Dist. 38, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 38
Articulus I. De voto in se.
Circa primum quaeruntur tria. Primo quaeritur de voto, quid sit secundum essentiam. Secundo quaeritur, de quo sit. Tertio, in quo sit.
Quaestio I. Quid sit votum secundum essentiam.
Quantum ad primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod votum secundum substantiam sit promissio:
1. Per definitionem Hugonis3: « Votum est testificatio quaedam promissionis spontaneae, quae Deo, et de his quae Deo pertinent, proprie fieri debet ».
2. Item, voto se obligat homo ad id, ad quod prius non obligabatur; sed homo ad novum se non obligat nisi propter beneficium, vel propter peccatum, vel propter promissum; sed in voto non obligatur homo beneficio, vel peccato: ergo obligatur promissione: ergo promissio est de substantia voti.
Item, quod sit obligandi intentio4, videtur:
3. Quia, sicut matrimonium est ab opere nostro, sic et votum; sed nullus contrahit matrimonium, quantumcumque promittat exterius, nisi intendat se obligare sive consentiat interius: ergo etc.
4. Item, votum est obligatio spontanea sive p. 815 voluntaria; sed nullus obligatione voluntaria obligatur, nisi velit obligari; et nullus vult obligari verbo, nisi qui intendit se obligare: ergo etc.
Contra: Ostenditur quod promissio non sit de genere voti:
1. Per aliam definitionem voti1: « Votum est melioris boni conceptio cum deliberatione firmata » — haec definitio dicit voti substantiam — sed hoc totum potest esse sine promissione: ergo etc.
2. Item, Gregorius super Ezechielem2: « Qui meliora agere deliberant et deliberata non faciunt, dum se elevant, cadunt »: ergo deliberatio melioris obligat ad faciendum, alioquin non esset casus; sed non est ibi alia obligatio quam voti: ergo sola deliberatio sine promissione est votum: non ergo promissio est de essentia voti.
Item, quod nec sit obligandi intentio, videtur:
3. Quia aliquis promotus ad sacros ordines, intendens ordines suscipere et nullo modo obligari ad castitatem, nihilominus obligatur, ac si intenderet: ergo videtur, quod de substantia3 voti non sit obligandi intentio.
4. Item, si aliquis iurat alicui, non intendens se obligare ad id quod verba significant, iudicatur nihilominus ita obligatus, ac si intenderet: ergo pari ratione videtur in voto, quod fit sine intentione.
Item, cum ista duo similiter faciant ad esse iuramenti, scilicet promissio et obligandi intentio, quaeritur, quae sit differentia.
Conclusio
Conclusio. De essentia voti sunt promissio et obligandi intentio; et in voto simplici requiritur verbum interius, in solemni exterius.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod ista duo sunt de essentia voti, scilicet promissio et obligandi intentio. Cum votum sit obligatio nova et voluntaria, quia de novo est superaddita, promissio est necessaria; quia vero voluntaria, oportet, quod velit obligari, et ita4, quod se obligare intendat. Sed contingit promittere alicui duplici verbo, scilicet interiori et exteriori. Promissio quantum ad verbum interius cogitationis et deliberationis est de necessitate voti simplicis, quod obligat quantum ad Deum, qui intuetur cor5. Sed promissio quantum ad verbum vel signum exterius est de necessitate voti solemnis, quod obligat quantum ad faciem Ecclesiae, quae iudicat secundum ea quae patent. Secundum hoc duplex datur definitio de voto; illa magistralis et communis est de voto simplici: « Conceptio melioris propositi6 » etc.
1. 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur per definitionem voti et auctoritatem Gregorii, in sola deliberatione votum consistere; dicendum, quod non intelligunt7 de qualibet deliberatione, sed de illa quae firmat propositum; et haec est quae consensui addit promissionem; aliter non firmat, unde licitum est dissentire.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod obligandi intentio non est necessaria, sicut patet in ordine; dicendum, quod intentio respectu alicuius potest esse dupliciter: aut principaliter, quia de illo cogitat et illud placet, aut quia intendit aliquid antecedens8 ad illud, vel simpliciter illi annexum; sicut si aliquis intendit vovere regulam monachorum, per consequens et ad continentiam obligari intendit et ad obedientiam; alioquin stulte appetit et vult. Similiter, quia ordini sacro annexum est votum, si intendit ordinem sacrum suscipere, per consequens et ad continentiam obligari principaliter, vel ex consequenti; quod si nullo modo intendat, non est votum; sic nec matrimonium.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod qui iurat in dolo tenetur; dicendum, quod duplex est forum, scilicet iudiciale et poenitentiale. In foro iudiciali iudicatur secundum exteriora, in foro poenitentiali secundum conscientiam. In foro iudiciali, quia « fraus nulli debet patrocinari9 », accipiuntur verba secundum intellectum communem et sanum; et quia fraus non debet ei patrocinari, iudicatur teneri, sicut si secundum intentionem rectam verba dixisset. In foro poenitentiali, ubi est iudicium secundum veritatem, iudicatur, istum peccasse in dolo, sed nequaquam ex illa promissione esse obligatum10; unde p. 816 sicut matrimonium contractum per verba exteriora sine consensu omni est matrimonium solum secundum interpretationem fori iudicialis, non secundum veritatem; sic de voto dicendum.
Ad illud quod ultimo quaeritur de differentia voti ad iuramentum obligatorium, dicendum, quod triplex est differentia, scilicet in obiecto, medio et fine. In obiecto, quia votum fit Deo, sed iuramentum homini; in medio, quia iuratur per Deum, sed vovetur per promissionem; in fine, quia iuramentum est ad astruendam veritatem, votum autem ad augendam honestatem et bonitatem.
I. In solvendis tribus huius articuli quaestionibus S. Thom. aliique doctores conveniunt. De 1. quaestione: S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1. quaestiunc. 1; S. II. II. q. 88. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1-3. — De hac et 2 seqq. qq. Durand., hic q. 1; Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.
II. De 2. quaestione: S. Thom., locis citt. quaestiunc. 2. et a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 1-3.
III. De 3. quaestione: S. Thom., locis citt. quaestiunc. 3. et a. 8. — B. Albert., hic a. 3. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 1-3.
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Article I. On the vow in itself.
Concerning the first, three [questions] are asked. First it is asked about a vow, what it is according to its essence. Second it is asked, of what it is. Third, in whom it is.
Question I. What a vow is according to its essence.
As to the first, one proceeds thus, and it is shown that a vow according to its substance is a promise:
1. By the definition of Hugh3: "A vow is a certain attestation of a spontaneous promise, which ought properly to be made to God and concerning the things that pertain to God."
2. Likewise, by a vow a man binds himself to that to which he was not previously bound; but a man does not bind himself to something new except on account of a benefit, or on account of a sin, or on account of a promise; but in a vow a man is not bound by a benefit or by a sin: therefore he is bound by a promise: therefore a promise is of the substance of a vow.
Likewise, that there is an intention to bind4, seems [to be shown]:
3. Because, just as matrimony is from our own act, so also is a vow; but no one contracts matrimony, however much he may promise outwardly, unless he intends to bind himself or consents inwardly: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, a vow is a spontaneous or p. 815 voluntary obligation; but no one is bound by a voluntary obligation unless he wills to be bound; and no one wills to be bound by a word unless he intends to bind himself: therefore etc.
On the contrary: It is shown that a promise is not of the genus of a vow:
1. By another definition of a vow1: "A vow is the conception of a better good confirmed by deliberation" — this definition states the substance of a vow — but this whole can exist without a promise: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, Gregory on Ezekiel2: "Those who deliberate to do better things and do not do the things deliberated, while they lift themselves up, fall": therefore the deliberation of a better [good] binds one to the doing [of it], otherwise there would be no fall; but there is there no other obligation than that of a vow: therefore deliberation alone without a promise is a vow: therefore a promise is not of the essence of a vow.
Likewise, that neither is there an intention to bind, seems [to be shown]:
3. Because someone promoted to sacred orders, intending to receive orders and in no way to be bound to chastity, is nonetheless bound, as if he had so intended: therefore it seems that the intention to bind is not of the substance3 of a vow.
4. Likewise, if someone swears to another, not intending to bind himself to that which the words signify, he is nonetheless judged to be bound thereby, as if he had so intended: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems [the same] in a vow, that it comes to be without intention.
Likewise, since these two, namely a promise and the intention to bind, similarly make for the being of an oath, it is asked what the difference is.
Conclusio
Conclusion. Of the essence of a vow are a promise and the intention to bind; and in a simple vow an inward word is required, in a solemn one an outward word.
I respond: It must be said that these two are of the essence of a vow, namely a promise and an intention to bind. Since a vow is a new and voluntary obligation, because it is newly superadded, a promise is necessary; but because it is voluntary, it is required that he will to be bound, and thus4 that he intend to bind himself. But it happens that one promises to another by a twofold word, namely inward and outward. A promise as regards the inward word of thought and deliberation is of the necessity of a simple vow, which binds with respect to God, who beholds the heart5. But a promise as regards the outward word or sign, outwardly, is of the necessity of a solemn vow, which binds with respect to the face of the Church, which judges according to the things that are manifest. According to this a twofold definition of a vow is given; the magisterial and common one is of the simple vow: "The conception of a better resolve6," etc.
1 and 2. To that which is objected by the definition of a vow and the authority of Gregory, that a vow consists in deliberation alone; it must be said that they do not understand7 [this] of any deliberation whatever, but of that which confirms the resolve; and this is what adds a promise to consent; otherwise it does not confirm, whence it is permitted to dissent.
3. To that which is objected, that the intention to bind is not necessary, as is clear in the case of [holy] orders; it must be said that intention with respect to something can be twofold: either principally, because one thinks of it and it pleases him, or because he intends something antecedent8 to it, or simply annexed to it; just as, if someone intends to vow the rule of monks, consequently he intends also to be bound to continence and to obedience; otherwise he foolishly desires and wills. Likewise, because a vow is annexed to a sacred order, if he intends to receive a sacred order, consequently [he intends] also to be bound to continence, either principally or by consequence; but if he in no way intends it, it is not a vow; and so neither is it matrimony.
4. To that which is objected, that he who swears in deceit is held [bound]; it must be said that there is a twofold forum, namely the judicial and the penitential. In the judicial forum one is judged according to outward things, in the penitential according to conscience. In the judicial forum, because "deceit ought to profit no one9," the words are taken according to the common and sound understanding; and because deceit ought not to profit him, he is judged to be bound, just as if he had spoken the words according to a right intention. In the penitential forum, where there is judgment according to truth, he is judged to have sinned by deceit, but by no means to be bound by that promise10; whence, p. 816 just as a matrimony contracted by outward words without any consent is a matrimony only according to the interpretation of the judicial forum, not according to truth; so must it be said of a vow.
To that which is finally asked concerning the difference of a vow from a binding oath, it must be said that there is a threefold difference, namely in object, in medium, and in end. In object, because a vow is made to God, but an oath to a man; in medium, because one swears by God, but one vows by a promise; in end, because an oath is for establishing truth, but a vow for increasing uprightness and goodness.
I. In the solving of the three questions of this article, St. Thomas and the other doctors are in agreement. On the first question: St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1, quaestiuncula 1; Summa II-II, q. 88, a. 1. — Blessed Albert, here a. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 1, q. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 2, qq. 1-3. — On this and the two following questions: Durandus, here q. 1; Denis the Carthusian, here q. 1.
II. On the second question: St. Thomas, at the places cited, quaestiuncula 2 and a. 2. — Blessed Albert, here a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, at the place cited, a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 3, qq. 1-3.
III. On the third question: St. Thomas, at the places cited, quaestiuncula 3 and a. 8. — Blessed Albert, here a. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, at the place cited, a. 3. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 4, qq. 1-3.
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- 3Libr. II. de Sacram. p. XII. c. 3: Votum enim est...[Hugh of St. Victor,] On the Sacraments, Book II, part XII, c. 3: "For a vow is...".
- 4Cod. aa supplet de essentia voti.Codex aa supplies de essentia voti ("of the essence of a vow").
- 1Cfr. supra pag. 156, nota 5. — Pro melioris boni in cod. E secunda manus substituit melioris propositi (cfr. infra in corp.), et pro cum edd. animi. Superius pro de genere codd. K V (I a secunda manu) de substantia.Cf. above p. 156, note 5. — For melioris boni ("of a better good") a second hand in codex E substitutes melioris propositi ("of a better resolve") (cf. below in the body), and for cum the editions read animi. Above, for de genere ("of the genus") codices K V (the first by a second hand) read de substantia.
- 2Libr. I. homil. 3. n. 18, ubi ostendit, verba (Ezech. 1, 9.): Non revertebantur, cum incederent etc., nec de peccatoribus bonum cognoscentibus et de ipso deliberantibus nec de imperfectis bonum quidem facientibus, sed meliora deliberata relinquentibus verificari, sed tantum de perfectis.[Gregory the Great, Homilies on Ezekiel,] Book I, homily 3, n. 18, where he shows that the words (Ezek. 1:9): "They did not turn back as they went," etc., are verified neither of sinners who recognize the good and deliberate about it, nor of the imperfect who do indeed do good but abandon the better things they had deliberated on, but only of the perfect.
- 3Ita cod. U, cod. V a secunda manu essentia, ceteri et edd. mendose obligatione, ut videtur, pro ratione.Thus codex U; codex V by a second hand reads essentia; the rest and the editions read, by an error, obligatione, as it seems, in place of ratione.
- 4Codd. P Q S et etiam.Codices P Q S read et etiam.
- 5Libr. I. Reg. 16, 7: Homo enim videt ea quae parent, Dominus autem intuetur cor.1 Kings [= 1 Samuel] 16:7: "For man sees the things that appear, but the Lord beholds the heart."
- 6Praeter definitionem, quam Magister hic in lit. c. 1. proponit, B. Albert. (hic a. 1.) sequentes affert: Hugo de S. Vict. in libro de Sacramentis, parte XII, sic definit votum: Votum est sponsio animi voluntaria. Et quidam iurisperiti sic: Votum est alicuius boni cum deliberatione facta promissio. Antiqui autem doctores theologiae sic: Votum est conceptio boni propositi cum deliberatione firmata, qua quis ad aliquid faciendum vel non faciendum se Deo obligat. Alii autem sic: Votum est promissio melioris boni ex deliberatione firmata.Besides the definition which the Master proposes here in the text, c. 1, Blessed Albert (here, a. 1) adduces the following: Hugh of St. Victor, in the book On the Sacraments, part XII, defines a vow thus: "A vow is a voluntary pledge of the soul." And certain jurists thus: "A vow is a promise, made with deliberation, of some good." But the ancient doctors of theology thus: "A vow is the conception of a good resolve confirmed by deliberation, by which one binds oneself to God to do or not to do something." And others thus: "A vow is the promise of a better good, confirmed by deliberation."
- 7Codd. E F G intelligitur.Codices E F G read intelligitur ("it is understood").
- 8Edd. aliud consequens. Circa finem solut. pro principaliter cod. H simpliciter, et post intendat codd. F G repetunt ad continentiam obligari.The editions read aliud consequens. Toward the end of the solution, for principaliter codex H reads simpliciter, and after intendat codices F G repeat ad continentiam obligari.
- 9Vide supra pag. 680, nota 2. — Post pauca vocibus quia fraus ex cod. L praemisimus et, pro quo cod. V (a secunda manu) habet sed quia.See above p. 680, note 2. — A little later, before the words quia fraus we have prefixed et from codex L, in place of which codex V (by a second hand) has sed quia.
- 10Cfr. III. Sent. d. 39. a. 3. q. I.Cf. [Bonaventure,] Sentences Book III, d. 39, a. 3, q. 1. ---