Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 29, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 29

Textus Latinus

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Articulus Unicus. De consensu coacto.

Quaestio I. Utrum consensus coactus faciat matrimonium.

Circa primum ostenditur, quod consensus coactus faciat matrimonium; et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia Augustinus¹ dicit, quod «coacta voluntas voluntas est»: ergo cum consensus sit voluntatis, consensus est; sed «posita causa, ponitur effectus»: ergo posito tali consensu, est matrimonium.

2. Item, hoc videtur ratione per simile: quia qui baptizari consentit timore mortis, baptizatus est et pro baptizato habetur²: ergo similiter est in matrimonio.

3. Item, hoc videtur per rationem: quia consensus non potest cogi, sed tantum induci³, sed sicut inducitur minis, ita inducitur blanditiis; sed si aliquis inductus blanditiis consentiat in matrimonium, matrimonium tenet: ergo similiter, si inducitur minis.

4. Item, qui negat Christum timore mortis, peccat; sed nullus peccat nisi liber⁴: ergo consentiens in aliquid timore mortis libere consentit. Sed consensus liber facit matrimonium: ergo qui consentit timore mortis etc.

Contra:

1. Decretalis, de Sponsalibus et matrimonio⁵: «Cum locum non habeat consensus, ubi metus, vel coactio intercedit, necesse est, ut ubi consensus communis requiritur, coactionis materia repellatur»: ergo etc.

2. Item, consensus matrimonialis signum est coniunctionis animae et Dei⁶; sed anima non coniungitur Deo consensu coacto: ergo si signum est congruum, matrimonium non contrahitur consensu timore coacto.

3. Item, nunquam anima fit sponsa Dei, nisi uniatur per amorem: ergo mulier⁷ nunquam fit sponsa viri, nisi uniatur per amorem; sed unio, quae est per consensum coactum, non fit per amorem: ergo etc.

4. Item, in consensu matrimonii acquiritur potestas⁸ in alterutrum: ergo necesse est, quod in consentiendo sint aequales; sed cum alter cogit alterum ad consentiendum, non sunt aequales: ergo tali consensu non contrahitur matrimonium.

Conclusio. Consensus coactus vel vi, vel metu cadente in virum constantem non facit matrimonium, nisi post coactionem in carnalem copulam consentiatur.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod consensus coactus potest esse dupliciter, scilicet vi, vel metu. «Vis est maioris rei impetus, qui repelli non potest⁹»; metus est instantis periculi trepidatio. Tunc autem fit vis, quando capitur, ducitur, trahitur invitus, vel ligatus, ipso reclamante et renitente; haec est coactio, in qua non est consensus, et in hac omnino non est matrimonium. — Est et alia coactio per metum, ut cum aliquis minatur mortem vel intentat, nisi consentiat; et de hac coactione distinguunt aliqui, quod talis consentiens aut consentit ore, sed non corde, et tunc non est matrimonium aliquo modo; aut corde consentit, quamvis coactus, et tunc matrimonium est in conspectu Dei, quia «voluntas coacta voluntas est»; sed non est in conspectu Ecclesiae, quae praesumit, quod talis non consenserit corde; et ideo sic iudicat et sententiat, ut uterque alteri in Domino nubat¹⁰. — Sed certe istud non videtur consentire decretali praedictae, quae dicit, quod «consensus non habet locum, ubi metus, vel coactio intercedit».

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Et ideo distinguitur aliter, quod metus duplex est, quidam levis, quidam iustus: iustus, utpote «qui in virum constantem cadere potest¹¹»; levis est, cum quis parvum malum minatur, vel cum talis minatur, de quo praesumitur, quod implere non possit; et talis metus non facit consensum adeo defectivum, quod impediat matrimonium contrahendum, vel dirimat iam contractum, sed consensus cum tali metu facit matrimonium. Tunc autem est metus iustus, quando aliquis comminatur damnum mortis, mutilationis, servitutis et stupri¹²; tunc autem cadit in virum constantem, quando praesumitur probabiliter, quod ille qui minatur, possit minas implere; non enim esset timendum, si simplex rusticus minaretur duci. In hoc metu dicunt iura consensum non facere matrimonium.

Sed ratio huius sumitur a diversis diversimode. Quidam enim dicunt, quod hoc est ex indulgentia iuris. Iura enim indulgent, tales separari, primum, quia praesumunt, consentientem ore non consensisse corde, et quia verbum solum dixit, ut poenam redimeret; vel etiam ratione finis, quia coacta matrimonia pessimos exitus consueverunt habere¹³. — Alii dicunt, quod non ex iuris indulgentia, sed hoc facit defectus perfecti et liberi consensus, qui debet esse in matrimonio, quia, sicut ostensum est, plenus debet ibi esse consensus; et hoc videtur probabilius. Si tamen post coactionem in carnalem copulam consensit, ex tunc incipit esse matrimonium¹⁴.

Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod coacta voluntas voluntas est; dicendum, quod verum est; sed nunquam sufficit talis voluntas ad faciendum bonum¹⁵, nec etiam ad contrahendum matrimonium, pro eo quod Dominus voluit, hoc Sacramentum contrahi per consensum liberum, non coactum.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod qui coactus consentit in baptismum baptizatur; respondetur, quod baptismus est opus Dei, non hominum, sed matrimonium est a consensu hominum. — Aliter potest dici, quod non est simile: quia non tanta libertas ibi requiritur, quanta in matrimonio; totum enim esse matrimonii a consensu causatur¹⁶.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod consensus inducitur per blanditias; dicendum, quod blanditiae non ita detrahunt de ratione consensus, sicut minae, quia blanditiae ad amorem excitant, sed minae ad terrorem.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de eo qui negat Christum timore, dicendum, quod facilius est peccare quam bene facere¹⁷, unde plura exiguntur ad construendum bonum quam ad faciendum malum. — Praeterea, nullus timor respectu peccati perpetrandi potest nec debet cadere rationabiliter in virum constantem, sed respectu alicuius rei faciendae, quae non est nostrae saluti contraria; sicut vir constans rationabiliter prius deberet permittere, se interfici, quam Deum negaret¹⁸; sed non rationabiliter ageret, si dimitteret, se interfici, antequam in aliquid indifferens consentiret; matrimonium autem non est de his quae sunt saluti contraria vel contra salutem. Et sic patet, quomodo intelligitur de metu, qui potest cadere in constantem virum.

Scholion

I. Distinctio duplicis consensus coacti est communis. De relatione utriusque ad voluntarium plura vide II. Sent. d. 25. p. II. q. 5; d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 3. — In controversia illa antiqua, utrum consensus coactus per metum cadentem in constantem virum tantum iure ecclesiastico, an etiam iure divino irritum faciat matrimonium, pro prima parte stat Durandus cum non paucis posterioribus; sed quod iure divino irritet, cum S. Thoma, Scoto, Petro a Tar., Richardo a Med. aliisque tenet S. Bonav. ut magis probabile. Cfr. etiam infra dub. 2. 3. — De 1. quaestione: Scot. (de hac et 2. seqq. qq.), in utroque Scripto hic q. unica. — S. Thom., hic a. 1. 2. 3.; Suppl. q. 47. a. 1. 2. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 1-4. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Durand., hic q. 1. 2. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et 2 seqq. qq. hic q. unica.

II. Quaestionem 2. ita exprimit S. Thom. (locis citt. a. 3. quaestiunc. 2; Suppl. a. 4.): utrum consensus coactus faciat matrimonium ex parte cogentis. De eadem explicite agit etiam Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 3.

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III. Circa solutionem 3. quaestionis omnes conveniunt. Quod autem in solut. ad 3. determinatur de potestate Summi Pontificis, quod possit praecipere acceptationem episcopatus, hoc approbat S. Thomas (locis citt. a. 4. ad 4; a. 6. ad 4.), sed ibi non facit mentionem de illa restrictione, quam ponit Bonav., scilicet de eo qui insufficientiam suam scit et periculum animae suae rationabiliter timet. — De ipsa quaestione praeter S. Thom.: Scot., loc. cit. n. 12. — [?] Albert., supra d. 28. a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 4. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 4.

English Translation

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Article Unique. On coerced consent.

Question I. Whether a coerced consent effects marriage.

Concerning the first it is shown that a coerced consent effects marriage; and that it is so, it seems:

1. Because Augustine¹ says that "a coerced will is [still] a will": therefore, since consent is of the will, it is a consent; but "a cause being posited, an effect is posited": therefore, such a consent being posited, marriage exists.

2. Likewise, this seems so by an argument from a like case: because one who consents to be baptized out of fear of death is baptized and is held as baptized²: therefore it is likewise in marriage.

3. Likewise, this seems so by reason: because consent cannot be coerced, but only induced³; but just as it is induced by threats, so it is induced by blandishments; but if someone induced by blandishments consents to marriage, the marriage holds: therefore likewise if he is induced by threats.

4. Likewise, one who denies Christ out of fear of death sins; but no one sins unless free⁴: therefore one who consents to something out of fear of death consents freely. But a free consent effects marriage: therefore one who consents out of fear of death, etc.

On the contrary:

1. The Decretal, On Betrothals and Marriage⁵: "Since consent has no place where fear or coercion intervenes, it is necessary that, where a common consent is required, the matter of coercion be excluded": therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, the matrimonial consent is a sign of the conjoining of the soul and God⁶; but the soul is not conjoined to God by a coerced consent: therefore, if it is a fitting sign, marriage is not contracted by a consent coerced through fear.

3. Likewise, the soul never becomes the bride of God unless it is united through love: therefore the woman⁷ never becomes the bride of the man unless she is united through love; but a union which comes about through a coerced consent does not come about through love: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, in the consent of marriage a power⁸ is acquired over one another: therefore it is necessary that they be equal in consenting; but since one compels the other to consent, they are not equal: therefore marriage is not contracted by such a consent.

Conclusion. A consent coerced either by force, or by fear falling upon a steadfast man, does not effect marriage, unless after the coercion consent is given to the carnal union.

I respond: It must be said that a coerced consent can be twofold, namely by force, or by fear. "Force is the onset of a greater thing, which cannot be repelled⁹"; fear is the trepidation of an imminent danger. Now force occurs when one is seized, led, dragged unwilling, or bound, while he himself protests and resists; this is coercion in which there is no consent, and in this case there is absolutely no marriage. — There is also another coercion through fear, as when someone threatens or intends death unless [the other] consents; and concerning this coercion some distinguish, that one who thus consents either consents with the mouth but not with the heart, and then there is no marriage in any way; or he consents with the heart, although coerced, and then the marriage exists in the sight of God, because "a coerced will is [still] a will"; but it is not in the sight of the Church, which presumes that such a one has not consented with the heart; and therefore it so judges and pronounces, that each may marry the other in the Lord¹⁰. — But surely this does not seem to agree with the aforesaid decretal, which says that "consent has no place where fear or coercion intervenes."

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And therefore it is distinguished otherwise, that fear is twofold, one light, another just: just, as being one "which can fall upon a steadfast man¹¹"; it is light when someone threatens a small evil, or when such a one threatens of whom it is presumed that he cannot carry it out; and such fear does not make the consent so defective as to impede the contracting of marriage, or to dissolve one already contracted, but a consent given under such fear effects marriage. Now the fear is just when someone threatens the harm of death, mutilation, servitude, and violation¹²; and it falls upon a steadfast man when it is probably presumed that he who threatens can carry out the threats; for it would not need to be feared, if a simple rustic were to threaten to be led away. In this fear the laws say that consent does not effect marriage.

But the reason for this is taken by different people in different ways. For some say that this is from an indulgence of the law. For the laws indulge that such persons be separated, first, because they presume that one who consents with the mouth has not consented with the heart, and because he said the word only that he might buy off the penalty; or also by reason of the end, because coerced marriages are wont to have the worst outcomes¹³. — Others say that this comes not from an indulgence of the law, but from a defect of a perfect and free consent, which ought to be present in marriage, because, as has been shown, a full consent ought to be there; and this seems more probable. If, however, after the coercion he consents to the carnal union, from then it begins to be a marriage¹⁴.

To the first. To the first, then, which was objected, that a coerced will is [still] a will: it must be said that this is true; but such a will never suffices to do good¹⁵, nor even to contract marriage, since it is the Lord's will that this Sacrament be contracted through a free consent, not a coerced one.

To the second. To that which is objected, that one who is coerced and consents to baptism is baptized: it is answered that baptism is a work of God, not of men, but marriage is from the consent of men. — It can be said otherwise, that it is not similar: because as much freedom is not required there as in marriage; for the whole being of marriage is caused by consent¹⁶.

To the third. To that which is objected, that consent is induced through blandishments: it must be said that blandishments do not detract from the nature of consent as much as threats do, because blandishments incite to love, but threats to terror.

To the fourth. To that which is objected concerning one who denies Christ out of fear: it must be said that it is easier to sin than to do good¹⁷, whence more is required for the building up of good than for the doing of evil. — Moreover, no fear with respect to the perpetrating of a sin can or ought reasonably to fall upon a steadfast man, but only with respect to some deed which is not contrary to our salvation; just as a steadfast man ought reasonably first to allow himself to be killed, rather than deny God¹⁸; but he would not act reasonably if he allowed himself to be killed before consenting to something indifferent; but marriage is not among the things which are contrary to salvation or against salvation. And thus it is clear how this is to be understood concerning the fear which can fall upon a steadfast man.

Scholion

I. The distinction of a twofold coerced consent is common [to the doctors]. On the relation of each to the voluntary, see more in II Sent. d. 25, p. II, q. 5; d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. 3. — In that ancient controversy, whether a consent coerced by a fear falling upon a steadfast man renders marriage void by ecclesiastical law only, or also by divine law, Durandus stands for the first part along with not a few later writers; but that it is voided by divine law is held — along with St. Thomas, Scotus, Peter of Tarantaise, Richard of Middleton, and others — by St. Bonaventure, as more probable. Cf. also below, dub. 2, 3. — On question 1: Scotus (on this and the two following questions), in both Scripta, here q. unica. — St. Thomas, here a. 1, 2, 3; Suppl., q. 47, a. 1, 2, 3. — Bl. Albert, here a. 1–4. — Peter of Tarantaise, here a. 1, 2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1, q. 1. — Durandus, here q. 1, 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the two following questions, here q. unica.

II. St. Thomas expresses question 2 thus (in the places cited, a. 3, quaestiuncula 2; Suppl., a. 4): whether a coerced consent effects marriage on the part of the one who coerces. Richard of Middleton also treats the same question explicitly, here a. 1, q. 3.

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III. Concerning the solution to question 3, all agree. But what is determined in the solution to [question] 3 concerning the power of the Supreme Pontiff, that he can command the acceptance of a bishopric — this St. Thomas approves (in the places cited, a. 4, ad 4; a. 6, ad 4), but there he makes no mention of that restriction which Bonaventure lays down, namely concerning one who knows his own insufficiency and reasonably fears the peril of his soul. — On the question itself, besides St. Thomas: Scotus, loc. cit., n. 12. — [?] Albert, above, d. 28, a. 4. — Peter of Tarantaise, here a. 4. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1, q. 4.

Apparatus Criticus

1
Augustinus, De Spiritu et littera, c. 31, n. 53. Verba vide tom. III. pag. 877, nota 2. — De seq. axiomate (posita causa etc.) cfr. supra pag. 102, nota 3. — Post primum ergo edd. legunt a simili consensus coactus consensus est.
Augustine, On the Spirit and the Letter, c. 31, n. 53. See the words in tom. III, p. 877, note 2. — On the following axiom ("a cause being posited," etc.) cf. above, p. 102, note 3. — After the first "therefore" the editions read: "by a like [reasoning], a coerced consent is [still] a consent."
2
Vide supra d. 4. p. I. a. 2. q. 1.
See above, d. 4, p. I, a. 2, q. 1.
3
Plurimi codd. et ed. I addunt sicut.
Very many codices and edition I add "just as."
4
Plures codd. libere, codd. K R T (I a secunda manu) libere consentiat.
Several codices read "freely"; codices K, R, T (I in a second hand) read "freely consents."
5
Extra lib. IV. tit. I. c. 14. Pro communis codd. L aa cum textu originali cuiusquam, cod. A purus.
Extra, lib. IV, tit. 1, c. 14. For "common" codices L, aa, along with the original text, read "of anyone whatsoever"; codex A [reads] "pure."
6
Ut ostensum est supra d. 26. a. 2. q. 1. — In fine arg. ex cod. R posuimus consensu timore pro timore, cod. E tantum consensu.
As was shown above, d. 26, a. 2, q. 1. — At the end of the argument, from codex R we have put "by a consent [given] out of fear" for "out of fear"; codex E [reads] only "consent."
7
Ex cod. U supplevimus mulier.
From codex U we have supplied "the woman."
8
Cod. L aequa potestas. Cfr. I. Cor. 7, 4.
Codex L [reads] "equal power." Cf. 1 Cor. 7:4.
9
Secundum Iustinian., D. IV. de Eo quod metus causa etc. (tit. 2.), lex 2. (Plurimi codd. et edd. quae pro qui). Seq. definitio metus insinuatur ibid. lege Ait praetor (I.) sic: instantis vel futuri periculi causa mentis trepidatio. (Post instantis Val. etiam addit vel futuri, et post periculi codd. L Y mentis). — Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 1. coactionem sive violentiam definit: Videtur autem violentum id esse, cuius principium extrinsecus est, nihilque ad id confert ille qui cogitur.
According to Justinian, Digest IV, On him who acts from fear, etc. (tit. 2), law 2. (Very many codices and editions read "which" for "who.") The following definition of fear is likewise suggested there, in the law "The praetor says" (1), thus: "trepidation of mind on account of an imminent or future danger." (After "imminent" the Vatican edition also adds "or future," and after "danger" codices L, Y add "of mind.") — Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics III, c. 1, defines coercion or violence thus: "That seems to be violent whose principle is extrinsic, and to which he who is compelled contributes nothing."
10
Respicitur I. Cor. 7, 39: Cui vult nubat, tantum in Domino.
Reference is to 1 Cor. 7:39: "Let her marry whom she will, only in the Lord."
11
Ut dicitur in C. Veniens ad nos (15.) et C. Consultationi tuae (28.), X. de Sponsalibus et matrim. (lib. IV. tit. 1.). Cfr. Iustinian., D. IV. de Eo quod metus causa etc. (tit. 2.), lex Metum autem non vani hominis, sed qui merito et in homine constantissimo cadat (6.). Vide Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 6. seqq.
As is said in c. Veniens ad nos (15) and c. Consultationi tuae (28), X, De sponsalibus et matrimoniis (lib. IV, tit. 1). Cf. Justinian, Digest IV, On him who acts from fear, etc. (tit. 2), the law "But fear [is] not that of a vain man, but such as may justly fall even upon a most steadfast man" (6). See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics III, c. 6ff.
12
Cfr. Glossa in C. Cum dilectus filius (6.), X. de his quae vi metuve etc. (lib. I. tit. 40.), in qua tam ex iure canonico quam civili afferuntur casus, in quibus metus sit iustus sive excuset.
Cf. the Gloss on c. Cum dilectus filius (6), X, De his quae vi metuve etc. (lib. I, tit. 40), in which cases are adduced, both from canon and from civil law, in which fear is just, or excuses.
13
Sive, ut habetur in Comment. in I. Cor. 7, 39. (olim Ambrosio tributo): Quia invitae nuptiae solent malos proventus habere (Cfr. Gratian. C. 31. q. 2. introduct. Vide C. Praeterea (12.), C. Cum locum (14.) et C. Nequisivit (17.), X. de Sponsalibus et matrim. (lib. IV. tit. 1.).
Or, as it is found in the Commentary on 1 Cor. 7:39 (formerly attributed to Ambrose): "Because unwilling marriages are wont to have bad outcomes" (cf. Gratian, C. 31, q. 2, introd. See c. Praeterea (12), c. Cum locum (14), and c. Nequisivit (17), X, De sponsalibus et matrimoniis, lib. IV, tit. 1).
14
Cfr. C. Ad id quod (21.), X. de Sponsalibus et matrim.
Cf. c. Ad id quod (21), X, De sponsalibus et matrimoniis.
15
August., II. contra Litteras Petiliani, c. 83. n. 184: «Nam bene facere nemo potest, nisi elegerit, nisi amaverit quod est in libera voluntate». Haec verba habentur apud Gratian., C. Ad fidem (33.), C. 23. q. 5, ubi Glossa dicit: Potest enim aliquis male facere propter voluntatem coactam, ut [habetur] C. 15. q. 1. C. Merito (1), sed non potest bene facere propter voluntatem coactam, ut hic dicitur.
Augustine, Against the Letters of Petilian II, c. 83, n. 184: "For no one can do good unless he has chosen it, unless he has loved what lies in free will." These words are found in Gratian, c. Ad fidem (33), C. 23, q. 5, where the Gloss says: "For a man can indeed do evil on account of a coerced will, as [is found] C. 15, q. 1, c. Merito (1), but he cannot do good on account of a coerced will," as is said here.
16
Cfr. supra d. 4. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. ad 2; ibid. q. 3. ad 1. tangitur prima solutio.
Cf. above, d. 4, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, ad 2; ibid., q. 3, ad 1, where the first solution is touched upon.
17
Cod. aa addit verba Aristot., supra pag. 19, nota 7. allegata, quia facilius destruere quam construere. Pro unde cod. A cum.
Codex aa adds the words of Aristotle cited above, p. 19, note 7: "because it is easier to destroy than to build." For "whence" codex A reads "with."
18
Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 1: Quaedam autem fortasse sunt, ad quae perpetranda nemo cogi compellive potest, sed potius extrema quaeque pati ac mori convenit. Cfr. ibid. c. 6. seqq. — Post contraria cod. K (I a secunda manu) supplet bene potest in eum cadere, substituto dein unde vir pro sicut vir; Val. substituit: Nam talis timor est tantum respectu pro sed respectu.
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics III, c. 1: "But there are perhaps some things to the perpetration of which no one can be compelled or coerced, but rather it is fitting to suffer the extremity of all things, even death." Cf. ibid., c. 6ff. — After "contraria," codex K (I in a second hand) supplies "it can indeed fall upon him," substituting thereafter "whence a man" for "just as a man"; the Vatican edition substitutes "for such fear is only with respect to" for "but with respect to."