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Dist. 18, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 18

Textus Latinus
p. 380

Articulus I. De merito quoad usum sive exercitium.

Quaestio I. Utrum Christus meruerit ab instanti conceptionis.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum Christus meruerit ab instanti conceptionis. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Ieremiae trigesimo primop380-1: Novum faciet Dominus super terram, mulier circumdabit virum, ergo Christus fuit vir ab instanti conceptionis; sed constat, quod non fuerit vir quantum ad aetatem: ergo fuit vir quantum ad animi vigorem: habuit igitur quantum ad animam virtutem et operationem viri perfecti. Sed haec consistit in merendo: ergo Christus meruit a suae conceptionis primordio.

2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur auctoritate Gregorii et Magistri in litterap380-2: «Non solum meruit Christus, quando Patri obediens crucem subiit, sed ab ipsa conceptione, ex quo homo factus est». Et hoc ipsum potest elici ab auctoritate Gregorii consequente.

3. Item, Christus ab instanti conceptionis suae fuit beatus; sed beatitudo est habitus in actup380-3: ergo a primo instanti conceptionis suae habuit actum gloriosum. Sed qua ratione per gloriam habuit actum gloriosum, eadem ratione per gratiam habuit actum virtuosum: ergo videtur, quod a primordio suae conceptionis Christus meruit.

4. Item, lux propter suam nobilitatem et actualitatemp380-4 in eodem instanti incipit esse et lucere: ergo si anima Christi multo nobilior et potentior et deiformior est, videtur, quod in instanti eodem, in quo incepit esse, coepit habere operationem sibi debitam. Sed talis est operatio meritoria: ergo etc.

5. Item, sicut animae nostrae se habent ad demeritum, ita anima Christi se habet ad meritum; sed animae nostrae in ipso instanti infusionis habent reatum culpae originalisp380-5: ergo anima Christi ab ipso instanti conceptionis et infusionis habuit meritum virtutis.

Sed contra: 1. «Prius est esse quam agerep380-6»: in oppositum si ergo mereri est agere, anima Christi prius habuit esse completum, quam habuerit meriti usum: ergo non meruit a primordio conceptionis.

2. Item, omne quod exit ab otio in actum, prius quiescit, quam agatp380-7, et omne tale prius est, quam operetur; sed anima Christi incepit mereri: ergo de non operante facta est operans: ergo in merendo exivit ab otio in actum: ergo prius quievit: ergo non meruit ab instanti conceptionis.

3. Item, meritum est a voluntate deliberativa, in quantum deliberativa est; sed ubi est deliberatio, ibi est collatiop380-8; ubi autem haec est, ibi est temporis successio: ergo non videtur, quod meritum Christi potuerit esse a suae conceptionis principio.

4. Item, Angelus non peccavit in primo instanti suae creationis; et tamen ita cito usum liberi arbitrii habuit, sicut aliqua anima rationalis, cum creatus esset in cognitionis perfectionep380-9: ergo pari ratione videtur, quod nec anima Christi ab instanti conceptionis mereri potuerit.

5. Item, omne illud, quod anima Christi habuit a primordio conceptionis suae, habuit ab alio; sed meritum ortum habuit a libero arbitrio gratia informato: ergo non videtur, quod usum meriti habuit ab ipso conceptionis primordio.

Conclusio. Christus certo meruit ab instanti suae conceptionis, si loquamur de habitu, et probabiliter etiam quoad actum.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod ad perfectionem meriti duo concurrunt, videlicet ipse habitus gratuitus et ipsius

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habitus actus vel ususp381-1. Si ergo loquamur de merito quantum ad habitum, qui reddit habentem dignum praemio, sic, absque dubio concedendum est, quod a principio suae conceptionis Christus meruit, quia omni bono et praemio dignus fuit propter plenitudinem gratiae, quam Deus animae suae contulit et infuditp381-2. Et ab hoc non discordat aliquis doctor catholicus. — Si autem fiat sermo de merito quantum ad virtutis actum sive usum, in quo proprie attenditur completa ratio merendi, sic est duplex modus dicendi: unus, quod Christus meruit statim post principium conceptionis, non autem in ipso primo instanti. Et ratio huius est, quia operatio debet sequi esse substantiae; ideo necesse fuit, animam Christi prius esse quam agere, praecipue eo actionis genere, quod spectat ad usum voluntatis deliberativae; talis autem est actus meritorius. Et ideo si dicatur alicubi, Christum a primordio suae conceptionis meruisse; dicunt verum esse, secundum quod a dicit ordinem ad principium extra sumtum, non intrap381-3.

Est et alius modus dicendi, quod Christus quantum ad virtutis usum et actum meruit in ipso conceptionis primordio; hoc enim datum est ei per gratiam perfectissimam, ut in primo instanti, in quo incepit esse, non tantum haberet habitus virtutum, sed etiam actum, unde simul coepit esse et usum comprehensionis habere; et anima Christi in eodem instanti habuit creari et infundi, et gratia informari et exire in actum meriti, qui quidem consistit in motu bonae voluntatis.

Uterque tamen istorum modorum satis est rationabilis, sed primus facilior est et communior et secundum ipsum plana ad obiecta responsio. — Nam quod dicitur Christus ab instanti conceptionis suae fuisse vir, et quod dicitur ab instanti conceptionis suae meruisse; hoc dicitur quantum ad habitum; et hoc innuit ipsum verbum Gregoriip381-4, cum dicit: «Non sibi plus Christus meruit per crucis patibulum, quam ab ipsa conceptione per gratiam virtutum». Notabile est, quod dicit «per virtutum gratiam», non per virtutum usum. Habuit enim gratiam a principio, ita quod in ipso principio; usum vero habuit a principio, ita quod post principium. — Et si tu obiicias de beatitudine et de lucep381-5, qui hoc tenent generaliter respondent, quod in omni creatura esse praecedit operari tam in corporali quam in spirituali, tam in actu naturae quam in actu gratiae, tam etiam in actu gratiae quam in actu gloriae. — Nec obstat illud quod obiiciturp381-6 de merito animae. Anima enim habet originale peccatum in sua infusione per modum habitus, non autem quantum ad actum. — Et sic secundum istam viam patet responsio ad omnia obiecta.

Si quis autem velit aliam viam tenere, videlicet quod Christus in primo instanti suae creationisp381-7 habuit usum liberi arbitrii propter excellentissimum gratiae donum et quantum ad actum viatoris et quantum ad actum comprehensoris; satis faciliter poterit ad obiecta in contrarium responderi.

1. Ad illud enim quod primo obiicitur, quod prius est esse quam agere; dicendum, quod illud habet veritatem, si intelligatur de prioritate quantum ad ordinem naturae. Si autem intelligatur de prioritate quantum ad durationem, non habet veritatem, secundum quod expresse dicit Augustinus octavo super Genesim ad litteramp381-8, ubi dicit, quod in luce corporali esse non praecedit agere; et in Angelis, de quibus dicit, quod in primo instanti suae conditionis eas res cognoverunt, quae simul cum eis in esse prodierunt. Et in sexto de Trinitatep381-9 dicit, quod «si ignis esset aeternus, splendor ab igne egrediens esset aeternus». Et ideo satis rationabiliter potest dici, quod illud non habet veritatem de ordine durationis, sed de ordine naturae.

2. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod sub-

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stantia, quae incipit agere, exit ab otio in actum; dicendum, quod illud non habet generaliter veritatem, nisi intelligatur de operatione, sine qua substantia operans potest esse; de alia autem non habet veritatem, pro eo quod creatura simul incipit esse et operari; nec incipit operari, quia exit ab otio in actum, sed quia exit a non esse in essep382-1. Hoc modo potest intelligi in Christo quantum ad actum gratiae et virtutis.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod meritum est a voluntate deliberativa; dicendum, quod quamvis secundum processum naturae deliberatio indigeat successione et tempore; tamen secundum plenitudinem gratiae et gloriae possibile est ipsi animae in instanti discernere, quod alias non posset facere «sine continuo et temporep382-2». Et sic per deiformitatem gloriae intellectus potest simul plura intelligere, quamvis per naturam non intelligatur nisi unum solum simul et semel. Et quia anima Christi erat in plenitudine gratiae et gloriae; hinc est, quod non indigebat mora temporis ad discernendum, quid eligendum, quid fugiendum, quid amandum, quid odiendum.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Angelo, dicendum, quod non est simile; non enim sic poterat simul et semel cognoscere plura, secundum quod anima Christi cum plenitudine gratiae. Praeterea, peccatum dicit motum deordinatum et contrarium naturali rectitudini, sed meritum dicit naturalis rectitudinis complementum; et licet non decuerit, aliquam substantiam creari cum actu contrario rectitudini naturali, decuit tamen creari in actu et cum actu consonante ipsi naturae et eam complente, maxime illam, in qua Deus a primordio suae conditionis plenissime habitavit, sicut fuit anima Christip382-3.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod illud quod inest a primordio conditionis inest aliunde; dicendum, quod si illud intelligatur praecise, ita quod anima Christi se habeat solummodo per modum suscipientis et nullo modo cooperantis, non habetp382-4 veritatem. Potuit enim ipsi animae dari, ut cooperaretur Deo statim, cum fuit, et ita quod aliquid haberet in se, quod non tantum esset aliunde, verum etiam a se; et sic potuit esse in actu virtutis et exercitio meriti.

Si quis igitur velit sustinere hunc modum dicendi, non videtur multum deviare a probabilitate rationis nec etiam a pietate fidei, quae, quanto plus potest, ipsi Christo gratiae et honoris attribuit.

Scholion

I. In tota hac distinctione multa supponuntur, quae a theologis de merito eiusdemque speciebus et conditionibus solent tractari, et quae etiam a S. Bonav. in 1. Sent. d. 41. a. 1. q. I; II. Sent. d. 27. a. 2. q. 2. et 3. (vide ibi scholion), d. 29. a. 3. q. 2, d. 40. a. 2. q. 1-3, et III. Sent. d. 4. a. 2. q. 1-3. iam explicata, vel saltem tacta sunt. Specialim autem supponitur, quod omnes conditiones ad merendum requisitae sufficienter fuerint in Christo, et quod de facto meruerit: de quo in seq. quaestione nonnulla dicuntur.

II. Quoad primum instans temporis, in quo incepit actus merendi in Christo, Alex. Hal. (3. p. III. q. 16. m. 2. § I.) cum B. Alberto et, ut refert Dionys. Carth., Uldarico aliisque antiquis docet primum modum hic in corp. relatum his verbis: «Est principium extra sumtum, vel intra sumtum. Si dicatur principium intra sumtum, non est dicere, quod a principio conceptionis meruerit, quia tunc principium illud dicit illud instans, quo producebatur in esse per Spiritum S. Si vero initium vel principium dicatur extra sumtum, tunc est dicere, quod Christus meruit a principio conceptionis, quia statim, postquam conceptus est, habuit plenum usum liberi arbitrii» etc. Ratio, cui idem innititur, est 1. arg. ad oppos., quod S. Bonav., saltem quoad Christum, non approbat (ad 1-5), sed tantum quoad demeritum Angelorum, ut docetur hic ad 4. et etiam II. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. I. q. 2. Durand. (hic q. 2.) sententiam Alexandri censet esse probabilem, immo idem, ulterius progressus, dubitat, anne hoc meritum inceperit posterius et post nativitatem ex utero, contradicentibus omnibus antiquis Scholasticis. — S. Bonav. tamen etiam oppositam opinionem iudicat esse probabilem et obiecta contra eam bene solvit; insuper ostendit, in quo sensu, scilicet loquendo de merito quoad habitum, secunda opinio sit certo vera (in principio corp.).

III. Praeter laudatos: Scot., in utroque Scripto hic q. unica (in Oxon. n. 41. seqq.). — S. Thom., hic a. 3; 3. III. q. 34. a. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 6. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. I. — Richard. a Med., hic a. I. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Biel, hic q. unica.

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English Translation

Article I. On merit with respect to its use or exercise.

Question I. Whether Christ merited from the instant of conception.

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and asks whether Christ merited from the instant of conception. And that he did, it seems.

1. Jeremiah thirty-onep380-1: The Lord will make a new thing upon the earth, a woman shall compass a man, therefore Christ was a man from the instant of conception; but it is agreed that he was not a man with respect to age: therefore he was a man with respect to vigor of soul: he had therefore, with respect to the soul, the virtue and operation of a perfect man. But this consists in meriting: therefore Christ merited from the beginning of his conception.

2. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow] from the authority of Gregory and of the Master in the textp380-2: «Christ did not only merit when, obedient to the Father, he underwent the cross, but from the very conception, from when he was made man». And this same thing can be drawn from the consequent authority of Gregory.

3. Likewise, Christ from the instant of his conception was blessed; but blessedness is a habit in actp380-3: therefore from the first instant of his conception he had a glorious act. But by the same reason by which through glory he had a glorious act, by the same reason through grace he had a virtuous act: therefore it seems that from the beginning of his conception Christ merited.

4. Likewise, light, on account of its nobility and actualityp380-4, in the same instant begins to be and to shine: therefore if the soul of Christ is much more noble and more powerful and more deiform, it seems that in the same instant in which it began to be, it began to have the operation due to it. But such is meritorious operation: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, just as our souls stand with respect to demerit, so the soul of Christ stands with respect to merit; but our souls in the very instant of infusion have the guilt of original faultp380-5: therefore the soul of Christ from the very instant of conception and infusion had the merit of virtue.

On the contrary: 1. «Being is prior to actingp380-6»: to the opposite — if therefore to merit is to act, the soul of Christ first had complete being before it had the use of merit: therefore it did not merit from the beginning of conception.

2. Likewise, everything that passes from rest into act, first rests before it actsp380-7, and everything of this kind is prior before it operates; but the soul of Christ began to merit: therefore from non-operating it was made operating: therefore in meriting it passed from rest into act: therefore it first rested: therefore it did not merit from the instant of conception.

3. Likewise, merit is from the deliberative will insofar as it is deliberative; but where there is deliberation, there is comparisonp380-8; and where this is, there is succession of time: therefore it does not seem that the merit of Christ could be from the principle of his conception.

4. Likewise, the Angel did not sin in the first instant of his creation; and yet he had the use of free choice as quickly as any rational soul, since he was created in the perfection of cognitionp380-9: therefore by equal reason it seems that neither could the soul of Christ merit from the instant of conception.

5. Likewise, everything that the soul of Christ had from the beginning of its conception, it had from another; but merit took its origin from free choice informed by grace: therefore it does not seem that it had the use of merit from the very beginning of conception.

Conclusion. Christ certainly merited from the instant of his conception, if we speak of the habit, and probably also with respect to act.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that two things concur for the perfection of merit, namely the gratuitous habit itself and the

act or use of that habitp381-1. If therefore we speak of merit with respect to the habit, which renders its possessor worthy of reward, thus, without doubt it must be conceded that from the principle of his conception Christ merited, because he was worthy of every good and reward on account of the fullness of grace which God conferred and infused into his soulp381-2. And no catholic doctor disagrees with this. — But if the discourse is about merit with respect to the act or use of virtue, in which the complete account of meriting is properly considered, thus there is a twofold manner of speaking: one, that Christ merited immediately after the principle of conception, but not in the very first instant. And the reason for this is that operation must follow the being of substance; therefore it was necessary that the soul of Christ be prior to acting, especially in that genus of action which pertains to the use of the deliberative will; but such is the meritorious act. And therefore if it is said anywhere that Christ merited from the beginning of his conception; they say it is true, according as from denotes an order to a principle taken outside, not withinp381-3.

There is also another manner of speaking, that Christ with respect to the use and act of virtue merited in the very beginning of conception; for this was given to him through most perfect grace, that in the first instant in which he began to be, he might have not only the habits of the virtues, but also the act, whence he simultaneously began to be and to have the use of comprehension; and the soul of Christ in the same instant had to be created and infused, and to be informed by grace and to pass into the act of merit, which indeed consists in the motion of the good will.

Each of these manners, however, is sufficiently reasonable, but the first is easier and more common, and according to it the response to the objections is plain. — For as to what is said, that Christ from the instant of his conception was a man, and that he is said to have merited from the instant of his conception; this is said with respect to the habit; and this the very word of Gregoryp381-4 suggests, when he says: «Christ did not merit more for himself through the gibbet of the cross than from the very conception through the grace of the virtues». It is notable that he says «through the grace of the virtues», not through the use of the virtues. For he had grace from the principle, so that in the very principle; but he had use from the principle, so that after the principle. — And if you object concerning blessedness and concerning lightp381-5, those who hold this generally respond that in every creature being precedes operating, both in the corporeal and in the spiritual, both in the act of nature and in the act of grace, and even in the act of grace as much as in the act of glory. — Nor does that which is objectedp381-6 about the merit of the soul stand in the way. For the soul has original sin in its infusion by way of habit, but not with respect to act. — And thus according to this way the response to all the objections is clear.

But if anyone should wish to hold another way, namely that Christ in the first instant of his creationp381-7 had the use of free choice on account of the most excellent gift of grace, both with respect to the act of the wayfarer and with respect to the act of the comprehensor; he will be able quite easily to respond to the objections to the contrary.

1. For to that which is first objected, that being is prior to acting; it must be said that that holds true if it is understood of priority with respect to the order of nature. But if it is understood of priority with respect to duration, it does not hold true, according as Augustine expressly says in the eighth book On Genesis according to the Letterp381-8, where he says that in corporeal light being does not precede acting; and concerning the Angels, of whom he says that in the first instant of their condition they knew those things which came forth into being together with them. And in the sixth book On the Trinityp381-9 he says that «if fire were eternal, the splendor going forth from the fire would be eternal». And therefore it can be said quite reasonably that that does not hold true of the order of duration, but of the order of nature.

2. But to that which is objected, that a sub-

stance which begins to act passes from rest into act; it must be said that that does not hold true generally, unless it is understood of an operation without which the operating substance can be; but of another [operation] it does not hold true, for the reason that a creature simultaneously begins to be and to operate; nor does it begin to operate because it passes from rest into act, but because it passes from non-being into beingp382-1. In this way it can be understood in Christ with respect to the act of grace and of virtue.

3. To that which is objected, that merit is from the deliberative will; it must be said that although according to the process of nature deliberation needs succession and time; nevertheless according to the fullness of grace and of glory it is possible for the soul itself to discern in an instant, which otherwise it could not do «without continuum and timep382-2». And thus through the deiformity of glory the intellect can understand many things at once, although through nature it understands only one thing at one time and once. And because the soul of Christ was in the fullness of grace and glory; hence it is that it did not need a delay of time to discern what was to be chosen, what to be fled, what to be loved, what to be hated.

4. To that which is objected about the Angel, it must be said that it is not similar; for it could not so know many things at one time and once, as could the soul of Christ with the fullness of grace. Moreover, sin denotes a disordered motion contrary to natural rectitude, but merit denotes the complement of natural rectitude; and although it was not fitting that any substance be created with an act contrary to natural rectitude, it was nevertheless fitting that it be created in act and with an act consonant with the nature itself and completing it, especially that one in which God from the beginning of its condition most fully dwelt, as was the soul of Christp382-3.

5. To that which is objected, that what is present from the beginning of condition is present from elsewhere; it must be said that if that is understood precisely, so that the soul of Christ stands solely by way of receiving and in no way of cooperating, it does not holdp382-4 true. For it could be given to the soul itself that it cooperate with God immediately, when it was, and so that it have something in itself which was not only from elsewhere, but also from itself; and thus it could be in the act of virtue and the exercise of merit.

If therefore anyone wishes to maintain this manner of speaking, he does not seem to deviate much from the probability of reason nor even from the piety of faith, which, as much as it can, attributes grace and honor to Christ himself.

Scholion

I. In this whole distinction many things are presupposed which theologians are accustomed to treat concerning merit and its species and conditions, and which also have already been explained, or at least touched upon, by St. Bonav. in I Sent. d. 41, a. 1, q. I; II Sent. d. 27, a. 2, q. 2 and 3 (see the scholion there), d. 29, a. 3, q. 2, d. 40, a. 2, q. 1-3, and III Sent. d. 4, a. 2, q. 1-3. But it is specially presupposed that all the conditions required for meriting were sufficiently in Christ, and that he in fact merited: concerning which some things are said in the following question.

II. As to the first instant of time in which the act of meriting began in Christ, Alex. Hal. (3. p. III. q. 16. m. 2. § I.) with B. Albert and, as Dionys. Carth. reports, Uldaricus and other ancients teaches the first manner here related in the body in these words: «There is a principle taken outside, or a principle taken within. If the principle is said to be taken within, one cannot say that he merited from the principle of conception, because then that principle denotes that instant in which he was produced into being by the Holy Spirit. But if the beginning or principle is said to be taken outside, then one can say that Christ merited from the principle of conception, because immediately after he was conceived, he had the full use of free choice» etc. The reason on which the same [author] relies is the 1st argument to the opposite, which St. Bonav., at least as regards Christ, does not approve (ad 1-5), but only as regards the demerit of the Angels, as is taught here ad 4 and also II Sent. d. 3, p. II, a. I, q. 2. Durand. (here q. 2.) judges the opinion of Alexander to be probable; indeed the same [author], advancing further, doubts whether this merit may have begun later and after birth from the womb, all the ancient Scholastics contradicting. — St. Bonav. nevertheless also judges the opposite opinion to be probable and solves well the objections against it; moreover he shows in what sense, namely speaking of merit with respect to the habit, the second opinion is certainly true (at the beginning of the body).

III. Besides those cited: Scot., in both Writings here q. unica (in the Oxon. n. 41 ff.). — S. Thom., here a. 3; 3. III. q. 34, a. 3. — B. Albert, here a. 6. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 2, a. I. — Richard. a Med., here a. I, q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., here q. 2. — Biel, here q. unica.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 22. Argumentum, quod ex hoc loco deducitur, est secundum Hieron. in hunc loc. et Bernard., Homil. 2. super Missus est, n. 9; de quo cfr. supra d. 3. p. I. a. I. q. 3. in corp. et p. II. a. 3. q. I. ad 2. — Pro ergo Christus fuit edd. videtur ergo, quod Christus fuerit. Paulo inferius pro sed haec consistit cod. bb sed haec consistunt.
    Verse 22. The argument deduced from this passage is according to Jerome on this passage and Bernard, Homily 2 on Missus est, n. 9; concerning which cf. above d. 3, p. I, a. I, q. 3 in the body and p. II, a. 3, q. I, ad 2. — For therefore Christ was the editions [read] it seems therefore that Christ was. A little below, for but this consists codex bb [reads] but these consist.
  2. Hic c. 2, ubi et verba Gregorii afferuntur.
    Here c. 2, where also the words of Gregory are adduced.
  3. Vide supra pag. 310, nota 2.
    See above p. 310, note 2.
  4. Pro actualitatem codd. F I T X bb et alii partim actuitatem, partim activitatem, codd. G L aa et edd. 1, 2 acuitatem, Vat. actualitatem sive activitatem. Paulo inferius pro in instanti codd. E H T ab instanti.
    For actuality codices F I T X bb and others [read] partly actuity, partly activity, codices G L aa and editions 1, 2 acuity, the Vatican [edition] actuality or activity. A little below, for in the instant codices E H T [read] from the instant.
  5. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 30. a. I. q. 2. — Subinde pro ab ipso edd. a primo.
    Cf. II Sent. d. 30, a. I, q. 2. — Thereupon for from the very the editions [read] from the first.
  6. Aristot., IX. Metaph. text. 13. (VIII. c. 8.): Semper etenim ex eo quod potentia est, fit actu ens ab actu existente... movens autem actu iam est. Cfr. III. Phys. text. 17. (c. 2.) et tom. I. pag. 84, nota 7. Hilar., XI. de Trin. n. 19. ait: Meruisse aliquid posterius est, quam esse qui possit mereri. Mereri enim eius est, qui sibi ipsi meriti acquirendi auctor existat. — Mox pro quam habuerit edd. 1, 2 cum multis codd. quam habuit.
    Aristotle, IX Metaphysics text 13 (VIII c. 8): For always, from that which is in potency, there comes to be a being in act from an existing being in act... but the mover is already in act. Cf. III Physics text 17 (c. 2) and tome I p. 84, note 7. Hilary, XI On the Trinity n. 19 says: To have merited something is posterior to being one who can merit. For to merit belongs to him who is the author for himself of acquiring merit. — Presently for than it had editions 1, 2 with many codices [read] than it had [habuit].
  7. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 45. (c. 4.): Neque faber a materia [ferri patitur], sed ab illo haec; faber autem mutatur solum in actum ex otio.
    Aristotle, II On the Soul text 45 (c. 4): Nor does the smith suffer from the matter [of the iron], but this [matter does] from him; but the smith is changed only into act out of rest.
  8. Vide supra pag. 375, nota I. — De maiori cfr. supra pag. 330, nota 9.
    See above p. 375, note I. — Concerning the major [premise] cf. above p. 330, note 9.
  9. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 2.
    Cf. II Sent. d. 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 2.
  10. Alan. ab Insul., Theolog. Regul. regul. 90: Meritum boni consistit penes liberum arbitrium occasionaliter, penes virtutem formaliter, penes motum virtutis essentialiter, penes gratiam efficaciter, penes opus instrumentaliter. Libertas enim arbitrii occasio est meriti; penes enim liberum arbitrium est velle vel nolle; nec ipsum est efficiens causa, sed ad hoc faciens, non sufficiens. Virtus vero est causa formalis meriti, ex qua tanquam ex forma procedit motus, quo meremur. Ipse autem motus essentialiter meritum est, quia penes ipsum motum proprie consistit meritum. Gratia vero efficit, quod ipse motus est meritum; sine gratia enim nullus motus vel opus erit meritum; et ita penes gratiam consistit meritum efficaciter. Opus exterius est quasi causa instrumentalis meriti, et ita penes ipsum opus consistit ipsum meritum instrumentaliter.
    Alan of Lille, Theological Rules, rule 90: The merit of the good consists in free choice occasionally, in virtue formally, in the motion of virtue essentially, in grace efficaciously, in the work instrumentally. For the liberty of choice is the occasion of merit; for it belongs to free choice to will or not to will; nor is it itself an efficient cause, but a contributing cause to this, not a sufficient one. Virtue, however, is the formal cause of merit, from which, as from a form, proceeds the motion by which we merit. But the motion itself is essentially merit, because merit properly consists in the motion itself. Grace, however, brings it about that the motion itself is merit; for without grace no motion or work will be merit; and so merit consists in grace efficaciously. The exterior work is as it were the instrumental cause of merit, and so merit itself consists in the work itself instrumentally.
  11. Cfr. supra d. 13. a. I. q. 1. et 3.
    Cf. above d. 13, a. I, q. 1 and 3.
  12. Ita Alex. Hal., cuius verba vide hic in scholio. — Paulo superius post secundum quod in Vat. desideratur praepositio a, pro qua edd. 1, 2, substituerunt anima. Aliquanto inferius pro habitus virtutum edd. nec non aliquot codd. exhibent habitum virtutum, et proxime post pro actum cod. O actus.
    Thus Alex. Hal., whose words see here in the scholion. — A little above, after according as the preposition from [a] is lacking in the Vatican [edition], in place of which editions 1, 2 substituted soul [anima]. Somewhat below, for habits of the virtues the editions and also some codices exhibit habit of the virtues, and immediately after, for act codex O [reads] acts.
  13. Vel potius Magistri (hic c. 2.), ex Gregorii verbis hoc inferentis, ut Guliel. Estius in III. Sent. d. 18. § 1. observat dicens: Ex quo [Gregorii verbo] recte infert Magister, Christum non plus meruisse per crucis patibulum, quam a conceptione meruit per gratiam virtutum. Quamvis enim profecerit quantum ad numerum meritorum, prout successu temporis opera alia aliis et quidem maiora accedebant, non tamen proficiebat quantum ad virtutem meriti. Aequalitas enim gratiae aequalitatem meriti omnibus eius operibus conciliabat.
    Or rather of the Master (here c. 2.), inferring this from the words of Gregory, as Guliel. Estius in III Sent. d. 18, § 1 observes, saying: From which [word of Gregory] the Master rightly infers that Christ did not merit more through the gibbet of the cross than he merited from the conception through the grace of the virtues. For although he advanced with respect to the number of merits, inasmuch as with the succession of time some works were added to others and indeed greater ones, he nevertheless did not advance with respect to the virtue of the merit. For the equality of grace reconciled equality of merit to all his works.
  14. Vide fundam. 3. et 4. — Mox pro operari cod. O operationem.
    See fundament 3 and 4. — Presently for to operate codex O [reads] operation.
  15. In fundam. 5. — Pro de merito cod. C conformiter ad fundam. allegat de demerito.
    In fundament 5. — For concerning merit codex C, conformably to the fundament, alleges concerning demerit.
  16. Pro creationis edd. conceptionis, et paulo inferius respondere pro responderi.
    For creation the editions [read] conception, and a little below respondere for responderi.
  17. Cap. 12. n. 26. August. verba videsis tom. I. pag. 186, nota 9. Edd. cum multis codd. allegant lib. 3, ubi c. 4. n. 10, c. 18. n. 36. et c. 23. n. 46. altera Augustini sententia hic allata invenitur, scil. de Angelorum cognitione, de qua cfr. etiam II. Sent. d. 4. a. 3. q. I. et d. 13. a. 1. q. I. — De prioritate naturae et durationis vide supra pag. 94, nota 4. — Paulo inferius pro quae simul codd. G H L T V Y aa contra mentem argumenti et sententiam Augustini non simul.
    Chapter 12, n. 26. The words of Augustine see in tome I p. 186, note 9. The editions with many codices allege book 3, where in c. 4, n. 10, c. 18, n. 36, and c. 23, n. 46 the other opinion of Augustine here adduced is found, namely concerning the cognition of the Angels, concerning which cf. also II Sent. d. 4, a. 3, q. I, and d. 13, a. 1, q. I. — Concerning the priority of nature and of duration see above p. 94, note 4. — A little below, for which together codices G H L T V Y aa [read], against the mind of the argument and the opinion of Augustine, not together.
  18. Cap. I. n. I. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 115, nota 4.
    Chapter I, n. I. Cf. tome II p. 115, note 4.
  19. Exempla vide in solut. ad 1. — Paulo ante pro de alia autem non pauci codd. perperam de illa autem.
    See the examples in the solution to 1. — A little before, for but of another not a few codices wrongly [read] but of that.
  20. Aristot., de Memoria et reminisc. c. 1. docet, quod propter dependentiam intellectus nostri in cognoscendo a phantasmatibus, quae respiciunt sensibilia singularia, «non contingit intelligere aliquid sine continuo neque sine tempore, quae non in tempore sunt». — De propos. seq. cfr. supra d. 14. a. 2. q. 1, et q. 2. fundam. 1. et in fine corp. (resp. ad fundam. 6.). — Subinde pro Et sic non pauci codd. Et sicut, codd. A I Sicut, cod. D Et sicut patet. Paulo superius pro processum naturae deliberatio indigeat cod. A processum naturae deliberantem [deliberativae?] indigeat ratio.
    Aristotle, On Memory and Reminiscence c. 1, teaches that on account of the dependence of our intellect in knowing upon phantasms, which regard singular sensibles, «it does not happen that one understands anything without continuum nor without time, [things] which are not in time». — Concerning the following proposition cf. above d. 14, a. 2, q. 1, and q. 2 fundament 1 and at the end of the body (response to fundament 6.). — Thereupon for And thus [Et sic] not a few codices [read] And as [Et sicut], codices A I As [Sicut], codex D And as is clear. A little above, for the process of nature, deliberation needs codex A [reads] the process of nature deliberating [deliberative?] reason needs.
  21. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 2. fundam. 3. et 4.
    Cf. II Sent. d. 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 2, fundament 3 and 4.
  22. Multi codd. et edd. 1, 2 habuit.
    Many codices and editions 1, 2 [read] it had [habuit]. ---
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