Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 38, Dubia

Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 38

Textus Latinus

p. 824

Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Qui privatim faciunt votum peccant mortaliter contrahendo. Videtur enim falsum dicere, quia possibile est, quod contrahant, ita tamen, quod nullo modo carnaliter conveniant, sicut Ioseph et Maria⁹, et Tiburtius et p. 825 Caecilia: ergo ibi non est culpa. — Item, si est ibi mortale peccatum: ergo nullus debet de hoc licentiari; sed mulier, quae vovit voto privato, licentiatur de matrimonio contrahendo, titulo de Eo quod voventes non possunt¹ etc., in decretali Veniens etc.; ibi dicitur «de voto violato congruam satisfactionem indicas et ei cui vult, in Domino nubendi licentiam non postponas».

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod contrahens matrimonium aut intendit contrahere solum intendendo et consentiendo in coniugalem societatem, aut in copulam carnalem, sive propter libidinem, sive propter generationem. Primum est licitum, secundum est mortale peccatum². De primo non loquitur Magister, sed de secundo, quia omnes contrahentes fere sic contrahere consueverunt.

Quod quaeritur de illa quae vovit voto simplici; dicendum, quod Ecclesia non dat ibi licentiam simpliciter, sed, sicut patet ex littera antecedenti, et Apparatus³ dicit ibi, «est comparativa permissio, quia permittitur malum fieri, ne veniat peius», sicut patet ex eo quod dicitur Causa vigesima secunda, quaestione prima, Considera, quod Salvator etc. Unde illud factum nullo modo trahendum est ad consequentiam, quia, sicut habetur in aliis decretalibus eiusdem tituli⁴, votum simplex impedit. — Et nota, quod praedicta mulier simplici voto vovit, quia, etsi in manibus eremitae voverit, tamen, quia non se obligabat ad religionem specialem, sed communiter ad continentiam, et ille eremita non erat persona publica, nec ipsa vestem mutavit, non fuit votum solemne⁵.

Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Solemne votum violare peccatum est et scandalum. Videtur enim haec duo male distinguere, quia ipsum scandalum peccatum est. — Item quaeritur, utrum sint ibi duo peccata. Et quod sic, videtur: quia frangendo votum peccat in Deum, sed scandalizando in proximum⁶.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod scandalum unitum peccato non facit novum peccatum quantum ad transgressionem nec quantum ad poenitentiam, sed novam addit circumstantiam aggravantem, ut fornicatio publica ultra privatam; duplex tamen esse posset quantum ad accusationem⁷. — Quod obiicitur, quod unum copulatur alteri; dicendum, quod hoc non est propter diversitatem peccati, sed circumstantiae adiectae. — Quod obiicitur, quod in Deum etc.; dicendum, quod idem peccatum et in Deum et in proximum potest esse, sed in Deum principaliter, in proximum ratione circumstantiae adiunctae⁸; et ideo hoc non facit diversa peccata, quia peccatum numeratur ratione actus, circa quem est, non ratione eius, in quem est. Si quis enim una actione offenderet plures homines, uno peccato peccaret.

Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod non potest probari quod occulte factum est etc. Videtur enim mala esse ratio, quia defectus probationis non aufert matrimonium nec facit.

Respondeo: Aliquorum opinio fuit, ut Hugutionis⁹, quod votum simplex ita impedit apud Deum, ut solemne; unde illud non est matrimonium in conspectu Dei, sed solum in facie Ecclesiae, quia non sunt testes, per quos possit dirimi; et semper alter coniugum fornicatur, alter vero per ignorantiam excusatur. — Sed nunc per iura nova¹⁰ satis determinatum est, quod vinculum voti simplicis non aufert obligationem matrimonii, tum quia minus est, tum quia potestas corporis non transfertur, tum etiam, quia in matrimonio, si non petatur, sed reddatur solum, sicut debet facere qui vovit, pro sanctificatione perfecta reputatur¹¹; unde defectus probationis non est ratio sufficiens, sed quaedam congruentia adiuncta.

p. 826

Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Viduas a proposito recedentes etc. Videtur enim male dicere, quia propositum non obligat aliquem: ergo videtur, quod non sint huiusmodi propter hoc obligatae, ergo possunt retrocedere.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Gregorius¹ intelligit non de proposito simplici vel qualicumque, sed de proposito, quod est firmatum publica testificatione, in qua est votum solemne; et istae sunt quae primam fidem irritam faciunt, ac per hoc damnationem habere noscuntur.

Dub. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: In virginali proposito se permanere simulaverunt. Videtur enim falsum dicere, quia ubi est simulatio non est votum verum: ergo nec Domino obligatur qui² se simulat obligari.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod promissio simulata dupliciter potest esse: aut quia non habet stabilitatem, aut quia non habet interiorem assensum correspondentem. Et haec duplex est, quia quaedam fit timore vel metu, «qui potest cadere in constantem virum», sicut David simulavit se stultum coram Achis, primi Regum vigesimo primo³; quaedam intentione decipiendi alios. — Prima simulatio simpliciter obligat, quia necesse est, ex quo semel se obligavit voluntarie et ore spopondit, quod permaneat in sua pollicitatione. — Si vero spopondit signo, non corde; tenetur apud forum iudiciale et coram Ecclesia, si non affuit timor; apud Deum vero tenetur facere poenitentiam de duplicitate et mendacio. — Si vero tertio modo fuit simulatio, tunc nec apud Deum nec apud Ecclesiam obligatur. Hic autem fit sermo de sponsione simulata primo modo, sicut patet Causa vigesima septima, quaestione prima⁴. Posset etiam fieri secundo modo, scilicet quando etiam non habet intentionem; tunc enim compellitur ab Ecclesia, sicut dicitur Extra, de Regularibus et transeuntibus ad religionem⁵, Vidua si sponte velum.

Dub. VI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Virgines et viduas, sive velatae fuerint, sive non, nullatenus coniugium sortire posse. — Videtur enim male dicere, quia velum est in signum professionis, sicut habitus est religiosis viris; sed ante habitus susceptionem non videtur solemnizari votum: ergo non videtur omnino impediri coniugium.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod contingit votum solemnizari tribus modis, scilicet ordinis susceptione, habitus assumtione, ubi est distinctio professorum a non professis, et propria testificatione, dum tamen fiat in manu publicae personae. Quamvis ergo tales non susceperint velum; si tamen se astrinxerunt in manu publicae personae ad continentiam, nullo modo possunt contrahere, nec de iure nec de facto. Si autem se voto simplici astrinxerunt, non possunt, scilicet sine peccato; possunt tamen de facto⁶.

Dub. VII.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Quid in omnibus peccatis est gravius quam adulterium? Videtur enim male dicere, quia gravius est peccatum in Spiritum sanctum, quod non remittitur, neque in hoc saeculo neque in futuro⁷. Item, gravius est peccatum incestus, sicut in littera sequenti habetur; item, adhuc gravius est peccatum contra naturam; item, gravius est homicidium et uxoricidium, de quo solemnis poenitentia imponitur Causa trigesima tertia, quaestione secunda, Admonere⁸ etc.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod peccatum dicitur esse gravius multis modis: aut ratione contemptus, et sic peccatum in Spiritum sanctum; aut ratione libidinis, ut peccata contra naturam, in quibus libido totum absorbet naturale iudicatorium; aut ratione ingratitudinis, et sic peccatum Adae in paradiso; aut ratione punitionis, et sic peccatum adulterii, in quo praecipiebantur moechus et moecha lapidibus obrui, sicut dicitur Deuteronomii vigesimo secundo⁹. Et sic accipitur in proposito, cum dicitur, quod est gravius etc.

Dub. VIII.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Secundum namque in poenis tenet locum. Videtur enim male dicere, quia ordo transgressionum et punitionum est secundum ordinem praeceptorum; sed istud, scilicet non moechari, non est secundum mandatum, sed est in secunda tabula. — Si dicas, quod p. 827 secundum locum tenet ratione poenae lapidationis, quae debetur blasphemo, Levitici vigesimo quarto¹, et adultero, Deuteronomii vigesimo secundo; obiicitur tunc, quia eadem poena infligitur filio contumaci et protervo, Deuteronomii vigesimo primo.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod aliqui dicunt, hoc esse intelligendum sic, quod secundum locum tenet, quia peccatum blasphemiae est a parte animae, sed peccatum adulterii est a parte corporis, et peccatum homicidii a parte coniuncti. — Sed istud non videtur, quoniam eadem poena pro istis omnibus est inflicta; omnes enim capite plectebantur. — Et ideo melius est dicere, quod hoc intelligitur ratione poenae lapidationis; homicidium vero puniebatur secundum legem talionis².

Si vero obiiciatur de filio inobediente, dicendum, quod non ratione inobedientiae solum, sed etiam ratione aliorum peccatorum, quae erant in dissipationem reipublicae, quia luxuriosus, et consimilia³.

Si quaeratur, quare adulterium ita graviter puniebatur; dicendum, quod propter duo, scilicet quia erat in destructionem concordiae ac per hoc reipublicae, quia erat generativum magnae infamiae; postremo, ratione pronitatis magnae. Et haec est causa, quare tam gravis poenitentia pro uxoricidio imponitur, ut pronitas refrenetur⁴.

Dub. IX.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Exsecrabiliter fit in meretrice, sed exsecrabilius in uxore. Videtur enim falsum dicere, quia magis peccat qui abutitur re non concessa, quam qui re concessa; quia ille dupliciter, iste uno modo: ergo gravius ille. — Item, Augustinus, de Bono coniugali⁵, ante illud verbum in originali dicit: «In rebus ad utendum concessis longe fit rationabilius, quam in eis quae non sunt concessa, vel minor, vel rarus excessus»: ergo cum uxor sit ad utendum concessa, patet etc.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod excessus in usu uxoris potest esse dupliciter: aut secundum naturam, aut contra naturam. Si secundum naturam, tolerabilior⁶ est in uxore, propter hoc quod habet excusationem aliquam. Si contra naturam, econtra est, quoniam in matrimonio sunt quaerenda bona matrimonii, et honestius tractanda est coniux quam meretrix; ideo, cum peccatum contra naturam et sit contra bona matrimonii et sit in contumeliam uxoris, cui est quaedam honestas maior in tractando eam exhibenda: hinc est, quod gravius peccat qui facit in uxore; et ideo etiam dicitur⁷, quod propter illud peccatum, scilicet contra naturam, mulier potest dimittere et fugere virum. Et sic patet, quod quamvis pluribus modis peccet qui peccat cum meretrice, quam qui peccat cum uxore; tamen hic intensius peccat propter maiorem contemptum⁸.

Dub. X.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod legitimarum foedera nuptiarum redintegranda credamus etc. Quaeritur ergo hic, si aliquis moriatur et resuscitetur, utrum uxor sua sibi reddenda sit. Et quod sic, videtur per litteram istam, quia primae nuptiae fuerunt legitimae. — Item apparet per illud quod dicitur ad Hebraeos undecimo⁹: Acceperunt mulieres de resurrectione mortuos suos. — Item ratione videtur: quia isti qui resuscitantur, non privantur hereditate paterna: ergo nec iure uxoris. — Item, qui resuscitantur divino iudicio ut dormientes sunt¹⁰; sed matrimonia sunt regenda iure poli: ergo si quantum ad Deum hic dormiens iudicatur, sicut somnus non solvit matrimonium, ita nec talis mortuus, ut videtur. — Item, si solvitur: ergo si resurgat, oportebit contrahi cum eadem: ergo bigamus iudicatur: ergo si non oportet, quod contrahat; videtur, quod primum vinculum adhuc maneat.

Contra: ad Romanos septimo¹¹: Mortuo viro, soluta est mulier a lege viri: ergo videtur, quod matrimonium sit solutum. — Item, ponatur, quod mulier, viro suo mortuo, statim contrahat; constans est, cum non sit alligata, quia non est cui ligetur, quod matrimonium est verum: ergo si primus resurgat, propter hoc non solvetur. — Item, ita vere mortuus est iste, sicut ille qui incineratur; sed tali, p. 828 quando resurget, non reddetur uxor, sicut Dominus determinat, Matthaei vigesimo secundo¹: ergo pari ratione videtur in proposito.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sicut superius² dictum est, vinculum matrimoniale non fundatur in anima, sed in coniuncto; unde cum aliquis moritur, statim perit altera pars relationis, et ideo vinculum statim solvitur; et si mulier alii esset matrimonialiter iuncta, non esset separanda. Si tamen alii non est iuncta, et ipse vult eam, ex quadam honestate est ei reddenda.

Quod ergo obiicitur, quod sunt redintegranda, verum est, quando solum de facto sunt soluta. — Quod obiicitur de undecimo ad Hebraeos, dicendum, quod mulieres acceperunt mortuos filios, non maritos³. — Quod obiicitur de hereditate, dici potest, quod illud est etiam gratia et honestas, quod ei reddatur; attamen non est simile, quia de uxore nihil potest vir post mortem disponere. Praeterea, aliud est de rebus; potest enim testari de rebus, sed non potest uxorem relinquere alii. — Quod obiicitur, quod sunt dormientes; dicendum, quod verum est respectu potentiae⁴, sed respectu veritatis in iudicando Deus iudicat vere mortuum. — Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum sit bigamus; dici potest, quod non, si illa non cognovit virum alterum, pro eo quod non dividit carnem, nec illa divisit⁵.

Dub. XI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Quodsi viri in dilectione suarum coniugum perseverent. Videtur enim male dicere, quia ex hoc videtur, quod non debet redintegrari, nisi velit vir. Contra: esto quod mulier petat; cum excusetur a fornicatione, videtur, quod vir non possit eam repellere: ergo sive diligat, sive non, debet eam resumere. — Item quaeritur, utrum talis putatio excuset⁶. Et quod non, videtur: quia nullus debet committere se discrimini: ergo quantumcumque vir mulieris se absentet, nisi sit certa, peccat, si contrahit cum alio.

Quaeritur ergo, pro quanta certitudine excusetur.

Quaeritur etiam, si dubitat, virum suum vivere, utrum debeat debitum reddere; videtur enim, quod non: quia nullus dubitans, utrum aliquid sit peccatum mortale, debet illud facere: ergo etc.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod mulier, quae putat virum suum interemptum et contrahit, aut credit hoc praesumtione tenui, quae magis debet generare dubitationem quam fidem, aut credit praesumtione probabili. Primo modo non excusatur, si contrahat, sicut dicitur Extra, de Sponsalibus et matrimoniis⁷, ubi dicitur, quod quantumcumque vir moretur in bello, et uxor sit iuvencula, tamen non debet contrahere, donec de viro mortuo aliquam habeat certitudinem; qua habita, tunc sine peccato potest contrahere, utpote si iuramentum habeat ducis exercitus, vel sociorum eius, qui mortem noverunt; et tunc excusatur. — Quodsi mulier incipiat post contractum matrimonium dubitare de morte viri; aut est dubitatio levis; et haec secundum consilium praelati poterit a corde removeri, et poterit debitum exigere et petere⁸; si vero probabiliter dubitat, debitum debet reddere, sed non exigere; si vero certificatur de vita primi viri, nec petere debet nec reddere, sed statim secundum virum deserere. Et hoc probatur per illud quod dicitur Extra, de Secundis nuptiis⁹, Dominus ac Redemptor, et Causa trigesima quarta, quaestione secunda, Cum per bellicam. Si vero non statim revertitur, tunc imputatur ei crimen adulterii, nec potest ad priorem virum redire, nisi ipse velit. In hoc casu loquitur Leo Papa¹⁰.

Ex his patent omnia obiecta. Non enim debet contrahere, nisi certitudinem habeat de morte; nec debet petere, quando probabiliter dubitat; nec debet reddere, quando est certa de vita; quodsi aliter faciat, iudicatur fornicationis rea.

Dub. XII.

Item quaeritur de hoc casu, quem ponit Magister de eo qui relinquit uxorem suam, abiens in regionem longinquam; de tali quaeritur, utrum, mortua uxore, vir possit contrahere cum alia secunda. Et quod non, videtur: quia pollutio per adulterium cum fide data impedit matrimonium, sicut supra¹¹ ostensum est; sed hoc est hic: ergo etc. — Item quaeritur, utrum talis, vivente uxore legitima, debeat reddere debitum, si compellat ipsum Ecclesia. Et videtur, quod non, quia ipse fornicatur; sed magis debet quis permittere se excommunicari quam fornicari.

Respondeo: Ad primum dicendum est, quod si, altero ignorante, contractum est, est¹² matrimonium in favorem illius qui ignoravit; si autem ille qui ignoravit, certificatur, non debet talis nec potest sibi copulari, veritate certificata. Sed primus non debet puniri, qui ignoravit, quia non peccavit; et ideo, si p. 829 ligamen primum solvatur, poterit secundum matrimonium stare.

Quod quaeritur, utrum, vivente prima, possit secundam sine peccato cognoscere; dicit Magister¹, quod sic, si reddat debitum compulsus ab Ecclesia. Sed illud hodie non tenetur, quia ecclesiastica excommunicatio non obligat ad faciendam fornicationem nec excusat; et ideo talis non debet Ecclesiae obedire; et hoc habetur Extra, de Sententia excommunicationis², Inquisitioni.

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English Translation

Dub. I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first it is asked about that which he says: Those who privately make a vow sin mortally by contracting [marriage]. For it seems to say something false, because it is possible that they contract [marriage], yet in such a way that they in no manner come together carnally, as Joseph and Mary⁹, and Tiburtius and Cecilia: therefore there is no fault there. — Likewise, if there is mortal sin there: then no one ought to be licensed for this; but a woman who has vowed with a private vow is licensed to contract marriage, under the title On the fact that those who vow cannot¹ etc., in the decretal Veniens etc.; there it is said, "concerning a violated vow, enjoin a fitting satisfaction, and do not withhold from her, for the one she wishes, license to marry in the Lord."

I respond: It must be said that one contracting marriage either intends to contract solely by intending and consenting to the conjugal society, or [intends] carnal union, whether on account of lust or on account of generation. The first is licit, the second is mortal sin². Of the first the Master does not speak, but of the second, because nearly all who contract have been accustomed to contract thus.

As for what is asked concerning her who vowed with a simple vow; it must be said that the Church does not there give license simply, but, as is clear from the preceding text, and the Apparatus³ says there, "it is a comparative permission, because an evil is permitted to be done, lest a worse come about," as is clear from what is said in Cause twenty-two, question one, Consider, that the Savior etc. Hence that deed is in no way to be drawn into a precedent, because, as is held in other decretals of the same title⁴, a simple vow impedes. — And note that the aforesaid woman vowed with a simple vow, because, although she vowed into the hands of a hermit, yet, since she did not bind herself to a special religious order but to continence in general, and that hermit was not a public person, nor did she change her habit, it was not a solemn vow⁵.

Dub. II.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: To violate a solemn vow is a sin and a scandal. For it seems to distinguish these two badly, because scandal itself is a sin. — Likewise it is asked whether there are two sins there. And that there are, it seems: because by breaking the vow one sins against God, but by giving scandal against the neighbor⁶.

I respond: It must be said that scandal united to a sin does not make a new sin as regards the transgression nor as regards the penance, but adds a new aggravating circumstance, as public fornication [adds] beyond private; it could nevertheless be twofold as regards accusation⁷. — As to the objection that the one is joined to the other; it must be said that this is not on account of a diversity of the sin, but of the added circumstance. — As to the objection that [it is] against God etc.; it must be said that the same sin can be both against God and against the neighbor, but against God principally, against the neighbor by reason of the adjoined circumstance⁸; and therefore this does not make diverse sins, because a sin is numbered by reason of the act about which it is, not by reason of the one against whom it is. For if someone by one action should offend several men, he would sin with one sin.

Dub. III.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says, that it cannot be proved which has been done secretly etc. For the reasoning seems bad, because a defect of proof neither takes away marriage nor makes it.

I respond: The opinion of some was, as of Hugutio⁹, that a simple vow impedes before God just as a solemn one does; hence that [marriage] is not a marriage in the sight of God, but only in the face of the Church, because there are no witnesses through whom it can be dissolved; and always one of the spouses fornicates, but the other is excused through ignorance. — But now by the new laws¹⁰ it has been sufficiently determined that the bond of a simple vow does not take away the obligation of marriage, both because it is less, and because the power over the body is not transferred, and also because in marriage, if [the debt] is not demanded but only rendered, as one who has vowed ought to do, it is reckoned to perfect sanctification¹¹; hence a defect of proof is not a sufficient reason, but a certain adjoined congruity.

Dub. IV.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: Widows withdrawing from their resolve etc. For it seems to say something wrong, because a resolve does not bind anyone: therefore it seems that such [widows] are not bound on account of this, therefore they can go back.

I respond: It must be said that Gregory¹ understands [this] not of a simple resolve or of any whatsoever, but of a resolve which is confirmed by public attestation, in which there is a solemn vow; and these are the ones who make void their first pledge, and thereby are known to incur damnation.

Dub. V.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: They pretended to persevere in a virginal resolve. For it seems to say something false, because where there is pretense there is no true vow: therefore neither is one bound to the Lord who² pretends to be bound.

I respond: It must be said that a simulated promise can be so in two ways: either because it does not have stability, or because it does not have an interior assent corresponding [to it]. And this [latter] is twofold, because one kind is made from fear or dread, "which can befall a steadfast man," as David feigned himself mad before Achis, first [book] of Kings, chapter twenty-one³; another kind, with the intention of deceiving others. — The first pretense binds simply, because it is necessary, from the fact that one once bound himself voluntarily and pledged with the mouth, that he remain in his promise. — But if he pledged by a sign, not with the heart; he is held in the judicial forum and before the Church, if fear was not present; but before God he is held to do penance for the duplicity and the lie. — But if the pretense was in the third way, then he is bound neither before God nor before the Church. Here, however, the discourse is about a simulated pledge in the first way, as is clear in Cause twenty-seven, question one⁴. It could also happen in the second way, namely when he does not even have the intention; for then he is compelled by the Church, as is said in the Extra[vagantes], on Religious and those passing over to religious life⁵, A widow if of her own accord [she takes] the veil.

Dub. VI.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: That virgins and widows, whether they have been veiled or not, can in no way obtain marriage. — For it seems to say something wrong, because the veil is a sign of profession, as the habit is for religious men; but before the reception of the habit the vow does not seem to be solemnized: therefore marriage does not seem to be wholly impeded.

I respond: It must be said that a vow happens to be solemnized in three ways, namely by the reception of an order, by the assumption of the habit, where there is a distinction of the professed from the non-professed, and by proper attestation, provided nevertheless that it be made in the hand of a public person. Although therefore such [women] have not received the veil; if nevertheless they bound themselves in the hand of a public person to continence, they can in no way contract [marriage], neither by law nor in fact. But if they bound themselves by a simple vow, they cannot, namely without sin; they can, however, in fact⁶.

Dub. VII.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: What in all sins is graver than adultery? For it seems to say something wrong, because graver is the sin against the Holy Spirit, which is not remitted, neither in this age nor in the future⁷. Likewise, graver is the sin of incest, as is held in the following text; likewise, still graver is the sin against nature; likewise, graver is homicide and wife-murder, for which a solemn penance is imposed [in] Cause thirty-three, question two, Admonere⁸ etc.

I respond: It must be said that a sin is called graver in many ways: either by reason of contempt, and thus the sin against the Holy Spirit; or by reason of lust, as the sins against nature, in which lust absorbs the whole natural judgment; or by reason of ingratitude, and thus the sin of Adam in paradise; or by reason of punishment, and thus the sin of adultery, in which the adulterer and the adulteress were commanded to be overwhelmed with stones, as is said in Deuteronomy, chapter twenty-two⁹. And thus it is taken in the matter at hand, when it is said that it is graver etc.

Dub. VIII.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: For it holds the second place among penalties. For it seems to say something wrong, because the order of transgressions and of punishments is according to the order of the precepts; but that [precept], namely not to commit adultery, is not according to the [first] commandment, but is in the second tablet. — If you should say that it holds the second place by reason of the penalty of stoning, which is due to the blasphemer, Leviticus, chapter twenty-four¹, and to the adulterer, Deuteronomy, chapter twenty-two; it is objected then that the same penalty is inflicted on the contumacious and insolent son, Deuteronomy, chapter twenty-one.

I respond: It must be said that some say this is to be understood thus, that it holds the second place, because the sin of blasphemy is on the part of the soul, but the sin of adultery is on the part of the body, and the sin of homicide on the part of the conjunct [i.e., the composite]. — But this does not seem [right], since the same penalty has been inflicted for all these; for all were beheaded. — And therefore it is better to say that this is understood by reason of the penalty of stoning; whereas homicide was punished according to the law of retaliation².

But if it is objected concerning the disobedient son, it must be said that [he was punished] not by reason of disobedience alone, but also by reason of other sins, which were toward the ruin of the commonwealth, because [he was] dissolute, and the like³.

If it is asked why adultery was punished so gravely; it must be said [that it was] on account of two things, namely because it was toward the destruction of concord and thereby of the commonwealth, because it was generative of great infamy; lastly, by reason of the great proneness [to it]. And this is the reason why so grave a penance is imposed for wife-murder, that the proneness may be restrained⁴.

Dub. IX.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: It is done execrably with a harlot, but more execrably with a wife. For it seems to say something false, because he sins more who misuses a thing not conceded than he who [misuses] a thing conceded; because the former [sins] in two ways, the latter in one way: therefore the former [sins] more gravely. — Likewise, Augustine, in On the Good of Marriage⁵, before that saying in the original text says: "In things conceded for use it becomes far more reasonable [a matter], than in those which are not conceded, whether a lesser or a rare excess": therefore since a wife is conceded for use, it is clear etc.

I respond: It must be said that excess in the use of a wife can be twofold: either according to nature, or against nature. If according to nature, it is more tolerable⁶ in a wife, on account of the fact that it has some excuse. If against nature, the contrary is [the case], since in marriage the goods of marriage are to be sought, and a spouse is to be treated more honorably than a harlot; therefore, since the sin against nature both is against the goods of marriage and is to the contumely of the wife, to whom a certain greater honor is to be shown in treating her: hence it is that he sins more gravely who does [this] with a wife; and therefore it is also said⁷ that on account of that sin, namely against nature, the woman can dismiss and flee her husband. And thus it is clear that although he who sins with a harlot sins in more ways than he who sins with a wife; nevertheless here [with the wife] one sins more intensely on account of the greater contempt⁸.

Dub. X.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says, that we should believe the covenants of lawful marriages are to be restored etc. It is asked therefore here, if someone dies and is raised, whether his wife is to be rendered back to him. And that she is, it seems from this text, because the first nuptials were lawful. — Likewise it appears through that which is said to the Hebrews, chapter eleven⁹: Women received back their dead from the resurrection. — Likewise by reason it seems: because those who are raised are not deprived of the paternal inheritance: therefore neither of the right over the wife. — Likewise, those who are raised by divine judgment are as sleepers¹⁰; but marriages are to be ruled by the law of heaven [iure poli]: therefore if, as regards God, this [dead man] is here judged sleeping, just as sleep does not dissolve marriage, so neither does such a dead man, as it seems. — Likewise, if it is dissolved: then if he should rise, it will be necessary to contract with the same woman: therefore he is judged a bigamist: therefore if it is not necessary that he contract; it seems that the first bond still remains.

On the contrary: to the Romans, chapter seven¹¹: The husband being dead, the woman is loosed from the law of the husband: therefore it seems that the marriage is dissolved. — Likewise, let it be supposed that a woman, her husband being dead, immediately contracts [anew]; it is certain, since she is not bound, because there is no one to whom she is bound, that the marriage is true: therefore if the first rises, on account of this it will not be dissolved. — Likewise, this man is as truly dead as one who is reduced to ashes; but for such a one, when he shall rise, the wife will not be rendered back, as the Lord determines, Matthew, chapter twenty-two¹: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems [the same] in the matter at hand.

I respond: It must be said that, as was said above², the matrimonial bond is not founded in the soul, but in the conjunct; hence when someone dies, immediately the other part of the relation perishes, and therefore the bond is immediately dissolved; and if the woman were matrimonially joined to another, she would not be to be separated. If nevertheless she is not joined to another, and he wills her, out of a certain fittingness she is to be rendered back to him.

As therefore to the objection that they are to be restored, it is true when they have been dissolved only in fact. — As to the objection from the eleventh [chapter] to the Hebrews, it must be said that the women received back their dead sons, not husbands³. — As to the objection concerning the inheritance, it can be said that this too is a grace and a fittingness, that it be rendered to him; nevertheless it is not similar, because concerning the wife the man can dispose nothing after death. Moreover, it is another matter concerning things [property]; for he can make a testament concerning things, but he cannot leave the wife to another. — As to the objection that they are sleepers; it must be said that it is true with respect to power⁴, but with respect to the truth in judging, God judges [him] truly dead. — To that which is asked, whether he be a bigamist; it can be said that he is not, if she did not know the other man, for the reason that she does not divide the flesh, nor did she divide it⁵.

Dub. XI.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: But if husbands persevere in the love of their wives. For it seems to say something wrong, because from this it seems that [the marriage] ought not to be restored, unless the husband wills [it]. On the contrary: granted that the woman demand [it]; since she is excused from fornication, it seems that the husband cannot repel her: therefore whether he love [her] or not, he ought to take her back. — Likewise it is asked whether such an opinion excuses⁶. And that it does not, it seems: because no one ought to commit himself to a peril: therefore however much the woman's husband absents himself, unless she is certain, she sins if she contracts with another.

It is asked therefore, for how great a certitude she is excused.

It is asked also, if she doubts that her husband is alive, whether she ought to render the debt; for it seems that she ought not: because no one who doubts whether something is a mortal sin ought to do it: therefore etc.

I respond: It must be said that a woman who thinks her husband slain and contracts [marriage] either believes this by a slight presumption, which ought rather to generate doubt than belief, or believes by a probable presumption. In the first way she is not excused, if she contract, as is said in the Extra[vagantes], on Betrothals and marriages⁷, where it is said that however long the man may tarry in war, and the wife be a young girl, nevertheless she ought not to contract until she has some certitude concerning the dead husband; and this being had, she can then contract without sin, as for instance if she has the oath of the commander of the army, or of his comrades, who knew of the death; and then she is excused. — But if the woman begins, after the marriage is contracted, to doubt concerning the death of the husband; either it is a slight doubt; and this, according to the counsel of the prelate, will be able to be removed from the heart, and she will be able to exact and demand the debt⁸; but if she probably doubts, she ought to render the debt, but not exact [it]; but if she is certified concerning the life of the first husband, she ought neither to demand nor to render, but immediately to desert the second husband. And this is proved by that which is said in the Extra[vagantes], on Second marriages⁹, Dominus ac Redemptor, and Cause thirty-four, question two, Cum per bellicam. But if he does not immediately return, then the crime of adultery is imputed to her, nor can she return to the prior husband, unless he himself will [it]. In this case Pope Leo speaks¹⁰.

From these things all the objections are clear. For she ought not to contract unless she have certitude concerning the death; nor ought she to demand when she probably doubts; nor ought she to render when she is certain concerning [his] life; but if she act otherwise, she is judged guilty of fornication.

Dub. XII.

Likewise it is asked about this case, which the Master sets down, concerning him who leaves his wife, going off into a far country; concerning such a one it is asked whether, his wife being dead, the man can contract with another, a second [wife]. And that he cannot, it seems: because pollution through adultery with a pledge given impedes marriage, as was shown above¹¹; but this is [the case] here: therefore etc. — Likewise it is asked whether such a one, his lawful wife being alive, ought to render the debt, if the Church compel him. And it seems that he ought not, because he himself fornicates; but one ought rather to permit himself to be excommunicated than to fornicate.

I respond: To the first it must be said that if, while the other party was ignorant, [the marriage] was contracted, the marriage stands¹² in favor of the one who was ignorant; but if the one who was ignorant is certified [of the truth], such a one neither ought nor can join himself [to her], the truth being certified. But the first ought not to be punished, who was ignorant, because he did not sin; and therefore, if the first bond be dissolved, the second marriage will be able to stand.

As to what is asked, whether, the first [wife] being alive, he can know the second without sin; the Master says¹ that he can, if he render the debt compelled by the Church. But that is not held today, because ecclesiastical excommunication does not oblige to the committing of fornication nor excuse [it]; and therefore such a one ought not to obey the Church; and this is held in the Extra[vagantes], on the Sentence of excommunication², Inquisitioni.

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Apparatus Criticus

9
Cfr. supra d. 30. q. 2. et dub. 4. — De Tiburtio (pro quo substituendum est Valerianus, cui Caecilia in matrimonium data fuit, cuius frater erat Tiburtius) et Caecilia cfr. Breviar. Roman. die 22. Nov. II. Noct. lect. 4. et 5.
Cf. above, d. 30, q. 2, and dub. 4. — Concerning Tiburtius (for whom Valerianus is to be substituted, to whom Cecilia was given in marriage, whose brother was Tiburtius) and Cecilia, cf. the Roman Breviary, 22 November, 2nd Nocturn, lessons 4 and 5.
1
Sive Qui clerici vel voventes matrimonium contrahere possunt, X. lib. IV. tit. 6. c. 5.
That is, Those clerics or vowing persons who can contract marriage, [Decretals of Gregory] IX, book IV, tit. 6, ch. 5.
2
Supple: illis qui privatum fecerunt votum continentiae. Cfr. supra a. 2. q. 1. et d. 28. q. 6. ad 1.
Supply: for those who made a private vow of continence. Cf. above, a. 2, q. 1, and d. 28, q. 6, ad 1.
3
Scil. Glossa (cfr. supra pag. 798, nota 3.). In ipsa decretali (Veniens) dicitur: Nos itaque attendentes, tutius esse, ut praefata mulier post fidem [cuidam viro absenti datam de matrimonio] et votum [in manibus cuiusdam eremitae] simpliciter oblatum, matrimonium contrahat, quam fornicationis reatum incurrat etc. — Summam seq. canonis Considera [codd. Considerate], quod hic Salvatur (8.) Gratian. exhibet his verbis: Infirmis iurare conceditur. — Subinde respicitur Regul. iuris, regul. 28: «Quae a iure communi exorbitant nequaquam ad consequentiam sunt trahenda» libr. V. tit. 12, in VI.
Namely the Gloss (cf. above, p. 798, note 3). In the decretal itself (Veniens) it is said: We therefore, considering it safer that the aforesaid woman, after the pledge [given to a certain absent man concerning marriage] and the vow [offered simply into the hands of a certain hermit], contract marriage rather than incur the guilt of fornication etc. — The summary of the following canon Consider [mss. Considerate], which Gratian here sets forth (8) in these words: To the infirm it is granted to swear. — Then there is a reference to a Rule of law, rule 28: "Things that depart from the common law are by no means to be drawn into a precedent," book V, tit. 12, in [the Sext].
4
Ut in C. Consuluit (4.) et C. Rursus (6.), in quibus dicitur, quod votum simplex matrimonium impedit contrahendum et non dirimit iam contractum. — Pro votum simplex edd. male votum simpliciter.
As in the canon Consuluit (4) and the canon Rursus (6), in which it is said that a simple vow impedes a marriage to be contracted and does not dissolve one already contracted. — For a simple vow the editions wrongly [read] a vow simply.
5
Vide supra a. 2. q. 1. in corp.
See above, a. 2, q. 1, in the body [of the article].
6
Cfr. supra pag. 781, nota 2.
Cf. above, p. 781, note 2.
7
Vide supra d. 17. p. III. a. 2. q. 3.
See above, d. 17, p. III, a. 2, q. 3.
8
Cfr. supra pag. 376, nota 3. — Idem dub. solvunt B. Albert., IV. Sent. d. 17. a. 48, ubi docet, scandalum tunc esse speciale peccatum, quando per se intenditur; S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2; Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.
Cf. above, p. 376, note 3. — The same doubt is resolved by Bl. Albert, IV Sent. d. 17 a. 48, where he teaches that scandal is then a special sin, when it is intended for its own sake; St. Thomas, here q. 2 a. 2 subquestion 2; Peter of Tarantaise and Richard of Middleton, here on the text.
9
Refertur Hugutionis (non pauci codd. Huguitionis) opinio a Glossa super C. Rursus (6.), X. Qui clerici vel voventes matrimonium contrahere possunt (lib. IV. tit. 6.) ad verba cum simplex votum apud Deum non minus obliget quam solemne, et dicitur, quod contraria «opinio hodie quasi communis est».
The opinion of Hugutio (not a few mss. Huguitio) is reported by the Gloss on the canon Rursus (6), [Decretals] IX, Those clerics or vowing persons who can contract marriage (book IV, tit. 6), at the words since a simple vow before God obliges no less than a solemn one, and it is said that the contrary "opinion is today almost the common one."
10
Vide supra nota 4.
See above, note 4.
11
Respiciuntur verba August. supra lit. Magistri, d. XXXII. c. 2, et hic a. 2. q. 1. (ubi etiam secunda ratio explicatur) relata. — Superius post petatur edd. supplent debitum. — Idem dub. solvunt S. Thom., Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.
There is a reference to the words of Augustine reported above [in] the text of the Master, d. XXXII, ch. 2, and here [in] a. 2, q. 1 (where also the second reason is explained). — Above, after demanded the editions supply the debt. — The same doubt is resolved by St. Thomas, Peter of Tarantaise and Richard of Middleton, here on the text.
1
In verbis huius dubii. — Eodem modo solvitur hoc dub. a S. Thom. et Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.
In the words of this doubt. — This doubt is resolved in the same way by St. Thomas and Peter of Tarantaise, here on the text.
2
Codd. I K quae.
Mss. I K [read] quae ["who," fem.].
3
Vers. 13. (cfr. III. Sent. d. 38. q. 2. ad 3.). — De metu vide supra pag. 700, nota 1.
Verse 13 (cf. III Sent. d. 38, q. 2, ad 3). — Concerning dread see above, p. 700, note 1.
4
Can. Viduas (2.) et C. Hae vero (9.). Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. — Superius pro apud Deum vero tenetur cod. F apud Deum non, tenetur tamen.
The canon Viduas (2) and the canon Hae vero (9). Cf. here the text of the Master, ch. 2. — Above, for but before God he is held ms. F [reads] before God he is not [held], he is nevertheless held.
5
Libr. III. tit. 31. c. 4.
[Decretals] book III, tit. 31, ch. 4.
6
Cfr. supra a. 2. q. 1.
Cf. above, a. 2, q. 1.
7
Matth. 12, 32: Non remittetur ei, neque etc. — De seq. obiect. cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. in fine.
Matthew 12:32: It shall not be remitted to him, neither etc. — Concerning the following objection cf. here the text of the Master, ch. 2, at the end.
8
Can. 8. Cfr. supra d. 37. a. 2. q. 2. arg. 1. ad oppos. et ibid. ad 4.
Canon 8. Cf. above, d. 37, a. 2, q. 2, argument 1 on the opposite side, and there ad 4.
9
Vers. 22. Vide supra pag. 784, nota 11. — De hac solut. cfr. II. Sent. d. 33. dub. 2; Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 148. m. 3. et q. 152. m. 3; B. Albert., hic a. 21; S. Thom. et Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.
Verse 22. See above, p. 784, note 11. — Concerning this solution cf. II Sent. d. 33, dub. 2; Alexander of Hales, Summa, part II, q. 148, memb. 3, and q. 152, memb. 3; Bl. Albert, here a. 21; St. Thomas and Peter of Tarantaise, here on the text.
1
Vers. 16. — Seq. locus est Deut. 22, 22; tertius Deut. 21, 18. seqq.
Verse 16. — The following passage is Deut. 22:22; the third [is] Deut. 21:18 ff.
2
August. XIX. contra Faustum, c. 25: Huic igitur immoderatae ac per hoc iniustae laesioni Lex iustum modum figens, poenam talionis instituit, hoc est, ut qualem quisque intulit iniuriam, tale supplicium pendat; proinde oculum pro oculo, dentem pro dente [Exod. 21, 24; Matth. 5, 38.] etc.
Augustine, XIX Against Faustus, ch. 25: To this immoderate and thereby unjust injury the Law, fixing a just measure, instituted the penalty of retaliation, that is, that as each inflicted an injury, so he should pay the punishment; hence an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth [Exod. 21:24; Matth. 5:38] etc.
3
Vide Deut. 21, 20.
See Deut. 21:20.
4
Ut dictum est supra d. 37. a. 2. q. 2. — Idem dub. solvunt B. Albert., hic a. 21; Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit., Secundum in poenis tenet locum, ubi hic dicit: scil. quantum ad lapidationis poenam in veteri lege. Lex enim primo et principaliter praecipiebat, lapidari blasphemantem Deum, de quo habetur Lev. 24, 16; deinde adulterum vel adulteram, de quo habetur Deut. 22, 22. seqq.
As was said above, d. 37, a. 2, q. 2. — The same doubt is resolved by Bl. Albert, here a. 21; Peter of Tarantaise and Richard of Middleton, here on the text, [at] It holds the second place among penalties, where he says here: namely as regards the penalty of stoning in the old law. For the Law first and principally commanded the one blaspheming God to be stoned, on which see Lev. 24:16; then the adulterer or adulteress, on which see Deut. 22:22 ff.
5
Cap. 11. n. 12: Tantum valet ordinatio Creatoris et ordo creaturae, ut in rebus ad utendum concessis, etiam cum modus exceditur, longe sit tolerabilius, quam in eis, quae concessa non sunt, vel unus vel rarus excessus. Cfr. C. Adulterii (11.), C. 32. q. 7.
Ch. 11, n. 12: So great is the ordination of the Creator and the order of the creature, that in things conceded for use, even when the measure is exceeded, a single or rare excess is far more tolerable than in those which are not conceded. Cf. the canon Adulterii (11), Cause 32, q. 7.
6
Codd. communiter tolerabilius.
The mss. commonly [read] tolerabilius [neuter].
7
Cfr. C. Omnes causationes (7.), C. 32. q. 7. et Glossa in hunc can. Vide etiam supra d. 35. q. 1. ad 5.
Cf. the canon Omnes causationes (7), Cause 32, q. 7, and the Gloss on this canon. See also above, d. 35, q. 1, ad 5.
8
Idem dub. solvunt Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 149. m. 2; S. Thom., Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.
The same doubt is resolved by Alexander of Hales, Summa, part II, q. 149, memb. 2; St. Thomas, Peter of Tarantaise and Richard of Middleton, here on the text.
9
Vers. 35.
Verse 35.
10
Cfr. Matth. 9, 24; 27, 52, et Ioan. 11, 11. seqq. — De iure poli cfr. supra pag. 807, nota 7. — Inferius pro talis mortuus codd. F G cum talis moritur (plures alii codd. exhibent vel etiam moritur) cod. K (I a secunda manu) talis mors.
Cf. Matth. 9:24; 27:52, and John 11:11 ff. — Concerning the law of heaven cf. above, p. 807, note 7. — Below, for such a dead man mss. F G [read] when such a one dies (several other mss. give or also dies), ms. K (I by a second hand) such a death.
11
Vers. 2. seq. Cfr. I. Cor. 7, 39.
Verse 2 f. Cf. 1 Cor. 7:39.
1
Vers. 30.
Verse 30.
2
Dist. 27. a. 3. q. 1.
Dist. 27, a. 3, q. 1.
3
Secundum Haymonem in hunc loc.
According to Haymo on this passage.
4
Cod. K bene supplet divinae.
Ms. K rightly supplies divine [power].
5
Idem dub. solvitur a S. Thom., hic circa lit.; Petr. a Tar., de hoc et seq. dubio hic a. 4. q. 1. 2.
The same doubt is resolved by St. Thomas, here on the text; Peter of Tarantaise, concerning this and the following doubt, here a. 4, q. 1, 2.
6
Multi codd. excusetur.
Many mss. [read] excusetur [subjunctive].
7
Libr. IV. tit. 1. C. In praesentia (19.). Cfr. Glossa ibid.
[Decretals] book IV, tit. 1, the canon In praesentia (19). Cf. the Gloss there.
8
Cod. L et reddere.
Ms. L [reads] and to render.
9
Libr. IV. tit. 21. c. 2. — Seq. locus est C. 34. q. 1. et 2. c. 1.
[Decretals] book IV, tit. 21, ch. 2. — The following passage is Cause 34, q. 1 and 2, ch. 1.
10
In verbis huius dubii. — Inferius post petere edd. supplent debitum. — Cfr. de hoc dubio S. Thom., hic circa lit.
In the words of this doubt. — Below, after to demand the editions supply the debt. — Cf. concerning this doubt St. Thomas, here on the text.
11
Dist. 37. a. 2. q. 3.
Dist. 37, a. 2, q. 3.
12
Pro est codd. illud, incongrue, nisi cum cod. bb (P a secunda manu) mox post ignoravit addatur: stare potest, quousque cognoscat.
For stands [est] the mss. [read] illud, incongruously, unless with ms. bb (P by a second hand) there be added just after was ignorant: it can stand, until he comes to know.
1
Hic in lit. c. 3.
Here in the text, ch. 3.
2
Libr. V. tit. 39. c. 44. — Idem dub. solvunt S. Thom., Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.
[Decretals] book V, tit. 39, ch. 44. — The same doubt is resolved by St. Thomas, Peter of Tarantaise and Richard of Middleton, here on the text. ---