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Dist. 12, Art. 2, Q. 2

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 12

Textus Latinus
p. 268

Quaestio II. Utrum Christus potentiam peccandi habuerit vel assumserit.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum Christus potentiam peccandi habuit vel assumsit. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Damascenusp268-1: «Omnia quae in natura nostra plantavit Deus, assumsit Dei Verbum»; si ergo potentiam, qua peccamus et bene facimus, Deus ab initio in nobis plantavit; videtur, quod eam ex tempore Dei Verbum assumsit.

2. Item, idem Damascenusp268-2: «Totum me assumsit, ut me totum redimeret»; ergo omnem nostram substantiam et omnis nostrae substantiae potentiam; sed potentia peccandi est potentia rationalis animae, quae non potest reperiri nisi in creatura valde nobili: ergo videtur, quod Christus eam habuerit.

3. Item, potentia peccandi est potentia rationalis, et illa est ad oppositap268-3, ergo eadem est potentia bene faciendi: si ergo non est aliud quam liberum arbitrium, et Christus liberum arbitrium assumsit; ergo et potentiam peccandi.

4. Item, solum illud curatum est in nobis, quod punitum et afflictum fuit in Christop268-4; sed in nobis curari maxime indigebat potentia peccandi, quoniam illa est, quae aegrotat per culpam: ergo videtur, quod in Christo passa fuerit et afflicta; et si hoc: ergo a Christo fuit habita et assumta.

Sed contra:

1. Christus secundum humanam naturam habuit plenam libertatem, sicut et plenam gratiam; sed «potentia peccandi, addita libertati, eam diminuit»; sicut dicit Anselmus in libro de Libero Arbitriop268-5: ergo potentia peccandi non fuit in Christo.

2. Item, omni potentia aliquis est potens, ergo si in aliquo est potentia peccandi, illa potest peccare; sed Christus non potuit peccare, sicut priusp268-6 ostensum est: ergo nec peccandi potentiam habere.

3. Item, potentia peccandi est principium culpae; sed in quocumque contingit reperire principium, possibile est reperire illud quod ex illo principio causatur: ergo si Christus habuit potentiam peccandi, habere potuit peccatum: ergo potuit esse p. 269damnatus et Dei inimicus. Quodsi hoc est impossibile, restat, quod et primump269-1.

4. Item, Christus secundum animam fuit Deo simillimus inter creaturas ceteras, quoniam maxime fuit eius anima deiformisp269-2; sed Deus non habet potentiam peccandi: ergo videtur, quod eam non habuerit nec assumserit Christus.

Conclusio

Conclusio. Christus assumsit potentiam peccandi, id est potentiam, qua peccatur, non tamen potentiam peccandi ordinatam ad actum peccandi.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod potentia peccandi dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo dicitur potentia peccandi, id est potentia, qua peccatur; et sic potentia peccandi nominat ipsum liberum arbitrium creatum, quod quidem potest in bonum, adiutum gratia; et quia per sui naturam est defectivump269-3, hinc est, quod illa potentia sive facultas dici potest potentia bene faciendi et potentia peccandi; nullus enim peccat nisi per illam. — Alio modo potentia peccandi dicitur potentia ordinata ad peccandum, ut potentia nominet aliquid medium inter substantiam et peccati actum, per quod substantia illa possit exire in peccati perpetrationem.

Si ergo primo modo dicatur potentia peccandi, sic absque dubio fuit in Christo. Et sic procedunt rationes ad primam partem, quae ostendunt, Christum habuisse potentiam peccandi, quia assumsit integre nostram naturam et eius quamlibet potentiam. Et ideo rationes illae concedi possunt, quia recta via procedunt et verum concludunt. — Si vero potentia peccandi dicatur potentia ut ordinata ad peccatum perpetrandum, sic non est concedendum, quod Christus habuitp269-4 potentiam peccandi, pro eo quod peccare non potuit; et talis ordinatio, immo deordinatio, diminuit de plenitudine libertatis.

Ad argumenta pro parte negativa:

Ad 1. Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum obiectum in contrarium.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omni potentia est aliquis potens; dicendum, quod verum est, si potentia dicat ordinationem ad actum; sed si dicat solum naturalem aptitudinemp269-5, non habet veritatem, quia potest impediri per oppositum eius, sicut gressibilis habet naturalem aptitudinem ad gradiendum, et caecus ad videndum; non tamen gressibilis truncatus potest gradi. Et sic damnati habent potentiam merendi, sed tamen mereri non possunt, quia praepeditur in eis ordinatio illius potentiae sive exitus in talem actump269-6. Sic et in proposito intelligendum est, quia animam Christi exire in actum peccati est impossibile, quamvis illam eandem potentiam habeat, quam habet peccator, et hoc propter perfectionem gratiae non sustinentis talem egressum sive defectum.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potentia peccandi est principium culpae; dicendum, quod verum est; sed hoc est in quantum deficiens, sive in quantum sibi relinquiturp269-7. In Christo autem non potest sibi relinqui propter inseparabilem unionem cum divinitate: et ideo non potest culpam perpetrare, quoniam non est in Christo sub ea ratione, qua habet principiare. Et ideo non sequitur, quod culpa aliqua possit esse in Christo.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Christus secundum animam fuit Deo simillimus: dicendum, quod etsi similior fuit anima Christi Deop269-8 ceteris creaturis, tamen improportionabiliter distat a Deo; quoniam Deus, cum sit summe potens in se, per se et ex se, non potest deficere nec habere potentiam deficiendi, nec quantum ad ordinationem, nec quantum ad radicem. Sed anima Christi est creatura, sicut et aliae animae, et ex hoc ipso per naturam suam est vertibilis et defectibilis et potentiam habet deficiendi; sed quod non deficiat, hoc habet beneficio eius qui longe distat ab omni defectu. Et ideo non sequitur, quod anima Christi caruerit omni potentia peccandi, sed quod caruit ordinatione ad talem actum sive defectum per illud donum, quod faciebat, Christum esse Deo simillimump269-9.

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English Translation

Question II. Whether Christ had or assumed the power of sinning.

Secondly it is asked whether Christ had or assumed the power of sinning. And that he did seems so.

1. Damascenep268-1: «All the things that God planted in our nature, the Word of God assumed»; if therefore God from the beginning planted in us the power by which we sin and do well, it seems that the Word of God assumed it in time.

2. Likewise, the same Damascenep268-2: «He assumed the whole of me, that he might redeem the whole of me»; therefore [he assumed] our whole substance and the whole potency of our substance; but the power of sinning is a rational potency of the soul, which cannot be found except in a very noble creature: therefore it seems that Christ had it.

3. Likewise, the power of sinning is a rational potency, and that is toward oppositesp268-3; therefore it is the same potency as the potency of doing well: if therefore it is nothing other than free choice, and Christ assumed free choice, then [he assumed] also the power of sinning.

4. Likewise, only that has been healed in us which was punished and afflicted in Christp268-4; but in us the power of sinning most needed to be healed, since it is that which is sick through fault: therefore it seems that in Christ it suffered and was afflicted; and if so: therefore it was had and assumed by Christ.

On the contrary:

1. Christ according to his human nature had full liberty, just as also full grace; but «the power of sinning, added to liberty, diminishes it»; as Anselm says in the book On Free Choicep268-5: therefore the power of sinning was not in Christ.

2. Likewise, by every potency someone is able [to act]; therefore if in anyone there is a power of sinning, that one can sin; but Christ could not sin, as was shown beforep268-6: therefore neither [could he] have the power of sinning.

3. Likewise, the power of sinning is a principle of fault; but in whatever it happens to find a principle, it is possible to find that which is caused from that principle: therefore if Christ had the power of sinning, he could have had sin: therefore he could have been p. 269damned and an enemy of God. But if this is impossible, it remains that the first [is impossible] alsop269-1.

4. Likewise, Christ according to his soul was most like to God among the other creatures, since his soul was supremely deiformp269-2; but God does not have the power of sinning: therefore it seems that Christ neither had it nor assumed it.

Conclusion

Conclusion. Christ assumed the power of sinning, that is, the potency by which one sins, yet not the power of sinning ordered to the act of sinning.

I respond: It must be said that the power of sinning is spoken of in two ways. In one way it is called the power of sinning, that is, the potency by which one sins; and so the power of sinning names free choice itself as created, which indeed can [tend] toward the good when aided by grace; and because by its own nature it is defectiblep269-3, hence it is that this potency or faculty can be called both the potency of doing well and the potency of sinning; for no one sins except through it. — In another way the power of sinning is called a potency ordered toward sinning, such that the potency names something intermediate between the substance and the act of sin, through which that substance can go out into the perpetration of sin.

If therefore the power of sinning is spoken of in the first way, then without doubt it was in Christ. And in this way proceed the arguments to the first part, which show that Christ had the power of sinning, because he assumed our nature integrally and every potency of it. And therefore those arguments can be conceded, because they proceed by the right way and conclude what is true. — But if the power of sinning is called a potency as ordered toward perpetrating sin, then it is not to be conceded that Christ hadp269-4 the power of sinning, for the reason that he could not sin; and such an ordering, indeed disordering, diminishes the fullness of liberty.

To the arguments for the negative part:

To 1. And through this the response to the first objection to the contrary is plain.

To 2. To that which is objected, that by every potency someone is able [to act]; it must be said that it is true, if the potency states an ordering to the act; but if it states only a natural aptitudep269-5, it does not hold true, because it can be impeded through its opposite, just as one able to walk has a natural aptitude for walking, and a blind man for seeing; yet one able to walk who is maimed cannot walk. And thus the damned have a potency for meriting, but nevertheless they cannot merit, because the ordering of that potency, or its going out into such an actp269-6, is impeded in them. And so it is to be understood in the matter at hand, because for the soul of Christ to go out into the act of sin is impossible, although it has the same potency that a sinner has, and this on account of the perfection of grace not allowing such a going-out or defect.

To 3. To that which is objected, that the power of sinning is a principle of fault; it must be said that it is true; but this is insofar as it is defective, or insofar as it is left to itselfp269-7. In Christ, however, it cannot be left to itself on account of the inseparable union with the divinity: and therefore it cannot perpetrate fault, since it is not in Christ under that account by which it has [the role] of being a principle. And therefore it does not follow that any fault could be in Christ.

To 4. To that which is objected, that Christ according to his soul was most like to God: it must be said that although the soul of Christ was more like to Godp269-8 than the other creatures, nevertheless it stands disproportionately distant from God; since God, being supremely powerful in himself, through himself and from himself, cannot fail nor have a potency of failing, neither as to ordering nor as to root. But the soul of Christ is a creature, just as the other souls are, and from this very fact by its own nature it is changeable and defectible and has a potency of failing; but that it does not fail, this it has by the benefit of him who stands far distant from all defect. And therefore it does not follow that the soul of Christ lacked all power of sinning, but that it lacked the ordering to such an act or defect through that gift which made Christ to be most like to Godp269-9.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Libr. III. de Fide orthod. c. 6. Vide supra lit. Magistri, d. II. c. I. — In conclus. respicitur illud Eccli. 15, 14: Deus ab initio constituit hominem et reliquit illum in manu consilii sui.
    Bk. III On the Orthodox Faith c. 6. See above, the text of the Master, d. II, c. I. — In the conclusion that text of Ecclus. 15:14 is regarded: God from the beginning constituted man and left him in the hand of his own counsel.
  2. Loc. cit. et in lit. Magistri, loc. cit. — Quoad minorem vide tom. II. pag. 1000, nota 4.
    In the place cited and in the text of the Master, in the place cited. — As to the minor premise, see vol. II, p. 1000, note 4.
  3. Secundum Aristot., IX. Metaph. text. 3. et 10. (VIII. c. 2. et 5.). — Subinde post ergo eadem est cod. A bene inserit cum, cod. H vero post bene faciendi subnectit et male faciendi. Post si ergo, quod proxime sequitur, subaudi: haec potentia. — Quod Christus liberum arbitrium assumsit, ostendit Damascen., III. de Fide orthod. c. 14. et 18.
    According to Aristotle, Metaphysics IX, text 3 and 10 (VIII, c. 2 and 5). — Then after ergo eadem est codex A rightly inserts cum, while codex H after bene faciendi appends et male faciendi. After si ergo, which follows next, understand: this potency. — That Christ assumed free choice, Damascene shows, On the Orthodox Faith III, c. 14 and 18.
  4. Quod enim inassumtibile est, incurabile est, ut dicit Damascen., III. de Fide orthod. c. 6, et habetur in lit. Magistri, supra d. II. c. I. Idem s. Doctor in eodem libro, c. 18. ulterius dicit: Quapropter totum hominem assumsit, illamque adeo ipsius partem [scil. animam], quae obnoxia morbo fuerat, ut toti salutem largiretur (ed. Migne). Cfr. ibid. c. 14, ubi insinuat, quod voluntas, quae primo subiacuit peccato, a Christo assumta fuit et curata.
    For what is unassumable is incurable, as Damascene says, On the Orthodox Faith III, c. 6, and it is found in the text of the Master, above, d. II, c. I. The same holy Doctor in the same book, c. 18, says further: Wherefore he assumed the whole man, and indeed that very part of him [namely, the soul], which had been subject to disease, that he might bestow salvation on the whole (Migne edition). Compare ibid. c. 14, where he intimates that the will, which first lay subject to sin, was assumed and healed by Christ.
  5. Cap. I. Verba integra vide tom. II. pag. 613, nota 9.
    Chap. I. For the entire words, see vol. II, p. 613, note 9.
  6. Quaest. praeced. — In principio huius arg. post Item edd. subdunt si.
    The preceding question. — At the beginning of this argument, after Item the editions add si.
  7. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.
    See here the text of the Master, c. 2.
  8. Cfr. quaest. praeced. fundam. I. et d. 13. a. I. q. I. in corp. — Pro simillimus multi codd. nec non edd. 1, 2 minus recte similis. In fine arg. codd. H K S V cc non habuit nec assumsit Christus.
    Compare the preceding question, foundation I, and d. 13, a. I, q. I, in the body. — For simillimus many codices, as well as editions 1 and 2, less correctly [read] similis. At the end of the argument codices H K S V cc [read] Christ neither had nor assumed [it].
  9. Edd. cum cod. cc attexunt bene faciendi.
    The editions, with codex cc, append bene faciendi.
  10. Codd. N T U V habuerit.
    Codices N T U V [read] habuerit.
  11. Pro aptitudinem non pauci codd. et edd. 1, 2 habitudinem, codd. M O habitudinem sive aptitudinem. — Similiter S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2. ait: «Actus se habet ad potentiam dupliciter: quia actus egreditur a potentia, et iterum per actus specificatur potentia... Et primo modo non potest dici, quod ille qui habet visum impeditum, habeat potentiam videndi, sicut non potest dici, quod possit videre. Secundo modo potest dici, quod habeat potentiam visivam». Cfr. II. Sent. d. 44. a. I. q. 2. — Post gressibilis supple: omnis, vel truncatus.
    For aptitudinem not a few codices and editions 1, 2 [read] habitudinem, codices M O habitudinem sive aptitudinem (a relation, or aptitude). — Similarly St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 2, says: «An act is related to a potency in two ways: because the act goes out from the potency, and again the potency is specified by the act... And in the first way it cannot be said that he who has impaired sight has a potency of seeing, just as it cannot be said that he is able to see. In the second way it can be said that he has a power of sight». Compare II Sent. d. 44, a. I, q. 2. — After gressibilis supply: every, or maimed.
  12. Libr. II. Sent. d. 33. a. 2. q. 3. ad 3: Damnatio vero aeterna reddit impossibilem [hominem] ad bonum, non quia ibi sit plenitudo omnis mali, nec etiam quia auferatur naturalis aptitudo ad bonum, sed quia aufertur merendi spatium, et Deus amplius non offert gratiam iuvantem ad bonum. Et ideo illa impossibilitas non dicitur per privationem habilitatis omnimodam, sed potius propter bene faciendi impedimenta. Cfr. ibi d. 34. a. 2. q. 2. — Mox pro quia codd. I K L aa bb quod, et pro actum peccati cod. A actum peccandi.
    Bk. II Sent. d. 33, a. 2, q. 3, to the 3rd: Eternal damnation, however, renders [man] incapable of the good, not because there is there the fullness of all evil, nor even because the natural aptitude for good is taken away, but because the space for meriting is taken away, and God no longer offers grace assisting toward the good. And therefore that impossibility is not said by a privation of capacity in every mode, but rather on account of impediments to doing well. Compare there d. 34, a. 2, q. 2. — Next for quia codices I K L aa bb [read] quod, and for actum peccati codex A [reads] actum peccandi.
  13. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 34. a. I. q. 2. et d. 44. a. I. q. I. seqq.
    Compare II Sent. d. 34, a. I, q. 2, and d. 44, a. I, q. I, and following.
  14. Post Deo codd. A (K a secunda manu) P R S interiiciunt et sic, codd. F H I (K primitus) L N T U V X aa cc et edd. 1, 2 et sic de. Paulo inferius pro ad ordinationem codd. F U ad ordinem, et pariter circa finem solut. ordine pro ordinatione.
    After Deo codices A (K by a second hand) P R S insert et sic, codices F H I (K originally) L N T U V X aa cc and editions 1, 2 [insert] et sic de. A little below, for ad ordinationem codices F U [read] ad ordinem, and likewise near the end of the solution ordine for ordinatione.
  15. Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    See the scholion to the preceding question.
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