Dist. 38, Art. 1, Q. 3
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 38
Quaestio III. In quo subiecto possit esse votum.
Tertio quaeritur de materia in qua, sive de subiecto, in quo est votum. Et videtur, quod sit in omni habente usum rationis:
1. Quia omnis talis habet usum liberi arbitrii; sed votum est a libertate arbitrii: ergo etc.
2. Item, omnis discretionem habens rationis potest se voluntarie obligare diabolo per peccatum, nullo impediente: ergo multo fortius potest se obligare Deo per votum.
3. Item, omnibus patet via salutis, et aequalis est conditio omnium quantum ad hoc; sed votum est de his quae promovent salutem: ergo omnes sunt aequales in vovendo.
4. Item, hoc ostenditur per definitionem voti3, quia est « conceptio boni animi deliberatione firmata »; sed omnes ratione utentes possunt bonum concipere: ergo etc.
Contra: 1. Numerorum trigesimo4 dicitur, quod si fuerit mulier in domo viri et voverit aliquid, et vir statim, ut audivit, contradixit, non erit promissionis rea: ergo mulier coniugata non potest auctoritate sua vovere; similiter videtur de viro, quia non habet sui corporis potestatem.
2. Item, puer et puella, quamdiu sunt impuberes, sunt omnino sub dispositione parentum et tutorum, sicut servus sub dispositione domini: ergo si omnino subsunt, nihil per se vovere possunt.
3. Item, religiosus abrenuntiavit5 propriae voluntati; sed votum est obligatio procedens ex propria voluntate: ergo non potest vovere.
4. Item, servus subest imperio domini sui, unde si intret religionem, potest ipsum extrahere6: ergo non est suus; sed votum est a libertate: ergo etc.
Conclusio. Simpliciter libere vovere potest qui nemini subest; qui autem subest, secundum id, in quo subest, non potest per se vovere.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod votum procedit a libera voluntate. Omnis ergo, qui libere potest facere quod vult, nullo impedimento in se existente, nullo homine de facto praepediente, nullo iure prohibente, potest simpliciter vovere; qui autem in omnibus subest nihil potest per se vovere; qui autem in aliquibus subest, secundum id, in quo subest, non potest vovere. — Quoniam igitur uxor subest viro, et puer patri in regimine vitae, nihil possunt circa hoc vovere, quod sit stabile, sine eorum auctoritate. Vir autem subest uxori in debito carnis; ideo contra hoc non potest vovere7. Religiosus subest in omnibus quae sunt infra religionem; et ideo nihil potest vovere sine sui praelati voluntate8. Sed servus subest quantum ad servitium corporale; ideo quod contra hoc sit vovere non potest nisi domini auctoritate; si quid autem est, quod libere possit facere, illud potest vovere.
1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnes sunt liberae voluntatis; dicendum, quod verum est ad vovendum9, sed non omnes sunt liberae voluntatis ad faciendum omne quod volunt; et haec voluntas requiritur in voto.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de obligatione diaboli, dicendum, quod illa fit sola voluntatis libertate; sed non sic est de obligatione ad Deum p. 819 quantum ad votum, quoniam votum respicit aliquod opus, respectu cuius frequenter liberum arbitrium non habet posse, vel de facto, vel etiam de iure.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnibus patet via salutis; dicendum, quod verum est quantum ad ea quae sunt praecepti, non quantum ad ea quae sunt supererogationis, quae respiciunt status diversos, quibus aliqui sunt apti, aliqui vero minime.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnes possunt concipere et deliberatione firmare; dicendum, quod, sicut superius1 dictum est, firmatio illa est per promissionem; non autem omnis promissio firmat nisi promissio obligatoria; nulla autem promissio est obligatoria, nisi quae fit ab eo qui potest se obligare; et talis est proprii iuris respectu illius quod vovere debet; et quia non omnes sunt tales, ideo non omnium est vovere, sed illorum tantummodo, qui hoc habent2.
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Question III. In what subject a vow can exist.
Thirdly, inquiry is made concerning the matter in which, or the subject in which, a vow is. And it seems that it is in everyone having the use of reason:
1. For everyone such has the use of free choice; but a vow is from the freedom of choice: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, everyone having discretion of reason can voluntarily bind himself to the devil through sin, with nothing hindering: therefore much more strongly can he bind himself to God through a vow.
3. Likewise, the way of salvation lies open to all, and the condition of all is equal as to this; but a vow is about those things which promote salvation: therefore all are equal in vowing.
4. Likewise, this is shown through the definition of a vow3, for it is "a conception of a good mind, confirmed by deliberation"; but all who use reason can conceive a good: therefore etc.
On the contrary: 1. In Numbers, chapter thirty4, it is said that if a woman be in her husband's house and vow anything, and the husband, as soon as he heard it, contradicted, she will not be guilty of the promise: therefore a married woman cannot vow by her own authority; and likewise it seems concerning the husband, because he does not have power over his own body.
2. Likewise, a boy and a girl, so long as they are underage, are entirely under the disposition of parents and guardians, as a slave is under the disposition of a master: therefore if they are entirely subject, they can vow nothing of themselves.
3. Likewise, a religious has renounced5 his own will; but a vow is an obligation proceeding from one's own will: therefore he cannot vow.
4. Likewise, a slave is subject to the command of his master, whence if he enters religion, [the master] can draw him out6: therefore he is not his own; but a vow is from freedom: therefore etc.
Conclusion. He who is subject to no one can simply and freely vow; but he who is subject, according to that in which he is subject, cannot vow of himself.
I respond: It must be said that a vow proceeds from a free will. Everyone, therefore, who can freely do what he wills, with no impediment existing in himself, no man hindering in fact, no law prohibiting, can simply vow; but he who is subject in all things can vow nothing of himself; while he who is subject in some things, according to that in which he is subject, cannot vow. — Since, therefore, a wife is subject to her husband, and a child to its father in the governance of life, they can vow nothing concerning this which is stable, without their authority. But a husband is subject to his wife in the debt of the flesh; therefore against this he cannot vow7. A religious is subject in all things which are within religion; and therefore he can vow nothing without the will of his prelate8. But a slave is subject as to bodily service; therefore, that he should vow against this he cannot do except by the master's authority; but if there is anything which he can freely do, that he can vow.
1. To that which is objected, that all are of free will; it must be said that this is true as to vowing9, but not all are of free will as to doing everything they will; and this will is required in a vow.
2. To that which is objected concerning the obligation to the devil, it must be said that that comes about by the freedom of the will alone; but it is not so concerning the obligation to God as p. 819 to a vow, since a vow regards some work, with respect to which free choice frequently does not have the power, either in fact, or even in law.
3. To that which is objected, that the way of salvation lies open to all; it must be said that this is true as to those things which are of precept, not as to those which are of supererogation, which regard diverse states, for which some are fit, but others not at all.
4. To that which is objected, that all can conceive [a good] and confirm it by deliberation; it must be said that, as was said above1, that confirmation is through a promise; but not every promise confirms except an obligatory promise; and no promise is obligatory except one that is made by him who can bind himself; and such a one is of his own right with respect to that which he ought to vow; and because not all are such, therefore it does not belong to all to vow, but only to those who have this2.
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- 3Vide supra quaest. 1.See above, question 1.
- 4Vers. 11. seqq. — In fine arg. allegatur I. Cor. 7, 4.[Numbers 30,] verses 11ff. — At the end of the argument 1 Corinthians 7:4 is cited.
- 5Cod. K abrenuntiat.Codex K [reads] abrenuntiat [renounces, present tense].
- 6Vide supra pag. 655, nota 4. — Aristot., I. Metaph. c. 3. (c. 2.), illum hominem vocat liberum, « qui sui ipsius et non alterius gratia est ». Cfr. I. Politic. c. 3. (c. 2.).See above, page 655, note 4. — Aristotle, Metaphysics I, c. 3 (c. 2), calls that man free "who is for his own sake and not for another's." Cf. Politics I, c. 3 (c. 2).
- 7Cfr. supra d. 32. dub. 2. — Pro ideo contra hoc plurimi codd. et ed. 1 ideo illud.Cf. above, distinction 32, dubium 2. — For ideo contra hoc [therefore against this] very many codices and edition 1 [read] ideo illud [therefore that].
- 8Vide C. Monacho non licet votum vovere etc. (2.), C. 20. q. 4.See the canon Monacho non licet [It is not permitted to a monk] to vow a vow, etc. (2), Causa 20, q. 4.
- 9Quae sequuntur suadent, ut legatur volendum.What follows suggests that volendum [for willing] should be read [in place of vovendum].
- 1Quaest. 1. in corp. et ad 1. — Inferius pro illa est cod. bb illa fit.Question 1, in the body and in reply 1. — Further below, for illa est [it is that], codex bb [reads] illa fit [that comes about].
- 2Vide scholion ad 1. huius articuli quaest.See the scholion to question 1 of this article. ---