Bonaventure

QUAESTIO II.

Utrum consentiens in renitentem generet sibi praeiudicium, ut non possit cum alio contrahere.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum consentiens in renitentem generet sibi praeiudicium, ut non possit cum alio contrahere matrimonium. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia «unusquisque potest abrenuntiare iuri suo»¹; sed de iure uniuscuiusque est, quod possit in aliam personam matrimonialiter consentire; huic autem iuri homo renuntiat, cum alii per consensum se obligat: si ergo qui consentit in invitum suo iuri renuntiat, patet etc.

2. Item, potestas proprii corporis transfertur per consensum animi, qui praeest ei; sed unusquisque sibi praeest: ergo cum consentit in aliquam, potestatem sui corporis ei tribuit: ergo iam non potest dare eam alii.

3. Item, iste consentit in invitam et renitentem, et postmodum illa consentit; constat, quod cum illa consentit, matrimonium ratum existit: ergo si mulier virum sibi obligat non ex hoc, quod ipsa consentit — quia consensus unius personae alteram non obligat — ergo hoc est propter priorem consensum, quem ille prius emiserat: ergo prius obligatus erat.

4. Item, efficacius et intensius consentit qui non solum favet consentienti, sed etiam consentit et aliam personam ad consentiendum compellit; sed primus modus consentiendi facit matrimonium et obligationem inducit: ergo multo fortius secundus.

5. Item, caritas est vinculum perfectionis, sicut dicitur ad Colossenses tertio²; hoc autem vinculum, quamvis sit perfectum, tamen potest esse unius ad alterum, ita quod non sit mutuum, ita pari ratione et vinculum carnale: ergo et matrimonium: ergo videtur, quod aliquis possit esse iunctus matrimonialiter alicui, si in aliquam consentit, aut e converso, etiam si altera dissentit.

Contra:

1. Matrimonium est maris et feminae coniunctio³; omnis autem talis coniunctio est aequiparantiae relatio; sed omnis talis requirit convenientiam inter extrema, quia ad minus est inter duos — unde si alter duorum desinat esse similis, non est similitudo — ergo a simili in matrimonio, si alter dissentiat, non est matrimonium nec sponsalia: constat ergo, quod nulla est ibi obligatio nec aliquod praeiudicium.

2. Item, ubi est matrimonialis obligatio, est vir et uxor; sed uxor dicitur respectu viri, sicut pater respectu filii, et e converso: ergo sicut sequitur: iste non est filius huius, ergo iste non est pater huius; ita bene sequitur: ista non est obligata isti ut uxor, ergo iste non est obligatus isti ut vir; nec alio modo: ergo etc.

3. Item, consensus, qui transfert corporis potestatem in alteram, est consensus, qui dicit: accipio te in meam; sed nullus potest accipere aliquam in suam, nisi quae facit se suam⁴: ergo absque consensu mulieris nullus est consensus viri.

4. Item, quantumcumque vendam tibi aliquid, non fit contractus nec adstrictio⁵, nisi tu emas: ergo pari ratione nunquam transfertur potestas viri in mulierem, nisi mulier consentiat: si ergo ipsa est coacta, non videtur ibi esse obligatio aliqua.

CONCLUSIO.

Consentiens in renitentem et in dissensu perseverantem non facit sibi praeiudicium ad consentiendum in aliam personam.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod quaerere, utrum consentienti in renitentem fiat praeiudicium, est quaerere, utrum matrimoniale vinculum claudicet, ut ex parte sit solidum et ex parte contritum⁶; et hoc est quaerere, utrum aliquis sit vir, cuius non est uxor, et aliqua sit uxor, quae non habet virum. Et haec in se ipsa quaestio solvitur, pro eo quod in ea opposita implicantur propter naturam matrimonialis vinculi, quod est relativum et mutuum, quod significat ipsa comparatio et relatio uxoris ad virum. Dico igitur, quod quia matrimonium non potest esse claudum quantum ad vinculum, quod si mulier invita est et in dissensu perseverat tam signo quam corde, nullum est matrimonium; nec p. 702 unus acquirit potestatem aliquam in alterum, pro eo quod in altero extremo defuit consensus. Unde primus non se habet per modum efficientis, sed disponentis; et ideo, si secundus adveniat, tunc perficit matrimonium, pro eo quod iam habet consensum mutuum, qui est eius principium completum⁷; et ex tunc vir obligatur, et ei praeiudicium ad consentiendum in personam aliam generatur.

Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod potest renuntiare iuri suo; dicendum, quod huic iuri non renuntiat nisi per votum, aut matrimonium; et quoniam in tali consensu non est votum nec matrimonium, et nemo est qui accipiat illud ius: ideo ille consensus nullum potest per se praeiudicium generare.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potestas transfertur per consensum animi; dicendum, quod in translatione potestatis huius duo sunt, scilicet donatio et acceptio. Quantum ad donationem attinet, hoc est consensus proprii; quantum ad receptionem, hoc est consensus alieni; et quia ille non est ibi, ideo non est translatio.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, si illa consentiat; dicendum, quod tunc incepit obligari, non ratione consensus alieni tantum, sed ratione sui, qui praecesserat in actu et erat in habitu — qui etsi non obligaret, quia non erat qui acciperet —, ideo, alieno consensu adveniente⁸, ille consensus habet vim obligandi quamvis prius non haberet. — Posset tamen dici, quod in tali casu consensus viri renovari debet vel verbo, vel signo.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod efficacius consentit; dicendum, quod si iste non obligetur, hoc non est propter defectum intentionis, quia non sit sufficienter intensus, sed quia non est mutuus.

Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de vinculo caritatis, dicendum, quod caritas, prout est vinculum, quod facit unum corpus spirituale, nunquam est, quin sit in utroque extremorum, alioquin non facit unum; et in matrimonio fiunt unum sponsus et sponsa, et significatur coniunctio Dei et animae, quae nunquam claudicat: ideo nullus est consensus quantum ad vim Sacramenti, si libertatem habet in una persona et coactionem in alia⁹.

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Question II. Whether he who consents to one who refuses him generates for himself a prejudice, such that he cannot contract marriage with another.

Secondly it is asked, whether he who consents to one who refuses generates for himself a prejudice, such that he cannot contract marriage with another. And that it is so, is seen:

1. Because "each one can renounce his own right"¹; but it is of each one's right that he can consent matrimonially to another person; but a man renounces this right when he obliges himself to another by consent: therefore if one who consents renounces his own right in favor of an unwilling party, it is clear, etc.

2. Likewise, the power over one's own body is transferred by the consent of the mind, which has authority over it; but each one has authority over himself: therefore when he consents to some woman, he bestows on her the power over his own body: therefore he can no longer give it to another.

3. Likewise, this man consents to an unwilling and resisting woman, and afterward she consents; it is agreed that when she consents, the marriage stands ratified: therefore if the woman obliges herself to the man not from the fact that she herself consents — since the consent of one person does not oblige another — then this is on account of the prior consent which he had already given: therefore he was obliged beforehand.

4. Likewise, he consents more effectively and intensely who not only favors the one consenting, but also himself consents and compels another person to consent; but the first manner of consenting makes marriage and induces an obligation: therefore much more so does the second.

5. Likewise, charity is the bond of perfection, as is said in the third chapter to the Colossians²; but this bond, although it is perfect, can nevertheless be from one toward the other, such that it is not mutual; by the same reasoning, so too the carnal bond: therefore also marriage: therefore it seems that someone can be joined matrimonially to another, if he consents with regard to her, or conversely, even if the other party dissents.

Contra:

1. Marriage is the conjunction of a man and a woman³; but every such conjunction is a relation of equalization; but every such [relation] requires a correspondence between the extremes, since likeness is at least between two — hence if one of the two ceases to be like [the other], there is no likeness — therefore by a like argument in marriage, if one party dissents, there is no marriage nor betrothal: it stands, therefore, that there is no obligation there, nor any prejudice.

2. Likewise, where there is a matrimonial obligation, there are husband and wife; but a wife is so called in relation to a husband, just as a father in relation to a son, and conversely: therefore just as it follows: this one is not the son of this man, therefore this man is not the father of this one; so it likewise follows well: this woman is not obliged to this man as a wife, therefore this man is not obliged to this woman as a husband; nor in any other way: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, the consent which transfers the power of the body to another is the consent which says: I take you as mine; but no one can take another as his own, unless she makes herself his own⁴: therefore without the woman's consent there is no consent of the man.

4. Likewise, however much I may sell you something, no contract or binding arises⁵, unless you buy it: therefore by the same reasoning the man's power is never transferred into the woman, unless the woman consents: if therefore she herself is coerced, there does not seem to be any obligation there.

CONCLUSIO.

One who consents to a resisting party, and who perseveres in dissent, does not create for himself a prejudice against consenting to another person.

Respondeo: It must be said that to ask whether a prejudice arises for one who consents to a resisting party is to ask whether the matrimonial bond limps, such that it is whole on one side and broken on the other⁶; and this is to ask whether someone is a husband whose wife he is not, and some woman is a wife who has no husband. And this question is resolved in itself, for the reason that opposites are implied in it, on account of the nature of the matrimonial bond, which is relative and mutual — which very comparison and relation of wife to husband signifies. I say, therefore, that since marriage cannot be lame with respect to the bond, if the woman is unwilling and perseveres in dissent both in sign and in heart, there is no marriage at all; nor does the one party acquire any power over the other, for the reason that consent was lacking on the other extreme. Hence the first party does not stand in the manner of an efficient [cause], but of one disposing; and therefore, if the second should come along, then it perfects the marriage, for the reason that it now has mutual consent, which is its completed principle⁷; and from then the man is obliged, and a prejudice is generated for him against consenting to another person.

To 1. To that which is objected, that he can renounce his own right: it must be said that he does not renounce this right except by vow or by marriage; and since in such a consent there is neither vow nor marriage, and there is no one to receive that right: therefore that consent cannot of itself generate any prejudice.

To 2. To that which is objected, that power is transferred by the consent of the mind: it must be said that in this transfer of power there are two things, namely giving and receiving. As far as the giving is concerned, this is the consent of one's own; as far as the receiving is concerned, this is the consent of another; and since the other is not present there, therefore there is no transfer.

To 3. To that which is objected, if she should consent: it must be said that then he began to be obliged, not by reason of the other's consent alone, but by reason of his own, which had preceded in act and was present in habit — which, even if it did not oblige, was because there was no one to receive it — therefore, when the other's consent arrives⁸, that [prior] consent has the force of obliging, although before it did not have it. — It could, however, be said that in such a case the man's consent ought to be renewed either by word or by sign.

To 4. To that which is objected, that he consents more effectively: it must be said that if this man is not obliged, this is not on account of a defect of intention, as though it were not sufficiently intense, but because it is not mutual.

To 5. To that which is objected concerning the bond of charity: it must be said that charity, insofar as it is the bond which makes one spiritual body, is never such that it fails to be in both extremes, otherwise it would not make one; and in marriage husband and wife become one, and the conjunction of God and the soul is signified, which never limps: therefore there is no consent as regards the force of the Sacrament, if one person has liberty and the other coercion⁹.

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