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Dist. 44, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 44

Textus Latinus
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Articulus I. Unde habeat ortum potestas peccandi.

Quaestio I. Utrum potentia peccandi sit in nobis a Deo.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum potentia peccandi sit in nobis a Deo. Et quod sic, videtur:

Ad oppositum.

1. Primo auctoritate Augustini super Psalmum1, et Magister adducit in littera: « Nocendi voluntas potest esse ab hominis animo; potestas autem non nisi a Deo »; sed voluntas nocendi, quae est hominis a se ipso, non est nisi respectu nocumenti, quo quis peccat: ergo si respectu illius eiusdem est a Deo potestas, videtur, quod potestas peccandi sit a Deo in ipso.

2. Item, Philosophus in Topicis2: « Potest Deus et studiosus prava agere »; sed omne illud, in quo communicat homo cum Deo, habet ab ipso tanquam a causa et principio: si ergo in potentia peccandi homo cum Deo communicat, videtur, quod potentiam peccandi a Deo accipiat.

3. Item, omne illud, quod attestatur nobilitati naturae, est a Deo; sed potestas peccandi in eo, in quo est, attestatur nobilitati naturae — non enim reperiri potest nisi in creatura rationali, quae est nobilissima omnium creaturarum3 — ergo videtur, quod potentia peccandi sit in homine a Deo.

4. Item, omne illud, quod facit ad amplificationem laudis, a Deo est, cuius est omnis honor et laus; sed posse peccare facit ad laudem viri iusti, secundum quod dicitur Ecclesiastici trigesimo primo4: Qui potuit transgredi et non est transgressus, et facere malum, et non fecit: ergo videtur, quod posse peccare sit in homine a Deo.

5. Item, potentia peccandi aut est in creatura rationali secundum quod est a Deo, aut secundum quod est ex nihilo. Si secundum quod est a Deo, habeo propositum, scilicet quod talem potentiam homo a Deo accipiat. Si secundum quod est ex nihilo: ergo cum omnis creatura sit ex nihilo, omnis creatura habet potentiam peccandi: si igitur hoc est falsum, restat etc.

Fundamenta. Sed contra:

1. Peccare est deficere5; sed posse deficere est non-posse et privatio potentiae: si igitur privatio et defectus potentiae non est a Deo, videtur, quod potentia peccandi non sit in homine a Deo, sed potius a se ipso.

2. Item, ab eodem principio sunt actus et potentia6: ergo si peccatum non est a Deo aliquo modo, ergo nec potentia peccandi in homine est ab ipso.

3. Item, gloria est perfectiva et salvativa naturae7; sed per gloriam aufertur potentia peccandi: si ergo gloria non aufert quod Deus dedit, videtur igitur, quod potentiam peccandi homo a Deo non acceperit.

4. Item, potentia peccandi est potentia faciendi contra Deum: ergo potentia peccandi, in quantum huiusmodi, adversatur divinae potentiae8: si igitur

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divina potentia nihil contra se facit, videtur igitur, quod ab ipso non sit potentia peccandi.

5. Item, omne quod est in homine a Deo, habet exemplar in Deo; sed potentia peccandi, in quantum huiusmodi, non habet exemplar in Deo; impossibile est enim, quod Deus peccet, sicut in locis pluribus9 Augustinus ostendit; et impossibile est etiam, defectus habere exemplar in Deo. Si igitur homo secundum potentiam peccandi Deo non assimilatur, immo potius assimilatur diabolo; et omne illud, quod homo habet a Deo, habet in ipso exemplaritatem et similitudinem: videtur, quod potentia peccandi in homine non habeat a Deo causam et originem.

Conclusio. Potentia peccandi uno modo accepta est a Deo, alio autem modo minime.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum dico potentiam peccandi, duo dico: et dico aliquam potentiam, et dico potentiam ad talem actum ordinabilem. — Si igitur loquamur de potentia peccandi, secundum quod potentia est; cum illa potentia sit liberum arbitrium, sic absque dubio a Deo est. — Si autem loquamur de ordinabilitate illius potentiae ad peccatum, tunc dicendum est, quod sicut peccatum aliquando accipitur abstracte, aliquando concrete — aliquando enim nominat actionem deformem, aliquando ipsam deformitatem10 — sic dupliciter est loqui de illa ordinabilitate ad peccandum: aut respectu deformitatis, aut respectu actionis substratae. Si respectu actionis substratae, sic talis ordinabilitas a Deo est, sicut et actio substrata peccato. Si autem loquamur de ordinabilitate illa respectu deformitatis, sic, cum illa deformitas nihil aliud sit quam privatio et defectus, talis ordinabilitas nihil aliud est quam defectibilitas; et ideo, sicut defectus deformitatis non est a Deo, sic nec talis defectibilitas est a Deo, sed est in11 ipsa creatura rationali, quia ex nihilo. Sic igitur potentia peccandi uno modo conceditur esse a Deo, alio modo minime. — Et secundum hoc currunt rationes ad oppositas partes, et etiam diversae fuerunt opiniones.

Nam sicut Magister dicit in littera12, quidam dixerunt, quod potentia peccandi non est a Deo; alii vero dixerunt, quod potentia peccandi a Deo est; quod nititur probare Magister multis auctoritatibus. Illae autem auctoritates non valent ad hoc concludendum, nisi accipiatur potentia peccandi secundum illud quod est, sive13 respectu actionis, ad quam est, quia hoc modo continetur sub genere potentiae. Secundum autem quod potentia peccandi consideratur in comparatione ad ipsam deformitatem, sic non est in genere potentiae, immo potius impotentiae; sic enim non nominat potentiam, sed defectum. Et sicut non sequitur: Deus potest omnia facere, ergo potest peccare; sic non sequitur isto modo: omnis potestas a Deo est, ergo potestas peccandi a Deo est. Et isto modo loquendo dicit Anselmus14, quod « potestas peccandi non est libertas nec pars libertatis ». — Et hoc modo procedunt rationes ostendentes, quod potestas peccandi non sit in homine a Deo; et ideo concedendae sunt.

Solutio oppositorum.

1. Ad illam vero, quae obiicitur de potentia nocendi, quod est a Deo, quamvis voluntas non sit ab ipso; dicendum, quod Augustinus vim facit in verbo illo inter ipsam potentiam, qua peccatur, et actualem ordinationem illius potentiae, qua peccatur15; et vult dicere, quod ipsa potentia a Deo est, quamvis ipsa ordinatio ad peccatum ab ipso non sit, quia potius est deordinatio quam ordinatio. Et ideo ex hoc non habetur, nisi quod potentia peccandi, secundum id quod est, a Deo sit; secundum autem quod est ad peccandum, non potest elici ex illa auctoritate, quod sit a Deo, immo potius oppositum, quia potentia peccandi non pervenit in peccatum nisi mediante voluntaria deordinatione, quam a Deo esse negat Augustinus in praedicta auctoritate.

2. Ad illud verbum Philosophi, quo dicit, quod Deus et studiosus potest prava facere; exponunt quidam, quod Philosophus intellexit de malo poenae. Sed hoc plane repugnat eius textui; et ideo, cum sacra Scriptura dicat, et omnes expositores concordant, quod nullo modo potest peccare, sicut nec mentiri, nec etiam se ipsum negare16; dicendum est, quod illud verbum Philosophi non habet veritatem. Nec credo, ipsum constituisse magnam vim in verbo illo, pro eo quod dixit hoc solum exemplificando et pertranseundo; et exemplum suum satis sufficiebat ad propositum pro parte, in qua habet veritatem, pro hac videlicet, quod studiosus potest mala agere, licet hoc non sit, unde studiosus, sed unde potest a virtute deficere.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potentia peccandi attestatur nobilitati naturae; dicendum, quod hoc non est verum, in quantum dicit ordinem17 ad

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defectum, sed in quantum dicit ordinationem ad actum substratum; nam nullus actus est deformabilis per culpam, nisi qui procedit a potentia deliberativa, quae nobilis est, quia sola illa informabilis est per iustitiam. — Vel dicendum, quod attestari nobilitati est dupliciter: aut per se, aut per accidens. Potentia autem peccandi et peccatum attestatur nobilitati naturae per accidens, sicut dicit Augustinus18, quod « dolor boni amissi testis est naturae bonae ».

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod facit ad amplificationem laudis; dicendum, quod sicut virtus commendabilior redditur ex peccatis, sic potentia bene faciendi commendabilior redditur ex potentia male faciendi; non quia vitium aliquid addat bonitati virtutis, nec potentia deficiendi aliquid addat potentiae bene faciendi; sed quia ex praesentia oppositi magis in sua bonitate clarescit19. Sic magis apparet virtuositas hominis, quando potest mala facere et non vult, quam si non posset nec vellet; et ideo laudatur vir iustus in hoc, quod potuit mala facere et non fecit, hoc est, laudatur in hoc, quod fecit bonum et non fecit malum, cum posset; ita quod laus essentialiter respicit hoc quod est facere bonum, hoc autem quod est posse peccare, non respicit nisi per accidens; unde circumscripta potentia faciendi malum, si bonum faceret voluntarie, adhuc laudaretur.

5. Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum potentia peccandi insit creaturae a Deo, vel ex nihilo; dicendum, quod ratione actus substrati, qui est actus deliberativus, inest ei a Deo; ratione vero defectus inest ei ex nihilo. Et hinc est, quod potentia peccandi non reperitur in omni creatura, quia ratione imperfectionis non reperitur in creatura irrationali, pro eo quod non potest in ea esse actus deliberationis. Ratione vero omnimodae perfectionis non reperitur in creatura beata, quia non potest in ea esse defectus; adeo20 suo Creatori est coniuncta. Et sic potentia peccandi quodam modo tollitur per gloriam, quodam modo relinquitur; quodam modo est ipsa libertas, quodam modo minuit libertatem; quodam modo est potentia, et quodam modo impotentia; quia21 quodam modo dicit positionem, et quodam modo privationem. Et ideo, cum quaeritur, utrum sit a Deo, non est respondendum simpliciter, sed secundum praedictam distinctionem.

Scholion

I. Suppositis principiis, quae supra d. 37. respectu actus mali probata sunt, duae quaestiones huius articuli de potentia peccandi eodem fere modo ab aliis solvuntur, nempe distinguendo in ipsa id quod est in se et ordinem ad actum peccandi sive ad defectum, qui non ex Deo, sed ex nihilo est (hic in corp. et in solut. ad 5.). Hinc etiam communiter tenetur, quod posse peccare non est libertas nec pars libertatis, sed est eiusdem defectus (cfr. supra d. 7. p. I. a. 2. q. 1-3, d. 25. p. II. q. 3; IV. Sent. d. 18. p. II. dub. 1.). — Paulo tamen subtilius Scot. (in utroque Scripto, hic q. unica) de hac quaestione loquitur, cum distinguat potentiam peccandi, ut accipitur formaliter, quatenus scilicet dicit tantum ordinem fundatum in aliquo et terminatum ad aliud, et fundamentaliter, prout accipitur pro fundamento talis ordinis. Primum membrum divisionis distinguit, sicut S. Bonav., idemque resolvit. De secundo autem membro resolvit, « quod aliquid positivum est fundamentum illius ordinis, utroque modo sumtum » i. e. tum quoad actum substratum tum quoad ipsam deformitatem; quod satis convenit cum iis quae S. Bonav. dicit infra q. 2. ad 5. Biel autem cum aliis Nominalibus vult, potentiam peccandi simpliciter esse a Deo, et fundamenta S. Bonaventurae solvere nititur. Etiam Durand. plura satis inepta profert contra communem doctrinam.

II. De utraque huius art. quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 94. m. 3. a. 6. § 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 1-3; S. p. II. tr. 2-4. q. 111. m. 1. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, hic q. unica.

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English Translation

Article I. Whence the power of sinning takes its origin.

Question I. Whether the power of sinning is in us from God.

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether the power of sinning is in us from God. And that it is, seems to be the case:

On the affirmative side.

1. First, by the authority of Augustine on the Psalm1, which the Master also adduces in the text: « The will to harm can be from man's own mind; but the power is only from God »; but the will to harm, which belongs to man from himself, exists only in respect of the harm by which one sins: therefore if in respect of that same thing the power is from God, it seems that the power of sinning is from God in him.

2. Likewise, the Philosopher in the Topics2: « Both God and the virtuous man are able to do depraved things »; but everything in which man shares with God, he has from him as from a cause and principle: if therefore man shares with God in the power of sinning, it seems that he receives the power of sinning from God.

3. Likewise, everything that bears witness to the nobility of nature is from God; but the power of sinning, in that in which it exists, bears witness to the nobility of nature — for it cannot be found except in a rational creature, which is the noblest of all creatures3 — therefore it seems that the power of sinning is in man from God.

4. Likewise, everything that makes for the amplification of praise is from God, to whom belongs all honor and praise; but to be able to sin makes for the praise of the just man, according to what is said in Ecclesiasticus 314: He that could have transgressed and has not transgressed, and could have done evil and has not done it: therefore it seems that to be able to sin is in man from God.

5. Likewise, the power of sinning is in the rational creature either according to that which is from God, or according to that which is from nothing. If according to that which is from God, I have my thesis, namely that man receives such a power from God. If according to that which is from nothing: then since every creature is from nothing, every creature has the power of sinning: if therefore this is false, the rest follows, etc.

The foundations. On the contrary:

1. To sin is to fail5; but to be able to fail is a non-ability and a privation of power: if therefore the privation and defect of power is not from God, it seems that the power of sinning is not in man from God, but rather from himself.

2. Likewise, acts and potency are from the same principle6: therefore if sin is in no way from God, then neither is the power of sinning in man from him.

3. Likewise, glory is perfective and preservative of nature7; but through glory the power of sinning is taken away: if therefore glory does not take away what God has given, it seems therefore that man has not received the power of sinning from God.

4. Likewise, the power of sinning is the power of acting against God: therefore the power of sinning, as such, is opposed to the divine power8: if therefore

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the divine power does nothing against itself, it seems therefore that the power of sinning is not from him.

5. Likewise, everything that is in man from God has an exemplar in God; but the power of sinning, as such, does not have an exemplar in God; for it is impossible that God should sin, as Augustine shows in many places9; and it is also impossible that a defect should have an exemplar in God. If therefore man, according to the power of sinning, is not made like to God, but rather is made like to the devil; and everything that man has from God has in him an exemplarity and likeness: it seems that the power of sinning in man does not have its cause and origin from God.

Conclusion. The power of sinning, taken in one way, is from God, but in another way not at all.

I respond: It must be said that when I say "the power of sinning," I say two things: I say some power, and I say a power orderable to such an act. — If therefore we speak of the power of sinning, according as it is a power; since that power is free choice, in this way it is without doubt from God. — But if we speak of the orderability of that power toward sin, then it must be said that, just as sin is sometimes taken abstractly, sometimes concretely — for sometimes it names the deformed action, sometimes the deformity itself10 — so there are two ways of speaking of that orderability toward sinning: either in respect of the deformity, or in respect of the underlying action. If in respect of the underlying action, then such orderability is from God, just as is the action underlying the sin. But if we speak of that orderability in respect of the deformity, then, since that deformity is nothing other than a privation and defect, such orderability is nothing other than defectibility; and therefore, just as the defect of deformity is not from God, so neither is such defectibility from God, but it is in11 the rational creature itself, because it is from nothing. Thus then the power of sinning in one way is granted to be from God, in another way not at all. — And according to this the reasons run to the opposite sides, and there were also diverse opinions.

For as the Master says in the text12, some have said that the power of sinning is not from God; but others have said that the power of sinning is from God; which the Master strives to prove by many authorities. But those authorities are not valid for concluding this, unless the power of sinning be taken according to that which it is, that is13, in respect of the action to which it is ordered, since in this way it is contained under the genus of power. But according as the power of sinning is considered in comparison to the deformity itself, then it is not in the genus of power, but rather of impotence; for thus it does not name a power, but a defect. And just as it does not follow: God can do all things, therefore he can sin; so it does not follow in this way: all power is from God, therefore the power of sinning is from God. And speaking in this way Anselm says14 that « the power of sinning is not liberty nor a part of liberty ». — And in this way proceed the reasons showing that the power of sinning is not in man from God; and therefore they are to be conceded.

Solution of the opposing arguments.

1. To that argument which is raised about the power of harming, that it is from God although the will is not from him; it must be said that Augustine lays weight in that statement upon the distinction between the power itself, by which one sins, and the actual ordering of that power, by which one sins15; and he means to say that the power itself is from God, although the ordering of it toward sin is not from him, because it is rather a disordering than an ordering. And therefore from this it is not gathered, except that the power of sinning, according to that which it is, is from God; but according as it is ordered to sinning, it cannot be elicited from that authority that it is from God, but rather the opposite, because the power of sinning does not arrive at sin except by the mediation of a voluntary disordering, which Augustine denies to be from God in the aforesaid authority.

2. To that statement of the Philosopher, by which he says that God and the virtuous man can do depraved things; some explain that the Philosopher understood it of the evil of punishment. But this plainly contradicts his text; and therefore, since sacred Scripture says, and all expositors agree, that he can in no way sin, just as he can neither lie nor even deny himself16; it must be said that that statement of the Philosopher does not hold true. Nor do I believe that he placed great weight on that statement, since he said it only by way of example and in passing; and his example sufficed well enough for his purpose as regards the part in which it holds true, namely this, that the virtuous man can do evil things, although this is not so insofar as he is virtuous, but insofar as he can fail from virtue.

3. To that argument which is raised, that the power of sinning bears witness to the nobility of nature; it must be said that this is not true insofar as it bespeaks an ordering17 toward

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a defect, but insofar as it bespeaks an ordering toward the underlying act; for no act is deformable through fault except one that proceeds from the deliberative power, which is noble, because that alone is informable through justice. — Or it must be said that to bear witness to nobility is twofold: either per se or per accidens. But the power of sinning and sin bear witness to the nobility of nature per accidens, as Augustine says18, that « the grief over a good that is lost is a witness of a good nature ».

4. To that argument which is raised, that it makes for the amplification of praise; it must be said that, just as virtue is rendered more commendable by sins, so the power of doing well is rendered more commendable by the power of doing ill; not because vice adds anything to the goodness of virtue, nor because the power of failing adds anything to the power of doing well; but because by the presence of its opposite it shines forth the more in its goodness19. Thus the virtuousness of a man appears the more when he can do evil things and does not will to, than if he could not nor would; and therefore the just man is praised in this, that he could do evil and did not, that is, he is praised in this, that he did good and did not do evil, although he could; so that praise essentially regards that which is doing good, while that which is being able to sin it regards only per accidens; whence, even were the power of doing evil removed, if he were to do good voluntarily, he would still be praised.

5. To that which is asked, whether the power of sinning is present in the creature from God or from nothing; it must be said that by reason of the underlying act, which is a deliberative act, it is present in it from God; but by reason of the defect it is present in it from nothing. And hence it is that the power of sinning is not found in every creature, because by reason of imperfection it is not found in the irrational creature, in that there cannot be in it an act of deliberation. And by reason of total perfection it is not found in the beatified creature, because there cannot be in it a defect; so closely20 is it joined to its Creator. And thus the power of sinning is in a certain way taken away through glory, in a certain way left remaining; in a certain way it is liberty itself, in a certain way it diminishes liberty; in a certain way it is a power, and in a certain way an impotence; for21 in a certain way it bespeaks position, and in a certain way privation. And therefore, when it is asked whether it is from God, one must not answer simply, but according to the aforesaid distinction.

Scholion

I. Granted the principles which were proved above in d. 37 concerning the evil act, the two questions of this article concerning the power of sinning are solved by others in nearly the same way, namely by distinguishing in it that which it is in itself and the ordering toward the act of sinning or toward the defect, which is not from God but from nothing (here in the body and in the reply to 5). Hence too it is commonly held that to be able to sin is not liberty nor a part of liberty, but is a defect of the same (cf. above d. 7, p. I, a. 2, q. 1-3, d. 25, p. II, q. 3; IV Sent., d. 18, p. II, dub. 1). — Yet Scotus (in both Scripta, here in the single question) speaks somewhat more subtly of this question, since he distinguishes the power of sinning as it is taken formally, namely insofar as it bespeaks only an order founded in something and terminated at another, and fundamentally, as it is taken for the foundation of such an order. The first member of the division he distinguishes as St. Bonaventure does, and resolves it likewise. But concerning the second member he resolves « that something positive is the foundation of that order, taken in either way » i.e. both as regards the underlying act and as regards the deformity itself; which agrees well enough with what St. Bonaventure says below in q. 2 ad 5. Biel, however, with the other Nominalists, holds that the power of sinning is simply from God, and strives to solve St. Bonaventure's foundations. Durandus too brings forward many quite inept things against the common doctrine.

II. On both questions of this article: Alexander of Hales, S. p. II, q. 94, m. 3, a. 6, § 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1. — Bl. Albert, here a. 1-3; S. p. II, tr. 2-4, q. 111, m. 1, 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 1, 2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1, q. 1, 2. — Giles of Rome, here q. 1, a. 1. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1. — Biel, here in the single question.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Psalm. 29. serm. 2. n. 6. sententialiter; verba ipsa habentur XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 3. n. 5. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. — Paulo inferius post eiusdem est a Deo codd., exceptis F X Y (bb a prima manu), et edd. malo omittunt potestas, et in fine arg. Vat. addit homine.
    On Psalm 29, sermon 2, n. 6, in substance; the words themselves are found in On Genesis to the Letter, bk. XI, c. 3, n. 5. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 1. — A little below, after eiusdem est a Deo, the codices, except F X Y (bb in the first hand), and the editions wrongly omit potestas, and at the end of the argument the Vatican edition adds homine.
  2. Libr. IV. c. 5. Cfr. supra pag. 615, nota 3.
    Topics, bk. IV, c. 5. Cf. above p. 615, note 3.
  3. Cfr. August., ill. de Lib. Arb. c. 5. n. 12. seqq., XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 1. n. 3, et supra lit. Magistri, d. XXV. c. 4.
    Cf. Augustine, On Free Choice, bk. III, c. 5, n. 12 ff.; On the City of God, bk. XII, c. 1, n. 3; and above, the text of the Master, d. XXV, c. 4.
  4. Vers. 10. — De maiori, in qua pro amplificationem cod. F et ed. I exhibent ampliationem, vide supra in lit. Magistri, d. XXXVII. c. 2. verba Augustini super Ps. 68, 3.
    Verse 10. — On the major premise, in which for amplificationem cod. F and ed. 1 read ampliationem, see above in the text of the Master, d. XXXVII, c. 2, the words of Augustine on Ps. 68, 3.
  5. Codd. F Y bene supplent ergo posse peccare est posse deficere. — De principiis, quibus hoc arg. innititur, vide supra d. 31. a. 1. q. 2. et d. 37. a. 2. q. 1.
    Codd. F Y rightly supply therefore to be able to sin is to be able to fail. — On the principles upon which this argument rests, see above d. 31, a. 1, q. 2, and d. 37, a. 2, q. 1.
  6. Nam quidquid est causa causae [potentiae] est causa causati [actus]; de quo cfr. supra pag. 803, nota 10. — De minori cfr. supra d. 37. a. 2. q. 1.
    For whatever is cause of the cause [of the potency] is cause of the caused [act]; on which cf. above p. 803, note 10. — On the minor premise cf. above d. 37, a. 2, q. 1.
  7. Cfr. supra d. 27. a. 1. q. 3. et d. 29. a. 1. q. 1. — Pro salvativa cod. cc et ed. I sanativa.
    Cf. above d. 27, a. 1, q. 3, and d. 29, a. 1, q. 1. — For salvativa cod. cc and ed. 1 read sanativa.
  8. Cfr. supra d. 35. a. 2. q. 1. circa finem corp. De sequente prop. vide supra pag. 435, nota 1.
    Cf. above d. 35, a. 2, q. 1, near the end of the body. On the following proposition see above p. 435, note 1.
  9. De Symbolo sermo ad Catechum. c. 1. n. 2; 83 Qq. q. 3. et 21; V. de Civ. Dei, c. 10. n. 1; XII. c. 8; XXII. c. 25. nec non c. 30. n. 3; contra Serm. Arianorum, c. 14. n. 9. — Quae res et quomodo exemplar habeant in Deo, ostensum est I. Sent. d. 36. per totam.
    Sermon to the Catechumens on the Creed, c. 1, n. 2; Eighty-Three Questions, qq. 3 and 21; On the City of God, bk. V, c. 10, n. 1; bk. XII, c. 8; bk. XXII, c. 25, and also c. 30, n. 3; Against the Sermon of the Arians, c. 14, n. 9. — How things and in what manner they have an exemplar in God was shown in I Sent., d. 36, throughout.
  10. Cfr. supra d. 34. a. 2. q. 3. in corp. — Paulo superius pro ordinabilitate in codd. W X Z legitur ordinatione.
    Cf. above d. 34, a. 2, q. 3, in the body. — A little above, for ordinabilitate in codd. W X Z is read ordinatione.
  11. Cod. F ab.
    Cod. F reads ab (from).
  12. Hic c. 1. Cfr. infra dub. 3.
    Here, c. 1. Cf. below, dubium 3.
  13. Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 sine.
    The Vatican edition with edd. 3, 4 reads sine (without).
  14. Dialog. de lib. arb. c. 1. Cfr. supra pag. 615, nota 9.
    Dialogue on Free Choice, c. 1. Cf. above p. 615, note 9.
  15. Codd. L O qua peccat peccator.
    Codd. L O read by which the sinner sins.
  16. Epist. II. Tim. 2, 13. — De sententia Aristot. cfr. eius X. Ethic. c. 8. — In fine solut. Vat. et edd. 3, 4 bis pro unde substituunt ut.
    2 Tim. 2, 13. — On the opinion of Aristotle cf. his Ethics, bk. X, c. 8. — At the end of the solution the Vatican edition and edd. 3, 4 twice substitute ut for unde.
  17. Vat. cum aliquibus codd. ordinationem. Edd. 2, 3 omittunt in quantum dicit ordinem ad defectum, sed; perperam, cum omissis his verbis sententia reddatur falsa.
    The Vatican edition with some codices reads ordinationem. Edd. 2, 3 omit insofar as it bespeaks an order toward a defect, but; wrongly, since with these words omitted the sense is rendered false.
  18. Libr. XIX. de Civ. Dei, c. 13. n. 2. In Augustini testimonio textus originalis post amissi adiungit in supplicio.
    On the City of God, bk. XIX, c. 13, n. 2. In Augustine's testimony the original text after amissi adds in supplicio (in punishment).
  19. Cfr. supra pag. 428, nota 5. et pag. 532, nota 4. — Subinde pro Sic Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 sicut, et mox pro mala facere codd. F I K T W ee etc. et edd. 1, 2 male facere.
    Cf. above p. 428, note 5, and p. 532, note 4. — Thereupon for Sic the Vatican edition with edd. 3, 4 reads sicut, and shortly for mala facere codd. F I K T W ee etc. and edd. 1, 2 read male facere.
  20. Pro adeo in cod. F habetur pro eo quod, in cod. T (a secunda manu) cum; codd. L O voculae adeo praeligunt quae, edd. 3, 4 eo quod; edd. 1, 2 post adeo subiiciunt enim. Paulo inferius pro tollitur codd. B K P (T a prima manu) V bb ee et ed. 2 perperam substituunt intelligitur, ed. 3 evellitur.
    For adeo cod. F has pro eo quod, cod. T (in a second hand) cum; codd. L O prefix quae to the little word adeo, edd. 3, 4 read eo quod; edd. 1, 2 after adeo add enim. A little below, for tollitur codd. B K P (T in the first hand) V bb ee and ed. 2 wrongly substitute intelligitur, ed. 3 evellitur.
  21. Cod. bb omittit quia, pro quo cod. V et ed. I substituunt et.
    Cod. bb omits quia, for which cod. V and ed. 1 substitute et.
← Dist. 44, Divisio TextusDist. 44, Art. 1, Q. 2→