Dist. 30, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 30
Articulus Unicus. De consensu, qui deficit a parte rationis.
Quaestio I. Utrum consensus erroneus faciat matrimonium.
Quantum ergo ad primum quaeritur, utrum consensus erroneus faciat matrimonium. Et quod non, videtur:
1. Quia consensus sequitur cognitionem1, ergo qui consentit consentit in eum, de quo cogitat; sed credens, hunc esse alium, de illo cogitat: ergo consentit in illum et non in hunc: et sic etc.
2. Item, «voluntarium est cuius principium est in ipso cognoscente singularia2»: ergo involuntarium, ubi non est cognitio; sed ubi errat, non cognoscit, et sic non est ibi ratio voluntarii: ergo nec matrimonium.
3. Item, plus habet de ratione involuntarii quod fit per ignorantiam quam per violentiam3; sed illud impedit: ergo et istud.
4. Item, ad hoc est auctoritas, quae dicit hoc, sicut habetur Causa vigesima nona, quaestione prima4 per totum.
Contra: 1. Isaac credidit benedicere Esau, tamen benedicendo Iacob benedictus est5: ergo a simili, qui credit ducere unam in uxorem et ducit aliam, uxor eius est.
2. Item, Iacob credidit cognoscere Rachelem et cognovit Liam6, et tamen matrimonium fuit: ergo etc.
3. Item, hoc ostenditur ratione: quia qui peccat per ignorantiam nihilominus peccat et non excusatur: ergo nec matrimonium infringitur propter errorem.
4. Item obiicitur, quia rusticus, credens cuprum aurum, emit cuprum, non aurum: ergo similiter videtur, quod mulier credens, Petrum esse Martinum, consentit in Petrum.
5. Item, si consensus erroneus impedit in quantum erroneus: ergo ubicumque est error, est impedimentum: ergo si credit contrahere cum divite et contrahit cum paupere, videtur, quod non fiat contractio matrimonii.
Iuxta hoc quaeritur, quis error impediat, et utrum error nobilitatis impediat matrimonium. Videtur enim, quod non, cum sit error qualitatis; oppositum autem dicit Magister in littera7.
Conclusio. Matrimonium impedit error circa personam, non autem error circa proprietates personae, nisi sit circa conditionem.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod error potest esse duplex in consensu: aut error circa personam, aut circa proprietates personae. Si sit error circa personam, talis consensum tollit et matrimonium impedit. Quae enim consentit in aliquem, credens ipsum esse alium, secundum veritatem affectus eius coniungitur ei, de quo credit, et in eum consentit; et ideo non est ibi matrimonium, pro eo quod non est consensus mutuus. Ad hoc autem, quod sit error personae, necesse est, quod duplex persona occurrat: una in aspectu interiori, altera in exteriori; et talis error facit, consensum et voluntatem diverti ab eo qui exterius apparet, pro eo quod consensus omnis et voluntas aliquam sequitur cognitionem. Invisa enim, ut dicit Augustinus8, diligere possumus, incognita nequaquam. — Si autem sit error proprietatum personae, talis error non omnino tollit consensum; et ideo non omnino impedit matrimonium, nisi quando est error conditionis sive servitutis. Quare autem iste error magis impediat quam alius, infra9 dicitur.
Ad argumenta: Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de benedictione Iacob, dicendum, quod non est simile: quia benedictio est opus Dei et secundum veritatem illi debebatur, quem ignorans benedicebat, et ideo Isaac benedictionem postmodum confirmavit; sed consensus est opus personae10 quantum ad iudicium potens errare; ideo non est simile.
Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Iacob, cognoscens Liam, erravit, et tamen matrimonium fuit; dicendum, quod non ex coitu fuit matrimonium; sed postmodum Iacob consensit in illam quam cognoverat, et rursus servivit pro prima11.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ignorantia non excusat a culpa; dicendum, quod ignorantia iuris non excusat, sed tamen ignorantia personae et facti, adhibita diligentia, excusat12, ut si quis cognoscat aliam, credens cognoscere suam; sic in proposito.
Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod qui credit emere aurum etc.; dicendum, quod non est simile duplici ex causa: primum, quia rusticus non cogitat de auro nisi in generali, sed de cupro in speciali; sed mulier, errans in Petro, cogitat de Martino in speciali. Praeterea, consensus est actus voluntatis interior, qui consequitur aestimationem et credulitatem; sed emptio est actus exterior, qui consequitur contractum exteriorem circa rem. Si tamen rusticus mentionem faceret de auro, ita quod mentio de auro fieret in contractu, et ille venderet aurichalcum pro auro; tunc non teneret contractus, immo teneretur decipiens ad restitutionem; et quantum ad hoc est simile. Et hoc est, quod Magister introducit istud pro simili in ipsa littera13.
Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quis error impediat; patet responsio ex praedictis. Quod vero quaeritur de nobilitate, dicendum, quod circa nobilitatem contingit errare dupliciter14, ut patet per exemplum. Mulier enim, quae credit, hunc quem videt, esse filium regis Angliae, dupliciter potest errare: aut enim cognoscit personam filii regis Angliae visu, vel auditu; et tunc in veritate consentit in illum, quia de illo cogitat; et tunc est error personae, et non est matrimonium. Aut personam eius non cognoscit, sed solum cogitat dignitatem et credit, hunc quem videt, habere illam dignitatem et nobilitatem; et tunc non consentit nisi in hunc, et est error proprietatis, non substantiae. — Quod ergo obiicitur: credit, hunc esse alium; falsum est, sed alterum, quia nobilitas non est substantia, sed accidens15.
I. Principia hic circa impedimentum erroris et servitutis posita iure canonico comprobantur; attentione digna est regula ab auctore nostro assignata, qua dignoscitur, quando sit error circa personam; et cfr. infra dub. 3.
De I. quaestione: Scot., hic q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1. 2; Suppl. q. 51. a. 1. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 1-4. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. 2. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.
II. Verum fuisse matrimonium inter Ss. Virginem et S. Ioseph, a nonnullis theologis in dubio positum est, refragante communi sententia, quae ex Patribus plures rationes congruentiae hoc loco relatas urgere solet. — Quomodo cum proposito sive voto castitatis verum matrimonium licite contrahi possit, disputatum est supra d. 28. q. 6. — Hic specialiter de voto agitur, quod emisisse B. Virginem, communiter docetur. Non autem ita conveniunt doctores in duplici quaestione, utrum ipsa iam ante matrimonium contractum hoc votum fecerit; et utrum hoc votum absolutum fuerit, an conditionatum (scilicet, nisi Deus aliter disponeret). Durand. (hic q. 2.) utrumque probabile esse putat, scilicet vel B. Virginem ante matrimonium non fecisse votum, sed tantum propositum conditionatum; vel (ut S. Bonav., supra d. 28. q. 6, docet) ipsam certificatam de custodienda virginitate, votum absolutum emisisse. Votum absolutum et ante matrimonium fuisse, docet cum nostro Doctore Scot. (hic q. 2.). Idem (n. 4. seq.) evertere nititur opinionem alteram, quae pro voto conditionato militat, et quam profitentur cum Magistro (hic c. 2.) S. Thom. (hic q. 2. a. 1. 2; Sum. III. q. 29. a. 2.); B. Albert. (hic a. 8-11.); Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 2.); Richard. a Med. (hic a. 1. q. 1. 2.); Dionys. Carth. (hic q. 2.) aliique multi. Sed Henr. Gandav. (Quodl. 9. q. 11.) quoad votum absolutum consentit S. Bonaventurae, et quod ipsa «ante matrimonium vovit, sed non nisi certificata de perseverantia sua in virginitate». — Hi igitur cum Scoto contra alios tenent, non obstante voluntate absoluta et certitudine nunquam utendi iure matrimonii, tamen fuisse inter eos verum matrimonium, cum ad hoc sufficiat potentia et obligatio remota, licet voto continendi perpetuo quoad actum impedita. — De locis Scripturae contra virginitatem Matris Dei obiectis vide infra dub. 4. 5.
III. Solutio 3. quaestionis communis est. De eadem: Scot., supra d. 26. q. unica n. 19. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3; Suppl. q. 48. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 13. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 1. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.
---
Article Unique. On the consent that fails on the part of reason.
Question I. Whether erroneous consent makes marriage.
As to the first, then, it is asked whether erroneous consent makes marriage. And that it does not, is shown:
1. Because consent follows knowledge1, therefore he who consents, consents to the one of whom he thinks; but one who believes this person to be another thinks of that other one: therefore he consents to that one and not to this one: and so on.
2. Likewise, "the voluntary is that whose principle is in the one who knows the particulars"2: therefore the involuntary is present where there is no knowledge; but where one errs, one does not know, and so the character of the voluntary is not present there: therefore neither is marriage.
3. Likewise, what comes about through ignorance has more of the character of the involuntary than what comes about through violence3; but the latter is an impediment: therefore so is the former.
4. Likewise, there is an authority which says this, as is found in Cause Twenty-Nine, Question One4, throughout.
On the contrary: 1. Isaac believed he was blessing Esau, yet in blessing him it was Jacob who was blessed5: therefore by a like argument, one who believes he is taking one woman as wife and takes another, she is his wife.
2. Likewise, Jacob believed he was knowing Rachel and knew Leah6, and yet there was marriage: therefore, and so on.
3. Likewise, this is shown by reason: because one who sins through ignorance sins nonetheless and is not excused: therefore neither is marriage broken on account of error.
4. Likewise it is objected, because a peasant, believing copper to be gold, buys copper, not gold: therefore it likewise seems that a woman who believes Peter to be Martin consents to Peter.
5. Likewise, if erroneous consent is an impediment insofar as it is erroneous: then wherever there is error, there is an impediment: therefore if she believes she is contracting with a rich man and contracts with a poor one, it seems that no contracting of marriage takes place.
In connection with this it is asked which error is an impediment, and whether error as to nobility impedes marriage. For it seems that it does not, since it is an error of quality; but the Master says the opposite in the text7.
Conclusion. Error concerning the person impedes marriage, but not error concerning the properties of the person, unless it concerns condition.
I respond: It must be said that error in consent can be twofold: either error concerning the person, or error concerning the properties of the person. If it is error concerning the person, such error takes away the consent and impedes the marriage. For she who consents to someone, believing him to be another, is joined, according to the truth of her affection, to him whom she believes [him to be], and consents to him; and therefore there is no marriage there, because there is no mutual consent. But for there to be error of the person, it is necessary that a twofold person be present: one in interior regard, the other in exterior; and such error makes the consent and the will turn away from the one who appears outwardly, because all consent and will follows some knowledge. For, as Augustine says8, we can love the unseen, but never the unknown. — But if it is error concerning the properties of the person, such error does not entirely take away consent; and therefore it does not entirely impede marriage, except when it is error of condition or of servitude. But why this error impedes more than another is said below9.
To the arguments: To 1. To that, then, which is objected concerning the blessing of Jacob, it must be said that it is not a like case: because the blessing is the work of God, and in truth was owed to him whom, unknowingly, he was blessing; and therefore Isaac afterward confirmed the blessing; but consent is the work of the person10, as regards a judgment capable of erring; therefore it is not a like case.
To 2. To that which is objected, that Jacob, in knowing Leah, erred, and yet there was marriage; it must be said that the marriage did not come from the intercourse; but afterward Jacob consented to her whom he had known, and again served for the first one11.
To 3. To that which is objected, that ignorance does not excuse from fault; it must be said that ignorance of law does not excuse, but nevertheless ignorance of the person and of the fact, due diligence having been employed, does excuse12 — as if someone should know another woman, believing he knows his own; so in the case proposed.
To 4. To that which is objected, that one who believes he is buying gold, etc.; it must be said that it is not a like case, for a twofold reason: first, because the peasant does not think of the gold except in general, but of the copper in particular; but the woman, erring as to Peter, thinks of Martin in particular. Moreover, consent is an interior act of the will, which follows an estimation and a believing; but purchase is an exterior act, which follows an exterior contract concerning the thing. If, however, the peasant were to make mention of gold, so that mention of gold were made in the contract, and the other were to sell brass for gold; then the contract would not hold — indeed the deceiver would be bound to restitution; and to this extent it is a like case. And this is what the Master introduces as a like case in the text itself13.
To 5. To that which is objected, as to which error is an impediment: the answer is clear from what has been said. But as to what is asked concerning nobility, it must be said that one can err about nobility in two ways14, as is clear from an example. For a woman who believes that this man whom she sees is the son of the king of England can err in two ways: for either she knows the person of the king of England's son by sight or by hearing, and then she truly consents to him, because she thinks of him; and then it is error of the person, and there is no marriage. Or she does not know his person, but only thinks of his rank, and believes that this man whom she sees has that rank and nobility; and then she consents only to this man, and it is error of a property, not of substance. — As to what is therefore objected, that she believes him to be another: that is false; rather, it is another [thing she believes of him], since nobility is not a substance, but an accident15.
I. The principles here concerning the impediment of error and of servitude are confirmed by canon law; a rule assigned by our author is worthy of attention, by which it is discerned when there is error concerning the person; and compare below, doubt 3.
On the first question: Scotus, here q. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, aa. 1–2; Suppl. q. 51, aa. 1–2. — Bl. Albert, here aa. 1–4. — Peter of Tarantaise, here q. 1, aa. 1–2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 1–2. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Denys the Carthusian, here q. 1.
II. That there was a true marriage between the Blessed Virgin and St. Joseph has been put in doubt by some theologians, the common opinion — which is accustomed to urge, on this point, several arguments of fittingness gathered from the Fathers — dissenting. — How, together with a proposal or vow of chastity, a true marriage can be lawfully contracted, has been disputed above, d. 28, q. 6. — Here the question deals specially with the vow, which the Blessed Virgin is commonly taught to have made. But the doctors do not agree so well on a twofold question: whether she had already made this vow before the marriage was contracted; and whether this vow was absolute, or conditional (namely, unless God should dispose otherwise). Durandus (here q. 2) thinks either is probable — namely, either that the Blessed Virgin made no vow before marriage, but only a conditional resolve; or (as St. Bonaventure teaches above, d. 28, q. 6) that, having been assured that she was to preserve her virginity, she made an absolute vow. That the vow was absolute, and made before marriage, is taught, along with our Doctor, by Scotus (here q. 2). The same author (n. 4 and following) strives to overturn the other opinion, which argues for a conditional vow, and which is professed, along with the Master (here c. 2), by St. Thomas (here q. 2, aa. 1–2; Summa III, q. 29, a. 2); Bl. Albert (here aa. 8–11); Peter of Tarantaise (here q. 2); Richard of Mediavilla (here a. 1, q. 1–2); Denys the Carthusian (here q. 2), and many others besides. But Henry of Ghent (Quodl. 9, q. 11), as to the absolute vow, agrees with St. Bonaventure, and holds that she "vowed before marriage, but only once assured of her perseverance in virginity." — These, therefore, together with Scotus, hold against the others that, notwithstanding the absolute will and certitude of never making use of the right of marriage, there was nevertheless a true marriage between them, since for this it suffices that the power and the obligation remain, even though remote, though impeded as to the act by a vow of perpetual continence. — On the passages of Scripture objected against the virginity of the Mother of God, see below, doubts 4 and 5.
III. The solution of the third question is the common one. On the same: Scotus, above, d. 26, q. unica, n. 19. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 3; Suppl. q. 48, a. 2. — Bl. Albert, here a. 13. — Peter of Tarantaise, here q. 3, aa. 1–2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 1–2. — Denys the Carthusian, here q. 1.
---
- 1Cfr. II. Sent. d. 25. p. 1. q. 3. ad 5. et d. 38. a. 2. q. 2. in corp.Cf. II Sent., d. 25, p. 1, q. 3, ad 5, and d. 38, a. 2, q. 2, in the body.
- 2Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 1. (Cfr. supra pag. 521, nota 8.) Multi codd. et edd. singula (τὰ καθ' ἔκαστα).Aristotle, Ethics III, c. 1. (Cf. above, p. 521, note 8.) Many codices and editions read "the particulars" (τὰ καθ' ἔκαστα).
- 3Vide Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 1. — Minor ostensa est supra d. 29. q. 1. — Pro quod fit, quod nonnulli codd. omittunt, cod. K (I a secunda manu) consensus, codd. LY (E a secunda manu) involuntarium, cod. aa ubi consentit. Iustinian., D. II. de Iurisdictione omnium iudicum (tit. 4.), lex Si per errorem (§ 15.): Quid enim tam contrarium est consensui quam error, qui imperitiam detegit?See Aristotle, Ethics III, c. 1. — The minor premise is shown above, d. 29, q. 1. — For quod fit ("that which comes about"), which several codices omit, codex K (a first hand, in a second hand) reads consensus, codices L and Y (E, in a second hand) read involuntarium, codex aa reads ubi consentit. Justinian, Digest II, "On the Jurisdiction of All Judges" (tit. 4), the law Si per errorem, § 15: "For what is so contrary to consent as error, which betrays inexperience?"
- 4Ex qua Magister, hic in lit. c. 1, plura proponit.From which the Master, here in the text, c. 1, sets forth a good deal more.
- 5Cfr. Gen. 27, 23. seqq.Cf. Gen. 27:23 and following.
- 6Gen. 29, 24.Gen. 29:24.
- 7Hic c. 1.Here, c. 1.
- 8Libr. VIII. de Trin. c. 4. n. 6. seqq. et X. c. 1. seqq.Book VIII, On the Trinity, c. 4, n. 6 and following; and Book X, c. 1 and following.
- 9Dist. 36. a. 1. q. 2.Dist. 36, a. 1, q. 2.
- 10Cod. K hominis. Cfr. supra d. 29. q. 1. ad 2.Codex K reads hominis ("of the man"). Cf. above, d. 29, q. 1, ad 2.
- 11Gen. 29, 27. seq. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1.Gen. 29:27 and following. See here the Master's text, c. 1.
- 12Cfr. supra pag. 86, nota 7.Cf. above, p. 86, note 7.
- 13Hic c. 1.Here, c. 1.
- 14Vat. addit: aut circa subiectam personae, aut circa proprietates personae.The Vatican [manuscript/edition] adds: "or concerning that which underlies the person, or concerning the properties of the person."
- 15Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Differentia, dicit, quod omnis quidem differentia alteratum facit, differentia vera substantialis sive specifica aliud.Porphyry, On the Predicables, the chapter On Difference, says that every difference indeed makes [a thing] "other" (alteratum) in some respect, but true, substantial or specific difference makes it "another thing" (aliud) entirely. ---