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Dist. 27, Art. 2, Q. 1

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 27

Textus Latinus
p. 602

Articulus II. De caritate quantum ad actum et modum.

Consequenter quaeritur de ipsa caritate quantum ad actum et modum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex.

Primo quaeritur, utrum actus caritatis per prius sit meritorius quam actus aliarum virtutum.

Secundo, utrum possibile sit, motum caritatis esse mercenarium.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum idem possit esse motus dilectionis in Deum et in proximum.

Quarto quaeritur, quis eorum praecedat alterum.

Quinto quaeritur, utrum motus caritatis in Deum habeat modum.

Sexto et ultimo, utrum teneamur ad illum modum implendum.

Quaestio I. Utrum motus caritatis per prius sit meritorius quam actus aliarum virtutum.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum motus caritatis per prius sit meritorius quam actus aliarum virtutum. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Primo per illud quod dicit Apostolus ad Romanos decimo tertio3: Plenitudo Legis est dilectio; sed nullus plene adimplet ea quae sunt Legis, nisi qui meritorie eam observat: si ergo plenitudo Legis per Apostolum attribuitur ipsi caritati, videtur, quod efficacia merendi primo et principaliter circa actum eius consistit.

2. Item, super illud ad Galatas quinto4: Fructus autem Spiritus caritas etc.; Glossa: « Attende, quod in enuntiatione fructuum caput virtutum praemisit caritatem. Quae enim alia inter fructus Spiritus primatum tenere meruit nisi caritas, sine qua ceterae virtutes non reputantur esse virtutes, et ex qua omnia bona nascuntur »? Si ergo ex caritate omnia bona nascuntur, et hoc non potest intelligi nisi de bonis meritoriis; quod primo nascitur ex caritate primo tenet rationem meritorii: ergo per prius est meritorius actus caritatis quam actus alicuius virtutis.

3. Item, Gregorius5: « Non habet aliquid viriditatis ramus boni operis, nisi maneat in radice caritatis »: ergo radix caritatis omnibus operibus tribuit viriditatem; sed haec viriditas non est aliud quam efficacia in merendo: si ergo hanc tribuit caritas aliis virtutibus per suum actum et motum, videtur, quod actus caritatis primo et principaliter sit meritorius inter omnes actus virtutum.

4. Item, meritum inest omni virtuti ex recta ordinatione in finem; sed caritas est virtus, quae immediate ordinat in finem, et mediante qua ceterae aliae ordinari habent6: videtur ergo, quod circa actum eius primo et principaliter contingit actum meriti reperire.

5. Item, nullum obsequium est meritorium apud Deum, nisi quod fit liberaliter7; sed nihil fit liberaliter, nisi quod fit ex amore, quoniam amor est donum, in quo omnia alia dona donantur: si ergo efficacia merendi consistit in liberalitate, et liberalitas primo et principaliter reperitur in motu caritatis et amoris; videtur idem quod prius, videlicet quod motus caritatis primo et principaliter sit meritorius.

6. Item, actus fidei non est meritorius, nisi secundum quod fides credit in Deum — nam credere Deo et credere Deum commune est fidei informi et fidei formatae — sed quod fides credat in Deum, hoc habet ratione caritatis adiunctae — « credere enim in Deum, sicut dicit Augustinus8, est credendo amare » — ergo videtur, quod actus fidei non sit meritorius nisi mediante actu caritatis. Si ergo actus fidei est primus inter actus omnium virtutum, videtur, quod circa actum caritatis primo et principaliter consistat meritum.

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Sed contra:

1. Omnis actus procedens a virtute formata est Deo placitus et meritorius, quia quales sunt habitus, tales sunt actus1; sed virtutibus existentibus formatis, per prius exit in actum fides quam aliqua alia virtus: ergo videtur, quod actus eius primo sit meritorius.

2. Item, in omni eo, in quo primo consistit ratio dirigendi, primo consistit ratio merendi; sed circa actum fidei primo consistit ratio dirigendi, cum ipsa sit directiva omnium virtutum2: ergo et circa ipsam primo consistit ratio merendi, non ergo circa actum caritatis.

3. Item, gratia in merendo movet conformiter libero arbitrio, et e converso3; sed liberum arbitrium per prius iudicat, quam eligat; ergo gratia per prius videtur respicere actum cognitionis quam affectionis. Sed quod per prius respicit gratia primo habet rationem meritorii: ergo videtur, quod ratio merendi prius inveniatur in actu cognitionis quam affectionis, et ita prius in actu fidei quam caritatis.

4. Item, fides informis meretur operationem miraculorum de congruo in statu peccati4; sed multo maioris efficaciae est fides formata respectu praemii assequendi, quam fides informis respectu miraculi impetrandi: si ergo impetratio miraculi primo et principaliter attribuitur actui fidei informis, videtur, quod actui fidei formatae primo et principaliter meritum vitae aeternae debeat attribui.

5. Item, quod magis est difficile et magis contra naturam, illud tenet magis rationem meriti in via; sed motus fidei magis est naturae dissonus quam motus caritatis, quia Deum diligere non est contra dictamen naturae, sicut credere multos articulos5: ergo videtur, quod in actu ipsius fidei primo et principaliter consistat efficacia merendi.

6. Item, sicut se habet prudentia respectu cardinalium, ita se habet fides respectu virtutum theologicarum; sed recta ordinatio per prius reperitur in actu prudentiae quam in actu virtutum cardinalium6: ergo recta ordinatio per prius invenitur in actu fidei quam in actu aliarum theologicarum. Sed illud per prius est meritorium, in quo per prius reperitur ordinatio: ergo videtur, quod actus sive motus fidei per prius sit meritorius quam motus caritatis.

Conclusio.

Motus caritatis primo et principaliter est meritorius, non quidem prioritate originis, sed prioritate completionis.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod aliqui voluerunt dicere, quod meritum primo et principaliter consistit circa actum sive motum fidei, cum ipsa sit prima virtutum, et eius actus principium aliorum. — Alii vero econtra dicere voluerunt, quod actus caritatis primo et principaliter sit meritorius, cum ipsa secundum Gregorium7 et Ambrosium sit caput et radix omnium bonorum. Et utramque harum positionum magni clerici sustinuerunt. Et si velimus sane intelligere, sibi invicem non contradicunt, immo utrique verum sentire poterunt.

Propter quod notandum, quod secundum quod vult Philosophus8, dupliciter dicitur aliquid altero prius. Est enim prius alterum altero origine, et est prius complemento et definitione. Si loquamur de prioritate originis, ratio merendi per prius consistit in actu fidei, quoniam ipse est origo motuum aliarum virtutum; et cum procedit a virtute formata, dicere est, ipsum esse meritorium. Si ergo motus fidei formatae est meritorius et prior origine quam motus aliarum virtutum; loquendo de prioritate originis, efficacia merendi per prius attribuenda est

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motui sive actui ipsius fidei. — Si vero loquamur de prioritate completionis, sic efficacia merendi per prius attribuenda est actui caritatis, cum ipsa completissima sit omnium virtutum, et in ipsius actu consummetur ipsum meritum.

Ratio autem, quare caritas excellentior est aliis, est, quia maxime nos efficit deiformes, tum ratione liberalis exhibitionis, tum ratione conformis unitionis, tum ratione finalis quietationis. Ratione liberalis exhibitionis: quia, sicut Deus ex amore tribuit omnia dona, sic caritas liberaliter exsequitur omnia obsequia et mandata. — Ratione conformis unitionis: quoniam, sicut Pater et Filius nectuntur nexu amoris et uniuntur, sic homo, per caritatem adhaerendo Deo, efficitur unus spiritus. Propter quod dicitur Ioannis decimo septimo2: Ut sint consummati in unum, sicut et nos unum sumus. — Ratione finalis quietationis: quia, cum amor sit pondus, facit in Deum tendere et in Deo quiescere, sicut corporalia per sua pondera in propriis locis situari habent et stabiliri3.

His ergo de causis per caritatem efficitur homo maxime Deo conformis secundum triplex genus causae, secundum quod creatura habet ad Creatorem referri, videlicet secundum rationem principii moventis, formae exemplantis et finis quietantis; et ratione huius primatum tenet inter ceteras virtutes, secundum quod dicit Apostolus4. — Et propterea, si loquamur de prioritate completionis, motus eius primo et principaliter est meritorius, sicut ostendunt auctoritates, quae ad primam partem inducuntur; et ideo concedendae sunt.

1. 2. 3. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur in contrarium primo et secundo et tertio, patet responsio: quia omnes illae tres rationes primae, sicut intuenti apparet, procedunt de originis prioritate; et ita non obviant veritati nec rationibus, quae ad oppositum habent adduci. Verum enim est, quod motus fidei primo5 exit a libero arbitrio gratia informato quam motus aliarum virtutum; sed tamen non habet plenam et perfectam tendentiam et ordinationem in finem, quousque adiungatur ei motus caritatis, qui det ei pondus et inclinationem; unde ex adminiculo caritatis inest ipsi fidei perfectio meriti. Et propterea magis mensurari dicitur quantitas meriti secundum quantitatem caritatis quam secundum quantitatem alterius virtutis6.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod fides meretur operationem miraculorum; dicendum, quod hoc est, quia in fide est prima elevatio hominis supra se; ideo videtur7 impetrare a divina virtute, ut operetur aliquid supra vim naturae. Sed meritum praemii consummati non respicit principaliter primam elevationem, sed elevationem summam et completam; et hoc quidem non reperitur in actu fidei secundum se, sed magis in actu caritatis.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod actus fidei est maioris difficultatis et magis contra naturam quam actus caritatis; dicendum, quod etsi actus fidei sit magis contra naturam iudicantem, non tamen magis est contra, vel supra naturam8 exsequentem, immo multo minus. Multo enim facilius est credere summae Veritati propter se et super omnia, quam ipsam propter se et super omnia diligere et ei soli adhaerere et omnia propter eam contemnere. Et quia hoc est maximum, quod homo possit Deo impendere; et hoc facit ipsa caritas: ideo primo et principaliter vindicat sibi merendi efficaciam.

6. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod sicut se habet prudentia respectu virtutum cardinalium, sic fides respectu theologicarum; dicendum, quod non est omnino simile, pro eo quod virtutes theologicae, cum habeant obiectum increatum, tanto perfectiores sunt, quanto magis intime illi uniunt et coniungunt. Et propterea spirituale aedificium dicitur fundari in fide et erigi in spe et consummari in caritate, quia caritas inter virtutes theologicas est maxime unitiva, et ideo actus eius maxime facit homines deiformes9. Et hinc est, quod respectu obiecti increati nobilior est modus apprehendendi per modum tactus et amplexus, quam per modum visus et intuitus; econtra est circa corporalia et circa materialia; et ideo non cogit illa ratio.

Scholion

I. De hac (1.) quaestione diffuse disputat Guliel. Antissiodorensis (Sum. III. tr. 16. q. 1.) et resolvit, quod « potius est meritum in fide quam in caritate ». Sed de hoc antiquo auctore, licet sit acutus et doctus, iure observat Dionysius Carth. (III. Sent. d. 30. q. 3.), quod est « in opinionibus suis frequenter singularis et extremus: nam et proprium corpus dicit esse plus diligendum quam proximum ». Commentatores autem Lombardi hanc quaestionem plerumque tractant infra in distinctione 30, et resolvunt, quod principalitas meriti est in caritate, in aliis virtutibus, secundum quod caritate informantur. Principia autem hic posita tanguntur in aliis quaestionibus, praesertim de conditione ad meritum requisita, quod scilicet ad plenum meritum actus virtutum aliarum saltem virtualiter debeant esse imperati a caritate, de quo cfr. S. Thom., S. I. II. q. 114. a. 4; Bonav., II. Sent. d. 29. a. 3. q. 2, d. 38. a. 1. q. 1. 2, d. 40. a. 1. q. 1. 2. 3, d. 41. a. 1. q. 3. ad 6; III. Sent. d. 36. q. 6; IV. Sent. d. 20. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. ad 5. — Quae hic dicuntur de excellentia caritatis approbant S. Thom., S. II. II. q. 23. a. 6, aliique commentatores Petri Lombardi infra d. 36. in quaestione de aequalitate virtutum. Concordant verba Alexandri Hal. (S. p. IV. q. 10. m. 2. a. 1. § 3.): « Caritas in virtutibus est complementum, eo quod idem est, in quod transit actus et finis; quia idem est in unitate quod diligitur et propter quod, quia diligitur summum Bonum et propter summum Bonum. Nec sic est in aliis, ut in fide et iustitia; sed caritas est ratio in aliis. Diffusio enim sive communicatio boni sive finis est ratio in omnibus virtutibus ».

De ipsa quaestione in III. Sent. d. 30. agunt: S. Thom., ibi a. 8. — Petr. a Tar., ibi q. 2. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., ibi q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., loc. cit.

II. Sequentem (2.) quaestionem S. Thom. (III. Sent. d. 29. q. 1. a. 1.) cum aliis magistris ita proponit: « Utrum in dilectione Dei possit haberi respectus ad aliquam mercedem »; sed Richard. a Med. (hic a. 7. q. 2.) ita: « Utrum principalior actus sit diligere amore amicitiae quam amore concupiscentiae ». — Plura ad hanc quaestionem spectantia vide II. Sent. d. 38. a. 1. q. 3; I. Sent. d. 1. a. 1. q. 3. ad 1. Iam supra (d. 26. a. 1. q. 1.) in scholio notatum est, quod amor Dei etiam purissimus non excludit actus spei, immo « maxima caritas maxime desiderat uniri Deo et habere Deum », ut dicit Bonav. (ibid. ad 3.). Porro cum Deus sit non tantum summa bonitas in se sumta, sed etiam bonitas conveniens nobis; etiam sub hoc secundo respectu non potest excludi a motivo caritatis, licet caritas proprie et principaliter motivum sumat a summa bonitate in se sumta (cfr. hic ad 2. 3.). Hinc etiam S. Thom. (II. II. q. 23. a. 4. in corp. et ad 2.) docet, obiectum caritatis esse Deum ut beatitudinis obiectum. Licet autem amore concupiscentiae ametur bonum ad hoc, ut sit bonum ipsius amantis, tamen « respectu nobilissimi amati, quod est Deus, amor concupiscentiae ordinatur sicut ad finem ad amorem amicitiae. Qui enim ex caritate vult frui Deo, quod est ipsum amare amore concupiscentiae, hoc ideo vult, ut Deus honoretur et glorificetur in se, quod est ipsum amare amore amicitiae » (Richard. a Med., loc. cit.). Similiter docet S. Thom. (III. Sent. loc. cit.): « Habens caritatem non potest habere oculum ad mercedem, ut ponat aliquid quodcumque finem amati, scilicet Dei... nec iterum, ut ponat aliquod bonum temporale finem ipsius amoris... potest tamen habere oculum ad mercedem, ut ponat beatitudinem creatam finem amoris, non autem finem amati. Hoc enim neque est contra rationem amicitiae neque contra rationem virtutis, cum beatitudo virtutum sit finis ».

III. De hac (2.) quaestione praeter laudatos alii tractant III. Sent. d. 29: B. Albert., ibi a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., ibi a. 3. — Durand., ibi q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., ibi q. 1. in fine.

English Translation

Article II. On charity as to act and mode.

Consequently, charity itself is inquired into as to act and mode. And concerning this six things are asked.

First it is asked whether the act of charity is prior in being meritorious than the act of the other virtues.

Second, whether it is possible that the motion of charity be mercenary.

Third it is asked whether the motion of love toward God and toward neighbor can be the same.

Fourth it is asked which of them precedes the other.

Fifth it is asked whether the motion of charity toward God has a mode.

Sixth and last, whether we are bound to fulfill that mode.

Question I. Whether the motion of charity is prior in being meritorious than the act of the other virtues.

Concerning the first the procedure is thus, and it is asked whether the motion of charity is prior in being meritorious than the act of the other virtues. And that it is so, seems [to be the case]:

1. First, through that which the Apostle says to the Romans 133: The fullness of the Law is love; but no one fully fulfills the things that are of the Law except one who observes it meritoriously: if therefore the fullness of the Law is attributed by the Apostle to charity itself, it seems that the efficacy of meriting consists first and principally in its act.

2. Likewise, upon that passage to the Galatians 54: But the fruit of the Spirit is charity etc.; the Gloss: « Note that in the enumeration of the fruits he placed charity as the head of the virtues. For what other thing among the fruits of the Spirit deserved to hold the primacy except charity, without which the other virtues are not reckoned to be virtues, and from which all good things are born »? If therefore from charity all good things are born, and this cannot be understood except of meritorious goods; that which is first born from charity first holds the account of the meritorious: therefore the act of charity is prior in being meritorious than the act of any [other] virtue.

3. Likewise, Gregory5: « The branch of a good work has nothing of greenness unless it remains in the root of charity »: therefore the root of charity gives greenness to all works; but this greenness is nothing other than efficacy in meriting: if therefore charity gives this to the other virtues through its act and motion, it seems that the act of charity is first and principally meritorious among all the acts of the virtues.

4. Likewise, merit is in every virtue from a right ordering to the end; but charity is the virtue which immediately orders to the end, and by the mediation of which the other [virtues] are to be ordered6: it seems therefore that it is in its act first and principally that the act of merit happens to be found.

5. Likewise, no service is meritorious before God except what is done freely7; but nothing is done freely except what is done from love, since love is the gift in which all the other gifts are given: if therefore the efficacy of meriting consists in liberality, and liberality is found first and principally in the motion of charity and of love; the same seems as before, namely that the motion of charity is first and principally meritorious.

6. Likewise, the act of faith is not meritorious except according as faith believes in God — for to believe God and to believe that there is a God is common to unformed faith and to formed faith — but that faith believes in God, this it has by reason of the charity joined to it — « for to believe in God, as Augustine says8, is by believing to love » — therefore it seems that the act of faith is not meritorious except by the mediation of the act of charity. If therefore the act of faith is the first among the acts of all the virtues, it seems that merit consists first and principally in the act of charity.

On the contrary:

1. Every act proceeding from a formed virtue is pleasing to God and meritorious, because as the habits are, so are the acts1; but, the virtues being formed, faith goes forth into act prior to any other virtue: therefore it seems that its act is first meritorious.

2. Likewise, in everything in which the account of directing first consists, the account of meriting first consists; but the account of directing first consists in the act of faith, since it is the director of all the virtues2: therefore the account of meriting also first consists in it, and therefore not in the act of charity.

3. Likewise, grace in meriting moves conformably to free will, and conversely3; but free will judges prior to choosing; therefore grace seems to regard the act of cognition prior to that of affection. But that which grace regards prior first has the account of the meritorious: therefore it seems that the account of meriting is found prior in the act of cognition than of affection, and thus prior in the act of faith than of charity.

4. Likewise, unformed faith merits the working of miracles by congruity in the state of sin4; but formed faith is of much greater efficacy with respect to attaining the reward than unformed faith with respect to obtaining a miracle: if therefore the obtaining of a miracle is attributed first and principally to the act of unformed faith, it seems that to the act of formed faith the merit of eternal life ought first and principally to be attributed.

5. Likewise, that which is more difficult and more against nature holds more the account of merit in this life; but the motion of faith is more discordant with nature than the motion of charity, because to love God is not against the dictate of nature, as is to believe many articles5: therefore it seems that the efficacy of meriting consists first and principally in the act of faith itself.

6. Likewise, just as prudence is related to the cardinal [virtues], so faith is related to the theological virtues; but right ordering is found prior in the act of prudence than in the act of the cardinal virtues6: therefore right ordering is found prior in the act of faith than in the act of the other theological [virtues]. But that is prior in being meritorious in which ordering is found prior: therefore it seems that the act or motion of faith is prior in being meritorious than the motion of charity.

Conclusion.

The motion of charity is first and principally meritorious, not indeed by priority of origin, but by priority of completion.

I respond: For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that some wished to say that merit consists first and principally in the act or motion of faith, since it is the first of the virtues, and its act the principle of the others. — But others, on the contrary, wished to say that the act of charity is first and principally meritorious, since it, according to Gregory7 and Ambrose, is the head and root of all goods. And great clerics have upheld each of these positions. And if we are willing to understand soundly, they do not contradict one another; indeed, both can hold what is true.

On account of which it must be noted that, according as the Philosopher holds8, something is said to be prior to another in two ways. For one thing is prior to another in origin, and is prior in completion and definition. If we speak of priority of origin, the account of meriting consists prior in the act of faith, since it is the origin of the motions of the other virtues; and since it proceeds from a formed virtue, it is to be said that it is meritorious. If therefore the motion of formed faith is meritorious and prior in origin than the motion of the other virtues; speaking of priority of origin, the efficacy of meriting is to be attributed prior

to the motion or act of faith itself. — But if we speak of priority of completion, then the efficacy of meriting is to be attributed prior to the act of charity, since it is the most complete of all the virtues, and in its act the merit itself is consummated.

But the reason why charity is more excellent than the others is that it most of all makes us deiform, both by reason of liberal bestowing, and by reason of conforming union, and by reason of final repose. By reason of liberal bestowing: because, just as God out of love bestowed all gifts, so charity liberally carries out all services and commands. — By reason of conforming union: since, just as the Father and the Son are bound and united by the bond of love, so man, by cleaving to God through charity, is made one spirit. On account of which it is said in John 172: That they may be consummated in one, as we also are one. — By reason of final repose: because, since love is a weight, it makes [one] tend toward God and rest in God, just as bodily things by their weights are situated and made stable in their proper places3.

For these reasons therefore man is made most conformed to God through charity according to the threefold kind of cause, according as a creature is to be referred to the Creator, namely according to the account of the moving principle, the exemplifying form, and the quieting end; and by reason of this it holds the primacy among the other virtues, according to what the Apostle says4. — And therefore, if we speak of priority of completion, its motion is first and principally meritorious, as the authorities show which are adduced for the first part; and therefore they are to be conceded.

1. 2. 3. To that indeed which is objected to the contrary in the first and second and third [places], the response is clear: because all those three first reasons, as is apparent to one considering, proceed from priority of origin; and thus they do not stand against the truth nor against the reasons which can be adduced for the opposite. For it is true that the motion of faith goes forth prior5 from free will informed by grace than the motion of the other virtues; but yet it does not have a full and perfect tendency and ordering to the end, until the motion of charity is joined to it, which gives it weight and inclination; whence from the support of charity the perfection of merit is in faith itself. And therefore the quantity of merit is said to be measured more according to the quantity of charity than according to the quantity of another virtue6.

4. To that which is objected, that faith merits the working of miracles; it must be said that this is because in faith is the first elevation of man above himself; therefore it seems7 to obtain from the divine power that it work something above the power of nature. But the merit of the consummated reward does not regard principally the first elevation, but the highest and complete elevation; and this indeed is not found in the act of faith in itself, but rather in the act of charity.

5. To that which is objected, that the act of faith is of greater difficulty and more against nature than the act of charity; it must be said that, although the act of faith be more against judging nature, yet it is not more against, or above, executing nature8, indeed much less. For it is much easier to believe the highest Truth for its own sake and above all things, than to love it for its own sake and above all things and to cleave to it alone and to despise all things for its sake. And because this is the greatest [thing] which man can render to God; and this charity itself does: therefore it first and principally claims for itself the efficacy of meriting.

6. To that which is objected last, that just as prudence is related to the cardinal virtues, so faith [is related] to the theological [virtues]; it must be said that it is not altogether alike, for the reason that the theological virtues, since they have an uncreated object, are the more perfect the more intimately they unite and join [us] to it. And therefore the spiritual edifice is said to be founded in faith and raised in hope and consummated in charity, because charity among the theological virtues is most of all unitive, and therefore its act most of all makes men deiform9. And hence it is that with respect to the uncreated object the manner of apprehending by way of touch and embrace is nobler than by way of sight and gazing; the contrary is the case concerning bodily and material things; and therefore that reasoning does not compel.

Scholion

I. Concerning this (1st) question William of Auxerre (Summa III, tr. 16, q. 1) disputes at length and resolves that « there is rather merit in faith than in charity ». But of this ancient author, although he is acute and learned, Dionysius the Carthusian (III Sent. d. 30, q. 3) rightly observes that he is « in his opinions frequently singular and extreme: for he even says that one's own body is to be loved more than one's neighbor ». But the commentators on Lombard for the most part treat this question below in distinction 30, and resolve that the principality of merit is in charity, [and] in the other virtues according as they are informed by charity. But the principles here laid down are touched on in other questions, especially concerning the condition required for merit, namely that for full merit the acts of the other virtues ought at least virtually to be commanded by charity, concerning which cf. St. Thomas, Summa I-II, q. 114, a. 4; Bonaventure, II Sent. d. 29, a. 3, q. 2, d. 38, a. 1, q. 1, 2, d. 40, a. 1, q. 1, 2, 3, d. 41, a. 1, q. 3, ad 6; III Sent. d. 36, q. 6; IV Sent. d. 20, p. II, a. 1, q. 1, ad 5. — What is here said concerning the excellence of charity St. Thomas approves, Summa II-II, q. 23, a. 6, and the other commentators on Peter Lombard below at d. 36 in the question on the equality of the virtues. The words of Alexander of Hales agree (Summa p. IV, q. 10, m. 2, a. 1, § 3): « Charity in the virtues is the complement, because it is the same into which the act and the end pass; for the same in unity is that which is loved and that on account of which, because the highest Good is loved and on account of the highest Good. Nor is it so in the others, as in faith and justice; but charity is the ground in the others. For the diffusion or communication of the good or of the end is the ground in all the virtues ».

Concerning this question in III Sent. d. 30 treat: St. Thomas, there a. 8. — Peter of Tarentaise, there q. 2, a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, there q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, loc. cit.

II. The following (2nd) question St. Thomas (III Sent. d. 29, q. 1, a. 1) with the other masters proposes thus: « Whether in the love of God there can be had regard to some reward »; but Richard of Mediavilla (here a. 7, q. 2) thus: « Whether the more principal act is to love with the love of friendship than with the love of concupiscence ». — More things pertaining to this question see II Sent. d. 38, a. 1, q. 3; I Sent. d. 1, a. 1, q. 3, ad 1. Already above (d. 26, a. 1, q. 1) it was noted in the scholion that the love of God, even the most pure, does not exclude the acts of hope, indeed « the greatest charity most of all desires to be united to God and to have God », as Bonaventure says (ibid. ad 3). Furthermore, since God is not only the highest goodness taken in itself, but also a goodness befitting us; even under this second respect he cannot be excluded from the motive of charity, although charity properly and principally takes its motive from the highest goodness taken in itself (cf. here ad 2, 3). Hence also St. Thomas (II-II, q. 23, a. 4, in the body and ad 2) teaches that the object of charity is God as the object of beatitude. But although by the love of concupiscence a good is loved to this end, that it be the good of the lover himself, yet « with respect to the most noble beloved, which is God, the love of concupiscence is ordered as to an end to the love of friendship. For he who out of charity wishes to enjoy God, which is to love him with the love of concupiscence, wishes this for this reason, that God be honored and glorified in himself, which is to love him with the love of friendship » (Richard of Mediavilla, loc. cit.). Similarly St. Thomas teaches (III Sent. loc. cit.): « He who has charity cannot have an eye to a reward, so as to set anything whatever as the end of the beloved, namely of God... nor again, so as to set some temporal good as the end of the love itself... yet he can have an eye to a reward, so as to set created beatitude as the end of the love, but not as the end of the beloved. For this is neither against the account of friendship nor against the account of virtue, since beatitude is the end of the virtues ».

III. Concerning this (2nd) question, besides those praised, others treat in III Sent. d. 29: Blessed Albert, there a. 4. — Peter of Tarentaise, there a. 3. — Durandus, there q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, there q. 1, at the end.

Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 10. (P. 602, n. 3.)
    Verse 10. (P. 602, n. 3.)
  2. Vers. 22. — Glossa, quae sumta est ex Comment. Hieronymi in hunc locum, habetur apud Petr. Lombardum et Lyranum. — In Glossa pro praemisit edd. substituerunt praemittit. Post pauca eaedem edd. pro quod primo exhibent actus qui primo. Deinde in fine arg. pro alicuius virtutis cod. O alterius virtutis. (P. 602, n. 4.)
    Verse 22. — The Gloss, which is taken from the Commentary of Jerome on this passage, is found in Peter Lombard and in Lyra. — In the Gloss, for praemisit the editions substituted praemittit. After a few [words] the same editions for quod primo exhibit actus qui primo. Then at the end of the argument, for alicuius virtutis codex O [reads] alterius virtutis. (P. 602, n. 4.)
  3. Libr. II. Homil. in Evang. homil. 27. n. 1. (P. 602, n. 5.)
    Book II of the Homilies on the Gospel, homily 27, n. 1. (P. 602, n. 5.)
  4. Vide infra d. 36. q. 6. (P. 602, n. 6.)
    See below, d. 36, q. 6. (P. 602, n. 6.)
  5. Cfr. supra pag. 267, nota 1. et pag. 381, nota 1. — De propos. seq. vide I. Sent. d. 18. q. 1, ubi solvitur quaestio: Utrum Spiritus S. sit donum, in quo omnia dona donantur. (P. 602, n. 7.)
    Cf. above, p. 267, note 1, and p. 381, note 1. — On the following proposition see I Sent. d. 18, q. 1, where the question is resolved: Whether the Holy Spirit is the gift in which all gifts are given. (P. 602, n. 7.)
  6. In Ioan. Evang. tr. 29. n. 6. Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. XXIII. c. 1, et Comment. dub. 3, ubi discrimen exponitur, quod est inter credere in Deum, credere Deo et credere Deum. (P. 602, n. 8.)
    On the Gospel of John, tract 29, n. 6. Cf. above, the Master's text, d. XXIII, c. 1, and the Commentary, dub. 3, where is expounded the distinction which there is between to believe in God, to believe God, and to believe that there is a God. (P. 602, n. 8.) <!-- p. 603 -->
  7. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 760, nota 6. — Quod actus fidei prior sit actibus aliarum virtutum, ostensum est supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. et dub. 6. (P. 603, n. 1.)
    Cf. tom. II, p. 760, note 6. — That the act of faith is prior to the acts of the other virtues was shown above, d. 23, a. 1, q. 1, in the body and dub. 6. (P. 603, n. 1.)
  8. Vide supra pag. 471, nota 3 et s. — Subinde pro circa ipsam edd. circa ipsum. (P. 603, n. 2.)
    See above, p. 471, note 3 and ff. — Thereupon for circa ipsam the editions [read] circa ipsum. (P. 603, n. 2.)
  9. Libr. II. Sent. d. 26. q. 6. ad 5, ubi Doctor ait: Secundum quod Deus movet per gratiam, per eandem gratiam potest excitare ad diversa opera. Secundum vero quod liberum arbitrium se ipsum movet per gratiam ad diversa opera, est in ipso cognitionis et affectionis diversitas, secundum quas ordinari habet ad diversa operum genera; et ideo, quamvis gratia non varietur in se, movet liberum arbitrium ad diversa, ratione variationis in ipso, quia ipsum potest movere. Nunquam enim gratia elicit opus meritorium, nisi voluntas sibi cooperetur. — Quaedam codd. dubiae sint lectionis, plures tamen, ut N, GTV, clare exhibent conformiter libero arbitrio [i. e. secundum naturam liberi arbitrii], quam lectionem edd. et Supplementum Sum. Alex. Hal., repugnante contextu, mutaverunt in conformiter liberum arbitrium, cod. I. in actum liberi arbitrii. (P. 603, n. 3.)
    Book II of the Sentences, d. 26, q. 6, ad 5, where the Doctor says: According as God moves through grace, by the same grace he can rouse to diverse works. But according as free will moves itself through grace to diverse works, there is in it a diversity of cognition and affection, according to which it is to be ordered to diverse kinds of works; and therefore, although grace is not varied in itself, it moves free will to diverse things, by reason of the variation in it [free will], because it [free will] can move it. For grace never elicits a meritorious work unless the will cooperates with it. — Certain codices are of doubtful reading, but several, as N, GTV, clearly exhibit conformiter libero arbitrio [i.e. according to the nature of free will], which reading the editions and the Supplement of the Summa of Alexander of Hales, against the context, changed into conformiter liberum arbitrium, codex I into actum liberi arbitrii. (P. 603, n. 3.)
  10. Epist. I. Cor. 13, 2: Et si habuero omnem fidem, ita ut montes transferam, caritatem autem non habuero, nihil sum. Cfr. Matth. 17, 19; Luc. 17, 6, et supra pag. 170, nota 3. (P. 603, n. 4.)
    Epistle I Cor. 13, 2: And if I should have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, but have not charity, I am nothing. Cf. Matthew 17, 19; Luke 17, 6, and above, p. 170, note 3. (P. 603, n. 4.)
  11. Vide supra d. 23. a. 2. q. 2. ad 3. et d. 24. a. 2. q. 2. ad 4. (P. 603, n. 5.)
    See above, d. 23, a. 2, q. 2, ad 3, and d. 24, a. 2, q. 2, ad 4. (P. 603, n. 5.)
  12. Cum secundum Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 6, [cfr. etiam ibid. VI. c. 13, et I. Magnor. Moral. c. 33. (c. 35.)] prudens praefiniat medium cuiuslibet virtutis. — Paulo inferius ante theologicarum codd. K U supplent virtutum. (P. 603, n. 6.)
    Since according to Aristotle, Ethics II, c. 6, [cf. also there VI, c. 13, and Magna Moralia I, c. 33 (c. 35)], the prudent man predefines the mean of any virtue. — A little below, before theologicarum codices K U supply virtutum. (P. 603, n. 6.)
  13. Praeter eius verba in fundam. 3. allata cfr. etiam eius Regul. pastor. p. III. c. 9; II. Regist. epist. Ind. I. epist. 17; Expos. in septem Ps. poenit. Ps. 2. n. 13. — De Ambrosio vide supra pag. 508, nota 9. Inferius pro poterunt edd. potuerunt. (P. 603, n. 7.)
    Besides his words adduced in fundamentum 3, cf. also his Pastoral Rule p. III, c. 9; the Register of Letters, indiction I, epistle 17; the Exposition on the seven Penitential Psalms, Ps. 2, n. 13. — On Ambrose see above, p. 508, note 9. Below, for poterunt the editions [read] potuerunt. (P. 603, n. 7.)
  14. Libr. VIII. Phys. text. 88. (c. 7.); V. Metaph. text. 16. et IX. text. 18. (IV. c. 11. et VIII. c. 8.). Cfr. de Praedicam., de Priori, et supra pag. 186, nota 2. — Paulo inferius post et definitione cod. I. addit sive dignitate, quod cod. bb substituit pro et definitione. Post pauca pro dicere est cod. A dicendum est. (P. 603, n. 8.)
    Book VIII of the Physics, text 88 (c. 7); Metaphysics V, text 16, and IX, text 18 (IV, c. 11, and VIII, c. 8). Cf. On the Categories, On the Prior [Analytics], and above, p. 186, note 2. — A little below, after et definitione codex I adds sive dignitate, which codex bb substitutes for et definitione. After a few [words], for dicere est codex A [reads] dicendum est. (P. 603, n. 8.) <!-- p. 604 -->
  15. In cod. A deest omnium, pro quo vocabulo non pauci codd. substituerunt obiectum. In edd. 1, 2 legitur: completissime sit obiectum. In seqq. pro unitionis edd. constanter exhibent unionis. (P. 604, n. 1.)
    In codex A omnium is lacking, for which word not a few codices substituted obiectum. In editions 1, 2 is read: completissime sit obiectum. In what follows, for unitionis the editions constantly exhibit unionis. (P. 604, n. 1.)
  16. Vers. 22. seq.: Ut sint unum, sicut et nos unum sumus. Ego in eis et tu in me, ut sint consummati in unum. — Cfr. I. Sent. d. 10. a. 2. q. 2. (Utrum Spiritus S. sit nexus sive unitas Patris et Filii). — Aliquanto superius pro omnia dona codd. lv Z et Supplementum Sum. Alex. Hal. omnia bona. (P. 604, n. 2.)
    Verse 22 ff.: That they may be one, as we also are one. I in them and you in me, that they may be consummated in one. — Cf. I Sent. d. 10, a. 2, q. 2 (Whether the Holy Spirit is the bond or unity of the Father and the Son). — Somewhat above, for omnia dona codices lv Z and the Supplement of the Summa of Alexander of Hales [read] omnia bona. (P. 604, n. 2.)
  17. Cfr. supra pag. 289, nota 5. et infra d. 36. q. 6. — Edd. et in Deum tendere est in Deo quiescere pro et in Deo quiescere, ut legit cod. N, in aliis codd. in Deum quiescere. Fortasse legendum et in Deum tendendo quiescere. (P. 604, n. 3.)
    Cf. above, p. 289, note 5, and below, d. 36, q. 6. — The editions [read] et in Deum tendere est in Deo quiescere for et in Deo quiescere, as codex N reads, in other codices in Deum quiescere. Perhaps it should be read et in Deum tendendo quiescere. (P. 604, n. 3.)
  18. Epist. I. Cor. 13, 13. (P. 604, n. 4.)
    Epistle I Cor. 13, 13. (P. 604, n. 4.)
  19. Edd. prius. Paulo inferius substituimus ex multis codd. ordinationem pro ordinem, et deinde pro det edd. cum aliquot codd. dat, alii codd. falso debet. (P. 604, n. 5.)
    The editions [read] prius. A little below we substituted from many codices ordinationem for ordinem, and then for det the editions with some codices [read] dat, other codices wrongly debet. (P. 604, n. 5.)
  20. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 40. a. 1. q. 1. seq. (P. 604, n. 6.)
    Cf. II Sent. d. 40, a. 1, q. 1 ff. (P. 604, n. 6.)
  21. Cod. A meretur. Mox pro et hoc quidem edd. cum nonnullis codd. et haec quidem. (P. 604, n. 7.)
    Codex A [reads] meretur. Presently for et hoc quidem the editions with several codices [read] et haec quidem. (P. 604, n. 7.)
  22. Maior pars codd. exhibet solum supra naturam, omisso contra vel, dum econtra edd. 1, 2 cum cod. U solum habent contra naturam; codd. A lv bb habent supra naturam vel contra naturam. (P. 604, n. 8.)
    The greater part of the codices exhibits only supra naturam, omitting contra vel, while on the contrary editions 1, 2 with codex U have only contra naturam; codices A lv bb have supra naturam vel contra naturam. (P. 604, n. 8.)
  23. Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 68. m. 9. a. 3: Fides dicitur fundamentum secundum rationem spiritualis aedificii, secundum quod dicit Glossa Hebr. 1: « Fides est fundamentum omnium bonorum, quod nemo mutare potest, sine quo non est bona aedificatio ». Dicitur autem fundamentum in via, quia est primus habitus, quo homo super se ascendit; sequens vero est spes, quae est sicut paries, quo animus erigitur ad attingendum magnitudinem gloriae caelestis; caritas vero est sicut supremum sive tectum, quod elevatur usque ad sublimitatem gloriae, quia nunquam excidet (I. Cor. 13, 8.). (P. 604, n. 9.)
    Alexander of Hales, Summa p. III, q. 68, m. 9, a. 3: Faith is called the foundation according to the account of the spiritual edifice, according as the Gloss on Hebrews 1 says: « Faith is the foundation of all goods, which no one can change, without which there is no good edification ». But it is called the foundation in this life, because it is the first habit by which man ascends above himself; the next is hope, which is like the wall by which the mind is raised to attain the magnitude of heavenly glory; but charity is like the highest [part] or roof, which is elevated up to the sublimity of glory, because it never falls away (I Cor. 13, 8). (P. 604, n. 9.)
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