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Dist. 38, Art. 2, Q. 2

Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 38

Textus Latinus
p. 821

Quaestio II. Utrum votum possit permutari.

Secundo quaeritur de obligatione voti in comparatione ad commutationem, utrum possit commutari. Et quod non, videtur.

1. Levitici ultimo5: Animal, quod immolari potest Domino, mutari non potest, nec in peius nec in melius: ergo etc.

2. Item, Ecclesiastis quinto6: Quodcumque voveris, redde: ergo ad illud quod vovet homo, tenetur: ergo non potest commutare.

3. Item, sicut veritas locutionis consistit in concordia vocis et intellectus7, sic veritas voti in concordia promissionis et solutionis; sed quandocumque vox discordat ab intellectu, est ibi falsitas: ergo et in voto, quando promissio a solutione. Sed unusquisque tenetur esse verax in promisso: ergo etc.

4. Item, quod non possit sine auctoritate superioris, videtur. Bernardus de Dispensatione8 etc.: « De bene ordinatis monasteriis nullus meo consilio egredietur desiderio arctioris vitae sine licentia superioris »: si ergo de hoc magis tenetur, patet etc.

5. Item, quod superior non possit mutare, videtur: quia aeque obligat votum solemne, ut matrimonium; sed matrimonium nulla auctoritate superioris potest mutari: ergo nec votum.

Contra: 1. Votum institutum est ad caritatem fovendam; sed dicit Bernardus9: « Quod ex caritate institutum est contra caritatem sustineri non debet »: ergo ubi est necessitas vel utilitas, cum caritas exigat, potest commutari; sed hoc est per votum: ergo etc.

p. 822 2. Item, semper licet proficere secundum statum: ergo et votum de bono in melius commutare, ergo etc.

3. Item, si quis emittit duo vota incompossibilia, quorum alterum est perfectius, impleto perfectiori, absolvitur ab alio, etiam quod prius vovit: ergo etc.

4. Item, sicut testamentum est propriae voluntatis, ita et votum; sed licet, quamdiu homo vivit, mutare testamentum: ergo et votum sine omni licentia.

Conclusio

Conclusio. Votum potest cum praelati auctoritate mutari et propter necessitatem supervenientem et propter periculum imminens et propter maiorem utilitatem voventis.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod licet votum mutari ex causa, illud scilicet, quod recipit recompensationem; sed non ex levitate nec ex propria voluntate, quam obligavit, sed ex necessitate sive utilitate, cum praelati auctoritate; excepto voto religionis, vel etiam status perfectioris, in quod potest aliud votum commutari sine praelati licentia, quia propter sui dignitatem licentiam dant iura1. Sanum tamen est consilium, quod fiat superioris auctoritate, ubi non creditur, quod contradicat, ne videatur ex levitate procedere et auctoritatem superioris contemnere.

Ratio autem, quare licet votum mutare et commutare, est propter necessitatem supervenientem, vel propter periculum, quod imminet frequenter in observatione, vel propter maiorem utilitatem et voventis et aliorum. In his enim ratio recta et divina illustratio manifeste clamat, quod per mediatorem et procuratorem debeat et possit provideri, ut Deus non damnificetur, nec iste periclitetur, in quo et iste debuit salvari, et Deus honorari, et propter quod votum ordinatum est fieri. Et ideo ex hoc potest mutari.

Quod tamen obiicit de testamento, non est simile, quia testamentum non obligat, ut votum.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Levitico secundum Glossam2 solvendum est: propria auctoritate.

2. 3. 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Ecclesiaste, dicendum, quod illud intelligitur in se, vel in aequivalenti. — Et per hoc patet de veritate, quia concordat impletio promissioni, dum datur aequivalens illi. — Quod vero dicit Bernardus de ascendentibus ad altiorem statum, credo, quod dicitur consulendo.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur ultimo de matrimonio, solvendum, quod non est simile: quia vinculum matrimonii ligat non tantum ratione promissionis, sed etiam significationis rei insolubilis, in quam nulla potest auctoritas3. — Praeterea, non est unum matrimonium melius alio, sicut votum; et ideo non competit matrimonium permutari nec commutari, sicut competit de voto4.

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English Translation

Question II. Whether a vow can be commuted.

Secondly, inquiry is made concerning the obligation of a vow in comparison to commutation, whether it can be commuted. And that it cannot, seems [to be the case]:

1. Leviticus, the last [chapter]5: An animal that can be immolated to the Lord cannot be changed, neither for the worse nor for the better: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Ecclesiastes, chapter five6: Whatever you have vowed, render it: therefore to that which a man vows he is bound: therefore he cannot commute it.

3. Likewise, just as the truth of speech consists in the agreement of the voice and the understanding7, so the truth of a vow [consists] in the agreement of the promise and its fulfillment; but whenever the voice is discordant from the understanding, there is falsity there: therefore also in a vow, when the promise [is discordant] from the fulfillment. But everyone is bound to be truthful in what he has promised: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, that it cannot [be commuted] without the authority of a superior, seems [to be shown]. Bernard, On Dispensation8, etc.: "From well-ordered monasteries let no one, by my counsel, depart out of a desire for a stricter life without the permission of his superior": if therefore one is the more bound to this, it is clear, etc.

5. Likewise, that a superior cannot change [it], seems [to be shown]: because a solemn vow binds equally, like matrimony; but matrimony cannot be changed by any authority of a superior: therefore neither can a vow.

On the contrary: 1. A vow is instituted for fostering charity; but Bernard says9: "What is instituted out of charity ought not to be maintained against charity": therefore where there is necessity or utility, since charity requires it, it can be commuted; but this is [done] through a vow: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, it is always permitted to make progress according to one's state: therefore also to commute a vow from a good [thing] into a better [thing], therefore etc.

3. Likewise, if someone makes two incompatible vows, of which one is more perfect, when the more perfect has been fulfilled, he is absolved from the other, even from that which he vowed first: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, just as a testament is of one's own will, so also is a vow; but it is permitted, as long as a man lives, to change a testament: therefore also [to change] a vow, without any permission.

Conclusion

Conclusion. A vow can, with the authority of a prelate, be changed both on account of a supervening necessity and on account of an imminent danger and on account of the greater utility of the one who vows.

I respond: It must be said that it is permitted to change a vow for a cause — namely, that [cause] which admits a recompense; but not out of levity nor out of the private will by which one bound oneself, but out of necessity or utility, with the authority of a prelate; with the exception of the vow of religion, or even of a more perfect state, into which another vow can be commuted without the permission of a prelate, because on account of its dignity the laws grant permission1. Yet it is sound counsel that it be done by the authority of the superior, where it is not believed that he would contradict [it], lest one seem to proceed out of levity and to despise the authority of the superior.

Now the reason why it is permitted to change and commute a vow is on account of a supervening necessity, or on account of a danger which frequently threatens in the observance [of it], or on account of the greater utility both of the one who vows and of others. For in these [cases] right reason and divine illumination manifestly cry out that through a mediator and procurator it ought to and can be provided that God be not defrauded, nor this man endangered — in which [matter] both this man ought to be preserved and God to be honored, and on account of which a well-ordered vow is made. And therefore on this account it can be changed.

But what he objects concerning a testament is not similar, because a testament does not bind, as a vow does.

1. To that which is objected from Leviticus, according to the Gloss2, it must be resolved: by one's own authority.

2. 3. 4. To that which is objected from Ecclesiastes, it must be said that it is understood [as fulfilled] either in itself or in an equivalent. — And through this the matter of truth is made clear, because the fulfillment agrees with the promise, when an equivalent to it is given. — But as to what Bernard says about those ascending to a higher state, I believe that it is said by way of counsel.

5. To that which is objected last concerning matrimony, it must be resolved that it is not similar: because the bond of matrimony binds not only by reason of the promise, but also of the signification of an indissoluble thing, over which no authority has power3. — Moreover, one matrimony is not better than another, as [one] vow [is better than another]; and therefore it is not fitting for a matrimony to be exchanged or commuted, as it is fitting concerning a vow4.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. 5
    Vers. 9. seq.: Animal autem, quod immolari potest Domino, si quis voverit, sanctum erit et mutari non poterit, id est nec melius malo nec peius bono.
    Verses 9f. [Lev. 27:9–10]: "But an animal that can be immolated to the Lord, if someone has vowed it, shall be holy and cannot be changed — that is, neither a better for a worse nor a worse for a better."
  2. 6
    Vers. 3.
    Verse 3 [Eccles. 5:3].
  3. 7
    Cfr. tom. I. pag. 707, nota 5. — Pro vocis plures codd. et edd. voluntatis. In fine arg. pro promisso edd. promissione.
    Cf. vol. I, p. 707, note 5. — For vocis ("of the voice") several codices and editions [read] voluntatis ("of the will"). At the end of the argument, for promisso the editions [read] promissione.
  4. 8
    De Praecepto et dispensat. c. 16. n. 13: Sane de religiosis ac bene ordinatis monasteriis nullus professorum meo consilio, ne arctioris quidem vitae desiderio, sine licentia sui senioris egredietur.
    On Precept and Dispensation, c. 16, n. 13: "Indeed, from religious and well-ordered monasteries let no one of the professed, by my counsel — not even out of a desire for a stricter life — depart without the permission of his elder."
  5. 9
    De Praecepto et dispensat. c. 2. n. 5. Cfr. supra pag. 483, nota 3. — Propositio in fine arg. sed hoc est per votum intelligenda videtur sic: sed necessitas vel utilitas commutationis habetur interdum per votum, i. e. voto emisso: ergo.
    On Precept and Dispensation, c. 2, n. 5. Cf. above, p. 483, note 3. — The proposition at the end of the argument, "but this is through a vow," seems to be understood thus: but the necessity or utility of commutation is sometimes had through a vow, i.e., once a vow has been made: therefore.
  6. 1
    Can. Scripturae (4.), X. de Voto et voti redemptione (lib. III. tit. 34.).
    The canon Scripturae (4), in the Decretals [X], "On the Vow and the Redemption of a Vow" (book III, title 34).
  7. 2
    Hugo de S. Charo Card., in hunc loc., glossam istam afferre videtur dicens: Non tamen tua auctoritate hoc [commutationem voti in melius] debes facere, sed superioris auctoritate.
    Hugh of Saint-Cher, Cardinal, on this passage, seems to bring forward this gloss, saying: "Yet you ought not to do this [the commutation of a vow into something better] by your own authority, but by the authority of a superior."
  8. 3
    Cfr. supra d. 26. a. 2. q. 1. et d. 27. a. 3. q. 1. seq.
    Cf. above, d. 26, a. 2, q. 1, and d. 27, a. 3, q. 1 f.
  9. 4
    Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    See the scholion to the preceding question. ---
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