Bonaventure

Dubia circa litteram Magistri

Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de illa definitione iustitiae, quam ponit: Iustitia est in subveniendo miseris. Et videtur, quod male definiat, quia iustitia distinguitur contra misericordiam, aut misericordia est pars iustitiae-virtutis: cum ergo ipsius misericordiae sit subvenire miseris, videtur male hic notificari habitus iustitiae-virtutis. — Item, iustitiae est « reddere unicuique quod suum est¹ »; sed aliquibus debemus honorem, aliquibus subventionem: ergo praedicta notificatio non convenit universaliter iustitiae. Obedientia enim est pars iustitiae, tamen obedientia non est in subveniendo miseris, sed in obediendo mandatis².

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Magister sive Augustinus³, cuius haec verba sunt, non intendit definire ipsam virtutem generaliter, sed secundum suum potissimum statum, in quo et secundum quem conformamur ad Christum. Et quoniam in isto actu iustitiae, etsi multi sint, maxime conformamur Christo, scilicet in subveniendo miseris; ideo iustitia per actum istum notificatur, non quia generaliter omni iustitiae conveniat, sed quia convenit iustitiae in suo potissimo statu. — Ex hoc tamen potest colligi generalis eius notificatio, quia, sicut miseris debemus subventionem, ita aliis generibus hominum alia et alia debemus. Unde generalis notificatio ipsius iustitiae ex hoc potest elici, quod iustitia est virtus reddens unicuique quod suum est. — Et sic patet responsio ad illa duo obiecta.

Notandum est tamen, quod subvenire miseris potest aliquis dupliciter: aut prout movetur sub ratione debiti, aut prout simpliciter considerat necessitatem proximi, cui compatiendum est. Et primum est iustitiae, secundum misericordiae. Verumtamen, sicut dictum est, misericordia continetur sub iustitia cardinali, licet aliquo modo iustitia distinguatur contra misericordiam.

Propter quod nota, quod iustitia dicitur multis modis: uno modo large, prout dicit generaliter rectitudinem animi sive in declinando a malo, sive in faciendo bonum⁴; et hoc modo iustitia est virtus generalis, secundum quam quilibet homo sanctus dicitur esse iustus. Alio modo dicitur iustitia rectitudo ordinans ad alterum in reddendo ei quod suum est; et sic est virtus cardinalis. Tertio modo dicitur iustitia magis proprie, secundum quod dicit rectitudinem in reddendo id quod est poenae; et accipitur ibi iustitia pro severitate. Et sic iustitia distinguitur contra misericordiam et est pars iustitiae cardinalis. — Si autem quaeras, quare iustitia magis accipiatur generaliter quam aliqua⁵ virtus; hoc est, quia nomen iustitiae imponitur ab ordine rectitudinis, qui generaliter convenire potest omni virtuti.

Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de alia notificatione, quam ponit: Prudentia est in praecavendis insidiis. Contra hoc est: quia, cum insidiae sint de contingentibus futuris et occultis, et ista non cognoscantur per virtutem aliquam, sed potius per donum prophetiae; non videtur, quod notificatio illa conveniat prudentiae. — Item, tres sunt partes prudentiae, sicut dicit Tullius⁶, videlicet « memoria, intelligentia et providentia »; et sola providentia est respectu futuri: igitur ipsa sola est in praecavendis insidiis: ergo non videtur, quod ista notificatio ipsius prudentiae sit communis et generalis.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sicut praedictum est de iustitia⁷, ita intelligendum est de prudentia, quod quia summus actus prudentiae consistit in praecavendo insidias, ideo Magister per actum illum definit prudentiam. Unde verum est, quod notificatio ista, accipiendo praecise, convenit uni soli prudentiae parti, quae est providentia; tamen, large accipiendo, omnes partes prudentiae ordinantur ad istam, quia memoria praeteritorum ordinat ad cautelam futurorum; parum enim valet esse circumspectum in his quae facta sunt, nisi per haec fiat homo circumspectior in his quae sunt facienda.

Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod nemo potest praescire futuras insidias nisi propheta: dicendum, quod quamvis non possit praescire cognitione certitudinali, potest tamen praescire cognitione coniecturae, sicut in signis praesentibus prognosticat homo futurum eventum⁸.

Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de notificatione, quam ponit de fortitudine dicens, quod fortitudo est in perferendis molestiis. Videtur enim male assignata: quia, secundum quod dicit Philosophus⁹, in hoc distinguitur patiens a forti, quod patiens patitur, sed non deducitur, fortis nec patitur nec deducitur: ergo non videtur, quod fortitudo sit in perferendis molestiis. — Item, omnis virtus est circa delectationes et tristitias¹⁰: ergo fortitudo non tantum est circa ea quae molestant, sed etiam circa ea quae delectant. — Et rursus, cum omnis virtus sit circa delectationes et tristitias, videtur, quod praedicta notificatio omni virtuti conveniat.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod perferre molestias, etsi habeat iunctum sibi pati, tamen plus dicit actionem quam passionem. Ille enim dicitur molestias perferre, qui perfecte eas fert, hoc est, qui in eis non succumbit, sed qui eis supereffertur; et talis vere dicitur fortis, quia non solum non deducitur, verum etiam magis agit quam agatur; et hoc est proprium ipsius fortitudinis. Licet etiam omnis virtus circa delectationes et tristitias consistat per modum electionis et fugae, sola tamen virtus fortitudinis consistit per modum supportationis et tolerantiae¹¹. — Et sic manifesta sunt illa duo, quae opponit.

Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de quarta definitione, quam assignat, quod temperantia est in coercendis delectationibus pravis. Sed contra: Christus potissime habuit temperantiam, et Adam in statu primo; tamen nec iste nec ille pro tempore illo delectationes pravas arcebat: ergo non videtur, quod praedicta notificatio¹² sit recte assignata. — Item, perfecte coercere delectationes pravas, hoc est ipsas non sentire; sed hoc est privatio, non positio: ergo cum quaelibet virtus¹³ habeat actum positivum, per quem notificatur; videtur, quod temperantia male definiatur.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod hic definitur temperantia secundum statum naturae lapsae, in qua delectationes pravae oriuntur et per virtutem temperantiae refrenantur; et circa hoc consistit maxima¹⁴ difficultas temperantiae in viatoribus; et in hoc conformamur Christo, licet non omnino, quia Christus huiusmodi delectationes nec sensit nec eis consensit; nos autem, si non consentimus, licet eas sentiamus¹⁵, aliquo modo eidem conformamur, et tunc delectationes huiusmodi coercemus. Unde coercere potest dicere quandam resistentiam respectu huiusmodi delectationum, quae est in ipsarum repressione; vel potest dicere omnis inordinatae delectationis absentiam et privationem. Et primum est hominis in statu naturae lapsae, secundum vero potest esse Christi et hominis instituti.

Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod omnis actus virtutis est positivus; dicendum, quod est loqui de actu interiori et de actu exteriori. Cum ergo dicitur, quod omnis actus virtutis est positivus; dicendum, quod verum est de actu interiori, sed de actu exteriori non est generaliter verum. Velle enim carere aliquo, quod non decet, virtutis est, et velle abstinere ab aliquo, quod non licet; et sic ad virtutem spectant silentium et ieiunium. Quamvis enim non loqui et non manducare sint privationes, tamen velle non loqui et non manducare est positionis¹⁶ et actus virtutis.

Dub. V.

Item quaeritur de illa ratione, quam assignat Hieronymus in littera dicens, quod hae virtutes cardinales dicuntur, quibus in hac vita mortali bene vivitur et post ad aeternam vitam pervenitur; quia non videtur recta ratio assignari. Per hanc enim rationem videtur omnis virtus cardinalis esse, quia omni virtute recte vivitur, et omnis virtus est via perveniendi in regnum¹. — Item, cum cardinales dicantur, quia sunt principales et principium movendi; cum caritas sit magis principale principium movendi², videtur, quod caritas debet dici virtus cardinalis. — Item, cum prudentia sit non tantum virtus, sed etiam auriga virtutum et aliarum directiva³; videtur, quod ipsa possit dici cardinalior aliis.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur: quare huiusmodi virtutes cardinales dicuntur politicae magis quam theologicae?

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod huiusmodi virtutes dicuntur consuetudinales, politicae et cardinales. Consuetudinales dicuntur ratione sui principii originalis, secundum quod acquiruntur ex frequenti bene agere⁴. Politicae vero dicuntur ratione operationis et exercitii sibi debiti, quia, sicut theologicae dicuntur, quia ordinant hominem ad divina et quasi faciunt hominem divinum, sic istae virtutes dicuntur politicae, quia reddunt hominem bene ordinatum ad vivendum inter homines; unde politica virtus dicitur a polis, quod est pluralitas⁵. Cardinales autem dicuntur ratione finis ultimi, quia per istas est ingressus ad caelestia regna. Duplex est enim porta ingrediendi in caelum, videlicet per observantiam mandatorum, secundum illud Matthaei decimo nono⁶: Si vis ad vitam ingredi, serva mandata; et per tolerantiam tribulationum, secundum illud Actuum decimo quarto: Per multas tribulationes oportet nos etc. Quantum ad quae duo principaliter ordinant istae quatuor virtutes; ideo dicuntur principales et cardinales. Ideo autem istae virtutes principaliter ordinant, quia sumuntur a rationibus praecipuis, secundum quas homo debet versari in agendis et patiendis. In omnibus enim agendis et patiendis debet homo attendere arduitatem, secundum quam conditionem attenditur fortitudo; et aequitatem, secundum quam attenditur iustitia; et honestatem, secundum quam attenditur temperantia; et utilitatem, secundum quam attenditur prudentia. Et quia istae quatuor rationes sunt quasi quatuor cardines⁷, ad quos reducuntur omnes virtutes, quae movent ad recte agendum, vel patiendum; ideo istae quatuor virtutes dicuntur cardinales et principales. Et sic patet, quare istae virtutes sic nominentur, et quod ratio Hieronymi, quae ponitur in littera⁸, est valde bona.

Nec valet illud quod obiicit de virtutibus theologicis et de caritate; quoniam ipsae theologicae virtutes tanquam excellentiores sortiuntur nobilius nomen. Praeterea, non sumuntur secundum illas quatuor conditiones principales, quae requiruntur ad virtutem, ratione quarum istae vocantur cardinales. Et per hoc patet illud quod obiiciebatur primo et secundo.

Ad illud vero quod obiiciebatur tertio, similiter patet responsio; quia omnes virtutes istae aequaliter dicuntur cardinales, pro eo quod omnes istae rationes, penes quas accipiuntur, aequaliter sunt necessariae ad virtutem, videlicet ratio ardui et debiti et honesti sive pulcri et eligibilis⁹.

Dub. VI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit ibi, quod iustitia in illa beatitudine non desit¹⁰, nec aliae tres virtutes, videlicet prudentia, fortitudo et temperantia; et quaeritur ratione huius de ordine istarum quatuor virtutum, quia Magister semper hic praemittit iustitiam et secundo subiungit prudentiam, tertio fortitudinem et quarto temperantiam. Sed in contrarium huius est, quia Philosophus¹¹ in prosecutione harum virtutum primo ordinat fortitudinem et secundo temperantiam. — Item, videtur, quod prudentia deberet omnibus aliis praemitti, quia ostendit viam aliis: ergo sicut palpebrae debent praecedere gressus¹², sic videtur, quod prudentia ordi-

nanda esset ante alias. — Item, in libro Sapientiae, octavo, praemittitur continentia et subiungitur prudentia, et tertio iustitia et quarto fortitudo. Ait enim sic: Sobrietatem docet et sapientiam et iustitiam et virtutem.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod istae virtutes possunt quadrupliciter considerari, secundum quod quatuor sunt, et secundum quadruplicem considerationem quaelibet primo loco potest ordinari. Habet enim virtus comparari ad subiectum et habet comparari ad obiectum. Ad subiectum autem comparatur dupliciter: aut secundum ordinem in acquirendo; et sic oportet incipere a continentia, quia, sicut mundus color aliis coloribus substernitur¹, sic munditia carnis praemitti debet aliis virtutibus; et iste ordo consideratur in libro Sapientiae, ubi praemittitur aliis. — Alio modo comparantur virtutes ad subiectum secundum ordinem in perficiendo; et quia in perfecto exercitio virtutis cognitio praecedit, sic prudentia omnibus aliis habet praeponi. Et sic praemittit eam Bernardus ad Eugenium² dicens, quod non tantum est virtus, verum etiam auriga virtutum.

Si autem considerentur virtutes per comparationem ad obiectum, hoc similiter potest esse dupliciter: quia obiectum virtutis est bonum et difficile³, secundum quod dicit Philosophus. Si comparentur ad obiectum sub ratione difficilis, sic prima est fortitudo, quae magis considerat difficile; et hoc modo ordinat Philosophus in Ethicis, praemittens fortitudinem aliis, et deinde gradatim descendens, secundum quod magis et minus habent rationem difficilis. — Si autem comparentur sub ratione boni, sic prima omnium virtutum est ipsa iustitia, cuius maxime est ordinem considerare et aliis bonum suum communicare; et hoc modo ordinat Augustinus et Magister in littera⁴. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta, patent etiam ea quae dicuntur in littera.

Et ex his quae quaesita sunt, possent formari sex problemata praeter illa quae quaesita sunt, quatuor videlicet de definitionibus harum quatuor virtutum, et duo sequentia de earum virtutum nomine et ordine. Et ista sufficiant de virtutibus cardinalibus in sua generalitate⁵.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation below. Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering on each printed page; this chunk gathers the footer sequences of pp. 728–731 (the Dubia's own share), renumbered continuously `<sup>1</sup>`…`<sup>33</sup>`.

Doubts concerning the text of the Master

Doubt I.

In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked about that definition of justice which he sets down: Justice consists in coming to the aid of the wretched. And it seems that he defines it badly, because justice is distinguished against mercy, or mercy is a part of the virtue-of-justice: since therefore it belongs to mercy itself to come to the aid of the wretched, it seems that the disposition of the virtue-of-justice is here ill-defined. — Likewise, it belongs to justice to "render to each what is his own¹"; but to some we owe honor, to some assistance: therefore the aforesaid description does not apply to justice universally. For obedience is a part of justice, yet obedience does not consist in coming to the aid of the wretched, but in obeying commands².

I respond: It must be said that the Master, or Augustine³, whose words these are, does not intend to define the virtue itself in general, but according to its most excellent state, in which and according to which we are conformed to Christ. And since in this act of justice, although they be many, we are most conformed to Christ, namely in coming to the aid of the wretched; therefore justice is described by this act, not because it applies to all justice in general, but because it applies to justice in its most excellent state. — From this, nevertheless, its general description can be gathered, because, just as we owe assistance to the wretched, so to other kinds of men we owe other and other things. Hence the general description of justice itself can be drawn from this, that justice is the virtue rendering to each what is his own. — And thus the reply to those two objections is clear.

It must be noted, however, that one can come to the aid of the wretched in two ways: either inasmuch as one is moved under the account of what is due, or inasmuch as one simply considers the need of the neighbor, with whom one must have compassion. And the first belongs to justice, the second to mercy. Nevertheless, as has been said, mercy is contained under cardinal justice, although in some way justice is distinguished against mercy.

On account of which note that justice is spoken of in many ways: in one way broadly, inasmuch as it signifies generally the rectitude of the mind whether in turning away from evil or in doing good⁴; and in this way justice is a general virtue, according to which any holy man is said to be just. In another way justice is said to be the rectitude ordering one toward another in rendering to him what is his own; and thus it is a cardinal virtue. In a third way justice is said more properly, inasmuch as it signifies rectitude in rendering what belongs to punishment; and there justice is taken for severity. And thus justice is distinguished against mercy and is a part of cardinal justice. — But if you ask why justice is taken more generally than any⁵ virtue; this is because the name of justice is imposed from the order of rectitude, which can apply generally to every virtue.

Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about another description, which he sets down: Prudence consists in guarding against snares. Against this is: that, since snares are among future and hidden contingents, and these are not known through any virtue, but rather through the gift of prophecy; it does not seem that that description applies to prudence. — Likewise, there are three parts of prudence, as Tully says⁶, namely "memory, intelligence, and providence"; and providence alone is with respect to the future: therefore it alone consists in guarding against snares: therefore it does not seem that this description of prudence is common and general.

I respond: It must be said that, just as was said before concerning justice⁷, so it must be understood concerning prudence, that because the highest act of prudence consists in guarding against snares, therefore the Master defines prudence by that act. Hence it is true that this description, taken precisely, applies to one single part of prudence, which is providence; yet, taken broadly, all the parts of prudence are ordered toward it, because memory of the past is ordered toward caution about the future; for it avails little to be circumspect in things that have been done, unless through these a man becomes more circumspect in things that are to be done.

Therefore to that which is objected, that no one can foreknow future snares except a prophet: it must be said that although he cannot foreknow them by certain cognition, he can nevertheless foreknow them by cognition of conjecture, just as a man forecasts a future event from present signs⁸.

Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about the description which he sets down concerning fortitude, saying that fortitude consists in enduring troubles. For it seems ill-assigned: because, according to what the Philosopher says⁹, in this a sufferer is distinguished from the brave man, that the sufferer suffers but is not led off, the brave man neither suffers nor is led off: therefore it does not seem that fortitude consists in enduring troubles. — Likewise, every virtue is concerned with pleasures and sorrows¹⁰: therefore fortitude is concerned not only with those things which trouble, but also with those which give pleasure. — And again, since every virtue is concerned with pleasures and sorrows, it seems that the aforesaid description applies to every virtue.

I respond: It must be said that to endure troubles, although it has joined to itself a suffering, nevertheless signifies action more than passion. For he is said to endure troubles who bears them perfectly, that is, who does not succumb in them, but who is carried above them; and such a one is truly called brave, because he is not only not led off, but even acts more than he is acted upon; and this is proper to fortitude itself. Although every virtue concerned with pleasures and sorrows consists in the mode of choice and flight, nevertheless fortitude alone consists in the mode of support and toleration¹¹. — And thus those two things which he objects are made manifest.

Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about the fourth definition which he assigns, that temperance consists in restraining depraved pleasures. But on the contrary: Christ pre-eminently had temperance, and Adam in the first state; yet neither this one nor that one for that time was restraining depraved pleasures: therefore it does not seem that the aforesaid description¹² is rightly assigned. — Likewise, to restrain depraved pleasures perfectly is not to feel them; but this is a privation, not a positing: therefore since any virtue¹³ has a positive act through which it is described; it seems that temperance is ill-defined.

I respond: It must be said that temperance is here defined according to the state of fallen nature, in which depraved pleasures arise and are restrained through the virtue of temperance; and about this consists the greatest¹⁴ difficulty of temperance in wayfarers; and in this we are conformed to Christ, although not entirely, because Christ neither felt such pleasures nor consented to them; we, however, if we do not consent, although we feel them¹⁵, are in some way conformed to him, and then we restrain such pleasures. Hence "to restrain" can signify a certain resistance with respect to such pleasures, which consists in the repression of them; or it can signify the absence and privation of every disordered pleasure. And the first belongs to man in the state of fallen nature, the second can belong to Christ and to man as constituted.

Therefore to that which is objected, that every act of virtue is positive; it must be said that one may speak of an interior act and of an exterior act. When therefore it is said that every act of virtue is positive; it must be said that this is true of the interior act, but of the exterior act it is not generally true. For to will to lack something which is not fitting belongs to virtue, and to will to abstain from something which is not lawful; and thus silence and fasting pertain to virtue. For although not to speak and not to eat are privations, nevertheless to will not to speak and not to eat belongs to positing¹⁶ and is an act of virtue.

Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked about that reason which Jerome assigns in the text, saying that these are called cardinal virtues, by which in this mortal life one lives well and afterward attains to eternal life; because it does not seem that a right reason is assigned. For by this reason it seems that every virtue is cardinal, because by every virtue one lives rightly, and every virtue is a way of arriving in the kingdom¹. — Likewise, since they are called cardinal because they are principal and the principle of moving; since charity is more the principal principle of moving², it seems that charity ought to be called a cardinal virtue. — Likewise, since prudence is not only a virtue, but also the charioteer of the virtues and the director of the others³; it seems that it can be called more cardinal than the others.

Adjoining this it is asked: why are virtues of this kind called political rather than theological?

I respond: It must be said that virtues of this kind are called customary, political, and cardinal. They are called customary by reason of their original principle, according to which they are acquired from frequently acting well⁴. They are called political by reason of the operation and exercise owed to them, because, just as the theological virtues are so called because they order man to divine things and as it were make man divine, so these virtues are called political because they render man well ordered for living among men; hence a political virtue is named from polis, which is a plurality⁵. But they are called cardinal by reason of the ultimate end, because through them is the entry to the heavenly kingdoms. For there is a twofold gate of entering into heaven, namely through the observance of the commandments, according to that of Matthew nineteen⁶: If you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments; and through the toleration of tribulations, according to that of Acts fourteen: Through many tribulations it behooves us etc. Inasmuch as these four virtues principally order toward these two things; therefore they are called principal and cardinal. And these virtues principally order for this reason, because they are taken from the chief grounds according to which a man ought to be engaged in things to be done and suffered. For in all things to be done and suffered a man must attend to the arduousness, according to which condition fortitude is attended to; and the equity, according to which justice is attended to; and the honorableness, according to which temperance is attended to; and the usefulness, according to which prudence is attended to. And because these four grounds are as it were four hinges⁷, to which all the virtues are reduced which move toward acting rightly, or suffering; therefore these four virtues are called cardinal and principal. And thus it is clear why these virtues are so named, and that the reason of Jerome, which is set down in the text⁸, is very good.

Nor does that avail which he objects concerning the theological virtues and concerning charity; since the theological virtues themselves, as more excellent, obtain a nobler name. Moreover, they are not taken according to those four principal conditions which are required for virtue, by reason of which these are called cardinal. And through this is clear that which was objected first and second.

To that, however, which was objected in the third place, the reply is likewise clear; because all these virtues are equally called cardinal, for the reason that all these grounds, according to which they are taken, are equally necessary for virtue, namely the ground of the arduous and of the due and of the honorable or beautiful and choiceworthy⁹.

Doubt VI.

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says there that justice in that beatitude does not fail¹⁰, nor the other three virtues, namely prudence, fortitude, and temperance; and by reason of this it is asked about the order of these four virtues, because the Master here always puts justice first and second subjoins prudence, third fortitude and fourth temperance. But on the contrary to this is, that the Philosopher¹¹ in his treatment of these virtues first orders fortitude and second temperance. — Likewise, it seems that prudence ought to be put before all the others, because it shows the way to the others: therefore just as the eyelids ought to precede the steps¹², so it seems that prudence ought to be ordered before the others. — Likewise, in the book of Wisdom, the eighth, continence is put first and prudence is subjoined, and third justice and fourth fortitude. For it speaks thus: It teaches sobriety and wisdom and justice and virtue.

I respond: It must be said that these virtues can be considered in four ways, according as they are four, and according to a fourfold consideration any one of them can be ordered in the first place. For virtue has being compared to the subject and has being compared to the object. To the subject, moreover, it is compared in two ways: either according to the order in acquiring; and thus it is necessary to begin from continence, because, just as a pure color is laid under the other colors¹, so cleanness of the flesh ought to be put before the other virtues; and this order is considered in the book of Wisdom, where it is put before the others. — In another way the virtues are compared to the subject according to the order in perfecting; and because in the perfect exercise of virtue cognition precedes, thus prudence has to be set before all the others. And thus Bernard to Eugenius² puts it first, saying that it is not only a virtue, but also the charioteer of the virtues.

If, however, the virtues are considered by comparison to the object, this likewise can be in two ways: because the object of virtue is the good and the difficult³, according to what the Philosopher says. If they are compared to the object under the account of the difficult, thus the first is fortitude, which considers the difficult more; and in this way the Philosopher orders them in the Ethics, putting fortitude before the others, and then gradually descending, according as they have more and less the account of the difficult. — But if they are compared under the account of the good, thus the first of all the virtues is justice itself, whose office it most of all is to consider order and to communicate its good to others; and in this way Augustine and the Master order them in the text⁴. — And through this the reply to the objections is clear, and also clear are the things which are said in the text.

And from these things which have been inquired into, six problems could be formed besides those which have been inquired into, namely four concerning the definitions of these four virtues, and two following concerning the name and order of these virtues. And let these things suffice concerning the cardinal virtues in their generality⁵.