Dist. 38, Art. 1, Q. 2
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 38
Quaestio II. De quo sive circa quam materiam sit votum.
Secundo quaeritur, de quo sit votum, sive de materia, circa quam est votum; et videtur, quod sit circa omnia.
1. Et primo videtur, quod de omni bono: quia omne bonum potest homo promittere et spondere Deo et in tali sponsione obligatur; sed non est alia1 quam votum: ergo etc. Unde et in baptismo promittit quod est necessitatis, scilicet abrenuntiare satanae.
2. Item, quod sit de minori bono, videtur: quia licitum est illud velle: ergo licite potest se homo ad illud obligare, ergo licite vovere; et istud videtur per simile in matrimonio, in quo quis obligat se ad statum imperfectionis2.
3. Item, quod sit de indifferenti, videtur: quia cibus et potus, quantum est de se, dicunt actus indifferentes, quia naturales sunt; sed circa cibum et potum contingit esse votum, utpote votum abstinentiae: ergo et circa indifferentia.
4. Item, videtur, quod de malis possit esse votum: quia occidere innocentem est malum; sed Iephte3 propter votum occidit filiam suam virginem et laudatur de voto. Unde Hieronymus dicit, quod «ideo ponitur in catalogo Sanctorum», quia «Deo placuit animus voventis»: ergo etc.
5. Item, conscientia non magis obligat quam votum; sed conscientia erronea ligat, quia quod non est ex fide est peccatum4, id est contra conscientiam: ergo et votum erroneum; sed tunc errat homo in voto, quando vovet malum pro bono: ergo etc.
Contra: 1. Quod non sit de bono praecepti, videtur: quia super illud5: Vovete et reddite, Glossa: «Vovere est voluntatis, sed reddere necessitatis»: ergo est de his solum, ad quae homo non aliunde, sed voluntarie obligatur; sed talia sunt supererogationis: ergo etc.
2. Item, quod non sit de minori bono, videtur per definitionem voti6: «Votum est conceptio melioris propositi cum deliberatione firmata»: ergo non videtur, quod sit de statu imperfectionis et minori bono. Et ideo videtur, quod votum debet esse ad promotionem salutis nostrae, non in dispendium; sed obligare ad statum minus bonum est in dispendium salutis, quia secundum Bernardum7: «Nemo bonus, qui non vult esse melior»: ergo etc.
3. Item, quod non sit de indifferenti, ostenditur per definitionem; dicitur8 enim, quod «votum de his quae Deo pertinent, fieri debet»; sed talia non sunt indifferentia: ergo etc.
4. Item, quod non de malis, videtur: quia dicit Isidorus9: «In malis promissis rescinde fidem, in turpi voto muta decretum»; sed votum verum est immutabile voventi: ergo votum turpe vel de turpi non est votum verum.
5. Item, votum verum obligat ad id, de quo est; sed nullus obligari potest ad malum: ergo etc.
Probatio minoris1: nullus faciens id, ad quod tenetur, facit malum; sed si homo obligatur ad malum et facit malum, facit id, ad quod tenetur: ergo faciens malum non facit malum.
Conclusio.
Votum, generaliter loquendo, est de his quae ad Deum pertinent et faciunt ad salutem; simpliciter vero et proprie est de his quae promovent ad salutem ultra statum communem.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod votum generaliter loquendo est de his quae ad Deum pertinent et faciunt ad salutem; simpliciter vero et proprie est de his quae promovent ad salutem ultra statum communem. Unde quaecumque sunt talia, cadunt sub voto; quae autem his opposita sunt, ut quae ad dispendium salutis vergunt, sub voto cadere non possunt; quoniam votum debet habere comites, quos habet iuramentum, scilicet veritatem, iudicium et iustitiam2.
Primo namque necesse est, ut in eo sit iustitia, scilicet ut illud quod vovetur, spectet ad salutem et sit bonum et honestum. — Secundo est iudicium, ut vovens deliberate voveat, non praecipitanter. — Tertio, quod sit in eo veritas, ut quod discrete et iuste vovit, hoc persolvat. Si ergo illud quod vovetur, ad detrimentum iustitiae faciat; non est ibi lex voti nec obligatio, sed ipsi voto fit iniuria; nec est obligatio ad servandum, sed potius ad poenitendum, sicut de conscientia erronea iudicatur. Secundum hanc regulam communem iudicandum est de his quae quaeruntur in speciali.
1. Quod enim quaeritur, utrum votum sit de omni bono, scilicet praecepti et consilii; dicendum, quod votum, proprie accipiendo, est de bono supererogationis, large tamen, si dicatur quaecumque testificatio, potest esse de bono praecepti. — Et per hoc patent obiecta ad utramque partem. Illud enim votum, quamvis non sit obligatio de novo, est tamen testificatio obligationis, qua homo non solum fatetur se obligatum, sed etiam complacet sibi in illa obligatione, et obligatio necessaria fit voluntaria3; et sic multi faciunt de necessitate virtutem.
2. Ad illud vero quod quaeritur, utrum sit de minori bono; dicendum, quod minus bonum est dupliciter considerare: uno modo, prout dicit statum quendam licitum; alio modo, prout dicit privationem maioris boni. Primo modo licitum est vovere illud respectu mali, quia respectu illius est quodam modo maius bonum. Secundo modo, prout privatorium maioris boni, licitum non est, nec obligatur quis ad servandum, sed ad poenitendum; ut si quis voveat, quod Deo serviet caste in statu saeculari, et nunquam ingredietur religionem: primum bonum est et licitum, sed in quantum privat statum altiorem, illicitum est, quia gratiam Dei duro corde repellit; et hoc est in praeiudicium salutis et in derogationem abundantis iustitiae. — Et si tu obiicias: licitum est sic esse, ergo et vovere; dicendum, quod sicut laudari non est malum, tamen appetere laudem est malum; sic in tali statu esse non est malum, sed obligare se, ut non possit ad melius pervenire, obligatione4, quae fiat Deo, Deo iniuriam facit. Nec est simile de matrimonio, quia est obligatio facta alii personae, quae contenta est illa et non quaerit perfectiorem; Deus autem vult semper quod melius est.
3. Ad illud quod quaeritur de indifferenti, dicendum, quod indifferens est dupliciter: unum, quod informabile est motu et circumstantia virtutis, sicut comedere et abstinere, et hoc potest voveri; aliud, quod nihil facit, quantum est de se, ut levare festucam vel ire ad prata, et de tali proprie non est votum; et si quis tale quid voveat, iudicio caret, quia nihil vovendum est, nisi quod creditur rationabiliter esse acceptum Deo. Unde si tale votum voveat quis, non est tenendum, sed commutandum. Et per hoc patet utrumque obiectum.
4. Ad illud autem quod obiicitur de malo, dicendum, quod aliquid simpliciter est malum; et hoc nullo modo potest quis vovere, et si vovet, peccat, sed non obligatur. Aliud est, quod uno casu contingente, potest esse bonum, alio casu contingente, potest esse malum; et hoc potest voveri sub conditione eventus boni; quodsi vovetur in omnem eventum sine conditione, indiscretum est votum, et non tenetur ad illud5. — Quod ergo obiicitur de voto Iephte, dicendum, quod quia vovit in omnem eventum, votum fuit indiscretum; sed tamen, quia devotio et fides movit, sed indiscrete emisit, inde6 duo fuerunt in voti emissione: unum laudabile, alterum vituperabile; similiter in voti impletione duo fuerunt, scilicet figura et factum, et factum fuit vituperabile, sed figura laudabilis. Quantum ergo ad diversa in voto Iephte, dicendum, quod laudatur ab Apostolo et Hieronymo7, scilicet quantum ad fidem et
devotionem; sed quantum ad indiscretionem et crudelitatem vituperatur ab Augustino; dicit enim, quod fuit in vovendo stultus et in reddendo fuit impius.
5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod conscientia erronea obligat; dicendum, quod conscientia dicitur erronea dupliciter: aut quia credit, se teneri ad id, ad quod non tenetur, tamen non tenetur ad eius oppositum; et talis error non est periculosus, et talis ligat. Est et alia erronea, quae credit bonum quod non est bonum, immo malum; et talis ligat non ad peccatum nec ad factum, sed ad se deponendum1. Sic votum erroneum, quod vergit in malum, est dimittendum, quia non obligat ad faciendum2.
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Question II. On what, or the matter concerning which, a vow is.
In the second place inquiry is made concerning what a vow is about, or concerning the matter about which a vow is; and it seems that it is about everything.
1. And first it seems that it is about every good: because a man can promise and pledge every good to God, and by such a pledge he is bound; but this is nothing other1 than a vow: therefore etc. Hence also in baptism he promises what is of necessity, namely to renounce Satan.
2. Likewise, that it is about a lesser good seems [to be the case]: because it is licit to will it: therefore a man can licitly bind himself to it, therefore [he can] licitly vow it; and this seems [to hold] by a similar case in marriage, in which one binds himself to a state of imperfection2.
3. Likewise, that it is about the indifferent seems [to be the case]: because food and drink, so far as they are of themselves, are called indifferent acts, since they are natural; but concerning food and drink a vow can be made, as for instance a vow of abstinence: therefore also concerning indifferent things.
4. Likewise, it seems that a vow can be about evils: because to kill an innocent person is evil; but Jephthah3 on account of a vow killed his virgin daughter and is praised for the vow. Hence Jerome says that "he is therefore placed in the catalogue of the Saints," because "the mind of the one vowing was pleasing to God": therefore etc.
5. Likewise, conscience does not bind more than a vow; but an erroneous conscience binds, because what is not of faith is sin4, that is, contrary to conscience: therefore also an erroneous vow [binds]; but then a man errs in the vow when he vows evil for good: therefore etc.
On the contrary: 1. That it is not about the good of precept seems [to be the case]: because upon that text5: Vow and render, the Gloss [says]: "To vow belongs to the will, but to render belongs to necessity": therefore it is only about those things to which a man is bound not from elsewhere, but voluntarily; but such things are of supererogation: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, that it is not about a lesser good seems [to be the case] from the definition of a vow6: "A vow is the conception of a better purpose, confirmed by deliberation": therefore it does not seem that it is about a state of imperfection and a lesser good. And therefore it seems that a vow ought to be for the promotion of our salvation, not to its detriment; but to bind oneself to a lesser good is to the detriment of salvation, because according to Bernard7: "No one is good who does not wish to be better": therefore etc.
3. Likewise, that it is not about the indifferent is shown from the definition; for it is said8 that "a vow ought to be made concerning those things which pertain to God"; but such things are not indifferent: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, that it is not about evils seems [to be the case]: because Isidore says9: "In evil promises break faith, in a base vow change the decree"; but a true vow is unchangeable for the one vowing: therefore a base vow, or one about a base thing, is not a true vow.
5. Likewise, a true vow binds to that of which it is; but no one can be bound to evil: therefore etc.
Proof of the minor1: no one doing that to which he is bound does evil; but if a man is bound to evil and does evil, he does that to which he is bound: therefore one doing evil does not do evil.
Conclusion.
A vow, generally speaking, is about those things which pertain to God and conduce to salvation; but simply and properly it is about those things which promote salvation beyond the common state.
I respond: It must be said that a vow, generally speaking, is about those things which pertain to God and conduce to salvation; but simply and properly it is about those things which promote salvation beyond the common state. Hence whatever things are such fall under a vow; but those things which are opposed to these, as those which tend to the detriment of salvation, cannot fall under a vow; since a vow ought to have the companions which an oath has, namely truth, judgment, and justice2.
For first it is necessary that there be justice in it, namely that what is vowed pertain to salvation and be good and honorable. — Secondly there is judgment, that the one vowing vow deliberately, not precipitately. — Thirdly, that there be truth in it, so that what he vowed discreetly and justly, this he should pay. If therefore what is vowed should tend to the detriment of justice, there is there no law of the vow nor obligation, but injury is done to the vow itself; nor is there an obligation to keep it, but rather to repent, as is judged concerning an erroneous conscience. According to this common rule judgment must be made concerning those things which are inquired into in particular.
1. For as to what is inquired, whether a vow is about every good, namely of precept and of counsel; it must be said that a vow, taking it properly, is about the good of supererogation, yet broadly, if any testification whatever be so called, it can be about the good of precept. — And through this the objections on both sides are made evident. For that vow, although it is not an obligation anew, is nevertheless a testification of the obligation, by which a man not only confesses himself bound, but also takes pleasure in that obligation, and the necessary obligation becomes voluntary3; and thus many make a virtue of necessity.
2. But to that which is inquired, whether it is about a lesser good; it must be said that a lesser good can be considered in two ways: in one way, as it names a certain licit state; in another way, as it names a privation of a greater good. In the first way it is licit to vow it with respect to evil, because with respect to that [evil] it is in a certain way a greater good. In the second way, as depriving of a greater good, it is not licit, nor is anyone bound to keep it, but to repent; as if someone should vow that he will serve God chastely in the secular state, and will never enter religion: the first is good and licit, but insofar as it deprives of a higher state, it is illicit, because it repels the grace of God with a hard heart; and this is to the prejudice of salvation and to the derogation of abounding justice. — And if you object: it is licit so to be, therefore also to vow it; it must be said that, just as to be praised is not evil, yet to seek praise is evil; so to be in such a state is not evil, but to bind oneself, so that one cannot attain to something better, by an obligation4 made to God, does injury to God. Nor is it similar with marriage, because it is an obligation made to another person, who is content with that [state] and does not seek a more perfect one; but God always wills what is better.
3. To that which is inquired concerning the indifferent, it must be said that the indifferent is twofold: one that is capable of being informed by the movement and circumstance of virtue, such as eating and abstaining, and this can be vowed; the other, which does nothing, so far as it is of itself, as to lift a straw or to go to the meadows, and about such a thing there is properly no vow; and if anyone should vow such a thing, he lacks judgment, because nothing is to be vowed except what is believed to be reasonably acceptable to God. Hence if anyone should vow such a vow, it is not to be kept, but to be commuted. And through this both objections are made evident.
4. But to that which is objected concerning evil, it must be said that something is simply evil; and this no one can in any way vow, and if he vows it, he sins, but is not bound. There is another thing, which by one contingent case can be good, by another contingent case can be evil; and this can be vowed under the condition of a good outcome; but if it is vowed for every outcome without condition, the vow is indiscreet, and one is not bound to it5. — As to what is therefore objected concerning the vow of Jephthah, it must be said that, because he vowed for every outcome, the vow was indiscreet; but nevertheless, because devotion and faith moved him, yet he uttered it indiscreetly, thence6 there were two things in the making of the vow: one praiseworthy, the other blameworthy; likewise in the fulfilling of the vow there were two things, namely the figure and the deed, and the deed was blameworthy, but the figure praiseworthy. As therefore to the diverse things in the vow of Jephthah, it must be said that he is praised by the Apostle and by Jerome7, namely as to faith and
devotion; but as to the indiscretion and cruelty he is blamed by Augustine; for he says that he was foolish in vowing and impious in rendering.
5. To that which is objected, that an erroneous conscience binds; it must be said that a conscience is called erroneous in two ways: either because it believes itself bound to that to which it is not bound, yet it is not bound to the opposite of it; and such an error is not dangerous, and such [a conscience] binds. There is also another erroneous [conscience], which believes to be good what is not good, but rather evil; and such [a conscience] binds not to sin nor to the deed, but to laying itself aside1. Thus an erroneous vow, which tends toward evil, is to be dismissed, because it does not bind to the doing of it2.
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- 1Cod. aa supplet huiusmodi obligatio.Codex aa supplies huiusmodi obligatio [an obligation of this kind].
- 2Ed. 1 cum multis codd. perperam perfectionis.Ed. 1 with many codices wrongly [reads] perfectionis [of perfection].
- 3Iud. 11, 30. seqq. — Sententia Hieron. habetur in Epist. 118. (alias 34.) n. 5: Iephte obtulit virginem filiam, et idcirco in enumeratione Sanctorum ab Apostolo [Hebr. 11, 32.] ponitur. Cfr. Epist. 60. (alias 3.) n. 8. In II. Comment. super Ierem. 7, 31. ait: Quodsi Iephte obtulit filiam suam virginem Deo, non sacrificium placet, sed animus offerentis. — In fine arg. codd. omittunt Deo.Judges 11:30 ff. — Jerome's statement is found in Epistle 118 (alias 34), n. 5: "Jephthah offered his virgin daughter, and therefore he is placed in the enumeration of the Saints by the Apostle [Heb. 11:32]." Cf. Epistle 60 (alias 3), n. 8. In the second Commentary on Jeremiah 7:31 he says: "If Jephthah offered his virgin daughter to God, it is not the sacrifice that pleases, but the mind of the one offering." — At the end of the argument the codices omit Deo [to God].
- 4Rom. 14, 23.Romans 14:23.
- 5Psalm. 75, 12. — Glossam (cfr. August., Epist. 127. alias 45. n. 8.) exhibet Petr. Lombard. in hunc loc.: Vovere enim consulitur voluntati, sed post voti promissionem necessario redditio exigitur. Haym. super hunc loc. ait: Vovere consilium est, solvere autem vota praeceptum.Psalm 75:12 [Vulgate]. — The Gloss (cf. Augustine, Epistle 127, alias 45, n. 8) is set forth by Peter Lombard on this passage: "For to vow is left to the will, but after the promise of the vow the payment is necessarily required." Haymo on this passage says: "To vow is a counsel, but to pay one's vows is a precept."
- 6Cfr. quaest. praeced. — Edd. in hac definitione pro cum exhibent animi.Cf. the preceding question. — The editions in this definition, instead of cum [with], read animi [of the mind].
- 7Epist. 91. n. 3: Minime pro certo est bonus qui melior esse non vult. — Superius pro Et ideo codd. Et illud.Epistle 91, n. 3: "By no means is he certainly good who does not wish to be better." — Above, for Et ideo [And therefore] the codices [read] Et illud [And that].
- 8Vide quaest. praeced. fundam. 1.See the preceding question, fundamentum 1.
- 9Libr. II. Synonym. n. 58. Cfr. supra pag. 697, nota 5.Synonyms, Book II, n. 58. Cf. above, p. 697, note 5.
- 1In permultis codd. desiderantur verba nullus... minoris.In very many codices the words nullus... minoris are lacking.
- 2Ierem. 4, 2: Et iurabis: Vivit Dominus in veritate et in iudicio et in iustitia. Cfr. III. Sent. d. 39. dub. 1. — Mox pro in eo, quod codd. communiter omittunt, cod. K (1 a secunda manu) ibi. Subinde post salutem edd. legunt: et sic bonum est et honestum. Secundo necesse est, in eo esse iudicium.Jeremiah 4:2: "And you shall swear: The Lord lives, in truth and in judgment and in justice." Cf. III Sent., d. 39, dub. 1. — Presently, for in eo [in it], which the codices commonly omit, codex K (and 1 by a second hand) [reads] ibi [there]. Thereupon after salutem the editions read: "and thus it is good and honorable. Secondly it is necessary that there be judgment in it."
- 3Edd. verbis male inversis voluntaria fit necessaria.The editions, with the words wrongly inverted, [read] voluntaria fit necessaria [the voluntary becomes necessary].
- 4Edd. per obligationem, cod. A originali obligatione.The editions [read] per obligationem [through an obligation], codex A originali obligatione [by an original obligation].
- 5Aliqui codd. omittunt ad illud, codd. W bb legunt: tenetur. Ad illud quod obiicitur.Some codices omit ad illud [to that], codices W bb read: "he is bound. To that which is objected."
- 6Codd. et edd. incongrue unde, nisi cum cod. V a recentiore manu correcto post emisit suppleatur laudatur.The codices and editions incongruously [read] unde [whence], unless, with codex V (corrected by a more recent hand), after emisit one supplies laudatur [is praised].
- 7Vide supra pag. 816, nota 3. — De Augustini sententia cfr. Qq. in Iudic. q. 49. n. 4. seqq. et 1. Qq. ex veteri Testam. (inter opera August.) q. 43. Hieron., 1. adversus Iovinian. n. 23: A plerisque Hebraeorum reprehenditur pater [Iephte] voti temerarii etc.See above, p. 816, note 3. — Concerning Augustine's opinion, cf. Questions on Judges, q. 49, n. 4 ff., and the first book of Questions on the Old Testament (among the works of Augustine), q. 43. Jerome, Against Jovinian, Book 1, n. 23: "By most of the Hebrews the father [Jephthah] is reproved for a rash vow," etc.
- 1Cfr. II. Sent. d. 39. a. 1. q. 3. — Pro peccatum codd. FG impletionem, et pro factum cod. Q effectum.Cf. II Sent., d. 39, a. 1, q. 3. — For peccatum [sin] codices FG [read] impletionem [fulfillment], and for factum [deed] codex Q effectum [effect].
- 2Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.See the scholion to the preceding question.