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Dist. 32, Art. 3, Q. 1

Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 32

Textus Latinus
p. 735

Articulus III. De obligatione coniugum per comparationem ad tempus.

Consequenter quantum ad tertium articulum quaeritur de obligatione quantum ad tempus. Et circa hoc duo quaeruntur.

Primo quaeritur, utrum tempore menstruorum obligetur mulier ad debitum reddendum, et utrum possit petere. Secundo, utrum tempore dierum solemnium debitum licite possit peti et solvi.

Quaestio I. Utrum tempore menstruorum possit reddi et peti debitum.

Circa primum ostenditur, quod tempore menstruorum non possit peti.

Levitici decimo quinto7: Vir, qui ad menstruatam accesserit, immundus erit septem diebus. Si tu dicas, quod caerimoniale est; contra: Ezechielis decimo octavo: Vir si iustitiam fecerit etc.; et post: Ad menstruatam non accesserit, ubi inter moralia computatur. Et Glossa ibidem: «Praecipitur, ut viri non solum in alienis, sed etiam in propriis uxoribus modum et tempora servent».

Item, quod non debeat reddi, videtur:

1. Quia non solum qui male agunt peccant, sed etiam qui consentiunt: ergo peccat qui reddit, cum consentiat.

2. Item, non est reddendus gladius furioso, ut se interficiat; sed petens debitum tempore menstruorum contra salutem suam petit: ergo non ei reddendum est.

Item, quod nec sit reddendum nec petendum, videtur.

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1. Levitici vigesimo1 dicitur, quod uterque interficiatur, scilicet vir et mulier; sed poena mortis non nisi pro peccato mortali infligebatur: ergo uterque peccat mortaliter.

2. Item, Hieronymus2 dicit, quod ex tali coitu nascuntur pueri elephantici et monstruosi: ergo uterque facit contra bonum prolis; et si hoc: ergo uterque mortaliter peccat.

Contra:

1. Maior passio est passio leprae quam passio menstrui: ergo si propter lepram non potest mulier debitum negare3, nec propter menstruum.

2. Item, mulier non habet potestatem sui corporis4: ergo cum vir petit, suum petit; et iustum est «unicuique reddere quod suum est»: ergo iuste reddit mulier.

3. Item, esto quod vir nesciat, quod sit tempus menstruorum, et mulier timet de lapsu eius; quaeritur: quid debet facere? Et ostenditur, quod reddere, quia illius animam liberat a morte5 et ab omni culpa.

4. Item, sicut fluxus sanguinis reddit mulierem immundam, ita fluxus seminis reddit virum immundum6; sed non peccat mulier, quae petit a viro seminifluo debitum: ergo etc.

5. Item, si aliquo modo repugnat matrimonio talis coitus, hoc non est nisi ratione prolis; sed possibile est, quod talis mulier sit sterilis, et tunc non timetur deformitas prolis: ergo etc.

Conclusio.

Tempore menstruorum, quae sunt secundum naturam, non licet sub mortali scienter exigere debitum; secus iudicandum de redditione.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod aliqui voluerunt dicere, quod omni tempore, sive menstruorum, sive alio, debet debitum reddi, sed non debet peti. Et dicunt, quod ratio huius est, quia petere est agere, sed reddere quodam modo pati; et primum est libertatis, secundum vero est necessitatis. Unde et Dominus7 non praecepit mulieri non reddere, sed homini non accedere; ac per hoc non exemit mulierem a tentione, sed vir obligatur, ut hoc non possit petere sine transgressione. Et hoc videtur Magister dicere in littera8, cum dicit: «Et licet omni tempore debitum sit petenti solvendum, non tamen licet omni tempore petere». — Sed istud non videtur consonare nec rationi nec auctoritati. Primum non auctoritati, quia est contra bonum prolis, sicut dicit Hieronymus super illud Isaiae sexagesimo quarto9: Omnes iustitiae nostrae sicut pannus menstruatae; dicit: «Tunc concipiuntur membris damnati, caeci, claudi, leprosi, ut, quia parentes non erubuerunt in conclavi commisceri, patenter eorum peccatum et aperte redarguatur in parvulis». Item, Augustinus super Leviticum10: Ad mulierem etc.: «Necessario utrique interim continentia indicitur». Et iterum: «Cum sufficienter prohibuisset, hic etiam repetit, ne forte in superioribus videretur figurative dictum». Et iterum, uterque praecipitur interfici, Levitici vigesimo11, sicut ibi patet: ergo uterque mortaliter peccat. Et iterum, esto quod mulier menstruata tunc temporis petat a viro, et hoc constet viro, durum videtur dicere, quod vir teneatur sibi reddere in prolis praeiudicium: si ergo ad paria iudicantur12, et dominium non habet alter in alterum contra divinum statutum; non videtur, quod reddere teneatur.

Et ideo aliqui voluerunt dicere, quod non debet reddere, nisi praesumat de viro, quod cadat in fornicationem; quod si praesumit, debet occurrere maiori periculo nec reddit sibi gladium ad interficiendum, sed potius ad sanandum. — Sed nec istud sufficit, quia aut mulier tenetur, aut non tenetur. Si tenetur, absque omni praesumtione periculi debet reddere. Si non tenetur ut tunc, hoc non est, nisi quia hoc est13 contra divinum mandatum: ergo quantumcumque timeat de culpa alterius, cum non sit faciendum malum certum pro incerto evitando, non debet sibi reddere debitum — non quia reddat

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gladium furioso, quia ista non est ratio — nam aliter se ipsum interficit. Nec dat ei occasionem periculi, nisi ipsa petat; non enim ideo est culpa, quia gladium furioso reddat, sed quia contra praeceptum sive prohibitionem agendo se deordinat; et hoc non est propter tempus, sed propter morbum, qui est contra prolis bonum. Unde similiter esset de vicina partui, quia ex actu illo timetur parvulus opprimi et occidi; vel si ipsa laboraret acuta1, nullus pro illo tempore diceret eam teneri, non ratione temporis, sed ratione morbi vel periculi.

Tertius modus dicendi est, qui videtur esse probabilior, quod tempus menstruorum aut est secundum naturam, aut praeter naturam2. Si secundum naturam semel in mense; quia tunc possibile est filios generare et per abundantiam et corruptionem humoris in pessimo statu: ideo morale est praeceptum, ut illo tempore non cognoscatur. Unde si ignoranter petit, vel violenter reddit, excusatur; si scienter et libenter petit et reddit, contra praeceptum facit et mortaliter peccat, et vir secundum tempus illud non habet potestatem in corpus mulieris. — Si autem sit tempus contra naturam et passio praeter naturam; tunc dicitur, quod filii non generantur3; et tunc, si diu duret, debitum potest peti et reddi. Ex his patent obiecta.

1. Quod enim obiicit de lepra, non est simile, quia ille morbus est continuus, iste momentaneus.

2. Ad illud quod obiicit, quod non habet potestatem; dicendum, quod tunc non habet, vel etiam, quod plus est obediendum Deo quam homini4 sive mulieri.

3. Ad illud quod quaeritur, quando vir nescit; dicendum, quod si credit, ipsum desistere, debet ei infirmitatem dicere, vel saltem infirmitatem simulare; quodsi nec tunc vult desistere, debet quantum potest resistere, quia, si ille violenter extorqueat, mulier5 est immunis a culpa. Aliter enim propter vitandam culpam viri non debet ipsa facere culpam.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de immunditia, dicendum, quod non est propter immunditiam, sed quia talis6 est proli contraria.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de sterili, dicendum, quod nescitur, quamdiu habet muliebria, utrum concipiat; et ideo obligatur divino mandato, sicut et aliae, quae consueverunt concipere.

Quamvis autem iste modus ultimo dictus videatur esse probabilior, primus tamen modus dicendi est securior et sanior, quoniam standum est pro matrimonio; et valde durum videtur, quod mulier debitum non reddat viro instanter petenti, cum non appareat infirmitas gravis et manifesta. Si tu dicas, quod non debet sine violentia; potest esse, quod vir non potest sibi violentiam facere, et ex hoc cadet in peiorem fornicationem. Et ideo dicendum est secundum primum modum, quod secus est in petitione et redditione, sicut dicit Magister in littera, et primo7 notatum est. Unde prohibitio de cognitione menstruae se extendit, ut non petant, sed non ut non reddant; et ideo non absolvitur a tentione reddendi. Et secundum hoc intelligendae sunt auctoritates de hoc loquentes. Sed tamen mulier aliquo modo se debet reddere difficilem et cum dolore debitum solvere, ne, dum appetit a se peti, ipsa rea sit, ac si peteret; unde resistere potest, nisi credat scandalum praestare marito.

Ex hoc patet illud quod obiicit de consensu. Dum enim necessitate compulsa femina reddit; non dicitur consentire nec furioso gladium reddere, sed ipse agit, et haec patitur. Praeterea, gladius furioso est reddendus, si evitetur maius periculum; sic in proposito, cum timetur periculum, et vir potest evadere periculum fornicationis, vel odii per redditionem, in quam incurreret per abnegationem. — Ex his patent alia. Concedendum est enim, quod debitum non potest peti scienter, quia hoc est mortale propter praeceptum8, quod debitum non petatur. — Et non valet de lepra nec de potestate corporis, quia usus est ei arctatus per mandatum illud; et patent auctoritates inductae in contrarium; omnes enim intelligendae sunt quantum ad scienter exigentes.

Scholion

I. Quoad petitionem debiti tempore naturalium menstruorum antiqui doctores Alex. Hal., S. Thom., Scot., Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med. aliique satis conveniunt, etiam in duplici illa causa assignanda, scilicet ob periculum vel damnum prolis et ob praeceptum morale in veteri lege promulgatum. Sed plures recentiores mitius iudicant, immo non pauci petitionem hanc etiam a veniali peccato excusare volunt. — Cum S. Bonav. S. Thomas et alii communiter censent, prohibitionem illam non se extendere ad reddentem. — De 1. quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 149. m. 2. ad obiecta. — Scot., hic q. unica n. 5. seqq. — S. Thom., hic a. 2. quaestiunc. 2. 3; Suppl. q. 64. a. 3. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 3. quaestiunc. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. I.

II. S. Thom. pluresque antiqui cum S. Bonav. docuerunt, non licere sub veniali certis temporibus sacris debitum petere; quod plerique recentiores cum S. Alphonso nullatenus prohiberi, sed tantum per modum consilii dissuaderi docent. — De 2. quaestione: S. Thom., hic a. 5. quaestiunc. 1. 2; Suppl. q. 64. a. 7. 8. — B. Albert., hic a. 9. 10. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. quaestiunc. I. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. I.

III. Quoad duas quaestiones 4. articuli nulla est difficultas. Breviter de utraque vel de I. tantum tractant: S. Thom., hic 5. quaestiunc. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 4. quaestiunc. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 5. q. I. 2.

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English Translation

Article III. On the obligation of spouses by comparison to time.

Next, as to the third article, the question is asked concerning the obligation with respect to time. And about this two things are asked.

First it is asked whether during the menstrual period the woman is bound to render the debt, and whether she may seek it. Second, whether during the time of solemn days the debt may licitly be sought and paid.

Question I. Whether during the menstrual period the debt may be rendered and sought.

As to the first, it is shown that during the menstrual period it cannot be sought.

Leviticus 157: The man who has approached a menstruous woman shall be unclean seven days. If you should say that this is ceremonial; on the contrary: Ezekiel 18: If a man do justice etc.; and afterward: He has not come near a menstruous woman, where it is reckoned among moral matters. And the Gloss on the same place: "It is commanded that men keep measure and times not only with other women, but also with their own wives."

Likewise, it seems that it ought not to be rendered:

1. Because not only those who do evil sin, but also those who consent: therefore he who renders sins, since he consents.

2. Likewise, a sword is not to be returned to a madman, that he may kill himself; but one who seeks the debt during the menstrual period seeks against his own welfare: therefore it is not to be rendered to him.

Likewise, it seems that it is neither to be rendered nor to be sought.

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1. In Leviticus 201 it is said that both are to be put to death, namely the man and the woman; but the penalty of death was inflicted only for mortal sin: therefore each sins mortally.

2. Likewise, Jerome2 says that from such intercourse elephantiac and monstrous children are born: therefore each acts against the good of offspring; and if this: therefore each sins mortally.

On the contrary:

1. The affliction of leprosy is a greater affliction than that of the menses: therefore if because of leprosy the woman cannot deny the debt3, neither [can she deny it] because of the menses.

2. Likewise, the woman does not have power over her own body4: therefore when the husband seeks, he seeks his own; and it is just "to render to each what is his own": therefore the woman rightly renders.

3. Likewise, suppose that the husband does not know that it is the time of the menses, and the woman fears his lapse; it is asked: what ought she to do? And it is shown that [she ought] to render, because it frees his soul from death5 and from all fault.

4. Likewise, just as the flux of blood renders the woman unclean, so the flux of seed renders the man unclean6; but the woman who seeks the debt from a man who has a seminal flux does not sin: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, if such intercourse is in some way repugnant to marriage, this is only by reason of offspring; but it is possible that such a woman is sterile, and then no deformity of offspring is feared: therefore etc.

Conclusion.

During the menstrual period, which is according to nature, it is not licit knowingly to exact the debt under [pain of] mortal [sin]; it is to be judged otherwise concerning the rendering of it.

I respond: It must be said that some have wished to say that at every time, whether of the menses or another, the debt ought to be rendered, but ought not to be sought. And they say that the reason for this is that to seek is to act, but to render is in a certain way to be acted upon; and the first belongs to liberty, but the second to necessity. Whence also the Lord7 did not command the woman not to render, but the man not to approach; and by this he did not exempt the woman from temptation, but the man is bound, so that he cannot seek this without transgression. And this the Master seems to say in the text8, when he says: "And although at every time the debt is to be paid to the one seeking it, nevertheless it is not licit to seek it at every time." — But this does not seem to accord either with reason or with authority. First, not with authority, because it is against the good of offspring, as Jerome says on that passage of Isaiah 649: All our justices are as the cloth of a menstruous woman; he says: "Then are conceived, in the members, the condemned, the blind, the lame, the leprous, so that, because the parents were not ashamed to mingle in the bedchamber, their sin is openly manifest and openly reproved in the little ones." Likewise, Augustine on Leviticus10: To the woman etc.: "Necessarily continence is enjoined upon each meanwhile." And again: "When he had sufficiently prohibited [it], here too he repeats it, lest perhaps in the earlier passages it might seem to have been said figuratively." And again, each is commanded to be put to death, in Leviticus 2011, as is clear there: therefore each sins mortally. And again, suppose that a menstruous woman at that time seeks from the man, and this is established to the man, it seems hard to say that the man is bound to render to her to the prejudice of offspring: if therefore they are judged equal12, and neither has dominion over the other against the divine statute; it does not seem that he is bound to render.

And therefore some have wished to say that she ought not to render, unless she presume of the man that he will fall into fornication; and if she presumes this, she ought to meet the greater danger, and she does not return to him a sword for killing, but rather for healing. — But neither does this suffice, because either the woman is bound or she is not bound. If she is bound, she ought to render without any presumption of danger. If she is not bound at that time, this is only because it is13 against the divine command: therefore however much she may fear the fault of the other, since a certain evil is not to be done in order to avoid an uncertain one, she ought not to render the debt to him — not because she renders

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a sword to a madman, since this is not the reason — for otherwise he kills himself. Nor does she give him occasion of danger, unless she herself seeks; for it is not therefore a fault because she renders a sword to a madman, but because by acting against a precept or prohibition she puts herself out of order; and this is not on account of the time, but on account of the disease, which is against the good of offspring. Whence it would be similar concerning a woman near to childbirth, because from that act the infant is feared to be crushed and killed; or if she were laboring under an acute [illness]1, no one would say that she is bound for that time, not by reason of the time, but by reason of the disease or danger.

The third way of speaking, which seems to be more probable, is that the time of the menses is either according to nature or beyond nature2. If according to nature, once a month; because then it is possible to generate children, and [that] through the abundance and corruption of the humor in a very bad state: therefore the precept is moral, that at that time [the woman] not be known. Whence if he seeks unknowingly, or renders under compulsion, he is excused; if he knowingly and willingly seeks and renders, he acts against the precept and sins mortally, and the man during that time does not have power over the body of the woman. — But if it is a time contrary to nature and an affliction beyond nature; then it is said that children are not generated3; and then, if it lasts a long time, the debt can be sought and rendered. From these things the objections are clear.

1. For what it objects concerning leprosy is not similar, because that disease is continuous, this momentary.

2. To that which it objects, that she does not have power; it must be said that at that time she does not have it, or also that one must obey God rather than a man4 or a woman.

3. To that which is asked, when the man does not know; it must be said that if she believes he will desist, she ought to tell him of the infirmity, or at least to feign an infirmity; but if even then he will not desist, she ought to resist as much as she can, because, if he extorts it by force, the woman5 is free from fault. For otherwise, in order to avoid the fault of the man, she ought not to commit a fault herself.

4. To that which is objected concerning uncleanness, it must be said that [the reason] is not on account of uncleanness, but because such [a flux]6 is contrary to offspring.

5. To that which is objected concerning the sterile woman, it must be said that it is not known, as long as she has her monthly courses, whether she conceives; and therefore she is bound by the divine command, just as also others who are accustomed to conceive.

Although, however, this way spoken of last seems to be more probable, the first way of speaking is nevertheless safer and sounder, since one must stand for marriage; and it seems very hard that the woman should not render the debt to the husband urgently seeking it, when no grave and manifest infirmity appears. If you should say that she ought not [to render] without violence; it may be that the man cannot do violence to himself, and from this he falls into a worse fornication. And therefore it must be said, according to the first way, that it is otherwise in the seeking and in the rendering, as the Master says in the text, and [as] was noted at first7. Whence the prohibition concerning the knowing of a menstruous woman extends [only] so that they may not seek, but not so that they may not render; and therefore [the woman] is not absolved from the temptation of rendering. And according to this the authorities speaking of this matter are to be understood. Yet the woman ought in some way to make herself difficult and to pay the debt with sorrow, lest, while she desires to be sought, she herself become guilty, as if she were seeking; whence she may resist, unless she believes she would give scandal to her husband.

From this is clear that which it objects concerning consent. For while, compelled by necessity, the woman renders, she is not said to consent, nor to return a sword to a madman, but he acts, and she suffers. Moreover, a sword is to be returned to a madman if a greater danger is thereby avoided; so in the case proposed, when danger is feared, and the man can escape the danger of fornication, or of hatred, by the rendering — into which [hatred] he would fall through refusal. — From these things the rest are clear. For it must be conceded that the debt cannot be sought knowingly, because this is mortal on account of the precept8 that the debt not be sought. — And [the argument] from leprosy is of no avail, nor [that] from the power over the body, because the use is restricted for her by that command; and the authorities adduced to the contrary are clear: for all are to be understood with respect to those knowingly exacting.

Scholion

I. As to the seeking of the debt during the time of natural menses, the ancient doctors — Alex. of Hales, S. Thomas, Scotus, Peter of Tarentaise, Richard of Middleton, and others — agree well enough, even in assigning that twofold cause, namely on account of the danger or harm to offspring and on account of the moral precept promulgated in the old law. But many more recent [authors] judge more mildly; indeed not a few wish to excuse this seeking even from venial sin. — With St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas and others commonly hold that that prohibition does not extend to the one rendering. — On the 1st question: Alex. of Hales, S. p. II q. 149 m. 2, at the objections. — Scotus, here q. unica n. 5 ff. — S. Thomas, here a. 2 quaestiunc. 2 and 3; Suppl. q. 64 a. 3 and 4. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 3 quaestiunc. 3. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 4 q. 1.

II. S. Thomas and many of the ancients, with St. Bonaventure, taught that it is not licit under [pain of] venial [sin] to seek the debt at certain sacred times; which [prohibition] most of the more recent [authors], with St. Alphonsus, teach is in no way forbidden, but only dissuaded by way of counsel. — On the 2nd question: S. Thomas, here a. 5 quaestiunc. 1 and 2; Suppl. q. 64 a. 7 and 8. — B. Albert, here a. 9 and 10. — Peter of Tarentaise, at the place cited, quaestiunc. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 3 q. 1.

III. As to the two questions of the 4th article there is no difficulty. Briefly, on both or on the first only, treat: S. Thomas, here 5, quaestiunc. 4. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 4 quaestiunc. 1 and 2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 5 q. 1 and 2.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. 7
    Vers. 24: Si coierit cum ea vir tempore sanguinis menstrualis, immundus etc. — Seq. locus est Ezech. 18, 5: Et vir si fuerit iustus et fecerit iudicium et iustitiam. Tertius ibid. v. 6: Et ad mulierem menstruatam etc. — Glossa, quae est ordinaria apud Strabum et Lyranum, sumta est ex Hieron., in hunc ult. loc.
    [Leviticus 15,] verse 24: If a man lie with her in the time of menstrual blood, he shall be unclean etc. — The following passage is Ezek. 18, 5: And if a man be just and do judgment and justice. The third [passage] is ibid., v. 6: And [if he come] not near to a menstruous woman etc. — The Gloss, which is the ordinary [Gloss] in Strabus and Lyra, is taken from Jerome, on this last passage.
  2. 1
    Vers. 18: Interficientur ambo de medio populi sui.
    [Leviticus 20,] verse 18: They shall both be put to death out of the midst of their people.
  3. 2
    Libr. VI. Comment. in Ezech. 18, 6: «Ita ut leprosi et elephantiaci... nascantur». Du Cange, Glossarium etc.: Elephantia, lepra sic dicta, quod cutem reddat elephanti corio similem... Elephanticus, qui elephantia laborat. — Codd. elephantini.
    Book VI of the Commentary on Ezekiel 18, 6: "so that leprous and elephantiac [children]... are born." Du Cange, Glossarium etc.: Elephantia, a leprosy so called because it renders the skin like an elephant's hide... Elephanticus, one who suffers from elephantiasis. — The codices [read] elephantini.
  4. 3
    Ut ostensum est supra a. 2. q. I. — Cod. E supplet viro.
    As was shown above, a. 2 q. 1. — Codex E supplies viro (to the husband).
  5. 4
    Epist. I. Cor. 7, 4. — De definitione iusti inferius posita cfr. tom. III. pag. 728, nota I. — Post petit codd. M O R S T bb addunt ergo si suum petit, cod. Y sed si suum, Vat. ergo si suum.
    First Epistle to the Corinthians 7, 4. — On the definition of the just, placed below, cf. tom. III, p. 728, note 1. — After petit (he seeks) codices M O R S T bb add ergo si suum petit (therefore if he seeks his own), codex Y sed si suum, the Vatican [edition] ergo si suum.
  6. 5
    Iac. 5, 20: Qui converti fecerit peccatorem... salvabit animam eius a morte.
    James 5, 20: He who causes a sinner to be converted... shall save his soul from death.
  7. 6
    Secundum Lev. 15, 2. et 19.
    According to Lev. 15, 2 and 19.
  8. 7
    Cfr. fundamentum. — Inferius post tentione Vat. supplet reddendi.
    Cf. the fundamentum [the opening argument]. — Below, after tentione (temptation) the Vatican [edition] supplies reddendi (of rendering).
  9. 8
    Hic c. 3.
    Here, c. 3 [of the Master's text].
  10. 9
    Vers. 6. — Verba, quae Hieronymo attribuuntur, habentur in Glossa ordinaria apud Strabum et Lyranum, in hunc loc., quae finem sic exhibet: eorum peccata pateant cunctis et aperte redarguantur in parvulis. — Pro damnati edd. depravati.
    [Isaiah 64,] verse 6. — The words attributed to Jerome are found in the ordinary Gloss in Strabus and Lyra, on this passage, which gives the ending thus: their sins may be manifest to all and be openly reproved in the little ones. — For damnati (condemned) the editions [read] depravati (depraved).
  11. 10
    Cap. 18, 19. — Prima sententia sive expositio non est Augustini, sed Hesychii (cui etiam attribuitur ab Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 149. m. 2.) in Lev. 18, 19. secundum Glossam ordinariam apud Strabum et Lyranum. Hesychii verba (ed. Migne) sunt, quod tales «non una die immundos, sed septem dies esse dicit: ergo sub dierum multorum continentia tam mulieres a viris, quam viri a mulieribus necessitate cohibentur». — Secunda est Augustini in allegatum locum (Lev. 18, 19.), Quaest. 64. Cfr. III. de Peccatorum meritis et remiss. etc. c. 12. n. 21.
    Chapter 18, 19. — The first opinion or exposition is not Augustine's, but Hesychius's (to whom it is also attributed by Alex. of Hales, S. p. II q. 149 m. 2) on Lev. 18, 19, according to the ordinary Gloss in Strabus and Lyra. Hesychius's words (Migne ed.) are that of such [persons] "he says [they are] unclean not for one day, but seven days: therefore under the continence of many days both women are restrained from men and men from women by necessity." — The second is Augustine's, on the passage cited (Lev. 18, 19), Question 64. Cf. book III On the Merits and Remission of Sins etc., c. 12, n. 21.
  12. 11
    Vers. 18.
    [Leviticus 20,] verse 18.
  13. 12
    Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. — Inferius pro contra permulti codd. secundum, perperam, nisi cum cod. F pro non habet substituatur habet; cod. E habet in maritum secundum.
    Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 1. — Below, for contra (against) very many codices [read] secundum (according to), wrongly, unless with codex F for non habet one substitutes habet; codex E [reads] habet in maritum secundum.
  14. 13
    Pro nisi quia hoc est, quod Vat. male omittit, nonnulli codd. perperam nisi quia hoc non est.
    For nisi quia hoc est (unless because this is), which the Vatican [edition] wrongly omits, some codices [read] wrongly nisi quia hoc non est (unless because this is not).
  15. 1
    Edd. aegritudine acuta.
    The editions [read] aegritudine acuta (with an acute illness).
  16. 2
    Haec distinctio insinuatur Lev. 15, 24. seq. Ad ea quae hac de re in Lev. dicuntur, Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 149. m. 2, utitur hac distinctione, scil. quod Lev. 15, 24. agatur de ignoranter accedente, Lev. 18, 19. de scienter accedente, Lev. 20, 18. de scienter accedente et peccatum suum publicante. — Inferius post statu codd. T X addunt infici.
    This distinction is suggested in Lev. 15, 24 f. Concerning the things said on this matter in Leviticus, Alex. of Hales, S. p. II q. 149 m. 2, uses this distinction, namely that Lev. 15, 24 treats of one approaching unknowingly, Lev. 18, 19 of one approaching knowingly, Lev. 20, 18 of one approaching knowingly and making public his sin. — Below, after statu codices T X add infici.
  17. 3
    Edd. addunt vitiosi in natura. Lectio codd. confirmatur a S. Thom., hic q. I. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2. in corp.
    The editions add vitiosi in natura (defective in nature). The reading of the codices is confirmed by S. Thomas, here q. 1 a. 2 quaestiunc. 2, in the body.
  18. 4
    Act. 5, 29: Obedire oportet Deo magis quam hominibus. — Post tunc non habet Vat. addit: alter potestatem in corpus alterius. Pro dicendum plures codd. vel solvendum, vel perperam solvendi.
    Acts 5, 29: One ought to obey God rather than men. — After tunc non habet the Vatican [edition] adds: the other [has] power over the body of the other. For dicendum several codices [read] either solvendum, or wrongly solvendi.
  19. 5
    Multi codd. et ed. I perperam uterque, cod. bb mulier utique. Superius pro vult desistere codd. G L aa (E a secunda manu) desisteret.
    Many codices and ed. 1 wrongly [read] uterque (each), codex bb mulier utique (the woman certainly). Above, for vult desistere (he wishes to desist) codices G L aa (E by a second hand) [read] desisteret.
  20. 6
    Supple: fluxus. — Post contraria cod. aa subiungit: sed quia passio illa, quae est seminiflui, non est proli contraria: ergo etc.
    Supply: fluxus (flux). — After contraria codex aa subjoins: but because that affliction, which is of the seminal flux, is not contrary to offspring: therefore etc.
  21. 7
    In principio corp. — Mox pro de cognitione edd. in fornicatione.
    At the beginning of the body [of the question]. — Soon, for de cognitione (concerning the knowing) the editions [read] in fornicatione (in fornication).
  22. 8
    Edd. est morale praeceptum. Post pauca codd. Z bb verbis Et non interserunt ideo.
    The editions [read] est morale praeceptum (it is a moral precept). After a little, codices Z bb insert ideo (therefore) among the words Et non (And not). ---
Cited by

1 place in the Opera Omnia citesthis question. Derived from Quaracchi’s own apparatus, never tagged by hand.

Dist. 32, Art. 2, Q. 2Dist. 32, Art. 3, Q. 2