Dist. 38, Art. 2, Q. 1
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 38
Articulus II. De voti obligatione.
Consequenter quantum ad secundum articulum quaeritur de voti obligatione, et circa hoc tria quaeruntur. Primo quaeritur de obligatione voti per comparationem ad matrimonii contractionem. Secundo, per comparationem ad commutationem. Tertio, per comparationem ad dispensationem.
Quaestio I. Utrum votum continentiae impediat, vel dirimat matrimonium.
Quantum ergo ad primum sic proceditur; supposito, quod votum continentiae universaliter impediat matrimonium, et quod votum solemne impediat contrahendum et dirimat iam contractum3; quaeritur de voto simplici, utrum sit impedimentum rescindens, sive impediens matrimonium. Et quod non dirimat:
1. Dicit Caelestinus Papa, Extra, de Voventibus et ordinatis, quod non possunt contrahere matrimonium4, Rursus quidam etc., quod « votum simplex impedit contrahendum, sed non dirimit iam contractum ».
2. Item, non magis obligat votum simplex quam iuramentum; sed iuramentum non impedit matrimonium, ita ut dirimat iam contractum: ergo etc.
3. Item, si votum simplex matrimonium dirimeret; cum votum illud sit occultum, et quilibet possit simulare, se vovisse; quandocumque malitiose alter coniugum vellet, posset matrimonium separari5 etiam legitimum.
4. Item, videtur, quod nullo modo impediat, sic: sicut se habet matrimonium consummatum ad votum solemnizatum, ita matrimonium non consummatum ad votum non solemnizatum; sed matrimonium non consummatum non impedit votum, ergo votum non solemnizatum non impedit nec dirimit matrimonium.
Sed contra:
1. Ratio, quare votum rescindit et dirimit matrimonium, ut dicit Magister in littera6, est, quia « voventibus non solum nubere, sed etiam velle nubere est damnabile »; et quia nuptiae sunt eis damnabiles, ideo irritantur; sed hoc non solum in voto solemni est, sed etiam in simplici: ergo etc.
2. Item, Caelestinus dicit et auctoritas in decretali praemissa7, quod « apud Deum non minus obligat votum simplex quam votum solemne »: si ergo non minus obligat; cum obligatio voti solemnis irritet matrimonium, videtur, quod et obligatio voti simplicis.
3. Item, qui voto simplici vovet continentiam tenetur nunquam coire: ergo quotiescumque coit, peccat mortaliter; sed nullus potest obligari ad mortale peccatum: ergo cum matrimonium obliget ad coitum, iste non potest obligari matrimonio.
Item quaero, quare magis votum solemne matrimonium dirimat quam simplex. Si dicas, quia privatum, et ideo non scandalizat nec potest probari8; contra hoc est, quia matrimonium contractum in clanculo sic irritat matrimonium sequens de facto, sicut contractum in manifesto. Et praeterea, p. 820 votum emissum in publico coram omnibus etiam in foro iudicatur simplex nec dirimit matrimonium iam contractum.
Conclusio. Probatur, quod votum simplex continentiae impedit quidem matrimonium contrahendum, non autem simplex, sed tantum solemne dirimit matrimonium iam contractum.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod votum continentiae est tale votum, quod generaliter impedit matrimonium contrahendum, sed non dirimit iam contractum nisi1 solemnizatum. — Et rationem huius assignant aliqui Ecclesiae institutionem. Quod enim vovens sit persona illegitima, hoc non est ex voto, quia in ipso matrimonio perfectio continentiae servari potest ab eo qui debitum non exigit, sed solvit. Unde Augustinus2 dicit, quod « computatur pro sanctificatione perfecta, si non exigis, sed reddis quod debes ». Sed quod impediat, hoc est ex constitutione Ecclesiae, cuius est personas legitimas, vel illegitimas matrimonio determinare. Ratio autem, quare Ecclesia de voto solemni instituit, ut dicunt, est, quod in voto solemni non potest decipi, et potest in fractione eius scandalizari, quia publicum est; sed in voto simplici neutrum habet locum, quia privatum est. — Sed haec solutio videtur supponere duplex falsum: unum, quod sit ab institutione talis illegitimitas, quia Ecclesia, ut communiter dicitur, non potest ibi dispensare3; potest autem dispensare generaliter in suis constitutionibus. Aliud falsum est: quia votum solemne non dicitur, quia notorium vel publicum; quia votum, quantumcumque publicetur, nisi aliud adsit, simplex iudicatur nec impedit matrimonium iam contractum; unde aliud est votum publicum, aliud solemne.
Ideo alia ratio assignatur veracior a voti solemnizatione. Votum enim tripliciter solemnizatur, scilicet ordinis susceptione, professionis emissione et habitus professorum assumtione cum aliis, quae hominem professum ostendunt4. Et hoc est commune in voti solemnizatione, quod fiat coram persona, quae locum Dei tenet et quae votum potest approbare; qua recipiente votum continentiae, transfertur potestas corporis voventis in alium, quia alius adest, qui recipit. Sed in voto simplici, ubi homo mera se obligat voluntate et in nullius manibus hoc facit, obligatur quidem, sed tamen dominium sui corporis in alterum non transfertur. Et quia quod translatum est in potestatem unius non potest transferri in potestatem alterius: ideo, emisso voto solemni, non potest matrimonium contrahi, in quo est translatio dominii proprii corporis. Sed quod translatum non est adhuc transferri potest; ideo, voto simplici emisso, potest vir potestatem sui corporis in matrimonio dare: ideo, si contrahat, contractum est. — Amplius, in voto solemni Deo et homini obligatur, sic et in matrimonio; et quoniam utrobique est par obligatio, et par obligatio non solvit vinculum paris obligationis, sed bene praepotens solvit5 vinculum minoris obligationis: ideo obligatio voti solemnis non potest infringi per superveniens vinculum matrimonii. — Hoc autem non ideo dico, quod faciat scandalum, quia et illud potest esse in voto simplici; sed hoc facit obligatio duplex cum translatione potestatis in alterum. Est igitur haec summa6 rationis, quia votum solemne obligat aequaliter districte; ex opposito non sic simplex; ideo impedit.
1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod ratio irritationis matrimonii est, quia, post votum damnabile est nubere; dicendum, quod hoc7 non est ratio tota, sed concausa.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non minus obligat etc.; dicendum, quod verum est quantum ad culpam sive transgressionem; tamen minus obligat quantum ad alterius vinculi solutionem, ut fiat vis in hoc quod dicit quantum ad Deum. Hoc enim dupliciter dicitur: vel quantum ad Deum ut obiectum, quia votum astringit astrictione8 necessitatis; vel quantum ad Deum, id est quantum ad divinum iudicium. Deus autem hunc qui obligatus est voto solemni, reputat magis obligatum, pro eo quod non solum reputat eum obligatum sibi, sed etiam homini; non solum reputat promissionem factam acceptam, immo per ministrum potestatem corporis esse translatam: et ideo Deus iudicat, quod votum solemne impediat, et non simplex. Et hoc non tantum est p. 821 manifestum in foro Ecclesiae, sed etiam in foro conscientiae1.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tenetur nunquam coire; dicendum, quod verum est, nisi fortiori vinculo solvatur; et quia matrimonium fortius est, ideo dicunt, quod cum consummatur matrimonium, tunc omnino absolvitur a voto, sed debet de eo poenitentiam agere, quia votum violavit; unde dicunt, quod potest debitum petere et solvere2. — Sed hoc non credo, scilicet quod absolvatur a voto quantum ad matrimonium, nisi in quantum ius matrimonii compellit eum agere contra votum; sed non compellit ius matrimonii debitum petere — quia hoc est libertatis — sed solum solvere. — Ideo dico, quod potest sine peccato solvere, quia facit id, ad quod tenetur, nunquam tamen potest sine peccato petere; et si uxor moriatur, tenetur omnino continere3.
Quod tamen obiicit, quod matrimonium non consummatum non impedit votum; ratio huius est, quia nullum fit ei praeiudicium, potest enim uxor, sive sponsa alteri nubere4; sed per matrimonium omni voto praeiudicium generatur.
I. Votum solemne religionis irritare matrimonium, declaratum est a Concilio Trident. (cfr supra d. 27. a 1. q. 1. scholion). Votum simplex vero non dirimit matrimonium, sed impedit tantum, exceptis votis simplicibus, in Societate Iesu post primum novitiatum emissis, quae a Gregorio XIII. paria in hoc solemnibus posita sunt. — Multum tamen ab antiquo disceptatum est de intrinseca ratione, qua differunt ista vota simplicia et solemnia. Cum S. Bonav. etiam S. Thomas, B. Albert., Petr. a Tar. et Durand. docent, in voto solemni non fieri tantum promissionem cum obligatione, ut in simplici, sed etiam actualem traditionem sive translationem corporis, qua ipsa persona Deo consecratur. Scotus vero cum Richardo a Med. docet, solemne votum differre a simplici hoc tantum, quod habeat annexam quandam institutionem ecclesiasticam, quosdam effectus determinantem. Prima sententia sibi constans vult, vota solemnia dirimere iure divino matrimonia nec admittere proprie dispensationem, ne a Summo quidem Pontifice. Secundum Scotum tota differentia fundata est in iure ecclesiastico, unde etiam proprie dispensatio fieri potest. Sententiae Scoti favent plures constitutiones et ipsa praxis S. Sedis. Iam Bonifacius VIII. (libr. III. tit. 15.) dicit, « quod voti solemnitas ex sola constitutione Ecclesiae est inventa »; quod repetit Gregor. XIII. Const. Ascendente Domino. Unde antiqua illa doctrina aliquatenus limitanda est, praesertim quoad 3. quaestionis solutionem.
II. De 1. quaestione: Scot. (de hac et 2. seqq.), hic q. unica. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2; S. II. II. q. 88. a. 7; Suppl. q. 53. a. 1. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 12-15. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 4. 5. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 7. q. 1-3. — Durand., hic q. 2; Dionys. Chart., hic q. 2.
III. De quaestione 2. et 3: S. Thom., locis citt. hic a. 3. 4, S. a. 10. 11. — B. Albert., hic a. 16-18. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1-5. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 8. q. 1-3, a. 9. q. 1-3.
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Article II. On the obligation of the vow.
Next, as to the second article, inquiry is made concerning the obligation of the vow, and about this three questions are asked. First, inquiry is made concerning the obligation of the vow by comparison to the contracting of marriage. Second, by comparison to commutation. Third, by comparison to dispensation.
Question I. Whether a vow of continence impedes or dissolves marriage.
As to the first, then, one proceeds thus; it being supposed that a vow of continence universally impedes marriage, and that a solemn vow impedes the contracting [of it] and dissolves [it] once contracted3; the question is asked about a simple vow, whether it is an impediment rescinding, or [merely] impeding, marriage. And that it does not dissolve [it]:
1. Pope Celestine says, in the Extra, On those who vow and are ordained, that they cannot contract marriage4; and again, Rursus quidam etc., that "a simple vow impedes the contracting, but does not dissolve what is already contracted."
2. Likewise, a simple vow does not oblige more than an oath; but an oath does not impede marriage so as to dissolve what is already contracted: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, if a simple vow were to dissolve marriage; since that vow is hidden, and anyone can pretend that he has vowed; whenever, maliciously, either spouse should wish it, a marriage could be dissolved5, even a legitimate one.
4. Likewise, it seems that it in no way impedes, thus: as a consummated marriage is related to a solemnized vow, so a non-consummated marriage [is related] to a non-solemnized vow; but a non-consummated marriage does not impede a vow, therefore a non-solemnized vow neither impedes nor dissolves marriage.
On the contrary:
1. The reason why a vow rescinds and dissolves marriage, as the Master says in the text6, is that "for those who vow, not only to marry, but even to wish to marry is damnable"; and because marriages are for them damnable, therefore they are annulled; but this is not only in a solemn vow, but also in a simple one: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, Celestine says, and the authority in the aforementioned decretal7, that "before God a simple vow obliges no less than a solemn vow": if therefore it obliges no less; since the obligation of a solemn vow annuls marriage, it seems that the obligation of a simple vow [does] also.
3. Likewise, he who by a simple vow vows continence is bound never to have intercourse: therefore as often as he has intercourse, he sins mortally; but no one can be obliged to a mortal sin: therefore, since marriage obliges to intercourse, such a one cannot be bound by marriage.
I also ask why a solemn vow dissolves marriage more than a simple one does. If you say, because [the simple vow] is private, and therefore does not scandalize nor can be proved8; against this is, that a marriage contracted clandestinely thus annuls a subsequent marriage in fact, just as one contracted openly. And moreover, p. 820 a vow uttered in public before all, even in [the external] forum, is judged simple and does not dissolve a marriage already contracted.
Conclusion. It is proved that a simple vow of continence indeed impedes the contracting of marriage, but a simple [vow] does not, but only a solemn [vow] dissolves a marriage already contracted.
I respond: It must be said that a vow of continence is such a vow as generally impedes the contracting of marriage, but does not dissolve what is already contracted unless1 solemnized. — And some assign as the reason for this the institution of the Church. For that the one vowing is an illegitimate person, this is not from the vow, because in marriage itself the perfection of continence can be preserved by him who does not exact the debt, but pays it. Whence Augustine2 says that "it is reckoned as perfect sanctification, if you do not exact, but render what you owe." But that it impedes, this is from the constitution of the Church, whose [office] it is to determine legitimate or illegitimate persons for marriage. But the reason why the Church instituted [this] concerning a solemn vow, as they say, is that in a solemn vow one cannot be deceived, and one can be scandalized at the breaking of it, because it is public; but in a simple vow neither has place, because it is private. — But this solution seems to suppose a twofold falsehood: one, that such illegitimacy is from the institution, since the Church, as is commonly said, cannot dispense there3; but it can dispense generally in its own constitutions. The other falsehood is: that a vow is not called solemn because it is notorious or public; because a vow, however much it be published, unless something else be present, is judged simple and does not impede a marriage already contracted; whence one thing is a public vow, another a solemn [one].
Therefore another, truer, reason is assigned from the solemnization of the vow. For a vow is solemnized in three ways, namely by the reception of [holy] orders, by the making of profession, and by the assumption of the habit of the professed together with the other [rites], which show a man to be professed4. And this is common in the solemnization of a vow, that it be made before a person who holds the place of God and who can approve the vow; and when that person receives the vow of continence, the power over the body of the one vowing is transferred to another, because another is present who receives [it]. But in a simple vow, where a man obliges himself by mere will and does this in the hands of no one, he is indeed obliged, but nevertheless the dominion of his own body is not transferred to another. And because what has been transferred into the power of one cannot be transferred into the power of another: therefore, once a solemn vow has been made, marriage cannot be contracted, in which there is a transfer of the dominion of one's own body. But what has not been transferred can still be transferred; therefore, once a simple vow has been made, a man can give the power over his body in marriage: therefore, if he contracts, it is contracted. — Furthermore, in a solemn vow one is obliged to God and to man, and so [also] in marriage; and since on both sides there is an equal obligation, and an equal obligation does not loose the bond of an equal obligation, but indeed a more powerful [one] looses5 the bond of a lesser obligation: therefore the obligation of a solemn vow cannot be infringed by a supervening bond of marriage. — But I do not say this because it would cause scandal, since that too can be present in a simple vow; but this the twofold obligation does, together with the transfer of power to another. This, then, is the sum6 of the reasoning: that a solemn vow obliges equally strictly; from the opposite side a simple [vow] does not thus [oblige]; therefore it impedes.
1. To that, then, which is objected, that the reason for the annulment of marriage is that, after a vow, it is damnable to marry; it must be said that this7 is not the whole reason, but a concurrent cause.
2. To that which is objected, that it obliges no less etc.; it must be said that this is true as regards fault or transgression; yet it obliges less as regards the loosing of the other bond, so that force be given to this which it says, before God. For this is said in two ways: either before God as an object, because the vow binds with the binding8 of necessity; or before God, that is, as regards the divine judgment. Now God reckons him who is bound by a solemn vow to be more obliged, in that He reckons him obliged not only to Himself, but also to man; He reckons not only the promise made to be accepted, but rather the power over the body to have been transferred through the minister: and therefore God judges that a solemn vow impedes, and not a simple one. And this is not only p. 821 manifest in the forum of the Church, but also in the forum of conscience1.
3. To that which is objected, that he is bound never to have intercourse; it must be said that this is true, unless he be loosed by a stronger bond; and because marriage is stronger, therefore they say that when a marriage is consummated, then one is wholly absolved from the vow, but he ought to do penance for it, because he violated the vow; whence they say that he can seek and pay the debt2. — But this I do not believe, namely that he is absolved from the vow as regards marriage, except insofar as the right of marriage compels him to act against the vow; but the right of marriage does not compel [him] to seek the debt — because this is a matter of liberty — but only to pay [it]. — Therefore I say that he can without sin pay, because he does that to which he is bound, yet he can never without sin seek; and if his wife dies, he is bound wholly to be continent3.
As for what he objects, that a non-consummated marriage does not impede a vow; the reason for this is that no prejudice is done to it [the vow], for the wife, or betrothed, can marry another4; but by [consummated] marriage prejudice is generated against every vow.
I. That a solemn vow of religion annuls marriage was declared by the Council of Trent (cf. above, d. 27, a. 1, q. 1, scholion). But a simple vow does not dissolve marriage, but only impedes [it], with the exception of the simple vows made in the Society of Jesus after the first novitiate, which by Gregory XIII were placed as equal in this to solemn [vows]. — Yet from of old there has been much dispute concerning the intrinsic reason by which these simple and solemn vows differ. With St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas also, Bl. Albert, Peter of Tarentaise, and Durandus teach that in a solemn vow there is made not only a promise with obligation, as in a simple one, but also an actual handing-over or transfer of the body, by which the very person is consecrated to God. But Scotus, with Richard of Middleton, teaches that a solemn vow differs from a simple one only in this, that it has annexed a certain ecclesiastical institution determining certain effects. The first opinion, consistent with itself, holds that solemn vows dissolve marriages by divine law and do not admit of dispensation properly [speaking], not even by the Supreme Pontiff. According to Scotus the whole difference is founded in ecclesiastical law, whence dispensation too can properly be made. Several constitutions and the very practice of the Holy See favor the opinions of Scotus. Already Boniface VIII (bk. III, tit. 15) says "that the solemnity of a vow was devised from the constitution of the Church alone"; which Gregory XIII repeats in the Constitution Ascendente Domino. Whence that ancient doctrine is to be somewhat limited, especially as regards the solution of the third question.
II. On the first question: Scotus (on this and the two following), here q. unica. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 2; Summa II-II, q. 88, a. 7; Suppl. q. 53, a. 1, 2. — Bl. Albert, here a. 12-15. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 4, 5. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 7, q. 1-3. — Durandus, here q. 2; Dionysius Carthusianus, here q. 2.
III. On the second and third question: St. Thomas, in the cited places, here a. 3, 4, [Suppl.] a. 10, 11. — Bl. Albert, here a. 16-18. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 1-5. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 8, q. 1-3, a. 9, q. 1-3.
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- 3Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. — Inferius pro rescindens codd. E L N Y aa irritans, codd. K V dirimens.Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 2. — Below, for rescindens codd. E L N Y aa [read] irritans, codd. K V dirimens.
- 4Libr. IV. tit. 6, qui nunc inscribitur: « Qui clerici vel voventes matrimonium contrahere possunt », c. 6, quod a codd. et ed. 1 tribuitur Clementi (idem recurrit infra in 2. arg. ad oppos.). Cfr. ibid. C. Consuluit (4.).Bk. IV, tit. 6, which is now entitled "What clerics or those who vow can contract marriage," c. 6, which by the codices and ed. 1 is attributed to Clement (the same recurs below in the 2nd argument to the opposite). Cf. ibid., c. Consuluit (4.).
- 5Cod. E separare.Cod. E [reads] separare.
- 6Hic c. 2. — Post est, quod in plurimis codd. et ed. 1 desideratur, Vat. addit et habetur 27. dist. C. Voventibus (4.). Cfr. supra pag. 695, nota 2. Superius pro rescindit plures codd. irritat, cod. I impedit.Here c. 2. — After est, which is wanting in very many codices and in ed. 1, the Vatican [edition] adds et habetur 27. dist. C. Voventibus (4.). Cf. above, p. 695, note 2. Above, for rescindit several codices [read] irritat, cod. I impedit.
- 7Scil. Rursus quidam in fundam. 1. allegata.Namely Rursus quidam, cited in the 1st fundamentum.
- 8Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. — Mox pro clanculo cod. aa clandestino.See here the text of the Master, c. 2. — Soon, for clanculo cod. aa [reads] clandestino.
- 1Cod. P nisi sit (votum).Cod. P [reads] nisi sit (the vow).
- 2Enarrat. in Ps. 149. n. 15. Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. XXXII. c. 2. — Superius pro perfectio continentiae edd. perfecto continentia.Enarration on Ps. 149, n. 15. Cf. above, the text of the Master, d. 32, c. 2. — Above, for perfectio continentiae the editions [read] perfecto continentia.
- 3Cfr. infra q. 3.Cf. below, q. 3.
- 4In additione Glossae super praeallegatam decretalem Rursus quidam legitur: Unde versus: Votum solemne demonstrant quatuor ista: | Ordo sacer, scriptum, professio praestita sponte, | Et professorum vestis suscepta scienter. Vel sic: Ordo sacer, vestis, professio religionis, | Quae sit facta palam, faciunt solemnia vota. — Superius pro veracior codd. L Y verior, edd. et accipitur. Inferius pro qua recipiente plures codd. quia recipiente (edd. quia in recipiente), cod. K (I a secunda manu) legit: quia in voto solemni continentiae transfertur etc.In the addition of the Gloss upon the aforecited decretal Rursus quidam one reads: Whence the verses: "These four things show a solemn vow: | holy order, a written [profession], a profession freely rendered, | and the garb of the professed knowingly received." Or thus: "Holy order, the garb, profession of religion, | which, made openly, make solemn vows." — Above, for veracior codd. L Y [read] verior, the editions et accipitur. Below, for qua recipiente several codices [read] quia recipiente (editions quia in recipiente), cod. K (I, by a second hand) reads: quia in voto solemni continentiae transfertur etc.
- 5Pro super, cui codd. K L U (I V a secunda manu) praemittunt est, substituimus ex cod. A solvit.For super, before which codd. K L U (I V by a second hand) prefix est, we have substituted from cod. A solvit.
- 6Cod. K substantia, plures alii codd. sententia. Sensus sequentis propositionis est, quod vinculum voti solemnis aequaliter districte obligat, ac vinculum matrimonii; unde non eliditur alio vinculo praepotentis obligationis.Cod. K [reads] substantia, several other codices sententia. The sense of the following proposition is that the bond of a solemn vow obliges equally strictly as the bond of marriage; whence it is not annulled by another bond of a more powerful obligation.
- 7Pro dicendum, quod hoc codd. solum vel haec vel hoc.For dicendum, quod hoc the codices [read] solum or haec or hoc.
- 8Codd. A S affectione, edd. constrictione. Inferius voci corporis cod. aa praemittit sui.Codd. A S [read] affectione, the editions constrictione. Below, to the word corporis cod. aa prefixes sui.
- 1Cfr. Glossa in hanc decretalem (Rursus quidam).Cf. the Gloss on this decretal (Rursus quidam).
- 2Hanc opinionem profitetur Magister (hic c. 3.), quae merito a posterioribus reprobatur.The Master professes this opinion (here, c. 3), which is rightly rejected by later [authors].
- 3Vide supra d. 27. dub. 4; d. 32. a. 1. q. 1. et dub. 2.See above, d. 27, dub. 4; d. 32, a. 1, q. 1, and dub. 2.
- 4Cfr. supra d. 27. dub. 5. — Mox post matrimonium Vat. addit consummatum.Cf. above, d. 27, dub. 5. — Soon, after matrimonium the Vatican [edition] adds consummatum. ---