Dist. 29, Art. 1, Q. 3
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 29
Articulus Unicus.
Quaestio III. Utrum aliquis possit ad matrimonium compelli per praeceptum patris.
Tertio quaeritur, utrum aliquis possit ad matrimonium compelli per praeceptum patris; et voco hic compulsionem, ut obedire teneatur. Et quod sic, videtur:
1. Quia dicitur Genesis vigesimo octavo1, Isaac vocavit filium suum Iacob praecepitque ei dicens: Ne accipias uxorem etc.; constat quod Isaac non praecepit, nisi quod potuit et debuit: ergo potest hoc pater filio praecipere.
2. Item, ad Colossenses tertio2: Filii, obedite parentibus vestris per omnia: ergo in omnibus quae non sunt contra salutem, tenetur patri filius obedire; unde Glossa: «Placet Deo, si per omnia obeditis, ita tamen si in Domino obeditis»: si ergo matrimonium non est contra salutem, patet etc.
3. Item, sicut se habet pater spiritualis respectu matrimonii spiritualis, ita pater carnalis respectu carnalis; sed dominus Papa potest praecipere alicui sub poena excommunicationis, quod episcopatum accipiat: ergo pater carnalis, quod filius cum muliere, cum qua vult, contrahat.
4. Item, stultus est qui iurat et se obligat pro alio, qui non est ei obligatus, ut si iurarem pro extraneo, quod ipse ad sanctum Dionysium iret: si ergo parentes iurant pro filiis, ergo videtur, quod filiis suis possint praecipere, ut iuramenta sua debeant implere3.
5. Item, si aliquis contrahat sponsalia cum aliqua, nondum est matrimonium contractum; tamen per ecclesiasticum praeceptum compellitur ad contrahendum4: si ergo potest compelli ab episcopo, pari ratione videtur, quod possit compelli a patre suo.
Contra: 1. In eo, in quo pares sumus, unus non tenetur obedire mandato alterius; sed quantum ad ius matrimonii omnes sunt pares: ergo non videtur, quod pater possit filio imperare.
2. Item, patre imperante matrimonium, filius sine peccato potest castitatem vovere: ergo non tenetur patri obedire.
3. Item, si filius vult religionem intrare, non tenetur patri determinanti religionem obedire, immo in quamcumque potest sine peccato intrare, quia tale votum est spontaneum: si ergo matrimonium debet esse liberum, patet etc.
4. Item, nemo potest me compellere ad perpetuam servitutem; sed vir, eo quod contrahit cum uxore, dat ei sui corporis perpetuam potestatem: ergo non videtur, quod in hoc teneatur quis alicui obedire. p. 703 5. Item, si teneretur obedire, tunc sponsalia per parentes contracta absque consensu filiorum nubentium essent stabilia; sed hoc est contra iura canonica et civilia5: ergo etc.
Conclusio. Contractus matrimonii debet esse liber nec ordinarie subiicitur praecepto parentum obligatorio.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sicut ostendunt rationes ultimae, matrimonii contractus debet esse liber omnino, tum ratione significationis, tum etiam ratione talis et tantae obligationis, quae in illo contractu consistit; et ideo non est praecipiendum a parentibus filio praecepto obligatorio, quod contrahat; quia potest continere, si vult, et iterum, si vult, contrahere. — Adhuc, per praeceptum non potest pater ad contrahendum cum hac, vel cum illa eum obligare, nisi caritas, vel rationabilis causa eum liget, vel promissio ipsius voluntaria. Rationabilis autem causa ligat, quando pater habet inimicitias et non potest evadere, nisi filius cum consanguinea inimici contrahat; vel6 quando pater prohibet filio, ne contrahat cum muliere mala. Ob promissionem voluntariam, ut quando ipsemet se obligat contrahendo sponsalia, praeiudicium sibi generat in hoc, quod inchoat matrimonium; unde tenetur ad consummandum et ad hoc compelli potest per mandatum ecclesiasticum.
Ad primum et ad ultimum. Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum in contrarium et ad ultimum. Nam Isaac rationabiliter praecepit illud quod Iacob alias tenebatur facere, tum propter malitiam mulierum, tum etiam, quia semen Chanaan de terra illa erat disperdendum; et illud clare insinuatur in textu7, et clarius in quodam libello, qui dicitur Testamentum Patriarcharum.
Ad secundum. Ad illud quod obiicitur de obedientia respectu patris, dicendum, quod illa distributio intelligitur solum quantum ad ea quae sunt de paterna honorificatione, et quantum ad ea quae spectant ad regimen familiae. Si autem quantum ad alia intelligatur, consilium est, non praeceptum; et hoc innuit Glossa, quae dicit: Placet Deo etc.
Ad tertium. Ad illud quod obiicitur de matrimonio spirituali, respondent aliqui, quod Papa non potest praecipere, quia consensus debet esse liber; sed post susceptionem potest praecipere administrationem. — Sed tamen istud non videtur securum dicere, cum tota die videamus fieri contrarium. Et ideo dicunt alii, quod simpliciter potest praecipere; nec est simile de patre carnali, quia pater spiritualis potestatis plenitudinem super filios suos habet amplius quam pater carnalis. Et praeterea, non est tanta servitus et tam indivisibilis copula in matrimonio spirituali, sicut in carnali; et hoc patet, quia Papa potest deponere et absolvere ab episcopatu8. Tertius modus dicendi est, quod ubi rationalis causa est, scilicet necessitas vel communis utilitas, potest praecipi, et tunc ille tenetur obedire; et quoniam semper praesumendum est, quod tantus pater ex causa rationabili moveatur, nisi expresse appareat contrarium; credendum est, quod subditus obedire tenetur. Quodsi sciret se insufficientem et indignum, et videret, sibi imminere periculum animae; credendum est, quod non teneretur obedire. Haec enim obedientia modicum aut nihil de suo debet habere, maxime temporibus modernis. Quidquid tamen sit, non est simile de isto matrimonio et de illo, ratione iam visa.
Ad quartum et quintum. Ad illud quod obiicitur de iuramento pro altero, dicendum, quod, sicut infra9 patebit, nullius est roboris, sed cuiusdam solatii et solemnitatis, quando parentes iurant pro parvulis: nec obligantur ad aliud, nisi quod bona fide ad hoc laborabunt, quod matrimonium compleatur. — Ultimum patet, quia talis sibi praeiudicium generavit ex propria obligatione10.
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Article, the Only One.
Question III. Whether someone can be compelled to marriage by a father's precept.
Third it is asked, whether someone can be compelled to marriage by a father's precept; and I call this "compulsion" here in the sense that he is bound to obey. And it seems that he can, thus:
1. Because it is said in Genesis 281, Isaac called his son Jacob and commanded him, saying: Do not take a wife etc.; it is agreed that Isaac did not command anything except what he was able and bound to command: therefore a father can enjoin this upon his son.
2. Likewise, to the Colossians 32: Children, obey your parents in all things: therefore in all things that are not contrary to salvation, a son is bound to obey his father; whence the Gloss: "It is pleasing to God, if you obey in all things, provided, however, that you obey in the Lord": if therefore marriage is not contrary to salvation, it is clear, etc.
3. Likewise, as a spiritual father stands with respect to spiritual marriage, so a carnal father stands with respect to carnal marriage; but the lord Pope can command someone, under pain of excommunication, to accept a bishopric: therefore a carnal father [can command] that his son marry the woman he wishes.
4. Likewise, he is a fool who swears and binds himself on behalf of another who is not obligated to him — as if I should swear on behalf of a stranger that he himself would go to Saint Denis: if therefore parents swear on behalf of their children, it seems, therefore, that they can enjoin upon their children that they must fulfill their oaths3.
5. Likewise, if someone contracts a betrothal with a woman, marriage is not yet contracted; nevertheless by ecclesiastical precept he is compelled to contract [marriage]4: if therefore he can be compelled by a bishop, it seems by the same reasoning that he can be compelled by his own father.
On the contrary: 1. In that in which we are equals, one is not bound to obey the command of another; but as to the right of marriage, all are equals: therefore it does not seem that a father can command his son [in this].
2. Likewise, with a father commanding marriage, a son can vow chastity without sin: therefore he is not bound to obey his father.
3. Likewise, if a son wishes to enter religious life, he is not bound to obey his father determining a religious order for him — indeed he can enter whichever order he wishes without sin, because such a vow is spontaneous: if therefore marriage ought to be free, it is clear, etc.
4. Likewise, no one can compel me to perpetual servitude; but a husband, by the fact that he contracts with a wife, gives her perpetual power over his body: therefore it does not seem that anyone is bound in this matter to obey another. p. 703 5. Likewise, if one were bound to obey, then betrothals contracted by parents without the consent of the children who are to marry would be binding; but this is contrary to the canon and civil laws5: therefore, etc.
Conclusion. The contract of marriage ought to be free, and is not ordinarily subject to a binding precept of parents.
I respond: It must be said that, as the last-mentioned arguments show, the contract of marriage ought to be entirely free, both by reason of its signification, and also by reason of the kind and greatness of the obligation that consists in that contract; and therefore it is not to be enjoined upon a son by parents through a binding precept that he contract [marriage]; for he can remain continent, if he wishes, and again, if he wishes, contract [marriage]. — Further, by precept a father cannot bind his son to contract with this woman or with that one, unless charity, or a reasonable cause, binds him, or his own voluntary promise. A reasonable cause, moreover, binds when the father has enmities and cannot escape them except by his son contracting with a kinswoman of the enemy; or6 when the father forbids his son to contract with an evil woman. On account of a voluntary promise — as when he himself binds himself by contracting a betrothal — he generates a prejudice against himself in this, that he begins a marriage; whence he is bound to consummate it, and can be compelled to this by ecclesiastical mandate.
To the first and to the last. And by this the answer to the first of the contrary arguments and to the last is clear. For Isaac reasonably commanded that which Jacob was in any case bound to do, both on account of the wickedness of the women, and also because the seed of Canaan was to be destroyed from that land; and this is clearly suggested in the text7, and more clearly in a certain little book which is called the Testament of the Patriarchs.
To the second. To that which is objected concerning obedience owed to a father, it must be said that that distribution ["in all things"] is understood only as regards those things that pertain to paternal honor, and as regards those things that pertain to the governance of the household. But if it is understood as regards other things, it is counsel, not precept; and this the Gloss suggests, which says: It is pleasing to God, etc.
To the third. To that which is objected concerning spiritual marriage, some reply that the Pope cannot command it, because consent must be free; but after its reception he can command its administration. — Yet this does not seem safe to say, since we see the contrary happen every day. And therefore others say that he can simply command it; nor is the case the same as with a carnal father, because the spiritual father has a fullness of power over his [spiritual] sons greater than a carnal father has. And moreover, there is not so great a servitude, nor so indivisible a bond, in spiritual marriage as in carnal marriage; and this is clear, because the Pope can depose [a bishop] and absolve him from his bishopric8. A third way of speaking is that where there is a rational cause — namely necessity or the common good — it can be commanded, and then the subject is bound to obey; and since it must always be presumed that so great a father is moved by a reasonable cause, unless the contrary expressly appears, it must be believed that the subject is bound to obey. But if he knew himself to be unfit and unworthy, and saw that danger to his soul threatened him, it must be believed that he would not be bound to obey. For this obedience ought to have little or nothing of one's own [interest] in it, especially in modern times. Whatever the case may be, however, it is not the same with this marriage as with that [spiritual bond], for the reason already seen.
To the fourth and fifth. To that which is objected concerning an oath sworn on another's behalf, it must be said that, as will be clear below9, it has no binding force, but is a matter of a certain comfort and solemnity, when parents swear on behalf of their small children: nor are they bound to anything else except that they will labor in good faith toward this, that the marriage be completed. — The last point is clear, because such a person generated a prejudice against himself by his own obligation10.
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- 1Vers. 6: Non accipias uxorem de filiabus Chanaan. Cfr. ibid. v. 1: Noli accipere coniugem de genere Chanaan.Verse 6: "Do not take a wife from the daughters of Canaan." Cf. ibid. v. 1: "Do not take a wife from the race of Canaan."
- 2Vers. 20. Vulgata omittit vestris. Cfr. Eph. 6, 1: Filii, obedite parentibus vestris in Domino. Ex Comment. Hieron. in hunc loc. sumta videtur Glossa (quam Petr. Lombard. et Lyranus ut interlinearem in Col. 3, 20 exhibent), in qua pro in Domino codd. et edd. Domino. — Superius post salutem cod. aa supplet animae.Verse 20. The Vulgate omits "your." Cf. Eph. 6:1: "Children, obey your parents in the Lord." From Jerome's Commentary on this passage the Gloss seems to be drawn (which Peter Lombard and Lyra present as an interlinear gloss on Col. 3:20), in which, for "in the Lord," the manuscripts and editions have "the Lord." — Above, after "salutem" ["safety"], codex aa supplies "of the soul."
- 3Cfr. C. Tua nos requisivit (1.), X. de Desponsatione impuberum (lib. IV. tit. 2.).Cf. the chapter Tua nos requisivit (1), Decretals, On the Betrothal of Minors (Bk. IV, tit. 2).
- 4Vide C. Ex litteris Silvani (10.), X. de Sponsalibus et matrim. (lib. IV. tit. 1.).See the chapter Ex litteris Silvani (10), Decretals, On Betrothals and Marriage (Bk. IV, tit. 1).
- 5Cfr. supra q. 1, et Glossa in C. Tua nos requisivit (1.), in nota penultima allegatum, ubi etiam loci ex iure civili proponuntur, secundum quos distinguendum videtur inter filios et filias (quae solum in casu, quo pater elegerit turpem vel moribus indignum, contradicendi ius habere dicuntur). Vide hic lit. Magistri, in fine.Cf. above, q. 1, and the Gloss on the chapter Tua nos requisivit (1), cited in the note before last, where passages from civil law are also brought forward, according to which a distinction seems to be drawn between sons and daughters (who are said to have the right to object only in the case where the father has chosen for them someone base or unworthy in character). See here the Master's text, at the end.
- 6In cod. A secunda manus hic addidit caritas et paulo inferius sicut Isaac post mala. Edd. pro vel substituunt ut caritas vero obligat. Inferius post voluntariam Vat. addit ligatur.In codex A a second hand added here "charity" and, a little below, "as Isaac" after "evil." The editions substitute for "or": "or charity indeed obligates." Below, after "voluntary," the Vatican [manuscript] adds "is bound."
- 7Gen. 28, 4. — Seq. libellus habetur apud Migne, Patrolog. Graec. tom. II. col. 1037, sub hoc titulo: «Testamenta duodecim Patriarcharum, filiorum Iacob ad filios suos», interprete Roberto Lincolniensi episcopo [Robert. Grosseteste]. Duplex haec ratio tangitur c. 2. n. 6. et c. 4. n. 11. — Edd. Testimonium Patriarcharum.Gen. 28:4. — The following little book is found in Migne, Patrologia Graeca, vol. II, col. 1037, under this title: "The Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, the sons of Jacob, to their sons," translated by Robert, bishop of Lincoln [Robert Grosseteste]. This twofold reasoning is touched on in ch. 2, n. 6, and ch. 4, n. 11. — The editions [read]: "Testimony of the Patriarchs."
- 8Cfr. C. Inter corporalia (2.), X. de Translat. episcopi (lib. I. tit. 7.).Cf. the chapter Inter corporalia (2), Decretals, On the Translation of a Bishop (Bk. I, tit. 7).
- 9Dist. 36. a. 2. q. 2. 3.Dist. 36, a. 2, q. 2, 3.
- 10Vide scholion ad I. huius articuli quaest.See the scholion to the first question of this article.