Dist. 39, Art. 3, Q. 1
Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 39
Articulus III. De obligatione iuramenti.
Consequenter quaeritur de obligatione iuramenti; et circa hoc quaeruntur tria. Primo quaeritur, utrum obligatio contrahatur per iuramentum dolosum. Secundo quaeritur, utrum contrahatur per iuramentum coactum. Tertio quaeritur, utrum contrahatur per iuramentum incautum sive indiscretum.
Quaestio I. Utrum obligatio per iuramentum dolosum contrahatur.
Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum obligatio contrahatur per iuramentum dolosum. Et quod sic, videtur:
1. Per auctoritatem Isidori, quam Magister adducit in littera1. Ait enim sic: « Quacumque arte verborum quis iuret, Deus sic accipit, sicut ille cui iuratur, intelligit »; sed ille cui iuratur, intelligit simpliciter et credit, quod alius se velit per verbum obligare: ergo videtur, quod Deus reputet ipsum obligatum: igitur secundum veritatem obligatur quis per iuramentum dolosum.
2. Item, « fraus et dolus nemini debet patrocinari2 »; sed si ille qui dolose iurat, ab obligatione esset absolutus, patrocinaretur ei fraus et dolus proprius: si igitur hoc est inconveniens dicere, videtur, quod iuramentum dolosum obligationem introducat.
3. Item, verba sunt, in quibus consistunt contractus3: ergo si forma verborum est obligatoria, necesse est, intervenire contractum obligatorium: ergo sive intendat, sive non intendat, dum tamen verba iuramenti obligationem praetendant, iurans obligatur: ergo ita obligatur homo per iuramentum dolosum, sicut per iuramentum simplex et verum.
4. Item, si solummodo verba fidelia et pura obligarent in iuramento; cum nemini constet de fidelitate aliena, nemini constaret, utrum aliquis esset obligatus per verba sua; sed homo redditur certus de obligatione per iuramentum exhibitum4: videtur ergo, quod sive per verba fidelia, sive per fraudulenta iuramentum fiat, iurans aequaliter obligatur.
Sed contra: 1. Gregorius5: « Verba deserviunt intentioni; et Deus talia verba iudicat, qualia ex intimis proferuntur »: ergo si homo se non intendit obligare, quantumcumque exterius loquatur; videtur, quod Deus non reputet eum obligatum.
2. Item, secundum illud quod dicitur primi Regum decimo sexto6: Homo iudicat ea quae parent, Deus autem intuetur cor; unde quantumcumque sint opera exterius laudabilia, non sunt tamen Deo placita, nisi procedant ex mera intentione et pura: ergo Deus obligationem iuramenti pensat secundum intentionem cordis: ergo si homo non
intendat se ipsum obligare, quidquid exterius loquatur, apud Deum non erit obligatus: ergo iuramentum dolosum secundum veritatem non est obligatorium.
3. Item, obligatio iuramenti non est a lege naturali tantum, sed etiam a lege naturali et actu proprio; sed nullus obligatur actu proprio, nisi velit et intendat se ipsum obligare: si ergo iurans iuramento doloso non intendat7 se ipsum obligare, sed alium deludere, non videtur obligari secundum veritatem.
4. Item, iuramentum non est obligatorium, nisi quando « habet suos comites, videlicet iudicium et iustitiam et veritatem8 »; sed dolosum iuramentum caret veritate: ergo non videtur, quod introducat obligationem.
Iuxta hoc quaeritur, quando verba iuramenti sunt duplicia, et iurans intendit in uno sensu, et recipiens in alio, cuius intentioni sit standum. Et quod magis standum sit intentioni recipientis, videtur per auctoritatem Isidori prius habitam; quod vero magis intentioni iurantis, videtur per auctoritatem Gregorii prius habitam, qua dicit, quod « verba illi intentioni deserviunt, ex qua proferuntur ».
Conclusio
Satis probabile esse videtur, quod iuramentum dolosum in foro Dei non sit simpliciter obligatorium, licet in foro Ecclesiae obliget, et simul committatur crimen periurii.
Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod hic est duplex modus dicendi.
Quidam namque dicere voluerunt, quod iuramentum dolosum simpliciter obligat, quoniam, etsi dolosus intendat alium decipere, intendit tamen dicere verba obligatoria; et dum illa voluntarie exterius profert, simpliciter se ipsum obligat. Nec aliquo modo excusatur per cordis fraudulentiam, quia non solummodo recipiens, sed etiam ipsa Veritas accipit verba secundum sensum, quem faciunt, et ita non solummodo in conspectu hominum, immo etiam secundum veritatem dicunt, quod iuramentum dolosum est obligatorium.
Sed quoniam obligatio iuramenti est obligatoria, sicut obligatio voti et matrimonii; ideo videtur aliis dicendum, quod sicut matrimonium non est verum, nisi intersit interior consensus, nec est votum obligatorium, nisi sit intentio obligandi11: sic etiam nec ipsum iuramentum dolosum dicendum est esse simpliciter obligatorium, in quo quis sic iurat, ut tamen per illa verba se ipsum obligare non intendat. Et propterea secundum istos distinguitur duplex forum, videlicet forum Ecclesiae et forum conscientiae. Secundum forum Ecclesiae iuramentum tale est obligatorium; Ecclesia enim iudicat de his quae exterius obligare12 possunt; unde cum verba illa obligationem exprimant, iudicat, sic iurantem ad id quod verba insinuant obligari. In foro autem Dei, qui iudicat secundum secreta conscientiae et secundum veritatem, iste quidem non obligatur, quia non voluit obligare se ipsum. Quia tamen dolose iuravit et nomen Dei in vanum assumsit, statim in actu ipso commisit crimen periurii. Nec reportat commodum de malitia, quia apud Deum ex illo iuramento iudicatur9 dignus poena aeterna.
Et iste quidem modus dicendi satis probabilis esse videtur. Et secundum ipsum patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam; etiam pro magna parte patet responsio ad obiecta. Nam rationes, quae probant, illud iuramentum non esse obligatorium, ostendunt hoc non simpliciter, sed in foro Dei, qui iudicat
secundum intentionem, secundum quam dolose iurans non intendebat se ipsum obligare. Rationes autem, quae ad oppositum inducuntur, procedunt secundum forum ecclesiasticum, aliter non concludunt.
Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:
Ad 1. Unde ad auctoritatem Isidori, qua dicit, quod Deus accipit verba secundum intentionem recipientis10; dicendum, quod hoc dicit, non quia ipse Deus ad hoc reputet hominem obligatum, sed quia ex hoc, quod ille non intendit iurare, sicut ille intendebat recipere, Deus, qui hoc requirebat ex veritate et iustitia, reputat ipsum obligatum ad poenam. — Vel potest ille sermo causaliter intelligi, ut dicatur, quod Deus sic accipit, quia sic vult accipi ab ipsa Ecclesia, et sic vult etiam iudicari.
Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod fraus et dolus nemini debent patrocinari; patet responsio per iam dicta: quia fraus et dolus non patrocinantur isti in foro Ecclesiae, immo compellitur ab ipsa Ecclesia iuramentum tenere, ac si iurasset vere et fideliter; non patrocinantur etiam in foro Dei, quia ex hoc ipso obligatur et reus efficitur magna poena. Unde si veniat ad poenitentiam, est ei gravis poenitentia imponenda; et sanum consilium est et decens, ut merito culpae sibi imponatur, ut iuramentum compleat, in quo proximum decipere intendebat, licet non possit sibi probari in facie ipsius Ecclesiae.
Ad 3, 4. Ad duo sequentia similiter patet responsio: quia verborum obligatio et certificatio per iuramentum superadditum respiciunt forum ecclesiasticum; et ideo obligationem concludunt non simpliciter, sed quantum ad illud forum13. Et hoc quidem est concedendum.
Ad illud vero quod quaeritur, quando sunt verba duplicia, ita quod dolus non intervenit, cuius14 intentioni standum sit; dicendum, quod verba illa multiplicia aut magis praetendunt unum illorum sensuum secundum usum communem, aut aequaliter praetendunt utrumque. Si magis praetendunt unum sensum, illi intentioni standum est, quae illum sensum intellexit. Si vero indifferenter se habent ad utrumque; cum neutrum probari possit, standum est iudicio bonorum virorum, qui, pensatis coniecturis et rationibus, condescendere debent saniori et puriori intentioni15. — Illa tamen auctoritas Isidori non facit ad propositum, quia Isidorus vocat illum arte iurare, cuius iuratio est dolosa; non oportet autem, dolum vel artem intervenire semper, quando verba sunt multiplicia16.
I. Quaestio haec versatur circa iuramentum promissorium, quod a S. Bonav. aliisque antiquis « appropriate dicitur obligatorium » (Scot., hic q. unica n. 9.). Illud tunc est dolosum, quando iurans, aliquid [se] esse facturum, in ipso actu iurandi intendit oppositum, et non intendit se obligare ad illud quod iuratur; et talis in ipso actu iurandi peccat mortaliter, quia adducit Deum tanquam testem sui propositi de aliquo implendo, cum tamen intendat oppositum. Tamen post illud iuramentum non remanet [scil. per se loquendo] obligatus, quia in obligationibus privatis nullus obligatur non intendens se obligare » (ita definit et resolvit Scot., hic q. unica n. 10.). Iuramentum dolosum hoc sensu acceptum idem est quod iuramentum fictum, quod secundum recentiores in proferendis verbis iuratoriis duobus modis fieri potest, scilicet cum verba proferuntur cum intentione vel non iurandi, vel in promissione non se obligandi. Tale iuramentum non valet, est tamen illicitum, ut constat ex prop. 25. inter damnatas ab Innocentio XI: « Cum causa licitum est iurare sine animo iurandi, sive res sit levis, sive gravis ». Quod autem fictum iuramentum semper sit peccatum mortale, ut Scot. videtur sentire, a recentioribus negatur (cfr. S. Alphons., Homo apost. tr. 5. n. 17.). — Alio autem sensu iuramentum dolosum saepe intelligitur de vero iuramento facto verbis duplicem sensum habentibus, quando « iurans intendit in uno sensu, et recipiens in alio » (hic q. incidens). Hoc autem potest esse cum dolo, vel sine dolo iurantis. « Si autem iurans dolum non adhibeat, obligatur secundum intentionem iurantis » (S. Thom., S. II. II. q. 89. a. 7. ad 4.); de quo non est dubium; et idem hic docet S. Bonav., sed quaedam addit. — Si vero iurans recipientem dolo fallit, S. Thom. resolvit, quod « debet iuramentum servari secundum sanum intellectum eius cui iuramentum praestatur ». Quoad ipsum iuramentum dolosum, de quo est hic quaestio principalis, S. Thom. (hic a. 3. quaestiunc. 3.) docet: « Quamvis ex ipsa ratione iuramenti, in quantum iuramentum, non obligetur ad servandum ipsum nisi secundum suam intentionem; tamen ex necessitate iuramenti, in quantum fuit dolosum, obligatur ad servandum taliter, quod ex dolo alius non laedatur; et hoc est, quando secundum intentionem recipientis implet iuramentum ». Circa ultima verba paulo mitius S. Bonav. cum multis recentioribus iudicat. — De obligatione, quam imponit forum Ecclesiae dolose iuranti, nullum est dubium.
II. De hac quaestione praeter laudatos: Alex. Hal., Sum. p. III. q. 31. m. 4. a. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 8. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 8. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. I. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et duabus seqq. qq. hic q. 3.
III. In solutione sequentis (2.) quaest. sententia nunc communissima est, quod iuramentum promissorium coactum de re licita in foro interno est validum, quia iurans, licet iniuste cogenti non obligetur, tamen contraxit obligationem coram Deo. Illud tamen est strictissimae interpretationis et rescindibile, saltem in foro Ecclesiae. — Alex. Hal. inter utramque sententiam hic relatam rem reliquit indicatam. De eadem (2.) quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. m. 4. a. 4. §2. — S. Thom., hic a. 3. quaestiunc. 2; S. loc. cit. a. 7. ad 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 9. 10. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 6. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2. — Durand., hic q. 2.
IV. Etiam seq. (3.) quaestio est de iuramento promissorio. Definitiones tres incauti iuramenti hic positae communes sunt apud antiquos doctores. In his tribus speciebus deficit illa conditio iuramenti liciti, quae vocatur iustitia. A recentioribus (cfr. Sporer, Theol. moral. tom. 1. tr. 3. sect. 4. § 1.) vocatur incautum illud iuramentum, « quo iuratur sine debita consideratione et examine, verumne sit, an falsum quod iuratur ». — Casus moralis, qui in quaestione incidenti proponitur, similiter solvitur a S. Thom. in Sum. (loc. cit. ad 2.), et etiam ab Alexandro Hal. (loc. cit. m. 4. a. 4. § 1.), qui tamen refert aliorum opinionem, qui sine distinctione asserunt, illud iuramentum esse incautum et non obligatorium simpliciter; quorum opinioni aliquatenus favent verba S. Thom., in Comment. hic a. 3. quaestiunc. I. ad 3. De ipsa (3.) quaestione praeter S. Thomam: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. m. 4. a. I. 2. — Scot., loc. cit. n. II. — B. Albert., hic a. 7. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 5. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 3. — Durand., hic q. 3.
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Article III. On the obligation of an oath.
Next there is inquiry concerning the obligation of an oath; and concerning this three things are asked. First it is asked whether an obligation is contracted through a deceitful oath. Second it is asked whether it is contracted through a coerced oath. Third it is asked whether it is contracted through an incautious or indiscreet oath.
Question I. Whether an obligation is contracted through a deceitful oath.
Concerning the first one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether an obligation is contracted through a deceitful oath. And that it is, seems to be the case:
1. From the authority of Isidore, which the Master adduces in the text1. For he speaks thus: « By whatever artifice of words one swears, God accepts it just as he to whom one swears understands it »; but he to whom one swears understands it simply and believes that the other wishes to bind himself by his word: therefore it seems that God reckons him bound: therefore in truth one is bound through a deceitful oath.
2. Likewise, « fraud and deceit ought to give patronage to no one2 »; but if he who swears deceitfully were absolved from the obligation, his own fraud and deceit would give him patronage: if therefore it is unfitting to say this, it seems that a deceitful oath introduces an obligation.
3. Likewise, words are those in which contracts consist3: therefore if the form of words is obligatory, it is necessary that an obligatory contract intervene: therefore whether he intends or does not intend, provided only that the words of the oath put forward an obligation, the one swearing is bound: therefore a man is bound by a deceitful oath just as by a simple and true oath.
4. Likewise, if only faithful and pure words bound in an oath; since the fidelity of another is evident to no one, it would be evident to no one whether anyone was bound through his own words; but a man is rendered certain of the obligation through the oath presented4: it seems therefore that whether the oath is made through faithful or through fraudulent words, the one swearing is equally bound.
On the contrary: 1. Gregory5: « Words serve the intention; and God judges such words as are brought forth from the inmost parts »: therefore if a man does not intend to bind himself, however much he speaks outwardly; it seems that God does not reckon him bound.
2. Likewise, according to that which is said in the first book of Kings, chapter sixteen6: Man judges those things which appear, but God beholds the heart; whence however much works may be outwardly praiseworthy, they are nonetheless not pleasing to God unless they proceed from a sincere and pure intention: therefore God weighs the obligation of an oath according to the intention of the heart: therefore if a man does not
intend to bind himself, whatever he speaks outwardly, before God he will not be bound: therefore a deceitful oath in truth is not obligatory.
3. Likewise, the obligation of an oath is not from natural law alone, but also from natural law and a proper act; but no one is bound by a proper act unless he wills and intends to bind himself: if therefore one swearing by a deceitful oath does not intend7 to bind himself, but to deceive another, he does not seem to be bound in truth.
4. Likewise, an oath is not obligatory except when it « has its companions, namely judgment and justice and truth8 »; but a deceitful oath lacks truth: therefore it does not seem that it introduces an obligation.
Alongside this it is asked, when the words of an oath are twofold, and the one swearing intends them in one sense and the one receiving in another, by whose intention one must stand. And that one must rather stand by the intention of the receiver, seems to be the case from the authority of Isidore held above; but that one must rather stand by the intention of the swearer, seems to be the case from the authority of Gregory held above, in which he says that « words serve that intention from which they are brought forth ».
Conclusion
It seems sufficiently probable that a deceitful oath in the forum of God is not simply obligatory, although in the forum of the Church it binds, and at the same time the crime of perjury is committed.
I respond: For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that here there is a twofold way of speaking.
For some wished to say that a deceitful oath simply binds, since, even though the deceiver intends to deceive another, he nonetheless intends to speak obligatory words; and while he voluntarily brings them forth outwardly, he simply binds himself. Nor is he in any way excused by the fraudulence of his heart, because not only the receiver but even Truth itself accepts the words according to the sense which they make, and thus they say not only in the sight of men, but even in truth, that a deceitful oath is obligatory.
But since the obligation of an oath is obligatory, just like the obligation of a vow and of marriage; therefore it seems that it must be said by others that just as marriage is not true unless an interior consent be present, nor is a vow obligatory unless there be an intention of binding11: so too neither must the deceitful oath itself be said to be simply obligatory, in which one swears in such a way that nonetheless he does not intend to bind himself through those words. And therefore according to these a twofold forum is distinguished, namely the forum of the Church and the forum of conscience. According to the forum of the Church such an oath is obligatory; for the Church judges concerning those things which can bind outwardly12; whence since those words express an obligation, it judges the one swearing thus to be bound to that which the words convey. But in the forum of God, who judges according to the secrets of conscience and according to truth, this man indeed is not bound, because he did not will to bind himself. Yet because he swore deceitfully and took the name of God in vain, in that very act he straightway committed the crime of perjury. Nor does he reap any advantage from his malice, because before God by that oath he is judged9 worthy of eternal punishment.
And this way of speaking indeed seems sufficiently probable. And according to it the response to the question proposed is clear; the response to the objections is also for the most part clear. For the reasons which prove that that oath is not obligatory show this not simply, but in the forum of God, who judges
according to the intention, according to which the one swearing deceitfully did not intend to bind himself. But the reasons which are brought in for the opposite proceed according to the ecclesiastical forum; otherwise they do not conclude.
To the arguments for the affirmative part:
To 1. Whence to the authority of Isidore, in which he says that God accepts the words according to the intention of the receiver10; it must be said that he says this, not because God himself for this reckons the man bound, but because from the fact that this man does not intend to swear as the other intended to receive, God, who required this out of truth and justice, reckons him bound to punishment. — Or that statement can be understood causally, so that it be said that God so accepts because he so wills it to be accepted by the Church itself, and so wills it also to be judged.
To 2. To that which is objected, that fraud and deceit ought to give patronage to no one; the response is clear from what has already been said: because fraud and deceit do not give patronage to this man in the forum of the Church—rather he is compelled by the Church itself to keep the oath, as if he had sworn truly and faithfully; nor do they give patronage even in the forum of God, because by this very fact he is bound and is made guilty of a great punishment. Whence if he comes to penance, a grave penance is to be imposed on him; and it is sound counsel and fitting that, by the merit of his fault, it be imposed on him to fulfill the oath in which he intended to deceive his neighbor, although it cannot be proved against him in the face of the Church itself.
To 3, 4. To the two following the response is likewise clear: because the obligation of words and the certification through a superadded oath regard the ecclesiastical forum; and therefore they conclude an obligation not simply, but with respect to that forum13. And this indeed must be granted.
But to that which is asked, when the words are twofold, in such a way that no deceit intervenes, by whose14 intention one must stand; it must be said that those manifold words either rather put forward one of those senses according to common usage, or equally put forward both. If they rather put forward one sense, one must stand by that intention which understood that sense. But if they are held indifferently toward both; since neither can be proved, one must stand by the judgment of good men, who, the conjectures and reasons having been weighed, ought to condescend to the sounder and purer intention15. — Yet that authority of Isidore does not bear on the matter, because Isidore calls him to swear by artifice whose swearing is deceitful; but it is not necessary that deceit or artifice always intervene when the words are manifold16.
I. This question turns upon a promissory oath, which by St. Bonaventure and the other ancients « is appropriately called obligatory » (Scotus, here in the sole question, n. 9). It is then deceitful when one swearing—that he will do something—in the very act of swearing intends the opposite, and does not intend to bind himself to that which is sworn; and such a one in the very act of swearing sins mortally, because he brings forward God as it were a witness of his purpose to fulfill something, while nonetheless he intends the opposite. Yet after that oath he does not remain [namely, speaking per se] bound, because in private obligations no one is bound who does not intend to bind himself » (so Scotus defines and resolves it, here in the sole question, n. 10). A deceitful oath taken in this sense is the same as a feigned oath, which according to more recent authors, in the uttering of the oath's words, can come about in two ways, namely when the words are brought forth with the intention either of not swearing, or, in a promise, of not binding oneself. Such an oath is not valid, yet it is illicit, as is established from proposition 25 among those condemned by Innocent XI: « With cause it is licit to swear without the intention of swearing, whether the matter be slight or grave ». But that a feigned oath is always a mortal sin, as Scotus seems to hold, is denied by more recent authors (cf. St. Alphonsus, Homo apost. tr. 5. n. 17). — But in another sense a deceitful oath is often understood of a true oath made with words having a twofold sense, when « the one swearing intends one sense, and the receiver another » (the incidental question here). But this can be with deceit, or without deceit of the one swearing. « But if the one swearing does not employ deceit, he is bound according to the intention of the swearer » (St. Thomas, S. II–II. q. 89. a. 7. ad 4); concerning which there is no doubt; and the same St. Bonaventure here teaches, but adds certain things. — But if the one swearing deceives the receiver by deceit, St. Thomas resolves that « the oath must be kept according to the sound understanding of him to whom the oath is given ». As to the deceitful oath itself, concerning which is the principal question here, St. Thomas (here a. 3. quaestiuncula 3) teaches: « Although by the very nature of the oath, insofar as it is an oath, one is not bound to keep it except according to his own intention; nonetheless by the necessity of the oath, insofar as it was deceitful, one is bound to keep it in such a way that another not be injured by the deceit; and this is the case when one fulfills the oath according to the intention of the receiver ». Concerning the last words St. Bonaventure judges a little more mildly, with many more recent authors. — Concerning the obligation which the forum of the Church imposes on one who swears deceitfully, there is no doubt.
II. Concerning this question, besides those praised: Alex. of Hales, Sum. p. III. q. 31. m. 4. a. 3. — B. Albert, here a. 8. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2. a. 8. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2. q. I. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the two following questions, here q. 3.
III. In the solution of the following (2nd) question the now most common opinion is that a coerced promissory oath concerning a licit matter is valid in the internal forum, because the one swearing, although he is not bound to the one unjustly coercing, nonetheless contracted an obligation before God. Yet that is of the strictest interpretation and rescindable, at least in the forum of the Church. — Alex. of Hales, between the two opinions related here, left the matter undecided. On the same (2nd) question: Alex. of Hales, loc. cit. m. 4. a. 4. §2. — St. Thomas, here a. 3. quaestiuncula 2; S. loc. cit. a. 7. ad 3. — B. Albert, here a. 9. 10. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2. a. 6. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2. q. 2. — Durandus, here q. 2.
IV. Likewise the following (3rd) question is concerning a promissory oath. The three definitions of an incautious oath set down here are common among the ancient doctors. In these three species there is lacking that condition of a licit oath which is called justice. By more recent authors (cf. Sporer, Theol. moral. tom. 1. tr. 3. sect. 4. § 1) that oath is called incautious « by which one swears without due consideration and examination as to whether what is sworn is true or false ». — The moral case which is proposed in the incidental question is likewise solved by St. Thomas in the Summa (loc. cit. ad 2), and also by Alexander of Hales (loc. cit. m. 4. a. 4. § 1), who nonetheless reports the opinion of others, who without distinction assert that that oath is incautious and not obligatory simply; whose opinion is somewhat favored by the words of St. Thomas, in his Commentary here a. 3. quaestiuncula I. ad 3. Concerning the (3rd) question itself, besides St. Thomas: Alex. of Hales, loc. cit. m. 4. a. I. 2. — Scotus, loc. cit. n. II. — B. Albert, here a. 7. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2. a. 5. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2. q. 3. — Durandus, here q. 3.
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- Hic c. 11. Pro Deus sic accipit cod. F cum textu originali Deus tamen, qui conscientiae testis est, ita hoc accipit.Here ch. 11. For God so accepts codex F, with the original text, reads yet God, who is the witness of conscience, so accepts this.
- Cap. Ex tenore, x. de Rescriptis. Cfr. supra pag. 413, nota 2. — Plures codd. debent.The chapter Ex tenore, in the Decretals, on Rescripts. Cf. above, p. 413, note 2. — Several codices read debent (ought).
- Regula 85. Iuris in VI: Contractus ex conventione legem accipere dignoscuntur. Cfr. Iustinian., II. Digest. tit. 14. Lex 1. — In fine arg. pro simplex et verum codd. N Q simpliciter verum.Rule 85 of the Rules of Law in the Sixth Book: Contracts are known to take their law from agreement. Cf. Justinian, Digest book II, title 14, Law 1. — At the end of the argument, for simple and true codices N Q read simply true.
- Vat. publicum.The Vatican edition reads publicum (public).
- Libr. XXVI. Moral. c. 10 n. 15. exponens illud Iob 34, 2: Nunquid aequa tibi videtur tua cogitatio, ut diceres: Iustior sum Deo? ait: Humanae aures verba nostra talia iudicant, qualia foris sonant; divina vero iudicia talia ea audiunt, qualia ex intimis proferuntur. Apud homines cor ex verbis, apud Deum vero verba pensantur ex corde. Beatus ergo Iob, dum hoc ait exterius quod interius Dominus dixit, omne quod locutus est tanto iuste exterius intulit, quanto pie ab interna sententia non recessit etc. Cfr. C. Humanae, c. 21. q. 5, ubi verba haec adducuntur; et paulo inferius a Gratiano additur: Si intentio non debet servire verbis, sed verba intentioni etc.Gregory, Morals, book XXVI, ch. 10, n. 15, expounding that of Job 34:2: Does your thought seem just to you, that you should say: I am more just than God? he says: Human ears judge our words such as they sound outwardly; but the divine judgments hear them such as they are brought forth from the inmost parts. Among men the heart is weighed from the words, but with God the words are weighed from the heart. Blessed Job therefore, while he said outwardly that which the Lord said inwardly, brought forth outwardly all that he spoke as justly as he piously did not depart from the inner sentence, etc. Cf. the canon Humanae, c. 21. q. 5, where these words are adduced; and a little below it is added by Gratian: If the intention ought not to serve the words, but the words the intention, etc.
- Vers. 7: Homo enim videt ea quae parent, Dominus autem etc. — Pro parent non pauci codd. cum edd. 1, 2 patent, et pro Deus cod. U Dominus. Inferius pro secundum intentionem cod. U ex intentione, et pro non intendat codd. F K non intendit.Verse 7: For man sees those things which appear, but the Lord etc. — For parent (appear) not a few codices, with editions 1 and 2, read patent (lie open), and for Deus codex U reads Dominus. Below, for according to the intention codex U reads from the intention, and for let him not intend codices F K read he does not intend.
- Codd. A N intendit.Codices A N read intendit (intends).
- Secundum Hieron. super illud Ierem. 4, 2: Et iudicabis: Vivit Dominus in veritate et in iudicio et in iustitia. Edit. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1.According to Jerome on that of Jeremiah 4:2: And you shall judge: The Lord lives, in truth and in judgment and in justice. See the edition here at the text of the Master, ch. 1.
- Cod. G reputatur, cod. U est. Inferius pro etiam codd. A N U et etiam.Codex G reads reputatur (is reckoned), codex U reads est (is). Below, for also codices A N U read and also.
- Permulti codd. obligari.Very many codices read obligari (to be bound).
- Cfr. IV. Sent. d. 27. a. 2. q. 2, ubi de matrimonio, et d. 38. a. 1. q. 1, ubi de voto. — Paulo ante pro obligatoria codd. A bb voluntaria. Aliquanto inferius pro secundum istos cod. A secundum istum modum.Cf. Sentences IV, d. 27. a. 2. q. 2, where on marriage, and d. 38. a. 1. q. 1, where on a vow. — A little before, for obligatory codices A bb read voluntary. Somewhat below, for according to these codex A reads according to this manner.
- Cod. A, pro concludunt posito excludunt, substituit ad aliud forum. — (positio in textu) Codd. A U cui. Aliquanto inferius pro quae illum sensum codd. A K L N Q V aa bb qui illum sensum.Codex A, having put excludunt (they exclude) for concludunt (they conclude), substitutes to another forum. — Codices A U read cui. Somewhat below, for which [understood] that sense codices A K L N Q V aa bb read who [understood] that sense.
- Cod. A, pro concludunt posito excludunt, substituit ad aliud forum.Codex A, having put excludunt (they exclude) for concludunt (they conclude), substitutes to another forum.
- Codd. A U cui. Aliquanto inferius pro quae illum sensum codd. A K L N Q V aa bb qui illum sensum.Codices A U read cui. Somewhat below, for which [understood] that sense codices A K L N Q V aa bb read who [understood] that sense.
- In cod. H additur: Ceteris tamen paribus, magis condescendere est intentioni recipientis quam iurantis; quia minus praesumitur de dolo ex parte eius qui verba audit, quam ex parte eius qui verba proponit. Et ratio huius est, quia in foro Ecclesiae non solum aspicitur ad ipsam veritatem, sed etiam ad coniecturae probabilitatem.In codex H is added: Yet other things being equal, it is rather to condescend to the intention of the receiver than of the swearer; because less deceit is presumed on the part of him who hears the words than on the part of him who proposes the words. And the reason of this is that in the forum of the Church regard is had not only to truth itself, but also to the probability of conjecture.
- Can. Qui peierare, c. 22. q. 5. Gratian. concludit: Ex his omnibus colligitur, quod iuramenta secundum intentionem praestantis, non recipientis, a Deo iudicantur. Quomodo ergo, secundum Isidorum, quacumque arte verborum quis iurat, Deus sic accipit, sicut ille cui iuratur, intelligit? Sed sicut aliud est callida arte verborum iurare, aliud simpliciter intentionem suam iurando enuntiare, sic aliud est simplici intentione iuramentum factum recipere, aliud in recipiendo calliditate uti; quia sicut quisquam apud Deum non valet aliquem laedere, sic nec praeter eius intentionem valet quis alicui subvenire. Deus autem duplicitatis aspernator simplicem intentionem utriusque considerat, et tam ex parte recipientis quam ex parte praestantis verborum artem aspernatur et odit.The canon Qui peierare, c. 22. q. 5. Gratian concludes: From all these it is gathered that oaths are judged by God according to the intention of the one who gives them, not of the one who receives them. How then, according to Isidore, by whatever artifice of words one swears, does God so accept it just as he to whom one swears understands it? But just as it is one thing to swear by the cunning artifice of words, another simply to declare one's intention in swearing, so it is one thing to receive with simple intention an oath that has been made, another to use cunning in receiving it; because just as no one before God is able to injure another, so neither is anyone able, apart from his intention, to assist another. But God, the spurner of duplicity, considers the simple intention of each, and both on the part of the receiver and on the part of the giver of the words he spurns and hates artifice.