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Dist. 18, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 18

Textus Latinus
p. 382

Quaestio II. Utrum Christus meruerit aliquid post conceptionem.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum Christus aliquid meruerit post conceptionem. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Ad Philippenses secundop382-5: Humiliavit semetipsum usque ad mortem; et post: Propter quod et Deus exaltavit illum etc. Sed humilitas non est causa exaltationis nisi per modum meriti: si ergo

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hoc fuit post conceptionem, ergo Christus post conceptionem aliquid meruit.

2. Item, Augustinusp383-1, tractans illud verbum praemissum: « Humilitas claritatis est meritum, claritas humilitatis est praemium »: si ergo humiliatio in Christo subsecuta fuit ipsam conceptionem, necessario etiam sequitur, quod meruerit, postquam conceptus fuerit.

3. Item, in libro de Regulis fideip383-2 mereri ita definitur: « Mereri apud Deum dicitur qui nulla necessitate compulsus hoc facit quod facere debet »; sed hoc fecit Christus post suam conceptionem: ergo apud Deum meruit.

4. Item, opera Christi fuerunt multo nobiliora, quam sunt merita aliorum Sanctorum: si ergo opera aliorum Sanctorum sunt digna retributione, videtur, quod multo fortius opera Christi: ergo videtur, quod Christus apud Deum meruerit.

5. Item, si non meruit apud Deum, postquam conceptus fuit: ergo videtur, quod frustra Deo servivit et quod frustra fecitp383-3, quidquid fecit post conceptionem. Si ergo hoc est impium dicere, necesse est, Christum post conceptionem aliquid meruisse.

Sed contra: 1. Mereri est facere opus de genere laudabilium; sed potentia determinata ad unum tantum non habet laudem in actu illius, sicut patet in omnibus potentiis naturalibusp383-4; sed liberum arbitrium Christi ab ipsa conceptione determinatum fuit ad bonum: ergo non potuit exire in opus de genere laudabilium, ergo nec in opus meritorium.

2. Item, mereri est facerep383-5 opus remuneratione dignum; sed liberum arbitrium, iam existens in statu remunerationis, iam non facit opus ulteriori remuneratione dignum, sicut patet in Beatis; sed tale fuit liberum arbitrium Christi, cum esset in statu comprehensoris: ergo videtur, quod post conceptionem suam nihil omnino mereri potuerit.

3. Item, quicumquep383-6 meretur, proficit in bonis animae, scilicet in gratia et gloria; sed Christus non potuit proficere supra id quod accepit a conceptione: ergo non videtur, quod post conceptionem mereri potuerit.

4. Item, quicumque meretur aliquid, de non-suo facit suum per opus et obsequium, et de eo quod est sibi indebitum, facit debitum; sed Christus non potuit facere de indebito debitum, vel de non-suo suum — omnia enim sua erant per gratiam conceptionis, sicut ipse testatur: Omnia tua mea suntp383-7 — ergo non videtur, quod post conceptionem aliquid meruerit.

5. Item, quod eodem modo se habet nunc et prius natum est consimiles operationes efficerep383-8; sed liberum arbitrium in Christo eodem modo se habet post conceptionem et post resurrectionem, et gratia similiter, et haec duo sunt principia merendi: si igitur post resurrectionem non meruit, ergo nec post conceptionem. Si tu dicas, quod aliter et aliter se habet, quantum est ex parte carnis; hoc non solvit, quia meritum non respicit statum carnis, sed statum caritatis: ergo si Christus post conceptionem habuit caritatem patriae aeque nobilem et perfectam, sicut modo habet, nec est eius caritas variata; si modo non habet usum merendi, videtur, quod nec tunc habuerit.

Conclusio.

Christus post conceptionem actu meruit, nobis quidem meruit gratiae infusionem, gratiae provectionem et bonorum operum multiplicationem; sibi autem id quod iam sibi debebatur, fecit debitum alio modo.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod mereri contingit tripliciter: uno modo simpliciter abusive, alio modo partim proprie et partim improprie, tertio modo simpliciter proprie. — Simpliciter abusive mereri dicitur qui facit aliquod opus de genere bonorum, tamen facit illud malo modo, id est mala intentione, sicut ille qui dat eleemosynam cum murmure; talia enim opera aliquando remunerantur a Deo ex immensa sua largitate, sicut innuitur de Nabuchodonosor in Ieremiap383-9. — Ille vero meretur partim proprie, partim abusive, qui facit opus de genere bonorum et bona intentione, verumtamen non ex caritate; sicut aliquis peccator facit opera de genere bonorum et propter Deum, in quibus de congruo se disponit ad gratiam. — Ille vero meretur simpliciter proprie, qui facit bonum opus et bona intentione et ex caritate. Et primum quidem meritum dicitur meritum interpretativump383-10; secundum dicitur meritum congrui; tertium dicitur meritum condigni.

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Cum igitur quaeritur, utrum Christus meruerit, non quaeritur de primo et secundo modo, sed quaeritur de tertio. Ad hoc igitur respondendum, quod mereri ex condigno tribus modis contingit. Uno modo mereri est ex indebito facere debitum, sicut meretur quis in gratiae infusione et motu liberi arbitrii. Alio modo mereri est de debito facere magis debitum, sicut contingit de profectu in profectum, de virtute in virtutem. Tertio modo mereri est de debito uno modo facere debitum alio modo, ut de debito per habitum facere debitum per usum, et de debito per alium actum facere debitum per unum aeque bonum.

Omnibus his modis Christus meruit nobis. Meruit enim nobis gratiae infusionem, meruit et gratiae provectionemp384-1, meruit et bonorum operum multiplicationem. Sibi autem non meruit nisi tertio modo tantum post conceptionem. Ipse enim non potuit facere sibi de indebito debitum, cum omni bono esset dignus. Non potuit facere de debito magis debitum, cum omni gratia ab ipsa conceptione esset plenusp384-2, sed quod erat debitum uno modo fecit debitum pluribus modis; et ita meruit secundum tertium modum dicendi meritum solum, non propter imperfectionem a parte meriti, sed propter perfectionem a parte merentis. Et hoc est quod dicitur in litterap384-3: « Non profecit Christus secundum meritum quantum ad virtutem meriti, profecit tamen quantum ad numerum meritorum. Plura enim habuit merita in passione quam in conceptione ». — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, Christum post conceptionem usum et exercitium meriti habuisse.

Ad 1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potentia determinata ad unum non facit opus de genere laudabilium; dicendum, quod determinatio potentiae ad unum potest esse dupliciter, videlicet per necessitatem naturae et per confirmationem gratiae. Si sit per necessitatem naturae, tunc tollit arbitrii libertatem, ac per hoc tollit dignitatem meriti. Si autem sit determinatio per confirmationem gratiae, cum talis confirmatio simul stet cum libera voluntate, sic non tollit ab ipso opere bonitatem moris, cum sit voluntarium, ac per hoc nec qualitatem meriti. In Christo autem fuit liberum arbitrium determinatum ad unum non per necessitatem naturae, sed per confirmationem gratiaep384-4.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod habens munus gloriae non facit opus remunerabile; dicendum, quod illud verum est, quando aliquis est simpliciter in statu patriae; cum autem non tantum est in statu comprehensoris, verum etiam in statu viatoris, tunc opus eius esse potest remunerabile propter statum viae; et sic est reperire in Christo secundum divinam dispensationem. Nam sicut anima Christi propter coniunctionem sui cum Divinitate habet statum patriae, sic propter coniunctionem sui cum carne habet statum viae et miseriae pro illo tempore. Et ideo, sicut potuit esse in statu viatoris simul et comprehensoris, sic habuit gloriam ad comprehendendum et gratiam ad merendum. — Et est simile de Angelis, in quibus ponimus vim administrativam et contemplativam, secundum quarum unam merentur, et secundum alteram fruuntur et praemianturp384-5.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quicumque meretur, merendo proficit; dicendum, quod proficere est duobus modis: vel incrementop384-6 habitus, vel in multitudine actuum; vel per alia verba: est proficere quantum ad virtutem merendi et quantum ad numerum meritorum. Primo modo accipiendo profectum, non competit tertio modo dicendi meritum, secundum quem tertium modum dicitur meruisse Christus. Alio modo accipiendo profectum, competit sibi, sicut patet per supra habitam distinctionem.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod mereri est facere de indebito debitum; dicendum, quod illud verum est quantum ad aliquem modum merendi, sed non quantum ad omnes, sicut prius dictum est; et ideo non habet locum in proposito.

Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod liberum arbitrium eodem modo se habet nunc et prius; dicendum, quod verum est per comparationem ad superius, scilicet ad Deum; non tamen est verum per comparationem ad inferius, scilicet ad carnem passibilem, ex cuius coniunctione tam liberum arbitrium quam gratia ipsum perficiens habet pertinere ad statum viae. Unde non valet illud quod obiicit de carne, quod non est principium merendi; hoc enim verum est, per se loquendo, facit tamen ad meritum, dum facit ad statum meriti, sicut patet in coniunctione animae ad carnem et eius separationep384-7. Anima enim nostra statim, dum a carne separatur, amplius non habet merendi vel demerendi statum.

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English Translation

Question II. Whether Christ merited anything after his conception.

Secondly it is asked whether Christ merited anything after his conception. And that he did, it seems thus.

1. To the Philippians, chapter twop382-5: He humbled himself unto death; and afterward: Wherefore God also hath exalted him etc. But humility is not a cause of exaltation except by way of merit: if therefore

this came about after the conception, therefore Christ after his conception merited something.

2. Likewise, Augustinep383-1, treating the aforesaid word: « The humility of brightness is the merit, the brightness of humility is the reward »: if therefore humiliation in Christ followed his conception itself, it necessarily also follows that he merited after he had been conceived.

3. Likewise, in the book On the Rules of Faithp383-2 meriting is defined thus: « He is said to merit before God who, compelled by no necessity, does that which he ought to do »; but Christ did this after his conception: therefore he merited before God.

4. Likewise, Christ's works were far nobler than are the merits of the other Saints: if therefore the works of the other Saints are worthy of recompense, it seems that much more are Christ's works: therefore it seems that Christ merited before God.

5. Likewise, if he did not merit before God after he had been conceived: therefore it seems that he served God in vain and that he did in vainp383-3 whatever he did after his conception. If therefore it is impious to say this, it is necessary that Christ merited something after his conception.

On the contrary: 1. To merit is to do a work of the kind that is praiseworthy; but a power determined to one thing only has no praise in the act of it, as is plain in all natural powersp383-4; but the free choice of Christ was from his very conception determined to the good: therefore it could not go forth into a work of the praiseworthy kind, therefore neither into a meritorious work.

2. Likewise, to merit is to dop383-5 a work worthy of recompense; but free choice, already existing in the state of recompense, no longer does a work worthy of further recompense, as is plain in the Blessed; but such was the free choice of Christ, since he was in the state of a comprehensor: therefore it seems that after his conception he could merit nothing at all.

3. Likewise, whoeverp383-6 merits advances in the goods of the soul, namely in grace and glory; but Christ could not advance beyond what he received from the conception: therefore it does not seem that he could merit after his conception.

4. Likewise, whoever merits anything makes his own out of what is not his own through work and service, and out of what is not owed to him makes what is owed; but Christ could not make out of the not-owed the owed, or out of the not-his-own his own — for all things were his own through the grace of the conception, as he himself testifies: All thine are minep383-7 — therefore it does not seem that he merited anything after his conception.

5. Likewise, that which is in the same condition now and before is apt to produce like operationsp383-8; but free choice in Christ is in the same condition after his conception and after his resurrection, and grace likewise, and these two are the principles of meriting: if therefore after the resurrection he did not merit, therefore neither after the conception. If you say that it is in one condition and another, as far as concerns the flesh; this does not solve it, because merit does not regard the state of the flesh, but the state of charity: therefore if Christ after his conception had the charity of the homeland as noble and perfect as he now has, nor is his charity varied; if he now does not have the use of meriting, it seems that neither then did he have it.

Conclusion.

Christ after his conception merited in act: for us indeed he merited the infusion of grace, the advancement of grace, and the multiplication of good works; but for himself, what was already owed to him he made owed in another manner.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that meriting comes about in three ways: in one way simply improperly, in another way partly properly and partly improperly, in a third way simply properly. — He is said to merit simply improperly who does some work of the good kind, yet does it in a bad manner, that is with a bad intention, like one who gives alms with grumbling; for such works are sometimes recompensed by God out of his immense bounty, as is intimated of Nabuchodonosor in Jeremiahp383-9. — But he merits partly properly, partly improperly who does a work of the good kind and with good intention, yet not out of charity; as some sinner does works of the good kind and for God's sake, in which he disposes himself by congruity for grace. — But he merits simply properly who does a good work and with good intention and out of charity. And the first kind of merit is called interpretativep383-10 merit; the second is called merit of congruity; the third is called merit of condignity.

Therefore when it is asked whether Christ merited, the question is not about the first and second mode, but about the third. To this then it must be answered that meriting by condignity comes about in three ways. In one way to merit is from the not-owed to make the owed, as one merits in the infusion of grace and the motion of free choice. In another way to merit is out of the owed to make more owed, as happens in advancing from progress to progress, from virtue to virtue. In a third way to merit is out of the owed in one manner to make it owed in another manner, as out of the owed by habit to make it owed by use, and out of the owed by another act to make it owed by one equally good.

In all these ways Christ merited for us. For he merited for us the infusion of grace, and he merited the advancementp384-1 of grace, and he merited the multiplication of good works. But for himself he merited only in the third way after his conception. For he could not make for himself the owed out of the not-owed, since he was worthy of every good. He could not make of the owed the more-owed, since he was fullp384-2 of every grace from the very conception, but what was owed in one manner he made owed in several manners; and so he merited only according to the third manner of speaking of merit, not on account of imperfection on the part of the merit, but on account of perfection on the part of the one meriting. And this is what is said in the textp384-3: « Christ did not advance according to merit as regards the virtue of the merit, yet he advanced as regards the number of merits. For he had more merits in his passion than in his conception ». — Therefore the reasonings must be granted which show that Christ after his conception had the use and exercise of merit.

To 1. As to the objection that a power determined to one thing does not do a work of the praiseworthy kind; it must be said that the determination of a power to one thing can be in two ways, namely by necessity of nature and by confirmation of grace. If it is by necessity of nature, then it takes away the liberty of choice, and thereby takes away the dignity of merit. But if the determination is by confirmation of grace, since such confirmation stands together with a free will, then it does not take away from the work itself the goodness of morals, since it is voluntary, and thereby neither the quality of merit. In Christ, however, the free choice was determined to one thing not by necessity of nature, but by confirmation of gracep384-4.

To 2. As to the objection that one having the gift of glory does not do a remunerable work; it must be said that this is true when someone is simply in the state of the homeland; but when he is not only in the state of a comprehensor, but also in the state of a wayfarer, then his work can be remunerable on account of the state of the way; and so it is to be found in Christ according to the divine dispensation. For just as the soul of Christ, on account of its conjunction with the Divinity, has the state of the homeland, so on account of its conjunction with the flesh it has the state of the way and of misery for that time. And therefore, just as he could be in the state of a wayfarer and a comprehensor at once, so he had glory for comprehending and grace for meriting. — And there is a likeness in the case of the Angels, in whom we posit an administrative and a contemplative power, according to one of which they merit, and according to the other they enjoy and are rewardedp384-5.

To 3. As to the objection that whoever merits advances by meriting; it must be said that to advance is in two ways: either by the increasep384-6 of a habit, or in the multitude of acts; or in other words: to advance is as regards the virtue of meriting and as regards the number of merits. Taking advancement in the first way, it does not belong to the third manner of speaking of merit, according to which third manner Christ is said to have merited. Taking advancement in the other way, it belongs to him, as is plain through the distinction set forth above.

To 4. As to the objection that to merit is to make of the not-owed the owed; it must be said that this is true as regards some mode of meriting, but not as regards all, as was said before; and therefore it has no place in the matter at hand.

To 5. As to the objection that free choice is in the same condition now and before; it must be said that this is true by comparison to what is above, namely to God; yet it is not true by comparison to what is below, namely to the passible flesh, from whose conjunction both the free choice and the grace perfecting it belong to the state of the way. Hence the objection about the flesh, that it is not a principle of meriting, does not hold; for this is true, speaking per se, yet it contributes to merit, while it contributes to the state of merit, as is plain in the conjunction of the soul to the flesh and in their separationp384-7. For our soul, as soon as it is separated from the flesh, no longer has the state of meriting or demeriting.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 8. — Seq. Script. loc. ibid. v. 9.
    Verse 8. — The following Scripture passage [is] from the same place, verse 9.
  2. In Ioan. Evang. tr. 104. n. 3. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. — Post praemissum Vat. supplet ait.
    On the Gospel of John, treatise 104, n. 3. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 1. — After praemissum the Vatican edition supplies ait.
  3. Sive de Articulis cathol. fidei, lib. II. in explicat. theorematis sive propos. 8, ubi textus origin. pro Mereri exhibet Bene mereri et deinde compulsus libens facit Deo quod debet pro compulsus hoc facit quod facere debet. Cfr. ibid. theorema 16.
    Or On the Articles of the Catholic Faith, book II, in the explanation of theorem or proposition 8, where the original text for Mereri gives Bene mereri and then compulsus libens facit Deo quod debet for compulsus hoc facit quod facere debet. Cf. ibid. theorem 16.
  4. Bene multi codd. fecerit. Mox pro Christum edd. incongrue Deum, cod. bb ipsum.
    Many codices well [read] fecerit. Presently, for Christum the editions incongruously [read] Deum, codex bb ipsum.
  5. Cfr. Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 5. — Pro laudem cod. K laudari.
    Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II, c. 5. — For laudem codex K [reads] laudari.
  6. Ita codd. A H K Q; in aliis deest facere.
    Thus codices A H K Q; in the others facere is lacking.
  7. Pro quicumque, quod et in solut. habetur nec non in codd. A K bb, cod. Z quisquis, alii codd. et edd. quidquid. Post pauca pro a conceptione edd. in conceptione.
    For quicumque, which is also held in the solution as well as in codices A K bb, codex Z [reads] quisquis, other codices and editions quidquid. A little after, for a conceptione the editions [read] in conceptione.
  8. Ioan. 17, 10.
    John 17, 10.
  9. Aristot., II. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 56. (c. 10.): Idem enim et similiter se habens semper idem natum est facere. — In fine arg. pro habuerit multi codd. habuit.
    Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption II, text 56 (c. 10): For the same thing and that which is in the same condition is always apt to do the same. — At the end of the argument, for habuerit many codices [read] habuit.
  10. Cap. 27, 6. seqq. — B. Albert., hic a. 1, exempli causa proponit quod in vita B. Ioannis eleemosynarii de quodam milite, Petro nomine, narratur, qui scilicet « iratus pane, quo proiecerat pauperem, meruit in iudicio Domini, ad quod raptus fuit, prolongationem vitae in poenitentiam ».
    Chapter 27, 6 ff. — Blessed Albert, here a. 1, proposes by way of example what is related in the life of Blessed John the Almsgiver about a certain soldier, Peter by name, who indeed « angered by the bread which he had thrown at a poor man, merited in the judgment of the Lord, to which he was rapt, a prolongation of life unto penance ».
  11. Quam appellationem Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 17. m. 1, sic explicat: « Quia Deus retribuit ei maius, quam faciat [peccator]; et ideo interpretatur Deus remunerando, ac si ille meruisset ». — De merito congrui et condigni vide supra d. 4. a. 2. q. 2. in corp. — Paulo inferius pro et secundo modo cod. U nec de secundo modo.
    Which appellation Alexander of Hales, Summa part III, q. 17, m. 1, explains thus: « Because God repays him more than [the sinner] does; and therefore God interprets [it] by remunerating, as if he had merited ». — On the merit of congruity and condignity see above d. 4, a. 2, q. 2, in the body. — A little below, for et secundo modo codex U [reads] nec de secundo modo.
  12. Edd. cum paucis codd. promotionem.
    The editions with a few codices [read] promotionem.
  13. Alan. ab Insul., Theolog. Regul., in exponenda regula 106. ait: Cum mereri sit de non-debito facere debitum, Christo autem a tempore incarnationis deberetur quidquid postea est consecutus, ipse de indebito debitum non fecit et ita sibi non meruit. Aeque enim dignus fuit ab incarnatione omnibus his etc.
    Alan of Lille, Theological Rules, in expounding rule 106, says: Since to merit is to make of the not-owed the owed, but to Christ from the time of the incarnation was owed whatever he afterward attained, he himself did not make the owed out of the not-owed and so did not merit for himself. For he was equally worthy from the incarnation of all these things, etc.
  14. Hic c. 2.
    Here, c. 2.
  15. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 7. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. — Aliquanto superius pro confirmationem (primo loco) codd. G H L T V aa consummationem; cod. K in hac solut. constanter exhibet vocem conformationis. Post sit determinatio edd. male adiiciunt meriti.
    Cf. II Sentences, d. 7, p. I, a. 2, q. 1. — Somewhat above, for confirmationem (in the first place) codices G H L T V aa [read] consummationem; codex K in this solution consistently exhibits the word conformationis. After sit determinatio the editions wrongly add meriti.
  16. Vide II. Sent. d. 11. a. 2. q. 2.
    See II Sentences, d. 11, a. 2, q. 2.
  17. Pro incremento edd. et nonnulli codd. substituunt in merito, et paulo inferius post tertium modum subiiciunt tantummodo.
    For incremento the editions and some codices substitute in merito, and a little below, after tertium modum, they add tantummodo.
  18. Vat. cum paucis codd. separationem; perperam.
    The Vatican edition with a few codices [reads] separationem; wrongly. ---
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