← Back to Pars II: De creatura mundi

Pars 2, Cap. 9

Breviloquium · Pars II: De creatura mundi

Textus Latinus
p. 226

Capitulum IX. De productione hominis quantum ad spiritum.

Post naturam corpoream et incorpoream dicenda sunt aliqua de natura ex utrisque6 composita, primo ex parte mentis, secundo ex parte carnis, tertio ex parte totius hominis.

De anima igitur rationali haec in summa tenenda sunt secundum sacram doctrinam, scilicet quod ipsa est forma ens, vivens, intelligens et libertate utens. Forma quidem ens non a se ipsa nec de divina natura, sed a Deo de nihilo per creationem in esse deducta. — Forma autem vivens; non ex natura extrinseca, sed se ipsa; non vita mortali, sed vita perpetua. — Forma vero intelligens non tantum creatam, sed etiam « creatricem essentiam7 », ad cuius imaginem facta est per memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem. — Forma quoque libertate utens, quia semper est libera a coactione; a miseria vero et culpa libera fuit in statu innocentiae, licet non in statu naturae lapsae; haec autem libertas a coactione nihil aliud est quam facultas voluntatis et rationis, quae sunt potentiae animae principales8.

Ratio autem ad intelligentiam praedictorum haec est: quia, cum primum principium sit beatissimum et benevolentissimum; ideo sua summa benevolentia beatitudinem suam communicat creaturae, non tantum spirituali et proximae, sed etiam corporali et longinquae. Corporali tamen et longinquae communicat mediate, quia « lex divinitatis haec est, ut infima per media reducantur ad summa9 ». Et ideo non tantum spiritum angelicum et separatum fecit beatificabilem, sed etiam spiritum coniunctum, sci-

p. 227

licet humanum. Est igitur anima rationalis forma beatificabilis. Et quia ad beatitudinis praemium pervenire non est gloriosum nisi per meritum; nec mereri contingit, nisi in eo quod voluntarie et libere fit: ideo oportuit, animae rationali dari libertatem arbitrii per remotionem omnis coactionis; quia hoc est de natura voluntatis, ut nullatenus possit cogi, licet per culpam misera efficiatur et serva peccati1.

Rursus, quia forma beatificabilis est capax Dei per memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem; et hoc est esse ad imaginem Trinitatis propter unitatem in essentia et trinitatem in potentiis: ideo animam necesse fuit esse intelligentem Deum et omnia, ac per hoc Dei imagine insignitam. — Et quia nihil beatum potest beatitudinem amittere, nihil poterat esse beatificabile, nisi esset incorruptibile et immortale; necesse fuit, animam rationalem immortali vita de sui natura esse viventem.

Postremo, quia omne, quod ab alio beatificabile est et immortale, est mutabile secundum bene esse et incorruptibile secundum esse; ideo anima nec a se est nec de divina natura, quia mutabilis; nec producta de aliquo nec per naturam generata, quia est immortalis et incorruptibilis; et ita haec forma non potest per generationem in esse introduci, quia omne naturaliter generabile est naturaliter corruptibile2. — Ex his apparet, qualiter finis beatitudinis necessitatem imponit praedictarum conditionum ipsi animae ad beatitudinem ordinatae.

Quoniam autem ut beatificabilis est immortalis; ideo, cum unitur mortali corpori, potest ab eo separari; ac per hoc non tantum forma est, verum etiam hoc aliquid3; et ideo non tantum unitur corpori ut perfectio, verum etiam ut motor; et sic perficit per essentiam, quod movet pariter per potentiam. Et quoniam ipsa non tantum dat esse, verum etiam vivere et sentire et intelligere; ideo potentiam habet vegetativam, sensitivam et intellectivam, ita quod per potentiam vegetativam generat, nutrit et augmentat: generat ut quid, nutrit ut quale, augmentat ut quantum4. — Per sensitivam apprehendit sensibilia, retinet apprehensa, componit et dividit retenta: apprehendit quidem per sensitivam exteriorem quinquepartitam secundum correspondentiam ad quinque mundi corpora principalia5; retinet per memoriam, componit et dividit per phantasiam, quae est prima virtus collativa. — Per intellectivam autem discernit verum, refugit malum et appetit bonum: verum quidem discernit per rationalem, malum repellit per irascibilem, bonum appetit per concupiscibilem6.

Rursus, quia discretio veri est cognitio, fuga et appetitus est affectio; ideo tota anima dividitur in cognitivam et affectivam.

Amplius, quoniam cognitio veri est duplex: vel veri ut veri, vel veri ut boni; et hoc vel aeterni, quod est supra animam, vel temporalis, quod est infra: hinc est, quod potentia cognitiva, utpote intellectus et ratio, dividitur ita, quod intellectus in speculativum et practicum, ratio in superiorem portionem et inferiorem; quae potius nominant diversa officia quam diversas potentias7.

Postremo, quoniam appetitus dupliciter potest ad aliquid ferri, scilicet secundum naturalem instinctum, vel secundum deliberationem et arbitrium; hinc est, quod potentia affectiva dividitur in voluntatem naturalem et voluntatem electivam, quae proprie voluntas dicitur8. Et quoniam talis electio indifferens est ad utramque partem, ideo est a libero arbitrio. — Et quia haec indifferentia consurgit ex deliberatione praeambula et voluntate adiuncta; hinc est, quod liberum arbitrium est facultas rationis et voluntatis; ita quod, sicut dicit Augustinus, omnes praedictas rationales potentias comprehendit. Ait enim9: « Cum de libero arbitrio loquimur, non de parte animae loquimur, sed certe de tota ». Ex concursu enim illarum potentiarum, rationis supra se ipsam redeuntis et voluntatis concomitantis, consurgit integritas libertatis, quae est principium meriti, vel demeriti, secundum electionem boni, vel mali.

English Translation

Chapter IX. On the production of man as regards the spirit.

After the corporeal and the incorporeal nature, some things are to be said about the nature composed of both6 — first on the side of the mind, second on the side of the flesh, third on the side of the whole man.

Concerning the rational soul, then, these things are to be held in sum according to sacred doctrine: namely, that it is a form being, living, understanding and using freedom. A form indeed being, not from itself nor of the divine nature, but brought into being by God from nothing through creation. — A form, moreover, living; not from an extrinsic nature, but by itself; not with a mortal life, but with a perpetual life. — A form indeed understanding not only a created but also « a creating essence7 », to whose image it was made through memory, intelligence and will. — A form likewise using freedom, because it is always free from coercion; from misery and guilt, however, it was free in the state of innocence, though not in the state of fallen nature; and this freedom from coercion is nothing other than the faculty of will and of reason, which are the principal powers of the soul8.

Now the reason for the understanding of the foresaid is this: that since the first principle is most blessed and most benevolent, therefore by its supreme benevolence it communicates its own beatitude to the creature — not only to the spiritual and near creature, but also to the corporeal and far. To the corporeal and far, however, it communicates mediately, because « this is the law of the Godhead, that the lowest be led back to the highest through the middle9 ». And therefore it made beatifiable not only the angelic and separated spirit, but also the conjoined spirit, that

p. 227

is, the human. The rational soul, therefore, is a beatifiable form. And because to arrive at the reward of beatitude is not glorious except through merit, and meriting does not befall except in that which is done voluntarily and freely: therefore it was fitting that freedom of choice be given to the rational soul by the removal of all coercion; for this belongs to the nature of the will, that it can in no way be coerced, although through guilt it be made wretched and a slave of sin1.

Again, because a beatifiable form is capable of God through memory, intelligence and will — and this is to be to the image of the Trinity, on account of the unity in essence and the trinity in powers: therefore it was necessary that the soul be understanding God and all things, and through this stamped with the image of God. — And because nothing blessed can lose beatitude, nothing could be beatifiable unless it were incorruptible and immortal; it was necessary that the rational soul be living, of its own nature, with an immortal life.

Lastly, because everything that is beatifiable and immortal from another is mutable as regards well-being and incorruptible as regards being: therefore the soul neither is from itself nor is of the divine nature, because it is mutable; nor is it produced from something nor generated through nature, because it is immortal and incorruptible; and thus this form cannot be introduced into being through generation, because everything naturally generable is naturally corruptible2. — From these things it appears how the end of beatitude imposes the necessity of the foresaid conditions upon the soul itself, which is ordered to beatitude.

But since, as beatifiable, it is immortal, therefore, when it is united to a mortal body, it can be separated from it; and through this it is not only a form, but also a this-something3; and therefore it is united to the body not only as its perfection, but also as its mover; and so it perfects through essence that which it likewise moves through power. And since it gives not only being, but also living and sensing and understanding, therefore it has a vegetative, a sensitive and an intellective power — in such a way that through the vegetative power it generates, nourishes and increases: it generates as to what, nourishes as to of what sort, increases as to how much4. — Through the sensitive it apprehends sensible things, retains the apprehended, composes and divides the retained: it apprehends indeed through the exterior sensitive power, which is fivefold according to a correspondence to the five principal bodies of the world5; it retains through memory, it composes and divides through the imagination, which is the first collative power. — Through the intellective, however, it discerns the true, flees the evil and seeks the good: the true indeed it discerns through the rational [power], the evil it repels through the irascible, the good it seeks through the concupiscible6.

Again, because the discernment of the true is cognition, and flight and appetite are affection: therefore the whole soul is divided into the cognitive and the affective.

Further, since the cognition of the true is twofold — either of the true as true, or of the true as good; and this either of the eternal, which is above the soul, or of the temporal, which is below — hence it is that the cognitive power, namely intellect and reason, is divided thus: that the intellect [is divided] into speculative and practical, and reason into a higher portion and a lower; which rather name diverse offices than diverse powers7.

Lastly, since appetite can be borne toward something in two ways, namely according to natural instinct, or according to deliberation and choice: hence it is that the affective power is divided into the natural will and the elective will, which is properly called will8. And since such an election is indifferent to either side, therefore it is from free choice. — And because this indifference arises from a preambular deliberation and a will adjoined, hence it is that free choice is a faculty of reason and of will; in such a way that, as Augustine says, it comprehends all the foresaid rational powers. For he says9: « When we speak of free choice, we do not speak of a part of the soul, but assuredly of the whole ». For from the concurrence of those powers — of reason returning upon itself and of will accompanying it — there arises the integrity of freedom, which is the principle of merit, or of demerit, according to the election of good, or of evil.

Apparatus Criticus
  1. 6
    B ex utraque parte, qui etiam inferius cum H producta pro deducta. — De his tribus agitur hic et 2 seqq. capp.
    B [reads] ex utraque parte, which also below, with H, [reads] producta for deducta. — These three are treated here and in the 2 following chapters.
  2. 7
    Quo dicendi modo utitur Anselm., Monolog. c. 13. — R increatam essentiam. Pro creatam B D S et 1, 2 creaturam, nonnulli codd. creata [entia]. Inferius ex B substituimus et culpa pro et coactione, quod alii codd. et edd. falso exhibent.
    Anselm uses this manner of speaking, Monologion c. 13. — R [reads] increatam essentiam. For creatam B D S and editions 1, 2 [read] creaturam, and some codices creata [entia]. Below, on the authority of B, we have substituted et culpa for et coactione, which the other codices and the editions falsely exhibit.
  3. 8
    Cfr. de his II. Sent., in quo d. 17. a. 1. q. 1. et d. 18. a. 2. q. 3. ostenditur, animam non esse a se nec de divina natura, sed ex nihilo productam; d. 19. a. 1. q. 1, ipsam esse immortalem; d. 16. per totam (cfr. I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 1.), ipsam esse ad Dei imaginem factam; d. 25. p. I. et II., eam esse praeditam libertate, quae est facultas rationis et voluntatis, libertate a coactione quidem semper, libertate a culpa et miseria vero non semper.
    On these things compare II Sent., in which d. 17, a. 1, q. 1 and d. 18, a. 2, q. 3 show that the soul is not from itself nor of the divine nature, but produced from nothing; d. 19, a. 1, q. 1, that it is immortal; d. 16, throughout (compare I Sent. d. 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 1), that it was made to the image of God; d. 25, p. I and II, that it is endowed with freedom, which is the faculty of reason and of will — with freedom from coercion always, indeed, but with freedom from guilt and misery not always.
  4. 9
    Secundum Dionys., de Caelest. Hierarch. c. 4. § 3, c. 8. § 2. et de Ecclesiast. Hierarch. c. 5. § 4. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 28, nota 3. — Superius pro sua summa A suavissima, alii codd. omittunt sua, et communicat inferius ante immediate.
    According to Dionysius, On the Celestial Hierarchy c. 4, § 3, c. 8, § 2, and On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy c. 5, § 4. Compare vol. II, p. 28, note 3. — Above, for sua summa A [reads] suavissima; other codices omit sua, and [place] communicat below, before immediate.
  5. 1
    Ioan. 8, 34: Omnis, qui facit peccatum, servus est peccati. Cfr. II. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. XXV. c. 8. — Bernard., serm. 81. in Cantic. n. 6: Ubi autem non est libertas, nec meritum. Vide tom. III. pag. 350, nota 9. et pag. 381, nota 1.
    John 8:34: Everyone who commits sin is a slave of sin. Compare II Sent., the Master's text, d. XXV, c. 8. — Bernard, sermon 81 on the Canticle, n. 6: But where there is no freedom, neither is there merit. See vol. III, p. 350, note 9, and p. 381, note 1.
  6. 2
    Aristot., I. de Caelo et mundo, text. 126. (c. 12.): Generabile enim et corruptibile sequuntur se invicem. — Inferius pro Quoniam autem O Quoniam anima, 1 legit Quoniam autem natura beatificabilis etc.
    Aristotle, I On the Heavens and the World, text 126 (c. 12): For the generable and the corruptible follow upon one another. — Below, for Quoniam autem O [reads] Quoniam anima; edition 1 reads Quoniam autem natura beatificabilis etc.
  7. 3
    Scil. prima seu singularis substantia, secundum Aristot.; cfr. tom. IV. pag. 273, nota 3; II. Sent. d. 15. a. 1. q. 1. et d. 17. a. 1. q. 2. — Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 24. (c. 2.): Anima autem id est, quo vivimus et sentimus et movemur et intelligimus primo.
    Namely a first or singular substance, according to Aristotle; compare vol. IV, p. 273, note 3; II Sent. d. 15, a. 1, q. 1, and d. 17, a. 1, q. 2. — Aristotle, II On the Soul, text 24 (c. 2): But the soul is that by which we primarily live and sense and are moved and understand.
  8. 4
    Cfr. Aristot., I. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 39. seqq. (c. 5.) et II. de Anima, text. 47. seqq. (c. 4.).
    Compare Aristotle, I On Generation and Corruption, text 39 and following (c. 5), and II On the Soul, text 47 and following (c. 4).
  9. 5
    Explicatur hoc ab E H, qui addunt: Terra correspondet tactui, aqua gustui, aër auditui, ignis [vapor] odoratui, quinta essentia sive quintum corpus, quod comprehendit totam luminosam naturam cum orbibus et sphaeris suis sursum ab elemento ignis usque ad caelum empyreum inclusive, correspondet visui. Cfr. de hoc Ioan. de Rupella, Sum. de anima, p. II. c. 19, qui allegat August., III. de Gen. ad lit. c. 4. n. 6. Vide tom. II. pag. 319, nota 8.
    This is explained by E H, which add: Earth corresponds to touch, water to taste, air to hearing, fire [vapour] to smell, and the quintessence or fifth body — which comprehends the whole luminous nature with its orbs and spheres, upward from the element of fire as far as the empyrean heaven inclusive — corresponds to sight. Compare on this John of La Rochelle, Summa on the Soul, p. II, c. 19, who cites Augustine, III On Genesis to the Letter c. 4, n. 6. See vol. II, p. 319, note 8.
  10. 6
    Vide tom. III. pag. 579, nota 9. verba auctoris libri de Spiritu et anima.
    See vol. III, p. 579, note 9, the words of the author of the book On the Spirit and the Soul.
  11. 7
    Vide II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. seq., et Damasc., II. de Fide orthod. c. 22. — Ex A D M et 2 substituimus dividitur pro dividuntur.
    See II Sent. d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. 1 and following, and Damascene, II On the Orthodox Faith c. 22. — On the authority of A D M and edition 2 we have substituted dividitur for dividuntur.
  12. 8
    Cfr. II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 3.
    Compare II Sent. d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. 3.
  13. 9
    Libr. III. Hypognosticon (inter opera August.), c. 5. n. 7: Cum de libero arbitrio agimus, non de parte hominis agimus, sed de toto (Cfr. II. Sent. d. 25. p. I. q. 3.). — P omittit certe.
    Book III Hypognosticon (among the works of Augustine), c. 5, n. 7: When we treat of free choice, we do not treat of a part of man, but of the whole (Compare II Sent. d. 25, p. I, q. 3). — P omits certe.
Cited by

2 places in the Opera Omnia citethis question. Derived from Quaracchi’s own apparatus, never tagged by hand.

Whether light is a substantial or an accidental form
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 13
Breviloq. p. II. c. 9.
Whether free choice can be bound as to its use on account of the unfitness of the body
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 25
Breviloq. p. II. c. 9.

1 further reference addresses the article or printed page this question belongs to, rather than the question itself.

← Pars 2, Cap. 8Pars 2, Cap. 10→