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Dist. 39, Art. 3, Q. 2

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 39

Textus Latinus
p. 877

Quaestio II. Utrum omne iuramentum coactum sit obligatorium.

Secundo quaeritur de iuramento coacto, et est quaestio, utrum omne iuramentum coactum sit obligatorium. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Omne iuramentum, quod habet iudicium et iustitiam et veritatem, est obligatorium1; sed iuramentum coactum potest haec tria habere: ergo videtur, quod sit obligatorium.

2. Item, « coacta voluntas, ut vult Augustinus2, vere voluntas est »; sed iuramentum dicitur coactum, quia fit a voluntate coacta: ergo iuramentum coactum a vera voluntate est. Sed cum quis voluntate aliquid iurat, nisi sit malum, se ipsum obligat: ergo etc.

3. Item, peccatum ex coactione perpetratum inducit obligationem ad poenam aeternam: si ergo iuramentum de sui natura obligat ad veritatem servandam, sicut peccatum obligat ad poenam perferendam; videtur per simile, quod iuramentum coactum sit obligatorium.

4. Item, hoc ipsum videtur auctoritate Augustini3. Quidam coactus iuravit cuidam concubinae, quod eam duceret in uxorem et ulterius non exhiberet parentes suos. Respondet beatus Augustinus ex consilio beati Ambrosii, quod matrimonium teneret et poeniteret de residuo: ergo videtur secundum sententiam beati Augustini, quod iuramentum coactum sit obligatorium.

Sed contra: 1. Vota coacta non obligant, quia votum est promissio spontanea4; sed iuramenti obligatio similiter a voluntate nostra procedit: ergo non videtur, quod iuramenta coacta sint obligatoria.

2. Item, « praetor5 dicit — et Tullius etiam in Rhetoricis — quod vi vel metu factum est ratum non habeo »: si ergo lex habet ratam omnem obligationem iustam, videtur, quod iuramenta coacta non sint obligatoria.

3. Item, causa metus mortis cadit in virum constantem; sed metus, qui cadit in virum constantem, excusat a toto, secundum quod iurisperiti6 dicunt: ergo videtur, quod iuramentum, quod fit ex tali metu, non sit obligatorium.

4. Item, coactio excludit contractum matrimonialem7; sed tanti roboris et obligationis est ipsum matrimonium, quanti et iuramentum: si ergo matrimonium ex coactione contractum non est obligatorium, eadem ratione videtur quod nec iuramentum.

Conclusio

Iuramentum coactum respectu rei licitae in foro Dei obligatorium esse videtur, nisi relaxetur.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod hic est duplex modus dicendi.

Quidam enim dicunt, quod cum duplex sit iuramentum, videlicet promissorium et assertorium8, respectu iuramenti assertorii coactio non excusat a toto, sed a tanto. Si quis enim coactus iurat et asserit, falsum esse verum, incurrit crimen periurii. In iuramento vero obligatorio sive promissorio coactio, quae surgit ex metu, qui potest cadere in constantem virum, a toto excusat — tale enim iuramentum licitum est et non est contra Deum, quo quis promittit, aliquid alicui se daturum, vel facturum — et ideo respectu talis iuramenti potest intervenire coactio sufficiens ad inclinandum etiam constantem virum. Et quia coactio sufficiens intervenit, voluntas illa non est iudicanda voluntas; ac per9 hoc nec iuramentum illud est vere obligatorium, ut dicunt.

Sed quoniam verba Augustini et consilium etiam

p. 878

eius videtur esse in contrarium — videtur enim beatus Augustinus iudicare tale iuramentum obligatorium — ideo est alius modus dicendi, ut distinguatur duplex forum, videlicet ecclesiasticum et divinum, ita quod obligatio iuramenti coacti e contrario se habet obligationi iuramenti dolosi respectu huius duplicis fori10. Nam in foro Ecclesiae iuramentum coactum non est obligatorium: tum quia Ecclesia praesumit, quia iste qui coacte iuravit, non iuravit voluntate implendi iuramentum, sed potius evadendi periculum; tum etiam, quia ille qui iurare compulit, cum malitiose et dolose processerit, nullum ius acquisivit nec de malitia commodum reportare debuit; unde nullum habet ius repetendi. — In foro autem Dei iuramentum coactum obligatorium est, quia, cum Deus aspiciat voluntatem interiorem, et voluntas non possit cogi coactione sufficiente, sed inducente11, et ita voluntas coacta voluntas sit, iudicat Deus, talem hominem obligari. Et ideo in foro conscientiae secundum theologos consulendum est ei qui sic iuravit, nisi relaxationem inveniat, iuramentum implere; et hoc dico, si iuramentum illud fuit respectu rei licitae. — Unde rationes concedi possunt, quae sunt ad partem istam.

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur in contrarium de obligatione voti; dicendum, quod non est simile; quia votum respicit obligationem ad Deum, qui vult sacrificia non coacta, sed voluntaria12. Si quis tamen coactione inducente cogatur, ut votum emittat, videlicet ut in periculo mortis existens a Domino liberetur, non videtur absurdum dicere, eum esse obligatum.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de praetore et lege, quod non reputat ratum iuramentum factum per metum; dicendum, quod lex loquitur in foro iudiciali, quia non intromittit se de foro conscientiae. Unde secundum illud forum verum est, quod iuramentum coactum non obligat. Ex hoc tamen non potest concludi, quod non obliget quantum ad Deum.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod metus, qui potest cadere in constantem virum, excusat a toto; dicendum, quod licet respectu actuum humanorum possit cadere metus sufficiens in virum constantem; tamen quantum ad ea quae iustitiae sunt, non potest cadere metus sufficiens in virum constantem. Quantum enim ad illa dicit Dominus13: Nolite timere eos qui corpus occidunt. Ideo apud Deum talis metus non reputatur causa sufficiens ad excusandum hominem a reatu peccati, vel ab obligatione iuramenti.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de obligatione matrimonii, dicendum, quod non est simile: quia matrimonium hoc habet ex ratione significationis et institutionis, ut contrahatur ex mera et libera voluntate. Significat enim coniunctionem Christi et Ecclesiae Dei et animae, in qua nulla intervenit coactio, sed mera benignitatis dilectio14. Non sic autem est ex parte iuramenti. — Et si tu quaeras de illo qui coactus iuravit contrahere matrimonium, utrum teneatur; dicendum, quod tenetur, nisi ex causa superveniente absolvatur. Si tamen contrahat cum alia, in contrahendo peccat mortaliter nec amplius obligatur, sed pro culpa periurii est ei poenitentia imponenda: et de hoc amplius habetur in quarto in tractatu de matrimonio15.

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English Translation

Question II. Whether every coerced oath is binding.

Secondly there is inquiry concerning a coerced oath, and the question is whether every coerced oath is binding. And that it is, seems to be the case.

1. Every oath which has judgment and justice and truth is binding1; but a coerced oath can have these three: therefore it seems that it is binding.

2. Likewise, « a coerced will, as Augustine holds2, is truly a will »; but an oath is called coerced because it is made by a coerced will: therefore a coerced oath is from a true will. But when one swears something with the will, unless it be evil, he binds himself: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, a sin perpetrated through coercion induces an obligation to eternal punishment: if therefore an oath by its own nature binds to keeping the truth, just as a sin binds to bearing punishment; it seems by likeness that a coerced oath is binding.

4. Likewise, this very thing seems to be the case from the authority of Augustine3. A certain man, coerced, swore to a certain concubine that he would take her as wife and would no longer maintain his parents. Blessed Augustine responds, from the counsel of blessed Ambrose, that he should keep the marriage and do penance for the rest: therefore it seems, according to the judgment of blessed Augustine, that a coerced oath is binding.

On the contrary: 1. Coerced vows do not bind, because a vow is a spontaneous promise4; but the obligation of an oath likewise proceeds from our will: therefore it does not seem that coerced oaths are binding.

2. Likewise, « the praetor5 says — and Tully also in the Rhetoric — what has been done by force or fear I do not hold ratified »: if therefore the law holds ratified every just obligation, it seems that coerced oaths are not binding.

3. Likewise, the cause of the fear of death falls upon a steadfast man; but fear which falls upon a steadfast man excuses wholly, according to what the jurists6 say: therefore it seems that an oath which is made from such fear is not binding.

4. Likewise, coercion excludes the marriage contract7; but marriage itself is of as much strength and obligation as an oath: if therefore a marriage contracted from coercion is not binding, by the same reasoning it seems that neither is an oath.

Conclusion

A coerced oath, with respect to a licit matter, seems to be binding in the forum of God, unless it be relaxed.

I respond: For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that here there is a twofold way of speaking.

For some say that, since an oath is twofold, namely promissory and assertory8, with respect to an assertory oath coercion does not excuse wholly, but in part. For if anyone, coerced, swears and asserts that what is false is true, he incurs the crime of perjury. But in an obligatory or promissory oath, the coercion which arises from fear—fear that can fall upon a steadfast man—excuses wholly; for such an oath is licit and not against God, by which one promises that he will give or do something to someone—and therefore with respect to such an oath there can intervene a coercion sufficient to incline even a steadfast man. And because a sufficient coercion intervenes, that will is not to be judged a will; and consequently9 neither is that oath truly binding, as they say.

But since the words of Augustine and also his counsel

seem to be to the contrary—for blessed Augustine seems to judge such an oath binding—therefore there is another way of speaking, namely to distinguish a twofold forum, that is the ecclesiastical and the divine, in such a way that the obligation of a coerced oath is related contrariwise to the obligation of a deceitful oath with respect to this twofold forum10. For in the forum of the Church a coerced oath is not binding: both because the Church presumes that this man who swore under coercion did not swear with the will of fulfilling the oath, but rather of escaping the danger; and also because he who compelled the swearing, since he proceeded maliciously and deceitfully, acquired no right nor ought to have reaped advantage from his malice; whence he has no right of reclaiming. — But in the forum of God a coerced oath is binding, because, since God beholds the interior will, and the will cannot be coerced by a sufficient coercion, but [only] by an inducing11 one, and thus the coerced will is a will, God judges such a man to be bound. And therefore in the forum of conscience, according to the theologians, it must be counseled to him who has so sworn, unless he find a relaxation, that he fulfill the oath; and this I say, if that oath was with respect to a licit matter. — Whence the reasons which are for this part can be granted.

1. But to that which is objected to the contrary concerning the obligation of a vow; it must be said that it is not alike; because a vow regards an obligation to God, who wills sacrifices not coerced, but voluntary12. Yet if anyone be compelled by an inducing coercion to make a vow, namely that, being in danger of death, he be freed by the Lord, it does not seem absurd to say that he is bound.

2. To that which is objected concerning the praetor and the law, that it does not reckon ratified an oath made through fear; it must be said that the law speaks in the judicial forum, because it does not concern itself with the forum of conscience. Whence according to that forum it is true that a coerced oath does not bind. Yet from this it cannot be concluded that it does not bind with respect to God.

3. To that which is objected, that fear which can fall upon a steadfast man excuses wholly; it must be said that, although with respect to human acts a sufficient fear can fall upon a steadfast man; nonetheless with respect to those things which belong to justice, a sufficient fear cannot fall upon a steadfast man. For as to those things the Lord says13: Do not fear those who kill the body. Therefore with God such fear is not reckoned a cause sufficient to excuse a man from the guilt of sin, or from the obligation of an oath.

4. To that which is objected concerning the obligation of marriage, it must be said that it is not alike: because marriage has this from the account of its signification and institution, that it be contracted from a sincere and free will. For it signifies the conjunction of Christ and the Church of God and the soul, in which no coercion intervenes, but the sincere love of kindness14. But it is not so on the part of an oath. — And if you ask concerning him who, coerced, swore to contract marriage, whether he is bound; it must be said that he is bound, unless he be absolved by a supervening cause. Yet if he contract with another, in contracting he sins mortally and is no longer bound, but for the fault of perjury a penance is to be imposed on him: and concerning this more is had in the fourth [book] in the treatise on marriage15.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Cfr. supra pag. 875, nota 2.
    Cf. above, p. 875, note 2.
  2. Libr. de Spiritu et lit. c. 31. n. 53: Si subtilius advertamus, etiam quod quisque invitus facere cogitur, si facit, voluntate facit; sed quia mallet aliud, ideo invitus, hoc est nolens facere dicitur. Cfr. C. Si vero, x. de Iureiur., ubi dicitur, iuramentum per metum extortum, si servari potest sine interitu salutis aeternae, servandum esse. — Inferius pro cum quis voluntate cod. U cum quis voluntarie [edd. ex voluntate].
    On the Spirit and the Letter, c. 31, n. 53: If we observe more subtly, even what each one is unwillingly compelled to do, if he does it, he does it by the will; but because he would prefer otherwise, he is therefore said to do it unwillingly, that is, not willing. Cf. the canon Si vero, in the Decretals, on Oaths, where it is said that an oath extorted through fear, if it can be kept without the loss of eternal salvation, must be kept. — Below, for when one [swears] with the will codex U reads when one [swears] voluntarily [editions read from the will].
  3. Secundum Gratian., C. Inter cetera c. 22. q. I. Nam ipse illi canoni haec verba praemittit: Unde Augustinus scribit Severo Milevetano episcopo, consulenti de quodam Hubaldo, qui a consanguineis cuiusdam pellicis coactus fuerat iurare, se illam ducturum in coniugem nec matri suae vel fratribus ulterius necessaria subministraturum. Rescribit ergo B. Augustinus, ut diximus, Severo Milevetano episcopo, ita dicens: Inter cetera, ut rogaveras, a patre nostro Ambrosio quaesivi etc. In nota adiecta editores dicunt: Nihil hunc canonem cum Augustino commune habere censemus (ed. Migne). — Pro exhiberet (i. e. alimentaret, cfr. Forcellini Lexicon etc.) edd. adverteret. Eodem sensu utuntur verbo exhibeo Guliel. Antissiod., S. p. III. tr. 24. q. 2, et Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 31. m. 4. a. 4. § 2.
    According to Gratian, the canon Inter cetera, c. 22. q. I. For he prefixes these words to that canon: Whence Augustine writes to Severus, bishop of Mileve, who consulted concerning a certain Hubaldus, who had been coerced by the kinsmen of a certain concubine to swear that he would take her as wife and would no longer supply necessities to his mother or brothers. Blessed Augustine therefore writes back, as we have said, to Severus, bishop of Mileve, saying thus: Among other things, as you had asked, I inquired of our father Ambrose, etc. In an added note the editors say: We judge that this canon has nothing in common with Augustine (Migne's edition). — For exhiberet (i.e. should provide food, cf. Forcellini's Lexicon etc.) the editions read adverteret. In the same sense William of Auxerre, Summa p. III. tr. 24. q. 2, and Alex. of Hales, Summa p. III. q. 31. m. 4. a. 4. § 2, use the word exhibeo.
  4. Magister, IV. Sent. d. XXXVIII. p. I: Votum est testificatio quaedam promissionis spontaneae, quae Deo, et de his quae Dei sunt, proprie fieri debet. — Pro promissio, quod habent codd. B K M X Z plures codd. et edd. coactio, cod. H contractio, cod. bb obligatio.
    The Master, Sentences IV, d. XXXVIII. p. I: A vow is a certain testification of a spontaneous promise, which ought properly to be made to God and concerning those things which are of God. — For promissio (promise), which codices B K M X Z and several codices and editions have, [some read] coactio (coercion), codex H contractio (contract), codex bb obligatio (obligation).
  5. Iustinian. IV. Digest. lit. 2. Lex I: Ait praetor: Quod metus causa gestum erit ratum non habebo. Cfr. II. Codic., lit. 20. de iis quae vi metusve causa gesta sunt, Lex 7. et 8. — Cicero I. Rhetor. c. II, et II. c. 31. quoad sensum; sed si verba attendantur, vide III. offic. c. 30, ubi dicit: Non debuit esse ratum quod erat actum per vim. Cfr. ibid. c. 28.
    Justinian, Digest book IV, title 2, Law I: The praetor says: What shall have been done for the sake of fear I shall not hold ratified. Cf. Code book II, title 20, on those things which have been done by force or for the sake of fear, Laws 7 and 8. — Cicero, Rhetoric book I, c. II, and book II, c. 31, as to the sense; but if the words be attended to, see On Duties book III, c. 30, where he says: That ought not to have been ratified which was done through force. Cf. ibid. c. 28.
  6. Cfr. Lex: Metum accipiendum, et Lex: Metus autem causa. — Lege 6. (IV. Digest. tit. 2.) dicitur: Metum autem non vani hominis, sed qui merito et in hominem constantissimum cadat, ad hoc edictum pertinere dicemus.
    Cf. the Law: Fear is to be taken, and the Law: But for the sake of fear. — In Law 6 (Digest book IV, title 2) it is said: But we shall say that to this edict pertains the fear not of a vain man, but such as may with reason fall even upon a most steadfast man.
  7. Cfr. IV. Sent. d. 29. q. I.
    Cf. Sentences IV, d. 29, q. I.
  8. Vide supra pag. 862, nota 2. — Aliquanto inferius pro qui potest non pauci codd. cum edd. 1, 2 incongrue quae potest.
    See above, p. 862, note 2. — Somewhat below, for which can [fall] not a few codices, with editions 1 and 2, read incongruously quae potest.
  9. Cod. G et propter, codd. B C D F H L V bb sic per.
    Codex G reads et propter (and on account of), codices B C D F H L V bb read sic per (thus through).
  10. Cfr. quaest. praeced.
    Cf. the preceding question.
  11. De quo vide II. Sent. d. 25. p. II. q. 4. — Circa finem corp. pro fuit codd. G K fuerit.
    Concerning which see Sentences II, d. 25. p. II. q. 4. — Near the end of the body, for fuit codices G K read fuerit.
  12. Cfr. IV. Sent. d. 38. a. I. q. I. ad 4, ubi triplex differentia voti et iuramenti affertur.
    Cf. Sentences IV, d. 38. a. I. q. I. ad 4, where a threefold difference of a vow and an oath is brought forward.
  13. Matth. 10, 28.
    Matthew 10:28.
  14. Vide Eph. 5, 25. seqq. — Paulo superius pro Dei cod. U et Dei.
    See Ephesians 5:25 ff. — A little above, for of God codex U reads and of God.
  15. Dist. 29. per totam. — Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    Distinction 29, throughout. — See the scholion on the preceding question.
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