Dist. 12, Art. 2, Q. 1
Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 12
Articulus II. De conditione naturae assumtae quoad liberum arbitrium.
Consequenter quaeritur de conditione naturae assumtae quantum ad liberum arbitrium. Et circa hoc incidunt duo dubitabilia.
Primo quaeritur, utrum ille homo peccare potuerit.
Secundo, utrum potentiam peccandi habuerit vel assumserit.
Quaestio I. Utrum Christus potuerit peccare.
Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum Christus potuerit peccare. Et quod sic, videtur.
1. Ecclesiastici trigesimo primop265-6 dicitur in laudem viri iusti: Qui potuit transgredi, et non est transgressus; sed omnis laus competit Christo, quae competit alicui eius membro: ergo videtur, quod illud potuit dici in laudem Christi: ergo etc.
2. Item, Augustinusp265-7: « Meliores iudicavit Deus p. 266 homines, si ei liberaliter deservirent », et vocat liberaliter deservire, si, cum possent eum offendere, nollent: ergo si Christum optimum fecit et optimum iudicavit, videtur, quod Christus peccare potuerit.
3. Item, Bernardusp266-1: « Tantum descendit, quantum descendere potuit »; sed inferioris gradus est qui potest peccare, quam qui non potest: ergo videtur, quod Christus in illo statu fuerit. Si dicas, quod hoc intelligitur ex parte carnis; contra: dispositio carnis correspondet dispositioni liberi arbitrii, sicut patet in Adam et in nobis: ergo sicut Christus assumsit carnis passibilitatem, ita videtur, quod liberi arbitrii vertibilitatem.
4. Item, Christus erat in statu viatoris: ergo cum ad statum viatoris pertineat posse peccare, sicut ad statum comprehensoris peccare non possep266-2; videtur, quod Christus peccare potuerit.
5. Item, nullus laudatur in his quae facit de necessitatep266-3; sed Christus erat laudabilis in operibus suis: ergo non faciebat ea necessario: ergo poterat a bonis et debitis operibus cessare; et hoc est omittere: ergo potuit peccare.
6. Item, Christus potuit dicere aliquam orationem negativam et veram; sed qui potest dicere locutionem negativam, potest dicere affirmativam sibi oppositam; sed illa est falsa: ergo Christus potuit dicere locutionem falsam. Sed hoc est mentiri in eo qui novit, locutionem esse falsam: ergo videtur, quod Christus mentiri potuerit: ergo potuit peccare, cum mentiri nullo modo possit bene fierip266-4.
Sed contra: 1. Ad Hebraeos secundop266-5: Eum qui paulo minoratus est etc.; Glossa: « Natura humanae mentis, quam Deus assumsit, et quae nullo peccato depravari potuit, solus Deus maior est »: ergo nullo modo anima Christi potuit infici aliqua macula peccati.
2. Item, Christus ab instanti conceptionis fuit comprehensor et beatus; sed de essentia beatitudinis est, quod sit bonum inamissibilep266-6: ergo Christus nunquam illam beatitudinem potuit perdere: ergo nec anima ipsius peccare.
3. Item, Christus ab instanti conceptionis tantam gratiam suscepit, quod maiorem illa habere non potuitp266-7, ergo ab instanti conceptionis habuit gratiam confirmationis; sed nullus potest peccare, qui illam gratiam habet: ergo etc.
4. Item, si Christus potuit peccare, ponatur — quia « possibili posito, nullum accidit impossibilep266-8 » — sed posito, quod Christus sive homo ille peccaverit, ponitur ex hoc, quod dignus fuit aeterna damnatione: ergo vel Deus damnaretur, vel homo a Verbo separaretur. Sed utrumque est omnino impossibile: ergo impossibile fuit, illum hominem peccare.
Conclusio
Anima Christi nullatenus potuit peccare ob triplicem rationem.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod absque dubio anima Christi non potuit depravarip266-9 aliqua culpa. — Et ratio huius est triplex, scilicet plenitudo gratiae, consummatio gloriae et unio divinae naturae et humanae. Plenitudo gratiae facit, quod ipse Christus secundum humanam naturam habuit gratiam confirmationis; sed illa gratia adeo liberum arbitrium firmat, ut nullo modo possit infirmari per culpam. — Hoc ipsum facit consummatio gloriae, quae quidem fuit in Christo a suae conceptionis primordio; statim enim fuit beatus et comprehensor; et sicut beatus non potest damnari, sic etiam non potest praevaricari, ac per hoc in Christo nulla potuit esse secundum animam macula peccati. — Postremo, hoc efficacissime facit unio divinae naturae et humanae in unitatem personae, quae unio facit, ut idiomata communicentur, et ipsa non potest frangip266-10. Si igitur Deus non potest esse peccator et non potest non esse homo; planum est, quod illa unio nullatenus sustinet, Christum secundum humanam naturam peccare potuisse. — Unde rationes hoc ostendentes sunt concedendae.
Ad argumenta in oppositum:
Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur de laude viri iusti, dicendum, quod laus illa rationep267-1 unius partis dicit perfectionem, in hoc scilicet, quod non est transgressus; ex alia parte dicit quandam defectibilitatem. Cum ergo dicitur, quod omnis laus attribuenda est Christo; dicendum, quod etsi illud aliquo modo habeat veritatem de laude perfecta, sive ratione eius conditionis, penes quam attenditur perfectio; non tamen oportet, quod ratione eius conditionis, secundum quam est imperfectio. — Posset etiam aliter dici, quia, sicut dicit Magisterp267-2, ista laus est capitis in membris, ita quod perfectio competit ipsi capiti in se, sed quod est ibi defectibilitatis competit ratione membrorum.
Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod meliores iudicavit Deus homines etc.; dicendum, quod hoc verum est de toto genere humano secundum aliquam meliorationem, quae attenditur in ordine universitatis. Sic enim decebat, hominem in universitate constitui, ut in prima sui constitutione haberet vertibilitatem arbitrii secundum legem communemp267-3. Sed Christus habuit aliquid supra hominem; ideo decuit, quod sibi fieret aliquod privilegium speciale, ut esset in eo liberalitas obsequii sine vertibilitate arbitrii, sicut et in divina voluntate videmus, quod liberaliter nobis bona impendit et facit, nullam tamen in eo est ponere vertibilitatem. Et propter hoc verbum illud Augustini, secundum quod liberaliter vocat vertibilitatem ad contrarium, non se extendit ad meliorationem, quae attenditur secundum privilegium speciale, sed secundum legem communem. — Si quis autem velit dicere, quod illi intelligitur liberaliter, id est voluntariep267-4, obviat ei littera sequens et ratio proponendi verbum, quia Augustinus hoc verbum dicit, ut reddat rationem, quare Deus talem fecit hominem, ut posset male facere.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Bernardo, quod descendit, quantum descendere potuit; dicendum, quod intelligitur de potentia ordinatap267-5, quae supponit condecentiam. Decuit autem Deum condescendere ad miseriam, sed nullo modo decuit descendere ad culpam. Nam etsi miseria Filio Dei non competat in se, tamen competit, ut est ordinata ad finem nostrae redemptionis. Culpa autem vel ordinatio ad culpam in actu, vel in habitu nullo modorum competit sibi; et ideo decenter non potuit se humiliare adeo, ut ad statum peccati secundum actum, vel habitum se Deus inclinaret. — Nec valet quod obiicit de passibilitate, quod respondet vertibilitati animae; dicendum est enim, quod hoc verum est secundum iustitiam communem, sed Christus passibilitates carnis assumsit dispensative, sicut inferiusp267-6 apparebit.
Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Christus erat in statu viatoris; dicendum, quod etsi erat in statu viatoris, non tamen omnino; habuit enim aliquid de statu comprehensoris. Unde Boethiusp267-7 dicit, « quod Christus de omni statu aliquid assumsit: de statu ante peccatum assumsit innocentiam, de statu post peccatum assumsit poenam, de statu comprehensoris impossibilitatem peccandi ». Quia ergo Christus purus viator non erat; ideo non sequitur, quod peccare potuerit, sicut possunt et alii viatores.
Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nullus laudatur in his quae necessario facit; dicendum, quod duplex est necessitas, quae repugnat voluntati, sicut necessitas coactionis, quae venit ab extrinseco; et est necessitas, quae subest voluntati, et ista est necessitas, quae venit ex voluntatis immutabilitatep267-8. Cum ergo dicitur, quod laus non est in operibus necessitatis; dicendum, quod verum est de necessitate primo modo dicta, sed non secundo.
Ad 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potuit scienter dicere locutionem falsam; dicendum, quod dicere est dupliciter: uno modo idem est quod ore proferre; et hoc modo absque dubio potuit proferre locutionem falsam, quia talis prolatio est perfectionis. Alio modo dicere idem est quod asserere sive affirmare; et hoc modo non potuit, quia veritas ad falsitatem declinare non potuit; et hoc quia non fuit impotentiae, immo magis potentiaep267-9.
I. Nonnulli haeretici blasphemaverunt dicentes, Christum actu peccasse; quod manifeste est contra s. Scripturam. Insuper omnino tenendum est, Christum fuisse absolute impeccabilem. Hoc docent communiter theologi, Ss. Patres et Concil. VI. oecumen. (Constantinop. III. an. 680), ubi inter alia contra Monothelitas, in Christo esse « duas naturales voluntates, non contrarias, absit, iuxta quod impii asseruerunt haeretici, sed sequentem eius humanam voluntatem, et non resistentem vel reluctantem, sed potius et subiectam divinae eius atque omnipotenti voluntati ». Et inferius: « Sicut enim eius caro caro Dei Verbi dicitur, ita et naturalis carnis eius voluntas propria Dei Verbi dicitur et est » etc. Et infra dicitur, quod sicut sanctissima caro Christi deificata non est peremta, « ita et humana eius voluntas deificata (θέλημα θεωθέν) non est peremta ». — Tres autem rationes huius impeccabilitatis affert S. Bonav. approbatas a S. Thoma, qui dicit (hic q. 2. a. 1.), quod Christus nec ut viator (ob plenitudinem gratiae) nec ut comprehensor, nec ut Deus potuit peccare. Et revera, si divina persona in Christo non tantum est terminus et principium existendi, sed et principium quod operandi, ipsa unio hypostatica formaliter excludit peccabilitatem. Hinc male audit Durandus (hic q. 2.), qui putat, quod Christus, dato quod humanitas eius fuisset assumta sine gratia (quod censet esse possibile), posset peccare et etiam damnari (!). Sed haec, ut dicit Dionys. Carth., « videntur prorsus absurda ». Etiam Scotus et plurimi eius discipuli in hoc recedunt ab egregia doctrina antiquorum Ordinis Magistrorum, scilicet Alexandri, S. Bonaventurae et Richardi, quod impeccabilitatem Christi non vi unionis hypostaticae, sed visionis beatificae necessariam esse asserant. Nonnulli tamen, ut Hauzeur (Collatio etc. t. II. col. 355. seqq.), aliter mentem ipsius Scoti interpretantur.
II. Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 5. m. 2. a. 2, q. 15. m. 2. — Scot., in utroque Scripto hic q. unica. — S. Thom., hic loc. cit.; S. III. q. 15. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 4. 5. 6. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 3. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.
III. Cum in Christo sit vera voluntas humana, ut constat contra Monothelitas, et cum voluntas humana in se considerata, praescindendo ab unione hypostatica et gratia gloriaque, sit potentia defectibilis et peccati capax, in aliquo sensu concedi potest, in Christo esse potentiam peccandi, scilicet « potentiam, quae in aliis est potentia peccandi » (ita S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2.). — De hac 2. quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. q. 14. m. 1. — B. Albert., a. 9. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard. a Med., loc. cit. q. 2.
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Article II. On the condition of the assumed nature with respect to free choice.
Next there is inquiry concerning the condition of the assumed nature with respect to free choice. And concerning this two matters of doubt arise.
First it is asked, whether that man could sin.
Second, whether he had or assumed a power of sinning.
Question I. Whether Christ could sin.
Concerning the first, one proceeds thus and it is asked, whether Christ could sin. And that he could, it seems:
1. In Ecclesiasticus, chapter thirty-onep265-6, it is said in praise of the just man: He that could have transgressed, and hath not transgressed; but every praise befits Christ which befits any member of his: therefore it seems that this could be said in praise of Christ: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, Augustinep265-7: « God judged p. 266 men to be better, if they served him freely », and he calls it to serve freely if, though they could offend him, they were unwilling to: therefore if he made Christ the best and judged him the best, it seems that Christ could sin.
3. Likewise, Bernardp266-1: « He descended as far as he was able to descend »; but he is of a lower grade who can sin than he who cannot: therefore it seems that Christ was in that state. If you say that this is understood with respect to the flesh; on the contrary: the disposition of the flesh corresponds to the disposition of free choice, as is evident in Adam and in us: therefore just as Christ assumed the passibility of the flesh, so it seems that he assumed the changeableness of free choice.
4. Likewise, Christ was in the state of a wayfarer: therefore since to be able to sin pertains to the state of a wayfarer, just as to be unable to sin pertains to the state of a comprehensorp266-2; it seems that Christ could sin.
5. Likewise, no one is praised in those things which he does of necessityp266-3; but Christ was praiseworthy in his works: therefore he did not do them necessarily: therefore he could cease from good and due works; and this is to omit: therefore he could sin.
6. Likewise, Christ could utter some negative and true statement; but he who can utter a negative locution can utter the affirmative opposed to it; but that one is false: therefore Christ could utter a false locution. But this is to lie, in one who knows the locution to be false: therefore it seems that Christ could lie: therefore he could sin, since to lie can in no way be done wellp266-4.
On the contrary: 1. To the Hebrews, chapter twop266-5: Him who was made a little lower etc.; the Gloss: « The nature of the human mind, which God assumed, and which could be depraved by no sin, God alone is greater »: therefore in no way could the soul of Christ be infected by any stain of sin.
2. Likewise, Christ from the instant of his conception was a comprehensor and blessed; but it belongs to the essence of beatitude that it be a good that cannot be lostp266-6: therefore Christ could never lose that beatitude: therefore neither could his soul sin.
3. Likewise, Christ from the instant of his conception received so great a grace that he could not have a greater than itp266-7, therefore from the instant of his conception he had the grace of confirmation; but no one can sin who has that grace: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, if Christ could sin, let it be posited — since « when a possible is posited, nothing impossible followsp266-8 » — but, supposing that Christ or that man had sinned, it is posited by this that he was worthy of eternal damnation: therefore either God would be damned, or the man would be separated from the Word. But both are altogether impossible: therefore it was impossible that that man should sin.
Conclusion
The soul of Christ could in no way sin, for a threefold reason.
I respond: It must be said that without doubt the soul of Christ could not be depravedp266-9 by any fault. — And the reason for this is threefold, namely the fullness of grace, the consummation of glory, and the union of the divine and human nature. The fullness of grace brings it about that Christ himself, according to his human nature, had the grace of confirmation; but that grace so confirms free choice that it can in no way be weakened by fault. — This same thing the consummation of glory brings about, which indeed was in Christ from the very beginning of his conception; for at once he was blessed and a comprehensor; and just as one who is blessed cannot be damned, so neither can he prevaricate, and through this there could be in Christ no stain of sin according to his soul. — Lastly, this the union of the divine and human nature into the unity of person brings about most efficaciously, which union brings it about that the idioms are communicated, and it itself cannot be brokenp266-10. If therefore God cannot be a sinner and cannot not be man; it is plain that that union in no way allows that Christ, according to his human nature, could have sinned. — Hence the reasons showing this are to be conceded.
To the arguments to the contrary:
To 1. To that, then, which is first objected concerning the praise of the just man, it must be said that that praise, by reasonp267-1 of one part, expresses perfection, namely in this, that he did not transgress; from the other part it expresses a certain defectibility. When therefore it is said that every praise is to be attributed to Christ; it must be said that, although this has some truth concerning the perfect praise, that is, by reason of that condition with respect to which perfection is regarded; nevertheless it is not necessary that it be so by reason of that condition with respect to which there is imperfection. — It could also be said otherwise, that, as the Master saysp267-2, this praise is of the head in the members, so that perfection befits the head itself in itself, but what is of defectibility there befits it by reason of the members.
To 2. To that which is objected, that God judged men to be better etc.; it must be said that this is true of the whole human race according to a certain betterment, which is regarded in the order of the universe. For thus it was fitting that man be constituted in the universe, so that in his first constitution he should have changeableness of choice according to the common lawp267-3. But Christ had something above man; therefore it was fitting that some special privilege should be made for him, that there should be in him a generosity of compliance without changeableness of choice, just as also in the divine will we see that it generously bestows and does good things to us, yet there is no changeableness to be posited in it. And on account of this that word of Augustine, according to which freely names changeableness toward the contrary, does not extend to the betterment which is regarded according to a special privilege, but according to the common law. — But if anyone should wish to say that there freely is understood, that is, voluntarilyp267-4, the following text and the reason for proposing the word stands against him, because Augustine utters this word in order to render the reason why God made such a man, that he could do evil.
To 3. To that which is objected concerning Bernard, that he descended as far as he was able to descend; it must be said that it is understood of ordained powerp267-5, which presupposes fittingness. Now it was fitting for God to condescend to misery, but in no way was it fitting to descend to fault. For although misery does not befit the Son of God in itself, nevertheless it befits him as it is ordained to the end of our redemption. But fault, or an ordering to fault in act, or in habit, in no manner of ways befits him; and therefore he could not fittingly humble himself so far that God should incline himself to the state of sin according to act or habit. — Nor does what he objects concerning passibility hold, that it corresponds to the changeableness of the soul; for it must be said that this is true according to the common justice, but Christ assumed the passibilities of the flesh by dispensation, as will appear belowp267-6.
To 4. To that which is objected, that Christ was in the state of a wayfarer; it must be said that, although he was in the state of a wayfarer, not however altogether; for he had something of the state of a comprehensor. Whence Boethiusp267-7 says, « that Christ assumed something of every state: from the state before sin he assumed innocence, from the state after sin he assumed punishment, from the state of a comprehensor the impossibility of sinning ». Since therefore Christ was not a pure wayfarer; therefore it does not follow that he could sin, as the other wayfarers can.
To 5. To that which is objected, that no one is praised in those things which he does necessarily; it must be said that necessity is twofold: that which repels the will, such as the necessity of coercion, which comes from without; and there is a necessity which underlies the will, and this is the necessity which comes from the immutabilityp267-8 of the will. When therefore it is said that praise is not in works of necessity; it must be said that it is true of necessity spoken of in the first way, but not in the second.
To 6. To that which is objected, that he could knowingly utter a false locution; it must be said that to say is twofold: in one way it is the same as to utter aloud; and in this way without doubt he could utter a false locution, because such an utterance is a matter of perfection. In another way to say is the same as to assert or to affirm; and in this way he could not, because truth could not decline to falsity; and this because it was not a matter of impotence, but rather of powerp267-9.
I. Some heretics blasphemed, saying that Christ had actually sinned; which is manifestly against Sacred Scripture. Moreover, it is altogether to be held that Christ was absolutely impeccable. This the theologians teach in common, the holy Fathers, and the VI. ecumenical Council (Constantinople III, A.D. 680), where, among other things against the Monothelites, [it is said] that in Christ there are « two natural wills, not contrary—far be it!—as the impious heretics asserted, but his human will following, and not resisting or struggling, but rather subject to his divine and omnipotent will ». And below: « For just as his flesh is called the flesh of God the Word, so also the natural will of his flesh is called and is the proper [will] of God the Word » etc. And further it is said that, just as the most holy deified flesh of Christ was not destroyed, « so also his human deified will (θέλημα θεωθέν) was not destroyed ». — Now St. Bonaventure brings forward three reasons for this impeccability, approved by St. Thomas, who says (here, q. 2, a. 1) that Christ could sin neither as a wayfarer (on account of the fullness of grace), nor as a comprehensor, nor as God. And indeed, if the divine person in Christ is not only the term and principle of existing, but also the principle by which he operates, the hypostatic union itself formally excludes peccability. Hence Durandus (here, q. 2) is ill spoken of, who thinks that Christ, granted that his humanity had been assumed without grace (which he holds to be possible), could sin and even be damned (!). But these things, as Dionysius the Carthusian says, « seem utterly absurd ». Scotus too and very many of his disciples in this depart from the excellent doctrine of the ancients of the Order of Masters, namely Alexander, St. Bonaventure, and Richard, in that they assert the impeccability of Christ to be necessary not by force of the hypostatic union, but of the beatific vision. Some, however, such as Hauzeur (Collatio etc., vol. II, col. 355 ff.), interpret Scotus's own mind otherwise.
II. Alex. of Hales, S. p. III, q. 5, m. 2, a. 2, q. 15, m. 2. — Scotus, in both Scripta here, q. unica. — St. Thomas, here, loc. cit.; S. III, q. 15, a. 1. — Bl. Albert, here, aa. 4, 5, 6. — Peter of Tarentaise, here, a. 3, quaestiuncula 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here, a. 2, q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here, q. 2.
III. Since in Christ there is a true human will, as is established against the Monothelites, and since the human will considered in itself, prescinding from the hypostatic union and from grace and glory, is a defectible power and capable of sin, in some sense it can be conceded that in Christ there is a power of sinning, namely « a power which in others is a power of sinning » (so St. Thomas, here, q. 2, a. 2). — Concerning this 2nd question: Alex. of Hales, loc. cit., q. 14, m. 1. — Bl. Albert, a. 9. — Peter of Tarentaise, loc. cit., quaestiuncula 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, loc. cit., q. 2.
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- Vers. 10.Verse 10. [Eccli. 31:10.]
- De Vera Relig. c. 14. n. 27: Voluntate ergo peccatur.On True Religion, c. 14, n. 27: « It is therefore by will that one sins. »
- Serm. 60. de Diversis (alias 18. ex Parvis), n. 1: Descendit siquidem, quo inferius non decuit. — Post descendit Vat. supplet Deus.Sermon 60, On Diverse Subjects (otherwise 18, From the Lesser), n. 1: « He descended, indeed, to where it was not fitting to go lower. » — After descendit the Vatican edition supplies Deus.
- Cfr. II. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. XXV. c. 3. seqq.Cf. II Sent., text of the Master, d. XXV, c. 3 ff.
- Secundum Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 5. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 113, nota 8. — Paulo inferius verbo cessare edd. cum cod. cc praemittunt necessario.According to Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II, c. 5. Cf. vol. II, p. 113, note 8. — A little below, before the word cessare, the editions with codex cc prefix necessario.
- Etiam apud Anselm., II. Cur Deus homo, c. 10. haec obiectio habetur, his verbis proposita: Quippe, ut alia taceam, quomodo dicemus, eum non potuisse mentiri, quod semper peccatum est? Cum enim dicat Iudaeis de Patre: Si dixero, quia non scio eum, ero similis vobis mendax (Ioan. 8, 55.), et inter haec verba dicat: non scio eum, quis eum dicat easdem tres nequivisse proferre dictiones, sive aliis verbis, ut sic diceret: non scio eum? Quod si faceret, ut ipse ait, esset mendax, quod est esse peccatorem. Quare, quoniam hoc potuit, peccare potuit. — Paulo superius pro in eo qui novit edd. 1, 2 et complures codd. in eo quod novit.This objection is also found in Anselm, Cur Deus homo II, c. 10, proposed in these words: Indeed, to pass over other things, how shall we say that he could not lie, which is always sin? For since he says to the Jews concerning the Father: If I should say that I know him not, I shall be like to you a liar (John 8:55), and among these words he says: I know him not, who would say that he was unable to utter the same three words, or in other words, so as to say: I know him not? But if he did so, as Anselm himself says, he would be a liar, which is to be a sinner. Wherefore, since he was able to do this, he was able to sin. — A little above, for in eo qui novit editions 1, 2 and very many codices read in eo quod novit.
- Vers. 9. — Glossa habetur ut ordinaria apud Petr. Lombard. et Lyranum in hunc loc.; sumta est ex August., II. contra Maximin. Arian. c. 25.Verse 9. — The Gloss is found as the ordinary [gloss] in Peter Lombard and Lyranus on this passage; it is taken from Augustine, Against Maximinus the Arian II, c. 25.
- Cfr. August., XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 11. et 13, XII. c. 20. n. 2, XIV. c. 25, XIII. c. 8. n. 11.Cf. Augustine, City of God XI, cc. 11 and 13; XII, c. 20, n. 2; XIV, c. 25; XIII, c. 8, n. 11.
- Cfr. infra d. 13. a. 1. q. 3.Cf. below, d. 13, a. 1, q. 3.
- Aristot., I. Prior. c. 12. et VII. Phys. text. 9. (c. 1.), VIII. text. 36. (c. 5.). — De ipso arg. cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. — Post ponatur Vat. addit in esse.Aristotle, Prior Analytics I, c. 12, and Physics VII, text 9 (c. 1), VIII, text 36 (c. 5). — On this argument cf. here the text of the Master, c. 2. — After ponatur the Vatican edition adds in esse.
- Codd. A H K Z aa damnari. Mox pro consummatio gloriae G (bb a secunda manu) et edd. 1, 2 confirmatio gloriae, quae mutatio scripturae in cod. bb a secunda manu paulo inferius iterum facta est.Codices A H K Z aa read damnari. Presently, for consummatio gloriae, G (bb in a second hand) and editions 1, 2 read confirmatio gloriae, which alteration of the writing is made again a little below in codex bb by a second hand.
- Cfr. supra pag. 138, nota 8. et pag. 162, nota 2. — Pro frangi cod. U infringi. Ante non potest frangi cod. F inserit peccato.Cf. above, p. 138, note 8, and p. 162, note 2. — For frangi codex U reads infringi. Before non potest frangi codex F inserts peccato.
- Vocem ratione, quae ab edd. abest, adiecimus fide codd. A K M O bb.The word ratione, which is absent from the editions, we have added on the authority of codices A K M O bb.
- Hic c. 2. Cfr. etiam II. Sent. d. 44. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4. — Proxime ante pro quia codd. A H I L U aa quod. Paulo inferius pro competat edd. 1, 2 cum non paucis codd. competit, et mox pro defectibilitatis codd. I L Z aa defectus.Here, c. 2. Cf. also II Sent., d. 44, a. 1, q. 1, ad 4. — Just before, for quia codices A H I L U aa read quod. A little below, for competat editions 1, 2 with not a few codices read competit, and presently, for defectibilitatis codices I L Z aa read defectus.
- Cfr. II. Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 1, ubi quaestio dissolvitur, utrum Deus debuerit facere hominem impeccabilem.Cf. II Sent., d. 23, a. 1, q. 1, where the question is resolved, whether God ought to have made man impeccable.
- Sive, ut paulo superius de Deo dictum est, liberalitate sine vertibilitate arbitrii, sicut et in divina voluntate videmus etc. Contra quam instantiam ibid. n. 28. dicitur: « Liberaliter igitur Deo Angeli serviunt, neque hoc Deo, sed ipsis prodest. Deus enim bono alterius non indiget… Illa vero quae facta sunt eius bono indigent… Minus autem sunt quam erant, cum per animae peccatum minus ad illum moventur » etc. Integrum August. locum, quo continetur etiam « littera sequens », ad quam lector hic delegatur, supra allegavimus pag. 265, nota 7. Cfr. III. de Lib. Arb. c. 5. n. 12. seqq.Or, as was said a little above concerning God, by generosity without changeableness of choice, just as also in the divine will we see, etc. Against which instance it is said in the same place, n. 28: « The Angels therefore serve God freely, nor does this profit God, but themselves. For God does not need the good of another… But those things which have been made need his good… They are less than they were, when through the soul's sin they are moved less toward him » etc. The whole passage of Augustine, which contains also the « following text » to which the reader is here referred, we have cited above, p. 265, note 7. Cf. On Free Choice III, c. 5, n. 12 ff.
- Anselm., I. Cur Deus homo, c. 12: Sic eas [libertatem, voluntatem et benignitatem Dei] debemus rationabiliter intelligere, ut dignitati illius non videamus repugnare. Libertas enim non est nisi ad hoc quod expedit, aut quod decet; nec benignitas dicenda est quae aliquid Deo indecens operatur. — Subinde pro Decuit autem, quemadmodum scriptum est in codd. A (K a secunda manu) M O bb, alii codd. tamen, edd. enim. Post pauca codd. A bb verbis Filio Dei praefigunt ipsi.Anselm, Cur Deus homo I, c. 12: We ought thus to understand these [the liberty, will, and benignity of God] reasonably, so that we may not see them to be repugnant to his dignity. For there is no liberty except for that which is expedient or which is fitting; nor is that to be called benignity which does anything unfitting to God. — Thereupon, for Decuit autem, as it is written in codices A (K in a second hand) M O bb, yet other codices and the editions read enim. After a few words, codices A bb prefix ipsi to the words Filio Dei.
- Dist. 15. a. 1. q. 1. seqq. — Pro carnis codd. U communes.Distinction 15, a. 1, q. 1 ff. — For carnis codices U read communes.
- De Una persona et duabus naturis, c. 8. Boethii sententia ibi longior est, quam quae hic a Bonav. affertur.On the One Person and the Two Natures, c. 8. The sentence of Boethius is there longer than that which is here adduced by Bonaventure.
- De qua necessitate vide II. Sent. d. 7. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. ad 3, d. 25. p. II. q. 2. in corp. et q. 4. seq. Cfr. etiam Anselm., II. Cur Deus homo, c. 17. seqq. — In fine solut. pro secundo, quod habent codd. A M bb, alii codd. et edd. minus congrue de secundo.Concerning this necessity see II Sent., d. 7, p. I, a. 2, q. 2, ad 3; d. 25, p. II, q. 2, in the body and q. 4 following. Cf. also Anselm, Cur Deus homo II, c. 17 ff. — At the end of the solution, for secundo, which codices A M bb have, other codices and the editions read, less fittingly, de secundo.
- Anselm., II. Cur Deus homo, c. 10. respondet: Et hoc dicere potuit, et peccare non potuit… Omnis potestas sequitur voluntatem. Cum enim dico, quia possum loqui vel ambulare, subauditur: si volo; si enim non subintelligitur voluntas, non est potestas, sed necessitas etc.Anselm, Cur Deus homo II, c. 10, answers: And he could say this, and could not sin… All power follows the will. For when I say that I can speak or walk, it is understood: if I will; for if the will is not understood along with it, there is not power, but necessity, etc. ---