Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 32, Dubia

Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 32

Textus Latinus

p. 742

## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo de hoc quod dicit: In hoc enim pares sunt etc. Videtur enim falsum, quia in hoc Sacramento significatur coniunctio Christi et Ecclesiae, Dei et animae, inter quos nulla omnino est paritas: ergo nec viri ad uxorem. — Item, ad Ephesios quinto¹: Mulieres subiectae sint viris suis; post dicit de viris, quod diligant eas sicut corpora sua: ergo cum corpus sit pars inferior, patet etc.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod in matrimonio est considerare sexus distinctionem et conformem coniunctionem et postremo mutuam obligationem. Ratione duorum primorum significat Deum et Ecclesiam, quia, sicut mulier eget viro, sic Ecclesia Christo; ratione coniunctionis inseparabilis et conformitatis significat illam coniunctionem²; sed ratione obligationis non est significatio, quia Deus omnino liber est et nulli omnino obligatur: tamen debet esse inter virum et mulierem obligatio, quia aliter non interveniret inseparabilis unio; et quoniam conformis est unio, ideo conformis est obligatio, et ideo quantum ad hoc pares iudicantur, quia conformiter sibi invicem obligantur.

Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod vir est superior; dicendum, quod illud intelligitur quantum ad illos actus, qui respiciunt sexum virilem specialiter, scilicet quantum ad regimen domus et consimilium³.

Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Nam vovenda talia non sunt a coniugatis etc.; utrum peccet mortaliter qui sic vovet. Et quod sic, videtur: quia qui scienter usurpat alienum peccat mortaliter, etiam si det in eleemosynam: ergo cum talis vovens usurpet alienum⁴, patet etc. — Item, qui vovet quod non licet, vel iurat, hoc ipso periurus est, quia temerarie iurat: ergo cum non liceat viro continere, uxore invita⁵; videtur, quod si voveat, mortaliter peccat. — Item, si iuraret, quod nunquam mulierem cognosceret, peccaret mortaliter: ergo pari ratione, si voveret.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum quis vovet continentiam, dupliciter potest vovere: aut intentione fraudandi uxorem, aut amore continentiae. Si intentione fraudandi uxorem, sic est iniquum et prohibitum; et tale votum est illicitum. Si continentiae amore vovet sine consensu coniugis, tale votum aliquid habet temeritatis, aliquid habet honestatis. Vir enim non habet sui corporis potestatem⁶ quantum ad debitum solvendum, sed sui iuris est quantum ad debitum petendum; et ideo primum non potest vovere, sed secundum; et ideo, nisi uxor consentiat, votum est revocandum, quantum est ad debiti redditionem, sed stat quantum ad petitionem⁷. Unde si quis deliberate vovit castitatem, tenetur, quantum in se est, continere, ut debitum non petat; si tamen uxor petat, solvere debet; et sic nulli fit praeiudicium, et non offertur Deo alienum⁸, sed proprium.

Et sic patet, quod hoc non est omnino alienum, et patet responsio ad obiecta. — Tamen quod obiicit de iuramento, non est simile: quia iuramentum temerarium est simpliciter, cum teneatur facere contrarium. Unde peccat statim, cum sic iurat, non⁹ sic, cum vovet.

Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Si vero quilibet eorum alterum a suo iure absolverit etc. p. 743 Ponatur, quod mulier de consensu viri emittat simplex votum, et postmodum vir poeniteat; utrum teneatur ei debitum reddere. Et videtur, quod non: quia suo iuri renuntiavit, unde videtur, quod non habeat ulterius potestatem petendi debitum. — In oppositum autem videtur auctoritas Augustini super Numerorum trigesimum¹⁰, ubi dicitur: Sin autem contradixerit etc.; super illud dicit Augustinus, et habetur in littera, quod vir potest retractare votum uxoris, in quod consenserat. Et praeterea, vir non est astrictus servare continentiam, quia, uxore mortua, posset ducere aliam: ergo videtur, quod possit debitum petere¹¹.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod si mulier vovet assensu viri, aut hoc est assensu privato, aut assensu, qui est in conspectu Ecclesiae sive praelati. Si assensu, qui fit in conspectu praelati; sic secundum iuris formam non potest debitum petere, quia renuntiat suo iuri. Si autem in occulto consentit, quia proponit continere et intendit simpliciter iuri suo renuntiare; iam mulier in conspectu Dei absoluta est nec tenetur debitum reddere, si hoc ex deliberatione vir concesserit. — Sed quoniam hoc non constat Ecclesiae, compelletur per excommunicationem ab Ecclesia viro debitum reddere.

Si quaeras, utrum debeat obedire; dicendum, quod si votum¹² non emisit, potest sine peccato debitum reddere et tenetur ad mandatum Ecclesiae. Si autem votum emisit, credo, quod vir eam revocare non possit, nec tenetur assentire ei. Nec est simile de voto abstinentiae, pro eo quod quantum ad omnia vir praeest uxori, praeterquam in lege tori¹³. Verumtamen talem modum vovendi non approbat Ecclesia propter periculum, quod imminet; unde non patitur, quod unus voveat et religionem ingrediatur, nisi alter similiter voveat et talis sit persona, de qua «non possit suspicio oriri¹⁴». Si autem aliter fiat, coram Deo tenetur observare.

Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Licet debitum poscenti sit semper solvendum, non licet tamen quolibet die poscere etc. Videtur enim falsum, quia, si non licet petere, ergo illicite et iniuste petit; sed iniuste petenti rem non tenetur quis reddere, quia non est ei reddendum nisi ius suum: ergo si non potest semper iuste petere, non ergo semper tenetur debitum solvere.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum dicitur non licet, intelligendum, non quia privet iustitiam et aequitatem, sed quia privat quandam condecentiam et honestatem, sicut patet per litteram sequentem¹⁵. Esto tamen, quod privet iustitiam; adhuc non valet ratio illa, quia iniuste petere est dupliciter: aut quia non habet ius in re petita, sicut ille qui petit rem alienam, et tali non oportet reddere. Aliter est petere iniuste, quia, etsi habeat iustitiam, tamen modum debitum in petendo non servat, vel potest esse, quod non sit prohibitum reddere, sed tamen sit prohibitum aliquando petere. Verbi gratia: si praelatus superior iniungat inferiori, ut nihil praecipiat subdito, tamen subdito non dicit, quod ille non obediat; si praelatus inferior praecipit, ille tenetur obedire, quia non est exemptus; attamen ille peccat mortaliter; sic in proposito potest intelligi. Quidquid sit de exemplo inducto, verum est, quod si aliquis ius suum inordinate exigit, tamen ex hoc non dat potestatem alteri retinendi quod debet reddere. Unde sicut Dominus solum prohibuit accedere ad menstruatam, et ideo ista prohibitio non se extendit ad mulierem; ideo tenetur reddere, sed ille petendo peccat. Et sic intelligendum est quod Augustinus dicit super Levitici decimum quintum¹⁶, quod «necessario utrique indicitur continentia», et uterque in Levitici vigesimo praecipitur interfici, et uterque facit contra bonum prolis, ut Hieronymus dicit. Hoc enim intelligere¹⁷ est ratione personae petentis, quae recte dicitur accedere et contra hoc facere, ut ex praedictis patet.

Dub. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Quicumque uxori debitum reddit, vacare non potest orationi. Videtur enim male dicere, quia dicitur primae ad Thessalonicenses ultimo¹⁸: Sine intermissione orate; hoc est praeceptum: ergo si non potest orare qui reddit debitum, patet etc. — Item, videtur, illud simpliciter esse falsum, quia nihil impedit orationem sicut peccatum; sed veniale peccatum non impedit; ergo nec actus, in quo nulla est culpa. — p. 744 Item, de David¹⁹ obiicitur, qui fuit devotissimus, et tamen habuit plures uxores et liberos. Si tu dicas, illud intelligi de eo tempore, in quo quis coit; similiter posset dicere de tempore, in quo homo dormit.

Respondeo: Magister dicit, hoc intelligendum esse de clericis; sed tamen istud non plene satisfacit obiectionibus praedictis. — Et ideo dicitur, quod cum dicitur aliquis non posse, negatio potest potentiam negare simpliciter, vel facilitatem; et iste modus saepe est in Scriptura²⁰. Non vult ergo Hieronymus negare potentiam, sed facilitatem; unde non dicit, quod non possit orare, sed dicit, quod non potest orationi vacare; quia actus ille multum deiicit mentem spiritualem, sicut dicit Augustinus²¹, nisi sit gratia excellens et specialis, sicut fuit in David. Et ideo aliud est consilium, ut cum quis vult se totum orationi dare, debet a tali actu abstinere. — Et sic patet, quod non repugnat orationis praecepto. Tamen de illo quod dicit, quod orandum est sine intermissione; intelligendum est, quod nomine orationis omnis bonus actus intelligitur secundum Glossam²². Unde dicit ibi: «Non cessat orare qui non cessat bene facere».

Quod obiicitur, quod peccatum magis gravat; dicendum, quod falsum est de veniali peccato, propter multam foeditatem animae, quae est in illo actu; et frequenter anima multum impeditur per aliquas foeditates vel etiam infirmitates poenales²³.

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English Translation

## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER

Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning that which he says: For in this they are equals etc. For it seems false, because in this Sacrament is signified the joining of Christ and the Church, of God and the soul, between which there is no equality whatsoever: therefore neither is there [equality] of the husband to the wife. — Likewise, to the Ephesians, chapter five¹: Let wives be subject to their husbands; afterward he says of husbands, that they should love them as their own bodies: therefore, since the body is the inferior part, it is plain, etc.

I respond: It must be said that in matrimony there is to be considered the distinction of the sexes, and the conformable joining, and lastly the mutual obligation. By reason of the two first it signifies God and the Church, because, just as the woman needs the man, so the Church [needs] Christ; by reason of the inseparable joining and of conformity it signifies that joining²; but by reason of obligation there is no signification, because God is altogether free and is bound to no one at all: yet there ought to be an obligation between husband and wife, because otherwise the inseparable union would not come about; and since the union is conformable, therefore the obligation is conformable, and therefore in this respect they are judged equals, because they are bound to one another conformably.

To that, then, which is objected, that the husband is superior; it must be said that this is understood as regards those acts which look to the male sex especially, namely as regards the governance of the household and the like³.

Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says: For such things are not to be vowed by married persons etc.; whether he who so vows sins mortally. And that he does, it seems: because he who knowingly usurps another's property sins mortally, even if he give it in alms: therefore since such a one vowing usurps another's property⁴, it is plain, etc. — Likewise, he who vows what is not licit, or swears it, by that very fact is a perjurer, because he swears rashly: therefore since it is not licit for a husband to be continent, his wife being unwilling⁵; it seems that, if he should vow, he sins mortally. — Likewise, if he should swear that he would never know a woman, he would sin mortally: therefore by parity of reasoning, if he should vow it.

I respond: It must be said that when someone vows continence, he can vow in two ways: either with the intention of defrauding his wife, or out of love of continence. If with the intention of defrauding his wife, thus it is iniquitous and prohibited; and such a vow is illicit. If out of love of continence he vows without the consent of his spouse, such a vow has something of rashness, and something of honorableness. For the husband does not have power over his own body⁶ as regards the debt to be rendered, but he is of his own right as regards the debt to be asked; and therefore the first he cannot vow, but the second; and therefore, unless the wife consent, the vow is to be revoked as regards the rendering of the debt, but it stands as regards the asking⁷. Whence if someone deliberately has vowed chastity, he is bound, as far as in him lies, to be continent, so that he not ask the debt; if, however, the wife asks, he ought to render it; and thus prejudice is done to no one, and there is not offered to God what is another's⁸, but what is one's own.

And thus it is plain that this is not altogether another's, and the response to the objections is plain. — Yet as to what is objected concerning the oath, it is not similar: because a rash oath is simply [illicit], since one is bound to do the contrary. Whence he sins at once, when he so swears, not⁹ so, when he vows.

Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says: But if either of them should absolve the other from his right etc. p. 743 Suppose that a woman with her husband's consent makes a simple vow, and afterward the husband repents; whether he is bound to render her the debt. And it seems that not: because she renounced her own right, whence it seems that she no longer has the power of asking the debt. — But to the contrary there seems [to be] the authority of Augustine on Numbers, chapter thirty¹⁰, where it is said: But if he should contradict it etc.; upon that Augustine says, and it is had in the text, that the husband can retract the wife's vow, to which he had consented. And moreover, the husband is not bound to keep continence, because, his wife having died, he could take another: therefore it seems that he can ask the debt¹¹.

I respond: It must be said that if the woman vows with the husband's assent, either this is by assent in private, or by assent which is in the sight of the Church or of a prelate. If by an assent which is made in the sight of a prelate; thus according to the form of law he cannot ask the debt, because he renounces his own right. But if he consents in secret, because he purposes to be continent and intends simply to renounce his own right; then the woman in the sight of God is absolved and is not bound to render the debt, if the husband has granted this out of deliberation. — But since this is not established to the Church, she will be compelled by the Church through excommunication to render the debt to the husband.

If you ask whether she ought to obey; it must be said that if she has not uttered a vow¹², she can without sin render the debt and is bound to [obey] the Church's command. But if she has uttered a vow, I believe that the husband cannot revoke her, nor is she bound to consent to him. Nor is it similar in the case of a vow of abstinence, for the reason that as regards all things the husband is preeminent over the wife, except in the law of the marriage-bed¹³. Nevertheless the Church does not approve such a manner of vowing on account of the danger which threatens; whence it does not permit that one should vow and enter religion, unless the other likewise vow and be such a person, of whom «no suspicion can arise¹⁴». But if it be done otherwise, before God one is bound to observe [the vow].

Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says: Although the debt is always to be rendered to the one asking, nevertheless it is not licit to ask on any day whatever etc. For it seems false, because, if it is not licit to ask, then one asks illicitly and unjustly; but to one asking unjustly one is not bound to render the thing, because nothing is to be rendered to him except his own right: therefore if one cannot always justly ask, therefore one is not always bound to render the debt.

I respond: It must be said that when it is said it is not licit, it is to be understood not that it deprives [it] of justice and equity, but that it deprives [it] of a certain decency and honorableness, as is plain through the following text¹⁵. Yet grant that it deprive [it] of justice; still that argument is not valid, because to ask unjustly is twofold: either because one does not have a right in the thing asked, like him who asks another's property, and to such a one it is not necessary to render. Otherwise it is to ask unjustly because, although one has justice, yet one does not keep the due manner in asking, or it can be that it is not prohibited to render, but nevertheless it is prohibited sometimes to ask. For example: if a superior prelate should enjoin an inferior that he command nothing to a subject, yet he does not say to the subject that he should not obey; if the inferior prelate commands, the subject is bound to obey, because he is not exempt; but nevertheless the [inferior prelate] sins mortally; so it can be understood in the case at hand. Whatever be [said] of the example adduced, it is true that if someone exacts his own right inordinately, yet from this he does not give power to another of retaining what he ought to render. Whence just as the Lord only prohibited approaching a menstruous woman, and therefore this prohibition does not extend to the [other] woman; therefore she is bound to render, but he sins in asking. And thus it is to be understood what Augustine says on Leviticus, chapter fifteen¹⁶, that «continence is necessarily enjoined on both», and both in Leviticus chapter twenty are commanded to be put to death, and both act against the good of offspring, as Jerome says. For to understand this¹⁷ is by reason of the person asking, who is rightly said to approach and to act against this, as is plain from what has been said.

Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says: Whoever renders the debt to his wife cannot be free for prayer. For it seems ill said, because it is said in the first [Epistle] to the Thessalonians, the last [chapter]¹⁸: Pray without ceasing; this is a precept: therefore if he who renders the debt cannot pray, it is plain, etc. — Likewise, it seems that this is simply false, because nothing impedes prayer as does sin; but venial sin does not impede [it]; therefore neither does an act in which there is no fault. — p. 744 Likewise, an objection is raised from David¹⁹, who was most devout, and yet had many wives and children. If you say that this is understood of that time in which one has intercourse; likewise one could say [it] of the time in which a man sleeps.

I respond: The Master says that this is to be understood of clerics; but nevertheless that does not fully satisfy the aforesaid objections. — And therefore it is said that when someone is said not to be able, the negation can deny the power simply, or the facility; and this manner is often [found] in Scripture²⁰. Therefore Jerome does not mean to deny the power, but the facility; whence he does not say that one cannot pray, but he says that one cannot be free for prayer; because that act greatly casts down the spiritual mind, as Augustine says²¹, unless there be excellent and special grace, as there was in David. And therefore it is a matter of counsel that when someone wishes to give himself wholly to prayer, he ought to abstain from such an act. — And thus it is plain that it is not repugnant to the precept of prayer. Yet concerning that which he says, that one ought to pray without ceasing; it is to be understood that by the name of prayer every good act is understood according to the Gloss²². Whence it says there: «He does not cease to pray who does not cease to do good».

As to what is objected, that sin aggravates the more; it must be said that this is false concerning venial sin, on account of the great foulness of the soul which is in that act; and frequently the soul is much impeded through certain foulnesses or also penal infirmities²³.

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Apparatus Criticus

1
Vers. 22, ubi Vulgata subditae pro subiectae. — Seq. locus est ibid. v. 28: Ita et viri debent diligere uxores suas ut corpora sua.
Verse 22, where the Vulgate has subject (subditae) for subiectae. — The following passage is at the same place, v. 28: So also ought husbands to love their wives as their own bodies.
2
Cfr. supra d. 26. a. 2. q. 1. — Pro illam codd. R S bb meram.
Cf. above, d. 26, a. 2, q. 1. — For illam codices R S bb read meram.
3
Vide de hoc dubio B. Albert., IV. Sent. d. 31. a. 29; S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3; Petr. a Tar., hic a. 2. quaestiunc. 2.
See on this doubt B. Albert, IV Sent., d. 31, a. 29; St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 3; Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 2, little-question 2.
4
Respicitur lit. Magistri, hic c. 2.
Reference is made to the Master's text, here c. 2.
5
Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. — Pro temerarie multi codd. temeritate.
Cf. here the Master's text, c. 2. — For temerarie (rashly) many codices read temeritate (rashness).
6
Epist. I. Cor. 7, 4. — Pro solvendum cod. L reddendum.
Epistle, 1 Cor. 7, 4. — For solvendum codex L reads reddendum.
7
Contextu exigente, substituimus petitionem i.e. ut debitum non petat, pro solutionem, quod codd. et edd. perperam exhibent: redditio et solutio debiti enim idem significant. Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 1. in corp.
As the context requires, we have substituted petitionem (the asking), i.e. that he not ask the debt, for solutionem (the rendering), which the codices and editions wrongly exhibit: for redditio and solutio of the debt signify the same thing. Cf. above, a. 1, q. 1, in the body.
8
Lev. 10, 1. seq. et 16, 1. dicitur, quod duo filii Aaron interfecti sunt, «offerentes ignem alienum».
In Lev. 10, 1 seq. and 16, 1 it is said that the two sons of Aaron were slain, «offering strange fire».
9
Codd. R S T non tamen. — Cfr. de hoc dubio supra a. 1. q. 1, ubi in scholio allegati sunt alii auctores tractantes de hac re.
Codices R S T read non tamen. — Cf. on this doubt above, a. 1, q. 1, where in the scholion other authors treating of this matter are cited.
10
Vers. 16: Sin autem contradixerit, postquam rescivit, portabit ipse iniquitatem eius. Sententia August. est hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.
Verse 16: But if he should contradict it after he came to know, he himself shall bear her iniquity. The opinion of Augustine is here [in] the Master's text, c. 2.
11
Codd. B Y solvere, cod. L et edd. reddere.
Codices B Y read solvere, codex L and the editions reddere.
12
Scilicet continentiae.
Namely [a vow] of continence.
13
Cfr. Gratian. super C. Manifestum est (11.), C. 33. q. 5, ubi eadem distinctio inter votum continentiae et abstinentiae eademque solutio habetur. (Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.). — Voci abstinentiae codd. R S T praemittunt continentiae vel.
Cf. Gratian on the canon Manifestum est (11.), C. 33, q. 5, where the same distinction between a vow of continence and of abstinence and the same solution is found. (See here the Master's text, c. 2.). — To the word abstinentiae codices R S T prefix continentiae vel.
14
Ut dicitur in regula Fratrum Minorum, c. 2. Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. XXVII. c. 7. seq. — Idem dub. solvunt B. Albert., hic a. 6; S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 4. et circa lit.; Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.; Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2.
As is said in the Rule of the Friars Minor, c. 2. Cf. above, the Master's text, d. XXVII, c. 7 seq. — The same doubt is resolved by B. Albert, here a. 6; St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 4 and on the text; Peter of Tarentaise, here on the text; Richard of Middleton, here a. 2, q. 2.
15
Hic in lit. Magistri, c. 3. — Edd. legunt: Dicendum, quod tunc non licet, quando privat iustitiam et aequitatem, condecentiam et honestatem etc.
Here in the Master's text, c. 3. — The editions read: It must be said that then it is not licit, when it deprives [it] of justice and equity, decency and honorableness etc.
16
Vers. 19. Codd. allegant c. 18. Pro Augustinus substituendum Hesychius. Cfr. supra pag. 736, nota 10. — Seq. locus est Lev. 20, 18. Sententiam Hieron. vide supra a. 3. q. 1. arg. 2. de utraque q. pro parte negat. et in corp. — Superius pro et ideo ista codd. Q Z bb tamen ista, codd. S T cum ista, non pauci codd. omittunt et ideo.
Verse 19. The codices cite c. 18. For Augustine one should substitute Hesychius. Cf. above, p. 736, note 10. — The following passage is Lev. 20, 18. For the opinion of Jerome see above, a. 3, q. 1, arg. 2 of each question on the negative side, and in the body. — Above, for et ideo ista codices Q Z bb read tamen ista, codices S T cum ista, not a few codices omit et ideo.
17
Codd. K L V Z (1 a secunda manu) intelligendum. — Vide de hoc dubio B. Albert., hic a. 8.
Codices K L V Z (1 by a second hand) read intelligendum. — See on this doubt B. Albert, here a. 8.
18
Vers. 17.
Verse 17.
19
Vide infra lit. Magistri, d. XXXIII. c. 4.
See below, the Master's text, d. XXXIII, c. 4.
20
Cfr. supra d. 14. p. II. a. 1. q. 2. ad 1. et 2; II. Sent. d. 43. a. 2. q. 2. ad 1. seq. et 4. — Pro negatio potest, quod praebent codd. N O P R S T X, cod. M ly non, alii codd. vel necessario potest, vel necessario, edd. necessario dicitur, quae etiam subinde bis facultatem pro facilitatem.
Cf. above, d. 14, p. II, a. 1, q. 2, ad 1 and 2; II Sent., d. 43, a. 2, q. 2, ad 1 seq. and 4. — For negatio potest, which codices N O P R S T X give, codex M [reads] ly non, other codices vel necessario potest, or necessario, the editions necessario dicitur, which also thereupon twice [read] facultatem for facilitatem.
21
Vide supra d. 31. a. 2. q. 1. in corp.
See above, d. 31, a. 2, q. 1, in the body.
22
In I. Thess. 5, 17. Cfr. supra pag. 368, nota 4.
On 1 Thess. 5, 17. Cf. above, p. 368, note 4.
23
Cfr. supra a. 3. q. 2, ubi etiam in scholio alii auctores allegantur, qui de hac re tractant.
Cf. above, a. 3, q. 2, where also in the scholion other authors are cited who treat of this matter. ---