron (Migne edition). — A little above, for substratus (underlying) the Vatican edition reads abstractus (abstracted) (!); codex B adds to the word substratus only [the word tantummodo].
  10. Locis in nota praeced. citt. — Paulo ante pro Sic enim, ut legimus cum codd. IX aa bb ee, Vat. Sic tantum.
    In the places cited in the preceding note. — A little before, for Sic enim (for thus), as we read with codices IX aa bb ee, the Vatican edition reads Sic tantum (thus only).
  11. In codd. Y aa subiungitur per se. — De hac solut. cfr. Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 6. et 9, ubi inter alia docetur, malum esse facile, bonum vero difficile.
    In codices Y aa there is appended per se (of itself). — On this solution cf. Aristotle, Ethics II, c. 6 and 9, where among other things it is taught that evil is easy, but the good difficult.
  12. Aristot., IV. Topic. c. 5, ubi haec propositio: «Potest enim et Deus et studiosus [i. e. virtuosus] prava agere, non sunt autem huiusmodi».
    Aristotle, Topics IV, c. 5, where [stands] this proposition: «For both God and the virtuous man can do depraved things, but they are not of such a sort».
  13. Dist. 42. q. 2. et d. 46. q. 2. nec non infra d. 37. a. 2. q. 1. — August., XXII. de Civ. Dei, c. 30. n. 3. et 83 Qq. q. 3. seq. — In fine solut. post secundum quod liberum ed. 1 addit per se.
    Dist. 42, q. 2, and d. 46, q. 2, and also below d. 37, a. 2, q. 1. — Augustine, City of God XXII, c. 30, n. 3, and 83 Questions, q. 3f. — At the end of the solution, after secundum quod liberum (insofar as it is free), ed. 1 adds per se.
  14. Codd. L ce (bb a prima manu) efficiente.
    Codices L ce (bb by the first hand) read efficiente (as efficient).
← Dist. 25, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 2Dist. 25, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 4→