Dist. 38, Art. 2, Q. 3
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 38
Quaestio III. Utrum Summus Pontifex possit dispensare in voto.
Tertio quaeritur de obligatione voti in comparatione ad dispensationem, et quaeritur, utrum Summus Pontifex possit dispensare in voto. Et quod non, videtur:
1. Quia Glossa super illud Psalmi5: Vovete et reddite etc.: « Reddere est necessitatis »; sed circa ea quae sunt de necessitate salutis, non potest dispensari: ergo etc.
2. Item, obligatio voti est secundum ius naturale, quod patet, quia omni tempore cucurrit; sed Pontifex non potest in ea quae sunt iuris naturalis: ergo etc.
3. Item, Bernardus6 dicit: quaedam sunt praecepta moralia primae tabulae ordinantia ad Deum; quaedam secundae ordinantia ad proximum; quaedam superaddita, ut canonicae sanctiones et Patrum instituta. In primis non potest dispensare nec homo nec Deus; in secundis non homo, sed Deus; in tertiis et homo et Deus. Ratio autem huius est: quia praecepta primae tabulae immediate ordinant ad Deum: si ergo votum immediate ad Deum ordinat, videtur etc.
4. Item, qui non facit quod promittit mentitur; sed Papa non potest dispensare in mendacio: ergo nec in voto.
5. Item, quod non in voto continentiae specialiter, videtur: Ecclesiastici vigesimo sexto7: Non est digna ponderatio continentis animae: si ergo continentia nullo modo potest recompensari, patet etc.
6. Item, quod nec in voto paupertatis, videtur, quia perfectius est pro Deo mendicare quam continere: ergo perfectius est votum paupertatis: ergo si dispensare non potest in voto continentiae, nec paupertatis.
7. Item, quod nec in voto obedientiae, videtur: quia hoc est perfectissimum, quia in castitate vincit homo corpus suum, in paupertate mundum, in obedientia mactat homo se ipsum: ergo etc.
Sed contra: 1. Quod possit in omni dispensare, videtur: quia votum unum non minus obligat quam aliud; sed potest dispensare in aliquo, utpote in voto peregrinationis et abstinentiae: ergo et in omni.
2. Item, quod specialiter in voto continentiae, videtur: quia dispensatio locum habet, ut dicit Bernardus1, ubi cadit necessitas, vel communis utilitas; sed possibile est, quod aliquis ex defectu mulieris incurrat periculum mortis, sicut dicitur de rege Ludovico; sed possibile est, quod omnes moriantur, qui possunt generare, solo eo remanente, qui vovit, et remanente Papa et muliere: ergo si necessitas est conservationis speciei2, in casu isto posset contrahere.
3. Item, possibile est ex matrimonio pacem Ecclesiae dari, quae est communis utilitas; sed communis utilitas praeferenda est bono privato3: ergo etc.
4. Item, quod in voto paupertatis, videtur: quia dispensare potest in voto abstinentiae; sed maius est carnem suam macerare quam divitias dimittere: ergo etc.
5. Item, quod in voto obedientiae, videtur: quia Summus Pontifex assumit de religionibus4 ad dignitates et praelationes; sed sic assumti non tenentur obedire praelatis sui ordinis, quibus voverunt obedientiam: ergo etc.
Conclusio.
Votum potest dispensari a Summo Pontifice, prout dispensatio dicit iuris declarationem, non autem, prout dicit iuris relaxationem.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod dispensatio dicitur dupliciter: uno modo iuris relaxatio, alio modo iuris declaratio. — Dicunt ergo aliqui, quod Papa potest in voto dispensare, secundum quod dispensatio est iuris relaxatio, eo quod eius auctoritas est circa5 obligationem voti. Et rationem huius assignant, quia Papa est immediatus omnium praelatus, et ad ipsum spectat omnium ordinatio, maxime quantum ad ea quae sunt supererogationis. Et quia omnium voluntates eius subsunt auctoritati et dispositioni; nullum votum aliter debet emitti nisi cum hac conditione, nisi dominus Papa de vovente aliter duxerit disponendum; et ideo nullus obligatur ad votum faciendum, cum Papa aliter disponat; quodsi illam conditionem non apponat, tamen non potest eam excludere. Et ideo dicunt, quod in omni voto potest dispensare et ab omni tali obligatione absolvere. Et ad omnes rationes respondent, quod non est ibi obligatio absoluta, sed conditionata; et ideo dispensare potest, cum possit illam conditionem infringere, si sibi aliud de vovente placet disponere. — Sed cum illa6 quae Deus consulit facienda — et absque dubio bona sunt — sine haesitatione totis visceribus amplectenda sint; videtur etiam, cum Deus voluerit, unumquemque liberum esse, quod unusquisque sine conditione aliqua talia possit et debeat vovere.
Et ideo alii dicunt, quod Papa in nullo voto potest dispensare, secundum quod dispensare7 est iuris relaxatio, quia obligatio voti pendet ex iure divino, non humano, ex iure naturali, non ex constitutione Patrum. Propterea Papa non habet posse nec auctoritatem in votum relaxando ius, quia illud non est ei subiectum; habet tamen potestatem, quantum ius sibi dat; et ideo dispensare potest, secundum quod dispensatio est iuris declaratio. Et haec positio est rationabilior et securior est, quia magis per ipsam satisfit conscientiae.
Ad intelligentiam eius est notandum quod ius obligationis voti constituitur ex duplici iure naturali, ex hoc videlicet, quod homo debet esse verax in promisso; et ex alio, quod nihil debet homo promittere, nisi salva sua salute et divinae maiestatis honore: ergo ex iure naturali est, quod quis per votum non impediri debet, quin facere possit sibi utilius et Deo acceptabilius; et ideo in omni voto, quod recipit recompensationem melioris boni, sive simpliciter, sive pro loco et tempore, dominus Papa, cuius est ius dilucidare, potest dispensare.
Et in hoc communiter omnes conveniunt, sed diversificantur penes modum dispensandi8. Aliqui enim dicunt, quod non est aliquod votum, quod pro loco et tempore non recipiat recompensationem; ideo nullum est, in quo non possit dispensare. Unde dicunt, quod bono continentiae praefertur bonum universalis Ecclesiae, ut pax; et ideo in voto continentiae, de quo minus videtur, potest fieri dispensatio, vel simpliciter, vel ad tempus, sicut etiam aliquando factum est.
Alii vero dicunt, quod votum continentiae non
recipit recompensationem, quia non est digna ponderatio animae continentis1, quando obtinetur victoria de domestico inimico; in omnibus aliis est recompensatio: ideo potest dispensare in omnibus, praeterquam in hoc.
Tertii dicunt, quod perfectioni religionis, quae est in imitatione Christi, nihil potest aequari nec pro illa recompensari; et illa substantialiter consistit in triplici voto, scilicet continentiae, paupertatis et obedientiae: et ideo in his tribus non potest dispensare. Perfectio enim consistit in assimilatione ad Christum maxime, sicut dicit Augustinus in libro de Vera Religione2; et quia in nullo tantum assimilatur homo Christo, sicut in his; nihil potest haec tria homini recompensare; quoniam recompensatio non tantum aliorum respicit bonum, verum etiam voventis, quoniam Deus vult, quod magis sit unusquisque sollicitus de sua salute quam aliorum.
Quae istarum trium opinionum sit verior, fateor me nescire; et satis potest quaelibet sustineri, ideo nullam assero. Si quis tamen velit hanc ultimam acceptare, non occurrit ei inconveniens manifestum, ut dicatur, quia nec in omni nec in nullo, sed in quodam sic et in quodam non.
Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod in nullo potest dispensare; dicendum, quod illa argumenta currunt, secundum quod dispensatio est iuris relaxatio; et sic non potest, potest tamen, secundum quod dispensatio est iuris declaratio, quia ius concedit, votum non teneri, cum potest recompensari; et universaliter domini Papae est hoc ius interpretari: et ideo in omnibus aliis ab his tribus potest dispensare.
1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, si potest in uno, et in omnibus; dicendum, quod non est simile; quia conditio recompensationis melioris non stat uniformiter in omnibus.
2. 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in voto continentiae potest cadere necessitas et utilitas; dicendum quod non cadit; et praeterea, cum certitudo3 cadit, non cadit necessitas, quia nunquam est infirmitas, a qua non possit quis nisi per coitum liberari. Non cadit necessitas respectu speciei, quia nunquam erit aliquis solus. Non cadit ibi maior utilitas facientis, et ibi non est, quia commutat meritum centesimi fructus in meritum trigesimi4. — Praeterea, si totum hoc esset, incertum esset, quia nescitur, utrum infirmus coitu sanaretur; nescitur, utrum ex coitu aliquis generaretur; nescitur etiam, utrum ex matrimonio pax reformaretur; et non est dimittendum certum pro incerto: ideo non valet.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod votum abstinentiae voto paupertatis est maius; dicendum, quod falsum est: quia exercitatio corporalis est ad modicum utilis, pietas autem valet ad omnia, ut dicit Apostolus5; et summa pietas est, quod omnia vendantur et dentur pauperibus. — Praeterea, difficilius est; plures enim inveniuntur, qui volunt ieiunare quam qui volunt mendicare. — Praeterea, ibi non tantum est abdicatio rei terrenae, sed etiam voluntatis habendi; unde pauperculus veniens ad religionem dimittit totum mundum ratione voluntatis6.
5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de voto obedientiae, quod fit dispensatio in religiosis, qui promoventur; dicendum, quod licet in praelationibus non teneantur obedire et multa habeant, quae non licerent eis, si essent subditi; tamen in neutro voto est dispensatum. Nam in voto paupertatis non dispensatur, quia non licet tali religioso habere proprium, etiam si Papa dispenset; sed tamen potest bona Ecclesiae dispensare, sicut abbas bona monasterii, nec amittit meritum paupertatis; sed est divitiarum non dominus, sed dispensator, non amator, sed contemptor, non conservator, sed dispersor7 in pauperes. — Similiter in voto obedientiae non est dispensatum, quia omnem obedientiam quam debebat prius suo superiori, debet Papae; et Papa a sua obedientia non potest eum absolvere; et in talibus meritum obedientiae commutatur in meritum pastoralis curae; nec est dispensatio, sed exemptio proprius debet dici8.
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Question III. Whether the Supreme Pontiff can dispense in a matter of a vow.
Thirdly there is inquiry concerning the obligation of a vow in comparison to dispensation, and it is asked whether the Supreme Pontiff can dispense in a matter of a vow. And that he cannot, seems [to follow]:
1. Because the Gloss on that [text] of the Psalm5: Vow and pay etc., [says]: "To pay back belongs to necessity"; but concerning those things which are of the necessity of salvation, one cannot be dispensed: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, the obligation of a vow is according to natural law, which is clear, because it has run in every age; but the Pontiff has no power in those things which are of natural law: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, Bernard6 says: some are moral precepts of the first table, ordaining [man] toward God; some of the second, ordaining toward the neighbor; some are superadded, such as canonical sanctions and the institutions of the Fathers. In the first neither man nor God can dispense; in the second not man, but God; in the third both man and God. And the reason for this is: because the precepts of the first table order [man] immediately toward God: if, then, a vow orders [him] immediately toward God, it seems etc.
4. Likewise, he who does not do what he promises lies; but the Pope cannot dispense in a lie: therefore neither in a vow.
5. Likewise, that [he cannot] especially in a vow of continence, seems [so]: Ecclesiasticus 267: No weighing is worthy of a continent soul: if, then, continence can in no way be recompensed, it is evident etc.
6. Likewise, that [he cannot] even in a vow of poverty, seems [so], because it is more perfect to beg for God's sake than to be continent: therefore the vow of poverty is more perfect: therefore if he cannot dispense in a vow of continence, neither [can he] in [a vow] of poverty.
7. Likewise, that [he cannot] even in a vow of obedience, seems [so]: because this is the most perfect, since in chastity a man conquers his own body, in poverty the world, in obedience a man immolates his very self: therefore etc.
On the contrary: 1. That he can dispense in every [vow], seems [so]: because one vow does not bind less than another; but he can dispense in some, as in a vow of pilgrimage and of abstinence: therefore also in every one.
2. Likewise, that [he can] especially in a vow of continence, seems [so]: because dispensation has place, as Bernard1 says, where necessity falls, or common utility; but it is possible that someone through the defect of a woman incur danger of death, as is said of King Louis; but it is possible that all who can generate should die, only he remaining who vowed, and the Pope and the woman remaining: therefore, if there is necessity of preserving the species2, in that case he could contract [marriage].
3. Likewise, it is possible that peace of the Church be given from a marriage, which is a common utility; but common utility is to be preferred to a private good3: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, that [he can] in a vow of poverty, seems [so]: because he can dispense in a vow of abstinence; but it is greater to mortify one's own flesh than to relinquish riches: therefore etc.
5. Likewise, that [he can] in a vow of obedience, seems [so]: because the Supreme Pontiff takes [men] from religious orders4 to dignities and prelacies; but those so taken are not bound to obey the prelates of their own order, to whom they vowed obedience: therefore etc.
Conclusion.
A vow can be dispensed by the Supreme Pontiff insofar as dispensation means a declaration of the law, but not insofar as it means a relaxation of the law.
I respond: It must be said that dispensation is spoken of in two ways: in one way [as] a relaxation of the law, in another way [as] a declaration of the law. — Some, then, say that the Pope can dispense in a vow insofar as dispensation is a relaxation of the law, because his authority is over5 the obligation of a vow. And they assign the reason for this: that the Pope is the immediate prelate of all, and to him belongs the ordering of all, especially as to those things which are of supererogation. And because the wills of all are subject to his authority and disposition; no vow ought to be made otherwise than with this condition, unless the lord Pope should judge to dispose otherwise concerning the one vowing; and therefore no one is bound to make a vow, when the Pope disposes otherwise; but if he does not append that condition, still he cannot exclude it. And therefore they say that in every vow he can dispense and absolve from every such obligation. And to all the reasons they respond that the obligation there is not absolute, but conditioned; and therefore he can dispense, since he can break that condition, if it pleases him to dispose otherwise concerning the one vowing. — But since those things which God counsels6 to be done — and they are without doubt good — are to be embraced without hesitation with the whole heart; it seems also, since God has so willed, that each one is free, so that everyone without any condition can and ought to vow such things.
And therefore others say that the Pope can dispense in no vow, insofar as to dispense7 is a relaxation of the law, because the obligation of a vow depends on divine law, not human, on natural law, not on the institution of the Fathers. Therefore the Pope has neither power nor authority over a vow by relaxing the law, because that is not subject to him; yet he has power, insofar as the law grants it to him; and therefore he can dispense, insofar as dispensation is a declaration of the law. And this position is more reasonable and safer, because through it the conscience is more fully satisfied.
For the understanding of this it must be noted that the law of the obligation of a vow is constituted from a twofold natural law, namely from this: that a man ought to be truthful in his promise; and from another: that a man ought to promise nothing except with his salvation preserved and the honor of the divine majesty: therefore it is of natural law that a man ought not to be impeded by a vow from being able to do for himself what is more useful and more acceptable to God; and therefore in every vow which admits a recompense of a better good, whether simply or for place and time, the lord Pope, whose it is to clarify the law, can dispense.
And in this all commonly agree, but they differ as to the manner of dispensing8. For some say that there is no vow which for place and time does not admit a recompense; therefore there is none in which he cannot dispense. Whence they say that to the good of continence is preferred the good of the universal Church, such as peace; and therefore in a vow of continence, in which it seems least [possible], a dispensation can be made, whether simply or for a time, as indeed has sometimes been done.
But others say that a vow of continence does not
recompense, because no weighing is worthy of a continent soul1, when victory over the domestic enemy is obtained; in all others there is recompense: therefore he can dispense in all, except in this.
The third say that to the perfection of religion, which consists in the imitation of Christ, nothing can be equated nor recompensed for it; and that consists substantially in the threefold vow, namely of continence, poverty, and obedience: and therefore in these three he cannot dispense. For perfection consists in assimilation to Christ most of all, as Augustine says in the book On True Religion2; and because in nothing is a man so assimilated to Christ as in these; nothing can recompense these three to a man; since recompense regards not only the good of others, but also of the one vowing, for God wills that each one be more solicitous of his own salvation than of others'.
Which of these three opinions is truer, I confess that I do not know; and each can well enough be maintained, therefore I assert none. If, however, anyone wish to accept this last one, no manifest inconvenience meets him, so that it be said that [he can dispense] neither in every [vow] nor in none, but in a certain one yes and in a certain one no.
To that, then, which is objected, that he can dispense in none; it must be said that those arguments run insofar as dispensation is a relaxation of the law; and in this sense he cannot, yet he can, insofar as dispensation is a declaration of the law, because the law grants that a vow is not binding when it can be recompensed; and universally it belongs to the lord Pope to interpret this law: and therefore in all others besides these three he can dispense.
1. To that which is objected, if he can in one, [then] also in all; it must be said that it is not similar; because the condition of a better recompense does not stand uniformly in all.
2. 3. To that which is objected, that in a vow of continence necessity and utility can fall; it must be said that it does not fall; and besides, when certitude3 falls, necessity does not fall, because there is never an infirmity from which one cannot be freed except by intercourse. Necessity does not fall with respect to the species, because there will never be anyone alone. Nor does there fall there a greater utility of the agent, and there it is not [present], because he exchanges the merit of the hundredfold fruit for the merit of the thirtyfold4. — Besides, if all this were so, it would be uncertain, because it is not known whether the sick man would be healed by intercourse; it is not known whether anyone would be generated from the intercourse; it is not known either whether peace would be restored from the marriage; and the certain is not to be relinquished for the uncertain: therefore it does not hold.
4. To that which is objected, that a vow of abstinence is greater than a vow of poverty; it must be said that it is false: because bodily exercise is useful for a little, but piety avails for all things, as the Apostle5 says; and the highest piety is that all things be sold and given to the poor. — Besides, it is more difficult; for more are found who wish to fast than who wish to beg. — Besides, there [in poverty] there is not only the renunciation of an earthly thing, but also of the will to possess; whence the poor man coming to religion relinquishes the whole world by reason of the will6.
5. To that which is objected concerning a vow of obedience, that dispensation is made in religious who are promoted; it must be said that, although in prelacies they are not bound to obey and have many things which would not be licit for them if they were subjects; nevertheless in neither vow is there a dispensation. For in a vow of poverty there is no dispensation, because it is not licit for such a religious to have property, even if the Pope dispense; yet he can dispense the goods of the Church, as an abbot [dispenses] the goods of the monastery, nor does he lose the merit of poverty; but he is of riches not the owner, but the dispenser, not the lover, but the despiser, not the keeper, but the disperser7 among the poor. — Similarly in a vow of obedience there is no dispensation, because all the obedience which he owed before to his superior he owes to the Pope; and the Pope cannot absolve him from his obedience; and in such cases the merit of obedience is exchanged for the merit of pastoral care; nor is it a dispensation, but rather ought to be called an exemption8.
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- 5Psalm. 75, 12. — Glossam vide supra pag. 816, nota 5.Ps. 75:12 [Vulg.]. — For the Gloss, see above p. 816, note 5.
- 6Libr. de Praecepto et dispensat. c. 2. et 3.[Bernard,] the book On Precept and Dispensation, cc. 2 and 3.
- 7Vers. 20: Omnis autem ponderatio non est digna continentis animae.Verse 20: But no weighing is worthy of a continent soul.
- 1Libr. III. de Considerat. c. 4. n. 18; de Praecepto et dispensat. c. 2. n. 4. seq. c. 4. n. 9.[Bernard,] book III On Consideration, c. 4, n. 18; On Precept and Dispensation, c. 2, n. 4 f., c. 4, n. 9.
- 2Gen. 1, 28. et 9, 1: Crescite etc.Gen. 1:28 and 9:1: Increase etc.
- 3Cfr. Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 2; Iustinian., C. VI. de Caducis tollendis, tit. 50, lex Et nomen (1. § Haec autem).Cf. Aristotle, Ethics I, c. 2; Justinian, Codex VI, On removing lapsed [inheritances], tit. 50, the law Et nomen (1, § Haec autem).
- 4Cod. X religiosis.Codex X [reads] religiosis.
- 5Nonnulli codd. et Val. supra.Several codices and the Vatican edition [read] supra.
- 6Ed. 1 legit Sed alii dicunt contra, quia, cum illa Deo complaceant et absque dubio etc.The first edition reads But others say the contrary, because, since those things are pleasing to God and without doubt etc.
- 7Codd. F G L dispensatio.Codices F G L [read] dispensatio.
- 8Cfr. Hugo a S. Vict., II. de Sacram. p. XII. c. 8. seq.; Glossa in C. Sunt quidam dicentes (6.), C. 25. q. 1. et in C. Cum ad monasterium (6.), X. de Statu monachor. (lib. III. tit. 35.). — Pro communiter codd. H W communi, et pro penes modum dispensandi codd. communiter, sed perperam substituunt postmodum dispensando (cod. E a secunda manu postmodum de dispensando).Cf. Hugh of St. Victor, On the Sacraments II, p. XII, c. 8 f.; the Gloss on the canon Sunt quidam dicentes (6.), C. 25, q. 1, and on the canon Cum ad monasterium (6.), X, On the Status of Monks (bk. III, tit. 35.). — For communiter codices H W [read] communi, and for penes modum dispensandi the codices [read] communiter, but wrongly substitute postmodum dispensando (codex E, by a second hand, postmodum de dispensando).
- 1Eccli. 26, 20. — Immediate post pro quando codd. L Y quoniam ibi, cod. aa quia, et pro victoria cod. Y (E a secunda manu) triumphus, multi codd. dupliciter, cui in cod. V secunda manus addidit victoria.Ecclus. 26:20. — Immediately after, for quando codices L Y [read] quoniam ibi, codex aa quia, and for victoria codex Y (E by a second hand) triumphus, many codices dupliciter, to which in codex V a second hand added victoria.
- 2Cap. 16. n. 30. seqq. et c. 41. n. 78. — Superius verbis et illa in cod. V secunda manus interseruit quia, quam lectionem sequuntur edd. Subinde ex cod. K (I a secunda manu) substituimus et ideo in his, cod. A et in his, edd. quod in his.[On True Religion] c. 16, n. 30 ff. and c. 41, n. 78. — Above, at the words et illa, in codex V a second hand inserted quia, which reading the editions follow. Thereupon, from codex K (I by a second hand), we have substituted et ideo in his; codex A [reads] et in his, the editions quod in his.
- 3Codd. L Y incertitudo, cod. I (a secunda manu) et praeterea, ubi incertitudo, edd. certitudo non. Mox pro nisi codd. N aa aliter quam.Codices L Y [read] incertitudo, codex I (by a second hand) et praeterea, where [it has] incertitudo, the editions certitudo non. Presently, for nisi codices N aa [read] aliter quam.
- 4Cfr. supra pag. 754, nota 6.Cf. above, p. 754, note 6.
- 5Epist. 1. Tim. 4, 8, ubi pro valet Vulgata utilis est. — Matth. 19, 21: Si vis perfectus esse, vade, vende quae habes et da pauperibus etc.1 Tim. 4:8, where for valet the Vulgate has utilis est. — Matt. 19:21: If you wish to be perfect, go, sell what you have and give to the poor etc.
- 6Cfr. Gregor., 1. Homil. in Evang. homil. 5. n. 2. (in Breviar. Roman. pro festo S. Andreae Apost. 30. Nov.). — Edd. addunt habendi.Cf. Gregory, book 1 of the Homilies on the Gospels, homily 5, n. 2 (in the Roman Breviary for the feast of St. Andrew the Apostle, 30 Nov.). — The editions add habendi.
- 7Codd. A P Q dispensator.Codices A P Q [read] dispensator.
- 8Vide scholion ad I. huius articuli quaest.See the scholion at question I of this article. ---