Dist. 18, Art. 1, Q. 3
Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 18
Quaestio III. Utrum Christus aliquid meruerit in passione.
Tertio quaeritur, utrum Christus aliquid meruerit in passione. Et quod sic, videtur:
1. Primo per textum Apostolip385-1: Humiliavit semetipsum usque ad mortem, propter quod et Deus exaltavit illum etc.; quod verbum tractans Magister dicit: « Aperte dicit Apostolus, propterea Christum exaltatum per impassibilitatis gloriam, quia est humiliatus per passionis obedientiam »: ergo meruit in passione.
2. Item, Augustinusp385-2, exponens verbum praedictum: « Ut Christus clarificaretur resurrectione, prius humiliatus est passione »: ergo videtur, quod per meritum passionis pervenerit ad gloriam resurrectionis.
3. Item, nihil est magis meritorium quam opus patientiae, propter quod dicitur Iacobi primop385-3: Patientia opus perfectum habet; sed patientia consistit in tolerantia passionis: ergo videtur, quod Christus in passione multum meruerit.
4. Item, nihil est satisfactorium, nisi quod est meritorium; sed passio Christi fuit satisfactoria, sicut dicunt Sanctip385-4: ergo fuit meritoria: ergo Christus meruit patiendo.
5. Item, omnis qui patitur, aut passionem promeruit, aut per passionem meretur, alioquin pateretur sine iustitia, pateretur etiam frustrap385-5; sed Christus non meruit passionem, quia immunis fuit a culpa omni: meruit ergo per passionem, alioquin passus esset iniuste et frustra, quod esset magnae impietatis et insaniae.
Sed contra: 1. « Passionibus, sicut dicit Philosophusp385-6, nec laudamur nec vituperamur »; sed per omne, per quod meremur, laudamur: ergo passionibus non meremur: ergo Christus patiendo non meruit.
2. Item, « passio est effectus et illatio actionisp385-7 »; sed qualis est causa, talis est effectus: si ergo actio passionem inferens non fuerit meritoria, videtur, quod nec ipsa passio meritoria fuerit: ergo Christus in passione non meruit.
3. Item, nihil est meritorium, nisi quod est voluntarium; nihil autem est voluntarium, nisi quod est a principio intrinseco, sicut patet per definitionem voluntarii, quam ponit Philosophus in Ethicisp385-8: « Voluntarium est cuius principium est in ipso »; sed passio Christi fuit ab extra, sicut patet: ergo non fuit meritoria.
4. Item, nihil est meritorium, nisi quod est secundum naturam; sed « passio est motus contra naturam », sicut dicit Damascenusp386-1: ergo impossibile est passione mereri: ergo etc.
5. Item, omne meritum ortum habet ab aliqua virtute; omnis autem virtus consistit in ratione, ut ratio estp386-2: ergo omne meritum consistit circa rationem, ut ratio est. Sed passio Christi solummodo fuit circa sensualitatem et circa rationem per modum naturae: ergo non videtur, quod Christus in passione aliquid meruisset.
Conclusio.
Christus non tantum meruit in actione, sed etiam in passione.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Christus non tantum meruit in actione, sed etiam in passione. Non enim passus fuit frustra, sed ex rationabili causa; nec passus fuit propter demeritum culpae, sed propter amorem veritatis et iustitiae.
Et propterea notandum, quod in passione est duo considerare, videlicet passionis causam et passionis sustinentiam. Passionis causa est a violentia agentis, sed passionis sustinentia est a voluntate patientis. Quantum ad primum passio non est meritoria nec demeritoria, quia est ab extrap386-3; quantum ad secundum potest esse meritoria et demeritoria: meritoria autem, si quis eam perferat ex voluntate bona; demeritoria autem, si quis eam sustineat impatienter et ex voluntate iniqua. Quoniam igitur Christus passionem pertulit non tantum ex voluntate bona, immo etiam ex voluntate optima; hinc est, quod passio eius fuit meritoria, non solum sicut passiones Sanctorum, sed inter omnia merita tenuit principatump386-4. — Et concedendae sunt rationes, quae hoc ostendunt.
1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod passionibus nec laudamur nec vituperamur; dicendum, quod verum est, secundum quod sunt purae passiones; prout autem coniuncta est eis voluntas bona, vel mala, sic habent sortiri rationem meriti et demeriti, laudis et vituperii. Et sic fuit in passione Christi, qui oblatus est, quoniam ipse voluit, et libenter et patienter passionem sustinuit, quoniam pro transgressoribus exoravitp386-5.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod passio est effectus actionis; dicendum, quod verum est quantum ad efficaciam in genere naturae, potest tamen nihilominus esse effectus voluntatis internaep386-6 quantum ad voluntatis complacentiam, et per hoc habet poni in genere moris. Et quoniam voluntas passionem acceptans fuit bona, quamvis voluntas passionem inferens fuerit mala; et hinc est, quod quamvis actio displiceret, passio tamen grata fuit: ideo non sequitur, quod si actio fuit demeritoria, quod propter hoc passio. Actio enim non erat causa passionis in genere moris.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod passio fuit involuntaria; dicendum, quod quamvis hoc sit verum quantum ad violentiam, quae est ab extra; non tamen est verum quantum ad sustinentiam, quae est ab intra. Et ideo ratio illa non concludit, quod nullo modo passio Christi esset meritoria; non enim tantum erat ab extra, sed etiam quodam modo erat ab intra per complacentiam et sustinentiamp386-7.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod passio est contra naturam; dicendum, quod esse contra naturam est dupliciterp386-8: aut quia est contra naturale dictamen rationis, aut quia est contra naturalem appetitum salutis. Primo modo accipiendo naturale, sic illud quod est contra naturam, est vitium, nisi forte sit supra naturam, sicut est in assensu fidei. Secundo modo accipiendo naturale, sic illud quod est contra naturam, potest esse meritorium, quamvis sit poenale; et hoc modo accipit Damascenus, cum dicit, quod « passio est contra naturam ».
5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne meritum consistit circa actum rationis; dicendum, quod verum est. Sed aliquid consisterep386-9 circa actum rationis contingit tripliciter: vel per modum elicientis, vel per modum imperantis, vel per modum acceptantis. Quamvis autem passio Christi non esset in ratione per modum elicientis, vel per modum imperantis, erat tamen per modum acceptantis; et hoc dabat ipsi passioni rationem meriti, dat etiam passionibus nostris ratione consimili. — Et per haec quae dicta sunt, potest dissolvi illa quaestio, qua quaeritur, utrum passionibus contingat mereri, vel demereri.
I. Cum secundum actionem divinae naturae non possit esse quaestio de merito, hic praesupponitur, in Christo fuisse etiam actionem humanam, vel potius divino-humanam, de qua in Concilio Lateranensi, an. 649 sub Martino I. celebrato (can. 15.), docetur: « Si quis secundum scelerosos haereticos deivirilem operationem, quam Graeci dicunt θεανδρικήν, unam operationem insipienter suscipit, non autem duplicem esse confitetur secundum Ss. Patres, hoc est divinam et humanam; aut ipsam deivirilis, quae posita est, novam vocabuli dictionem unius esse designativam, sed non utriusque mirificae et gloriosae unitionis demonstrativam, condemnatus sit ». Haec autem actio humana in Christo dicitur etiam divina, non quia divina sit per essentiam, sed per participationem, et hoc triplici ratione: primo propter associationem aliquam in una persona agente; secundo propter associationem in modo agendi, quia perfectius operabatur ceteris operantibus propter unionem, sicut sensualitas in homine perfectius quam in brutis; tertio propter associationem in uno effectu, seu opere operato, ut in uno et eodem miraculo, in quo Divinitas operabatur interius, sicut leprosum sanando, humanitas exterius, sicut leprosum tangendo » (ita Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1; cfr. S. Thom., S. III. q. 19. a. 2; Bonav., supra d. 17. a. 1. q. 1. 2.).
II. Distinctio triplicis meriti ex condigno sumta est ex Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 17. m. 1, qui ibi quinque species meriti in genere distinguit. — Notandum, quod in solutione ad 1. 5. tantum quaestio, in qua solvenda posteriores theologi multum laboraverunt, scilicet quomodo in Christo fuerit sufficiens libertas ad merendum (cfr. hic a. 2. q. 2. et supra d. 12. a. 2. q. 2; II. Sent. d. 7. p. I. a. q. 1.). — Item in solut. ad 2. docetur, quod Christus singularissimo modo fuerit in statu viae, extra quem non potest esse meritum (cfr. II. Sent. d. 7. p. I. q. 1.), et quod non ratione gloriae et amoris huic statui annexi meruerit (cfr. a. 2. q. 1. fundam. 5. et ad 2.), sed ratione amoris, quem habuit ut viator ex gratia infusa. Consentiunt Alex. Hal. et S. Thom. aliique multi. Scotus autem cum nonnullis vult, Christum etiam per amorem beatificum meruisse. — Denique observandum est, quod in corp. satis clare docetur, Christum nobis etiam applicationem sui meriti respectu primae infusionis gratiae sanctificantis meruisse, quod plures antiqui theologi negarunt (cfr. Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 4, et Suarez in III. p. tom. disp. 41. sect. 2.).
III. Alex. Hal., loc. cit. — Scot., in utroque Scripto hic q. unica. — S. Thom., hic a. 2; S. III. q. 19. a. 3. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 1. 7. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2, q. 3. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 1.
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Question III. Whether Christ merited anything in the passion.
Thirdly it is asked, whether Christ merited anything in the passion. And that he did, it seems:
1. First, by the text of the Apostlep385-1: He humbled himself even unto death, on account of which God also exalted him etc.; treating which word the Master says: « The Apostle plainly says that Christ was exalted through the glory of impassibility for this reason, because he was humbled through the obedience of the passion »: therefore he merited in the passion.
2. Likewise, Augustinep385-2, expounding the aforesaid word: « That Christ might be glorified in the resurrection, he was first humbled in the passion »: therefore it seems that through the merit of the passion he attained to the glory of the resurrection.
3. Likewise, nothing is more meritorious than the work of patience, on account of which it is said in James, chapter onep385-3: Patience has a perfect work; but patience consists in the endurance of suffering: therefore it seems that Christ merited much in the passion.
4. Likewise, nothing is satisfactory unless it is meritorious; but the passion of Christ was satisfactory, as the Saints sayp385-4: therefore it was meritorious: therefore Christ merited by suffering.
5. Likewise, everyone who suffers either has earned the suffering [as punishment] or merits through the suffering, otherwise he would suffer without justice, and would also suffer in vainp385-5; but Christ did not earn the suffering, because he was free from all fault: therefore he merited through the suffering, otherwise he would have suffered unjustly and in vain, which would be of great impiety and insanity.
On the contrary: 1. « By sufferings, as the Philosopher saysp385-6, we are neither praised nor blamed »; but by everything through which we merit, we are praised: therefore by sufferings we do not merit: therefore Christ by suffering did not merit.
2. Likewise, « suffering is the effect and the consequence of an actionp385-7 »; but as the cause is, so is the effect: if therefore the action inflicting the suffering was not meritorious, it seems that the suffering itself was not meritorious either: therefore Christ in the passion did not merit.
3. Likewise, nothing is meritorious unless it is voluntary; but nothing is voluntary unless it is from an intrinsic principle, as is clear from the definition of the voluntary which the Philosopher gives in the Ethicsp385-8: « The voluntary is that whose principle is in [the agent] himself »; but the passion of Christ was from without, as is clear: therefore it was not meritorious.
4. Likewise, nothing is meritorious unless it is according to nature; but « suffering is a motion against nature », as Damascene saysp386-1: therefore it is impossible to merit by suffering: therefore etc.
5. Likewise, all merit takes its origin from some virtue; but all virtue consists in reason, as reason isp386-2: therefore all merit consists about reason, as reason is. But the passion of Christ was only about sensuality and about reason in the manner of nature: therefore it does not seem that Christ merited anything in the passion.
Conclusion.
Christ merited not only in action, but also in passion.
I respond: It must be said that Christ merited not only in action, but also in passion. For he did not suffer in vain, but from a reasonable cause; nor did he suffer on account of the demerit of fault, but for the love of truth and justice.
And therefore it is to be noted that in the passion there are two things to consider, namely the cause of the suffering and the endurance of the suffering. The cause of the suffering is from the violence of the agent, but the endurance of the suffering is from the will of the one suffering. As regards the first, the suffering is neither meritorious nor demeritorious, because it is from withoutp386-3; as regards the second, it can be meritorious and demeritorious: meritorious, if one endures it from a good will; demeritorious, if one bears it impatiently and from a wicked will. Since therefore Christ bore the passion not only from a good will, but indeed from a most excellent will; hence it is that his passion was meritorious, not only as the sufferings of the Saints, but it held the chief place among all meritsp386-4. — And the reasons which show this are to be granted.
1. To that which is objected, that by sufferings we are neither praised nor blamed; it must be said that this is true insofar as they are pure sufferings; but inasmuch as a good or evil will is joined to them, thus they come to take on the character of merit and demerit, of praise and blame. And so it was in the passion of Christ, who was offered because he himself willed it, and willingly and patiently endured the passion, since he prayed for the transgressorsp386-5.
2. To that which is objected, that suffering is the effect of an action; it must be said that this is true as regards efficacy in the genus of nature, yet it can nonetheless be an effect of the internal willp386-6 as regards the will's complacency, and through this it comes to be placed in the genus of morals. And since the will accepting the passion was good, although the will inflicting the passion was evil; and hence it is that, although the action was displeasing, the passion nevertheless was pleasing: therefore it does not follow that, if the action was demeritorious, the passion was so on that account. For the action was not the cause of the passion in the genus of morals.
3. To that which is objected, that the passion was involuntary; it must be said that, although this is true as regards the violence which is from without; nevertheless it is not true as regards the endurance, which is from within. And therefore that argument does not conclude that the passion of Christ was in no way meritorious; for it was not only from without, but also in a certain way from within through complacency and endurancep386-7.
4. To that which is objected, that suffering is against nature; it must be said that to be against nature is twofoldp386-8: either because it is against the natural dictate of reason, or because it is against the natural appetite for well-being. Taking natural in the first way, that which is against nature is a vice, unless perhaps it be above nature, as is the case in the assent of faith. Taking natural in the second way, that which is against nature can be meritorious, although it be penal; and it is in this way that Damascene takes it when he says that « suffering is against nature ».
5. To that which is objected, that all merit consists about the act of reason; it must be said that this is true. But for something to consistp386-9 about the act of reason happens in a threefold way: either in the manner of one eliciting, or in the manner of one commanding, or in the manner of one accepting. Now although the passion of Christ was not in reason in the manner of one eliciting, or in the manner of one commanding, it was nevertheless [there] in the manner of one accepting; and this gave to the passion itself the character of merit, and gives it also to our sufferings by a like account. — And by these things which have been said, that question can be resolved which asks whether it can happen that one merit, or demerit, by sufferings.
I. Since with respect to the action of the divine nature there can be no question of merit, it is here presupposed that there was in Christ also a human action, or rather a divine-human one, concerning which it is taught in the Lateran Council, held in the year 649 under Martin I (canon 15): « If anyone, following the wicked heretics, foolishly admits one deivirile operation — which the Greeks call θεανδρικήν — but does not confess that there are two according to the holy Fathers, that is, a divine and a human one; or if [he holds] that the very word "deivirile," which has been laid down, is a new coinage of speech indicating one operation, but not demonstrating the marvelous and glorious union of both — let him be condemned ». Now this human action in Christ is also called divine, not because it is divine by essence, but by participation, and this in a threefold way: first, on account of a certain association in one acting person; secondly, on account of an association in the manner of acting, because it operated more perfectly than other operating things by reason of the union, just as sensuality [operates] more perfectly in man than in brutes; thirdly, on account of an association in one effect, or work performed, as in one and the same miracle, in which the Divinity operated interiorly, as in healing the leper, [and] the humanity exteriorly, as in touching the leper » (so Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 1; cf. St. Thomas, Summa III, q. 19, a. 2; Bonaventure, above d. 17, a. 1, qq. 1–2).
II. The distinction of the threefold merit of condignity is taken from Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. III, q. 17, m. 1, who there distinguishes five species of merit in general. — It is to be noted that in the solution to [arguments] 1 and 5 [is touched] only the question — in the solving of which the later theologians labored much — namely, how there was in Christ sufficient freedom for meriting (cf. here a. 2, q. 2, and above d. 12, a. 2, q. 2; II Sent. d. 7, p. I, a. , q. 1). — Likewise in the solution to [argument] 2 it is taught that Christ was in a most singular way in the state of the wayfarer, outside of which there can be no merit (cf. II Sent. d. 7, p. I, q. 1), and that he merited not by reason of the glory and love annexed to this state (cf. a. 2, q. 1, fundam. 5 and ad 2), but by reason of the love which he had as a wayfarer from infused grace. Alexander of Hales and St. Thomas and many others agree. Scotus, however, with some, holds that Christ merited also through beatific love. — Finally it is to be observed that in the body [of the question] it is taught clearly enough that Christ merited for us also the application of his merit with respect to the first infusion of sanctifying grace, which many of the ancient theologians denied (cf. Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 4, and Suarez, in III. p., tom., disp. 41, sect. 2).
III. Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. — Scotus, in both Writings, here q. unica. — St. Thomas, here a. 2; Summa III, q. 19, aa. 3, 4. — Blessed Albert, here a. 1. 7. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 2, q. 3, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 1. — Durandus, here q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following question, here q. 1.
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- Philip. 2, 8. seq. — Verba Magistri habentur hic in lit. c. 1.Phil. 2:8 ff. — The words of the Master are found here in the text, c. 1.
- In Ioan. Evang. tr. 104. n. 3. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. — Post praedictum Vat. adiicit inquit.On the Gospel of John, tractate 104, n. 3. See here the text of the Master, c. 1. — After praedictum the Vatican edition adds inquit.
- Vers. 4. — Paulo inferius pro passionis edd. passionum.Verse 4. — A little below, for passionis the editions read passionum.
- Cfr. infra d. XIX. lit. Magistri, c. 1. seqq., et ibid. Comment. a. 1. per totum nec non d. 20. q. 5.Cf. below d. XIX, text of the Master, c. 1 ff., and there the Commentary, a. 1, throughout, as also d. 20, q. 5.
- Vide II. Sent. d. 36. a. 2. q. 2.See II Sent. d. 36, a. 2, q. 2.
- Libr. II. Ethic. c. 5.Ethics, Book II, c. 5.
- Gilbert. Porret., de Sex Princip. de Passione. — De minori cfr. Aristot., II. Poster. c. 17. (c. 14.), et II. Phys. text. 38. (c. 3.), ubi docet, causam et effectum debere esse proportionata.Gilbert of Poitiers, On the Six Principles, on Passion. — On the minor [premise] cf. Aristotle, Posterior [Analytics] II, c. 17 (c. 14), and Physics II, text 38 (c. 3), where he teaches that the cause and the effect must be proportionate.
- Libr. III. c. 1. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 592, nota 3. — Pro voluntarii multi codd. et edd. 1, 2 voluntatis.[Ethics] Book III, c. 1. Cf. tom. II, p. 592, note 3. — For voluntarii many codices and editions 1, 2 [read] voluntatis.
- Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 22.On the Orthodox Faith, Book II, c. 22.
- Aristot., VI. Ethic. c. 13: Virtus enim non tam secundum rectam rationem, quam cum recta ratione habitus est. — De minori vide supra d. 16. a. 2. q. 1.Aristotle, Ethics VI, c. 13: For virtue is a habit not so much according to right reason as with right reason. — On the minor [premise] see above d. 16, a. 2, q. 1.
- Sive violenta; violentum enim, voluntario contrarium, ab Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 1. definitur « cuius principium extrinsecus est, nihilque ad id confert ille qui cogitur ».Or violent; for the violent, contrary to the voluntary, is defined by Aristotle, Ethics III, c. 1, as « that whose principle is from without, and to which he who is compelled contributes nothing ».
- Cfr. supra d. 13. a. 1. q. 2. in corp.Cf. above d. 13, a. 1, q. 2, in the body.
- Isai. 53, 7. 12. Pro exoravit Vulgata rogavit, edd. cum aliquot codd. oravit.Isa. 53:7, 12. For exoravit the Vulgate [reads] rogavit, the editions with several codices oravit.
- Edd. voluntatis in genere moris, incongrue propter subnexa. Mox pro et per hoc codd. E N T et pro hoc, codd. V bb et secundum hoc.The editions [read] voluntatis in genere moris, incongruously on account of what follows. Soon, for et per hoc codices E N T [read] et pro hoc, codices V bb et secundum hoc.
- Ita codd. A G T; in aliis sufferentiam, quod vocabulum non ita bene exprimit virtutem constantiae in passione sufferenda, unde auctor etiam alibi passim utitur voce sustinentia. Post quodam modo codd. L aa supplent passio.So codices A G T; in others sufferentiam, which word does not so well express the virtue of constancy in enduring suffering, whence the author also elsewhere commonly uses the word sustinentia. After quodam modo codices L aa supply passio.
- Cfr. I. Sent. d. 42. dub. 5, II. Sent. d. 30. a. 1. q. 2. ad 5.Cf. I Sent. d. 42, dub. 5, II Sent. d. 30, a. 1, q. 2, ad 5.
- Cod. O existere, edd. esse. Mox pro elicientis cod. Z bis efficientis.Codex O [reads] existere, the editions esse. Soon, for elicientis codex Z [reads] twice efficientis.