Dist. 29, Dubia
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 29
DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.
Dub. I
In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de situ huius partis. Videtur enim male hic situari; si enim coactio est impedimentum matrimonii, ergo in illo capitulo deberet determinari, ubi agitur de impedimentis matrimonii1.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod quia Magister agit hic de matrimonio a parte causae efficientis; et causa efficiens est consensus, non quilibet, sed plenus, et plenitudo consensus deficit secundum modos praedictos: ideo hic agit de coactione et errore, infra vero agit de personarum legitimitate. Et quia illa multis modis potest privari, et per consequens matrimonium impediri; ideo inferius agit de multis impedimentis. Et haec est ratio, quare tractatus ille ab hoc separatur, quia ratio impediendi venit ex alio genere causae.
Dub. II
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Nequaquam eam invitam ac renitentem cogas eius coniugio copulari etc. Ponatur, quod aliqua consentiat in aliquem per nuntium et ante adventum nuntii poeniteat et nolit consentire, utrum sit compellanda. Et quod sic, videtur: quia, si potestatem suam commisit procuratori, tunc ita ratum est quod procurator facit, sicut si ipsa2 faceret: ergo si procurator et nuntius consentiat, quantumcumque postmodum reclamet; videtur, quod stet matrimonium. — Sed contra: ponatur, quod statim, ex quo poenitet, antequam nuntius perveniat, cum alio contrahat; constat, quod matrimonium est, cum adhuc alii non sit alligata: ergo aliud matrimonium non stat. — Item, non fit matrimonium nisi per mutuum consensum; consensus autem mutuus nullus est, nisi simul sit actu, vel habitu: ergo si poenitet, antequam tunc consentiat, patet etc.
Quaeritur ergo, utrum matrimonium possit contrahi inter absentes.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod si aliquis consentit in absentem per procuratorem, potest fieri matrimonium, non solum sponsalia contrahi, dum tamen constet, utrumque consentire; sicut impraesentiarum3 potest unus alteri consensum exprimere per interpositam personam.
Quod autem quaeritur, utrum, ipsa poenitente, matrimonium contrahatur; dicendum, quod re vera, si non ante poeniteat, quam ille consentiat, res est salva. Et si poenitet in corde et reclamat in signo in conspectu testium, per quos possit probari, utpote negando, vel matrimonium cum alio contrahendo; re vera non est matrimonium, nec in conspectu Dei nec in conspectu Ecclesiae, quia consensus non simul concurrunt, maxime si fecit quod in se fuit, ut revocatio voluntatis eius ad nuntium perveniret. Et hoc patet, quia, si statim, ex quo poenitet, cum alio contraheret, matrimonium esset.
Quod obiicitur, quod dedit alteri suam potestatem; dicendum, quod semper intelligitur potestatem ad hunc actum dare, consensu in ipsa remanente, qui est de essentia matrimonii interius in facie Dei et exterius in facie Ecclesiae4.
Dub. III
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod inviti et coacti coniuncti sunt etc. Videtur enim dicere, quod si non reclamat, quod est matrimonium. Contra: illud potest esse ex negligentia; sed negligentia non supplet locum consensus: ergo non videtur, quod sit matrimonium.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod secundum faciem Ecclesiae consensus praesumtus matrimonium facit, quando scilicet probabiliter praesumitur quod consensus ille sit maritalis. Hoc autem potest esse tripliciter: primo modo, quando consentit ore; secundo vero, quando, etsi non consentit ore, tamen voluntarie consentit in carnale opus, petendo vel reddendo quod exigitur; tertio modo, quando reclamare potest et habet locum et tempus et non reclamat, consentire praesumitur, et ideo amplius non auditur; immo in facie Ecclesiae pro matrimonio habetur, non propter negligentiam, sed propter consensum, qui creditur inclinatus et voluntarius simpliciter, quamvis in principio fuerit coactus5.
DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.
Doubt I
In this section there are doubts concerning the text, and first it is asked concerning the placement of this part. For it seems to be badly placed here; for if coercion is an impediment of marriage, then it ought to be determined in that chapter where the impediments of marriage are treated1.
I respond: It must be said that, because the Master here treats of marriage on the side of the efficient cause; and the efficient cause is consent, not just any consent, but full consent, and the fullness of consent is lacking according to the aforesaid modes: therefore he here treats of coercion and error, while below he treats of the legitimacy of persons. And because that [legitimacy] can be lacking in many ways, and consequently marriage impeded; therefore further below he treats of many impediments. And this is the reason why that treatise is separated from this one, because the ground of impeding comes from another kind of cause.
Doubt II
Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: By no means force her, unwilling and resisting, to be joined in her marriage etc. Suppose that some woman consents to someone through a messenger, and before the messenger's arrival she repents and does not wish to consent — is she to be compelled? And it seems that she is: because, if she committed her power to a proxy, then what the proxy does is as ratified as if she2 had done it herself: therefore if the proxy and the messenger consent, however much she afterward protests, it seems that the marriage stands. — But on the contrary: suppose that, as soon as she repents, before the messenger arrives, she contracts with another; it is settled that there is a marriage, since she is not yet bound to the other: therefore the other marriage does not stand. — Likewise, marriage is not made except through mutual consent; but mutual consent is none, unless it is simultaneous either in act or in habit: therefore if she repents before he then consents, it is clear, etc.
It is asked, therefore, whether marriage can be contracted between absent parties.
I respond: It must be said that if someone consents to an absent party through a proxy, marriage can be made — not only betrothal contracted — provided it be established that both consent; just as in the present3 one person can express consent to another through an interposed person.
As for what is asked, whether, she repenting, the marriage is contracted: it must be said that in truth, if she does not repent before he consents, the matter is safe. And if she repents in her heart and protests by a sign in the sight of witnesses, by whom it can be proved — for instance by denying, or by contracting marriage with another — in truth there is no marriage, neither in the sight of God nor in the sight of the Church, because the two consents do not concur simultaneously, especially if she did what was in her power, so that the revocation of her will might reach the messenger. And this is clear, because, if as soon as she repents she were to contract with another, there would be a marriage.
As for the objection, that she gave her power to another: it must be said that it is always understood that she gives the power for this act, the consent remaining in herself, which consent is of the essence of marriage — inwardly in the sight of God and outwardly in the sight of the Church4.
Doubt III
Likewise it is asked about this, that he says that unwilling and coerced persons are joined etc. For he seems to say by this that, if she does not protest, there is a marriage. On the contrary: that could be from negligence; but negligence does not supply the place of consent: therefore it does not seem that there is a marriage.
I respond: It must be said that, according to the face of the Church, presumed consent makes a marriage, namely when it is probably presumed that the consent is marital. But this can happen in three ways: in the first way, when one consents by word; second, when, although one does not consent by word, one nevertheless consents willingly to the carnal act, by seeking or rendering what is required; in the third way, when one is able to protest and has the place and the time and does not protest, one is presumed to consent, and therefore is not heard afterward; rather, in the sight of the Church it is held for a marriage, not on account of negligence, but on account of consent, which is believed to be inclined and voluntary simply, although at the beginning it was coerced5.
- 1Infra d. XXXIV. seqq.Below, d. XXXIV and following.
- 2Cod. C propria, edd. Papa.Codex C reads propria ("her own"), the editions Papa [an apparent misreading, retained as the editions' variant].
- 3Codd. II aa in praesentia.Two codices read in praesentia ("in the present") [for impraesentiarum].
- 4Solutio nititur C. Procurator (9.), de Procuratoribus in Sexto (lib. I. tit. 19.). Cfr. ibid. Glossa, sicut et in C. Nec illud otiosum (8.), C. 30. q. 5. — De ipso dubio vide S. Thom., hic circa lit.; Richard. a Med., IV. Sent. d. 27. a. 4. q. 3.The solution rests on the canon Procurator (9.), On Proctors, in the Sext (bk. I, tit. 19). Cf. there the Gloss, as also on the canon Nec illud otiosum (8.), C. 30, q. 5. — On this doubt itself see St. Thomas, here on the text; Richard of Mediavilla, IV Sentences, d. 27, a. 4, q. 3.
- 5Cfr. supra d. 28. q. 1. ad 3. et 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 3. et circa lit.Cf. above, d. 28, q. 1, ad 3 and 4. — Peter of Tarantaise, here a. 3 and on the text.