Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 6, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 1

Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 6

Textus Latinus

p. 152

Articulus II. De intentione baptizantis.

Quantum ad secundum articulum quaeritur de intentione baptizantis, et circa hoc duo quaeruntur. Primo quaeritur, utrum intentio sit de necessitate baptismi. Secundo⁴ quaeritur, utrum recta intentio sit de integritate⁵ baptismi.

Quaestio I. Utrum intentio in conferente sit de necessitate baptismi.

Et quantum ad primum, quod intentio sit de necessitate baptismi, ostenditur:

1. Primo per auctoritatem Magistri in littera⁶: «In hoc et in aliis Sacramentis, sicut forma servanda est, ita intentio conferendi illud est habenda»; sed forma est de necessitate: ergo et intentio.

2. Item, forma verborum est de necessitate, non secundum quod cogitantur, sed secundum quod dicuntur⁷; sed dicere est cum intentione proferre: ergo intentio est necessaria ad baptismum. Si tu dicas, quod ex hoc non sequitur, quod oporteat habere intentionem talem et talem, sed sufficit, quod intendat aliquid, ut puta ludere; ostenditur, quod necesse est habere intentionem dandi Sacramentum: quia opera, quae sunt secundum artem vel rationem, ut ratio est, recipiunt denominationem ab eius intentione — quoniam si intendit ludere, ludus est⁸ — ergo si non intendit administrare Sacramentum, non est Sacramentum.

Contra:

1. Augustinus dicit, et habitum est supra distinctione tertia⁹: «Accedente verbo ad elementum, fit Sacramentum»: ergo si ista duo adsint, Sacramentum est integrum, maxime cum in datione formae intentio non tangatur.

2. Item, ad baptismum concurrit fides, cum sit Sacramentum fidei; sed fides Ecclesiae sufficit, cum baptizans est infidelis¹⁰: ergo videtur similiter, quod intentio Ecclesiae suppleat intentionem baptizantis.

3. Item, baptismus ita respicit recipientem sicut dantem; sed non est necessaria intentio in recipiente, ut patet in parvulo et furioso¹¹: ergo nec in dante; et sic etc.

4. Item, videmus opera spiritualia, quae Dominus facit per ministros aliud intendentes, ut puta probat iustos per daemones¹², qui probationem non intendunt; similiter in operibus corporalibus, qui percutit vulnere lethali, etsi non intendat occidere, homicidium facit: ergo videtur similiter in proposito, quia, licet quis non intendat baptizare, tamen si facit quod requiritur ad baptismum, baptizat.

5. Item, si intentio est necessaria, ergo quilibet est incertus, utrum sit baptizatus: ergo si non debet se committere discrimini: semper tenetur rebaptizari, cum numquam possit certificari de intentione baptizantis.

p. 153

Conclusio.

Intentio requiritur ad conferendum omne Sacramentum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod in omni Sacramento necessaria est intentio. — Ratio autem huius est, quia Sacramentum non habet esse suum a natura, sed ab institutione; unde si ante institutionem immersisset quis in aquam sub forma verborum, non esset Sacramentum.

Dicunt ergo quidam, sicut magister Hugo de sancto Victore, quod Sacramenta instituta sunt, ut fiant rationabiliter et ex intentione; et ideo, si non sit intentio, non est Sacramentum. Ait enim sic^1p153: «Sacramenta Dei non sic instituta sunt, ut operandi nullam rationem admittant, sed tumultuosa quadam et violenta atque irrationabili pertinacia sine omni intentione aut voluntate operantium ad effectum procedant». «Vide igitur et considera, quod rationabile oportet esse opus ministrorum Dei, nec propter solam formam praeiudicare, ubi agendi intentio nulla est».

Potest tamen et alia ratio assignari: quia Sacramentum necessaria est intentio et institutio. Ad hoc enim, quod sit Sacramentum, necesse est, quod forma et elementum ad unum ordinentur; hoc autem non est ex se, cum forma et elementum indifferentia sint ad multa; ideo supervenit institutio Christi, quae formam et elementum ordinavit ad aliquem effectum et significavit. Sed tamen institutio, etsi verba ordinavit ad unum, non tamen arctavit, quia ad alios usus possunt sumi et sumuntur^2p153; et ideo ad hoc, quod ordinentur, necessarium est, intervenire intentionem ministri, qua intendit illo actu et verbo talem effectum dare, vel saltem quod facit Ecclesia facere, vel saltem quod Christus instituit dispensare; alioquin verbum et elementum ut disiuncta, vel ad aliud iuncta, non faciunt Sacramentum.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur primo: Accedit verbum ad elementum etc.; dicendum, quod non accedit unum ad alterum, nisi adsit intentio iungens.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de fide, quod sufficit fides Ecclesiae; dicendum, quod fides est sicut agens universale; sed intentio est agens particulare, applicans fidem ad hoc vel ad illud^3p153: et ideo fides salvatur in generalitate Ecclesiae, sed intentio est necessaria, qua copulatur actus ille fidei Ecclesiae, tanquam actus particularis et actualis in ministrante. Virtus igitur Sacramenti est a fide Ecclesiae, sed dispensatio est ab actione ministri; et quoniam ministratio respicit intentionem dantis, ideo non sic requiritur fides in dispensante, ut intentio.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de suscipiente, dicendum, quod si suscipiens sit adultus et nullo modo intendat, sibi fieri quod facit Ecclesia, sed potius iocum; non credo, quod reciperet^4p153 Sacramentum, si nihil intendat nisi ludere et lavari.

Ex hoc patet illud quod consuevit quaeri, utrum aliqua fictio impediat susceptionem Sacramenti. Si enim fictio illa non removeat intentionem hanc, videlicet suscipiendi quod Ecclesia dat vel intendit dare; quantacumque sit fictio, non impedit susceptionem Sacramenti. Si vero ita sit fictus, quod non habeat intentionem recipiendi vel fiendi circa se quod Ecclesia facit vel intendit facere, sed solum intendit ludere vel alios illudere; non video, quomodo iste suscipiat Sacramentum, vel rem^5p153.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de operibus, dicendum, quod opera illa de se sunt ordinata ad illum finem, ut gravis percussio ad occisionem et poena bonorum ad probationem; sed ablutio et Trinitatis invocatio sunt ordinata ad multa: et ideo non faciunt Sacramentum sine intentione. Et sic patet illud.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod semper oportet rebaptizari, cum non constet de intentione baptizantis; dicendum, quod non oportet, quia fecit quod in se est^6p153 et debitam adhibuit diligentiam; et ideo amplius non tenetur, maxime cum defectus intentionis non potuit cognosci ex aliquo signo.

Utrum autem sit baptizatus, vel non; hic duplex opinio. Una est, quod Deus reputat illum baptizatum, non tantum Ecclesia. Et rationem huius sumunt ex illo verbo Isidori^7p153: «Quacumque arte verborum quis irret, Deus sic accipit, sicut ille qui iuratur, intelligit». — Sed illud intelligitur quantum ad culpam, non quantum ad rationem voti vel Sacramenti, et hoc est manifestum in matrimonio et voto^8p153.

p. 154

Et ideo dicunt alii, quod non est Sacramentum, quamvis ibi sint verba: quia, ut dicit Gregorius in Moralibus^1p154, «non debet intentio verbis deservire, sed verba intentioni», et hoc maxime habet locum in Sacramento. Et ideo non baptizatur, quantum est per id quod per hominem gestum est.

Si quaeras, an aliter^2p154 salvetur; dicendum, quod si adultus baptizatur, ut debet, fides interior supplet: si parvulus, pium est credere, quod summus sacerdos suppleat; si tamen non faciat, iustum facit; et nos esse voluit incertos de salute ad deponendam superbiam et excitandam diligentiam, ut attentius et a personis dignioribus et securioribus^3p154 requiramus; credo tamen, vel quod Deus revelet, vel integre suppleat, nisi peccata nostra praepediant. — Hoc igitur habendum est pro regula in omnia sequentia, quod ad omnium Sacramentorum dispensationem necessarium est habere intentionem vel actu vel habitu, vel implicite vel explicite.

Scholion

I. Ab omnibus de re morali tractantibus nunc recepta est multiplex intentionis distinctio, scilicet in actualem (quae iterum dividitur in expressam et implicitam), habitualem et virtualem; item in absolutam et conditionatam; iterum in directam et indirectam sive interpretativam. Iam notavimus (II. Sent. d. 41. a. 1. q. 3. in scholio n. 2.), S. Bonaventuram cum S. Thoma aliisque illius aetatis auctoribus non raro vocare habitualem eam, quae post Scotum ab ipsa distinguitur nomine virtualis. — Communiter quoad modum intentionis, ex parte baptizantis, docetur, non requiri intentionem actualem, non sufficere habitualem nec interpretativam, sed sufficere virtualem.

II. Ex parte obiecti coliti intentio potest versari circa Sacramentum tantum materialiter (id est circa actiones physicas quibus fit positio materiae et formae), vel formaliter (quatenus actiones illae sunt sacrae, vel sacramentales), vel circa effectus per easdem conferendos. Extra controversiam est, quod intentio effectuum non requiritur, dummodo non positive et absolute excludatur. Item de fide est, in ministris, dum Sacramenta conficiunt, requiri «intentionem saltem faciendi quod facit Ecclesia» (Concil. Trident. Sess. VII. de Sacram. in genere can. 11.). Insuper notanda est propositio 28, ab Alex. VIII. an. 1690 prohibita: «Valet baptismus collatus a ministro, qui omnem ritum externum formamque baptizandi observat, intus vero in corde suo apud se resolvit: non intendo quod facit Ecclesia». — Nihilominus post Concil. Trident., duce Catharino, nonnulli theologi voluerunt tenere, sufficere ad valorem Sacramenti, si illud tantum intendatur materialiter. Sed communissima sententia theologorum docet, requiri intentionem formalem, saltem implicitam et aequivalentem. Ita cum Hugone a S. Victore, Magistro, Praepositivo docent Alex. Hal., S. Bonav., B. Albertus, Scot., Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med. ceterique Scholastici, non excepto S. Thoma, licet contrariae opinionis defensores conati sint ipsum in suam partem trahere, afferentes duos locos obscuros, scilicet hic q. 1. a. 2. quaestiunc. 1. ad 2; et S. III. q. 64. a. 8. ad 2. Sed genuinum eorum sensum bene interpretatus est Caietanus ad Summae locum cit. — Rationes ab auctore hic insinuatae optime in Breviloq. (p. VI. c. 5.) proponuntur, quod scilicet «rectitudo iuris exigit, ut opera hominis, secundum quod homo non fiant praecipitanter, et opera hominis ut ministri Christi aliquo modo referantur ad Christum, et opera hominis ut ministri salutis aliquo modo referantur ad salutem, vel in generali vel in speciali; et dispensatio Sacramentorum est opus hominis ut rationalis, ut ministri Christi et ut ministri salutis: hinc est, quod necesse est, quod fiat ex intentione, qua quis intendat facere quod Christus instituit ad humanam salutem, vel saltem facere quod facit Ecclesia, in quo clauditur in generali intentio praedicta» etc. — Efficacia huius rationis et causa, quare Ecclesia in administratione Sacramentorum urgeat necessitatem intentionis respectu operis coliti, facile intelligitur, si quis attendat, Sacramentis hoc esse proprium et singulare, quod praeter actionem et locutionem externam (quae iam requirunt intentionem operis materialis) ex institutione Christi habent non tantum determinatam significationem, sed etiam causalitatem supernaturalem, ad quam aliquatenus intentio se extendere debet; et cum non nisi in nomine Christi Sacramentum efficaciam habere possit, dispensator eius intentione saltem implicita ut minister Christi «signum Dei exercere» debet (Scot., hic q. 5. n. 4.).

III. De hac (1.) quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 8. m. 3. a. 1. § 1. 3. 4. — Scot., quaest. cit. — S. Thom., praeter artt. citt. Opusc. (4.) de Sacram. Eccles.; IV. Sent. d. 30. q. 1. a. 3. ad 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 11. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. 3. — De hac et seq. q. Durand., hic q. 2., et Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

---

English Translation

p. 152

Article II. On the intention of the one baptizing.

As to the second article, inquiry is made concerning the intention of the one baptizing, and concerning this two things are asked. First it is asked whether intention is necessary for baptism. Second⁴ it is asked whether right intention belongs to the integrity⁵ of baptism.

Question I. Whether intention in the one conferring is necessary for baptism.

And as to the first, that intention is necessary for baptism is shown:

1. First, by the authority of the Master in the text⁶: «In this and in the other Sacraments, just as the form must be observed, so the intention of conferring it must be had»; but the form is necessary: therefore the intention also.

2. Likewise, the form of words is necessary, not insofar as they are thought, but insofar as they are spoken⁷; but to speak is to utter with intention: therefore intention is necessary for baptism. If you say that from this it does not follow that one must have this or that intention, but that it suffices that he intend something, as for instance to play; it is shown that it is necessary to have the intention of giving the Sacrament: because works that are according to art or reason, insofar as it is reason, receive their denomination from his intention — for if he intends to play, it is play⁸ — therefore if he does not intend to administer the Sacrament, it is not a Sacrament.

On the contrary:

1. Augustine says, and it was treated above in the third distinction⁹: «When the word is joined to the element, the Sacrament comes to be»: therefore if these two are present, the Sacrament is complete, especially since in the giving of the form intention is not touched upon.

2. Likewise, faith concurs in baptism, since it is the Sacrament of faith; but the faith of the Church suffices, since the one baptizing is an unbeliever¹⁰: therefore it seems likewise that the intention of the Church supplies for the intention of the one baptizing.

3. Likewise, baptism regards the recipient just as it does the giver; but intention is not necessary in the recipient, as is clear in an infant and a madman¹¹: therefore neither in the giver; and so on.

4. Likewise, we see spiritual works which the Lord performs through ministers intending something else, as for instance He proves the just through demons¹², who do not intend the proving; likewise in bodily works, one who strikes with a lethal wound, even if he does not intend to kill, commits homicide: therefore it seems likewise in the matter at hand, that although someone does not intend to baptize, nevertheless if he does what is required for baptism, he baptizes.

5. Likewise, if intention is necessary, then everyone is uncertain whether he is baptized: therefore, if he ought not to commit himself to danger: he is always bound to be rebaptized, since he can never be made certain of the intention of the one baptizing.

p. 153

Conclusion.

Intention is required for the conferring of every Sacrament.

I respond: It must be said that in every Sacrament intention is necessary. — Now the reason for this is that a Sacrament does not have its being from nature, but from institution; whence if before its institution someone had immersed another in water under the form of words, it would not be a Sacrament.

Some, then, say, like master Hugh of Saint Victor, that the Sacraments were instituted so that they should be done reasonably and from intention; and therefore, if there be no intention, there is no Sacrament. For he speaks thus^1p153: «The Sacraments of God were not so instituted that they should admit no rational account in their working, but should proceed to their effect by a certain turbulent and violent and irrational obstinacy without any intention or will of those operating». «See therefore and consider that the work of the ministers of God ought to be rational, nor on account of the form alone should it prejudge where there is no intention of acting».

Yet another reason can also be assigned: namely, that for a Sacrament both intention and institution are necessary. For in order that there be a Sacrament, it is necessary that the form and the element be ordered to one thing; but this is not so of itself, since form and element are indifferent to many things; therefore the institution of Christ supervenes, which ordered and signified the form and the element to some effect. But yet the institution, although it ordered the words to one thing, did not however restrict them, since they can be and are taken to other uses^2p153; and therefore, in order that they be ordered, it is necessary that the intention of the minister intervene, by which he intends by that act and word to give such an effect, or at least to do what the Church does, or at least to dispense what Christ instituted; otherwise word and element, as disjoined, or joined to something else, do not make a Sacrament.

1. To that, then, which is objected first: the word is joined to the element, etc.; it must be said that the one is not joined to the other unless there be present an intention uniting them.

2. To that which is objected concerning faith, that the faith of the Church suffices; it must be said that faith is like a universal agent; but intention is a particular agent, applying faith to this or to that^3p153: and therefore faith is preserved in the generality of the Church, but intention is necessary, by which that act of the Church's faith is joined, as a particular and actual act in the minister. Therefore the power of the Sacrament is from the faith of the Church, but the dispensation is from the action of the minister; and since the ministration regards the intention of the giver, therefore faith is not so required in the dispenser as intention.

3. To that which is objected concerning the recipient, it must be said that if the recipient be an adult and in no way intend that there be done to him what the Church does, but rather a jest; I do not believe that he would receive^4p153 the Sacrament, if he intend nothing but to play and to wash.

From this is clear that which is wont to be asked, whether any pretense impedes the reception of the Sacrament. For if that pretense does not remove this intention, namely of receiving what the Church gives or intends to give; however great the pretense be, it does not impede the reception of the Sacrament. But if he be so feigning that he does not have the intention of receiving or of having done about himself what the Church does or intends to do, but only intends to play or to mock others; I do not see how this man receives the Sacrament, or its reality^5p153.

4. To that which is objected concerning works, it must be said that those works are of themselves ordered to that end, as a grievous blow to killing and the punishment of the good to proving; but ablution and the invocation of the Trinity are ordered to many things: and therefore they do not make a Sacrament without intention. And so that is clear.

5. To that which is objected, that one must always be rebaptized, since the intention of the one baptizing is not established; it must be said that this is not necessary, because he did what was in his power^6p153 and applied due diligence; and therefore he is no longer bound, especially since the defect of intention could not be known from any sign.

But whether he is baptized, or not; here there is a twofold opinion. One is that God reputes him as baptized, not only the Church. And the reason for this they take from that word of Isidore^7p153: «By whatever artifice of words one may err, God accepts it just as he who is sworn understands it». — But that is to be understood as to guilt, not as to the account of the vow or of the Sacrament, and this is manifest in matrimony and in a vow^8p153.

p. 154

And therefore others say that it is not a Sacrament, although the words be there: because, as Gregory says in the Morals^1p154, «the intention ought not to serve the words, but the words the intention», and this has place especially in a Sacrament. And therefore he is not baptized, as far as concerns that which was performed by man.

If you ask whether he is saved otherwise^2p154; it must be said that if an adult is baptized, as he ought to be, the interior faith supplies: if an infant, it is pious to believe that the supreme Priest supplies; if nevertheless He does not do so, He does what is just; and He willed us to be uncertain of salvation in order to lay aside pride and to stir up diligence, so that we should seek more attentively and from worthier and safer persons^3p154; I believe nevertheless either that God reveals it, or supplies it entirely, unless our sins impede. — This therefore is to be held as a rule for all that follows, that for the dispensation of all the Sacraments it is necessary to have intention either in act or in habit, either implicitly or explicitly.

Scholion

I. By all who treat of moral matters there is now received a manifold distinction of intention, namely into actual (which is again divided into express and implicit), habitual, and virtual; likewise into absolute and conditioned; again into direct and indirect or interpretative. We have already noted (II. Sent. d. 41, a. 1, q. 3, in the scholion, n. 2) that St. Bonaventure, with St. Thomas and other authors of his age, not rarely calls habitual that which after Scotus is distinguished from it under the name of virtual. — Commonly, as to the mode of intention, on the part of the one baptizing, it is taught that actual intention is not required, that habitual nor interpretative does not suffice, but that virtual suffices.

II. On the part of the object cultivated, intention can be concerned with the Sacrament only materially (that is, about the physical actions by which the placing of matter and form occurs), or formally (insofar as those actions are sacred, or sacramental), or about the effects to be conferred through the same. It is beyond controversy that intention of the effects is not required, provided it be not positively and absolutely excluded. Likewise it is of faith that in ministers, while they confect the Sacraments, there is required «the intention at least of doing what the Church does» (Council of Trent, Session VII, on the Sacraments in general, canon 11). Moreover, there is to be noted proposition 28, prohibited by Alexander VIII in the year 1690: «The baptism conferred by a minister is valid, who observes every external rite and form of baptizing, but within in his heart resolves to himself: I do not intend what the Church does». — Nevertheless, after the Council of Trent, under the lead of Catharinus, some theologians wished to hold that it suffices for the validity of the Sacrament if it be intended only materially. But the most common opinion of theologians teaches that formal intention is required, at least implicit and equivalent. Thus with Hugh of Saint Victor, the Master, and Praepositivus, there teach Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, Blessed Albert, Scotus, Peter of Tarentaise, Richard of Mediavilla, and the rest of the Scholastics, not excepting St. Thomas, although the defenders of the contrary opinion have tried to draw him to their side, adducing two obscure passages, namely here q. 1, a. 2, little-question 1, ad 2; and S. III, q. 64, a. 8, ad 2. But Cajetan well interpreted their genuine sense at the cited passage of the Summa. — The reasons here insinuated by the author are best set forth in the Breviloquium (p. VI, c. 5), namely that «the rectitude of right demands that the works of man, insofar as he is man, not be done precipitately, and that the works of man as minister of Christ be in some way referred to Christ, and the works of man as minister of salvation be in some way referred to salvation, whether in general or in particular; and the dispensation of the Sacraments is a work of man as rational, as minister of Christ, and as minister of salvation: hence it is that it is necessary that it be done from intention, by which one intends to do what Christ instituted for human salvation, or at least to do what the Church does, in which the aforesaid intention is contained in general» etc. — The efficacy of this reason, and the cause why the Church in the administration of the Sacraments urges the necessity of intention with respect to the cultivated work, is easily understood if one attends that it is proper and singular to the Sacraments that, besides the action and the external locution (which already require intention of the material work), from the institution of Christ they have not only a determinate signification, but also a supernatural causality, to which intention must in some measure extend itself; and since the Sacrament can have efficacy only in the name of Christ, its dispenser, with at least implicit intention, as minister of Christ, ought to «exercise the sign of God» (Scotus, here q. 5, n. 4).

III. Concerning this (first) question: Alexander of Hales, S. p. IV, q. 8, m. 3, a. 1, § 1, 3, 4. — Scotus, the cited question. — St. Thomas, besides the cited articles, Opusc. (4) on the Sacraments of the Church; IV. Sent. d. 30, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3. — Blessed Albert, here a. 11. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 2, 3. — Concerning this and the following question, Durandus, here q. 2, and Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2.

---

Apparatus Criticus

4
(p. 152, n. 4) Plurimi codd. addunt secundo.
(p. 152, n. 4) Very many codices add secundo (secondly). [Marker on the article-opener word "Secundo"; the variant note attaches to the opener's "Secundo quaeritur."]
5
(p. 152, n. 5) Ita fere omnes codd.; edd. necessitate.
(p. 152, n. 5) Thus nearly all the codices; the editions read necessitate (necessity), i.e. in place of integritate.
6
(p. 152, n. 6) Hic c. 5. — De minori cfr. supra d. 3. p. 1. a. 2. q. 3.
(p. 152, n. 6) Here c. 5. — On the minor, cf. above d. 3, p. 1, a. 2, q. 3.
7
(p. 152, n. 7) Vide supra d. 3. p. 1. a. 1. q. 2. et a. 2. q. 1. seqq. nec non d. 5. a. 1. q. 1. in corp., ubi etiam minor insinuatur.
(p. 152, n. 7) See above d. 3, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2, and a. 2, q. 1 and following, as well as d. 5, a. 1, q. 1 in the body, where also the minor is insinuated.
8
(p. 152, n. 8) Permulti codd. omittunt in hac propositione vel rationem, pro quo cod. L, omisso secundum artem, substituit paulo interius qui ante percutit. Cod. H omittit ut ratio est, pro quo codd. M X ponunt in ultimo. Post intentione edd. subiungunt qui operatur.
(p. 152, n. 8) Very many codices omit in this proposition vel rationem (or reason), and for it codex L, omitting secundum artem (according to art), substitutes paulo interius qui ante percutit (a little further on, "who first strikes"). Codex H omits ut ratio est (insofar as it is reason), and for it codices M X place in ultimo (at the end). After intentione (intention) the editions add qui operatur (which operates).
9
(p. 152, n. 9) Lit. Magistri, c. 1.
(p. 152, n. 9) The text of the Master, c. 1.
10
(p. 152, n. 10) De duplici hac proposit. cfr. supra d. 3. p. 1. a. 1. q. 3, d. 4. p. 1. q. dub. 2. et d. 5. a. 1. q. 2.
(p. 152, n. 10) On this twofold proposition, cf. above d. 3, p. 1, a. 1, q. 3; d. 4, p. 1, dubium q. 2; and d. 5, a. 1, q. 2.
11
(p. 152, n. 11) Vide supra d. 4. p. 1. a. 2. q. 1. seq.
(p. 152, n. 11) See above d. 4, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1 and following.
12
(p. 152, n. 12) Edd. Item, videmus, quod opera... aliud intendentes, approbat, ut puta tentari iustos per daemones. Edd. omittunt paulo inferius qui ante percutit.
(p. 152, n. 12) The editions read: Item, videmus, quod opera... aliud intendentes, approbat, ut puta tentari iustos per daemones (Likewise, we see that He approves works... intending something else, as for instance that the just be tested through demons). The editions omit a little further on qui ante percutit (who first strikes).
1p153
(p. 153, n. 1) Libr. II. de Sacram. p. VI. c. 13: Eiusmodi est, quod quidam imperiti existimant verba illa... qualicumque intentione super panem et vinum prolata, effectum consecrationis et sanctificationis habere, quasi Sacramenta Dei sic instituta sint, ut nullam operandi rationem admittant etc. — In secundo testimonio, quod habetur ibid., multi codd. nec per pro nec propter, et pro praeiudicare codd. possunt dare, contradicente textu originali, qui cum nostra lectione concordat solumque substituit ministeriorum pro ministrorum.
(p. 153, n. 1) Book II, On the Sacraments, p. VI, c. 13: Of this sort is what certain unskilled persons think, that those words... uttered over the bread and wine with any kind of intention whatever, have the effect of consecration and sanctification, as though the Sacraments of God were so instituted that they admit no rational account in their working, etc. — In the second testimony, which is found in the same place, many codices read nec per for nec propter, and for praeiudicare codices may read dare, against the original text, which agrees with our reading and only substitutes ministeriorum (of ministries) for ministrorum (of ministers).
2p153
(p. 153, n. 2) Cfr. supra d. 3. p. 1. a. 2. q. 1. ad 2. — Superius post effectum edd. addunt determinatum. In fine corp. pro Sacramentum, quod plures codd. omittunt, edd. talem effectum, cod. M legit: non sufficiunt vel non faciunt.
(p. 153, n. 2) Cf. above d. 3, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1, ad 2. — Above, after effectum (effect), the editions add determinatum (determinate). At the end of the body, for Sacramentum (Sacrament), which several codices omit, the editions read talem effectum (such an effect); codex M reads: non sufficiunt vel non faciunt (they do not suffice, or they do not make it).
3p153
(p. 153, n. 3) De agente sive causa universali et particulari cfr. I. Sent. d. 43. a. 2. q. 2. in corp.
(p. 153, n. 3) On the universal and particular agent or cause, cf. I. Sent. d. 43, a. 2, q. 2, in the body.
4p153
(p. 153, n. 4) Ita codd., ed. 1 recipiet, Vat. recipiat. Pro iocum codd. F H intentionem.
(p. 153, n. 4) Thus the codices; edition 1 reads recipiet, the Vatican edition recipiat. For iocum (jest) codices F H read intentionem (intention).
5p153
(p. 153, n. 5) Cfr. supra d. 4. p. 1. a. 2. q. 2. Vide etiam ibid. q. 1. in fine corp.
(p. 153, n. 5) Cf. above d. 4, p. 1, a. 2, q. 2. See also the same place, q. 1, at the end of the body.
6p153
(p. 153, n. 6) Codd. E F H fuit.
(p. 153, n. 6) Codices E F H read fuit (was).
7p153
(p. 153, n. 7) Libr. II. Sent. c. 31. n. 8, et C. quacumque arte (9.) n. 22, q. 5. Textus originalis plura verba interserit; cfr. tom. III. pag. 874, nota 4. — Pro Isidori codd. G 1 quod ait Glossa super Isaia. Superius pro non tantum Vat. et aliqui add. non tamen.
(p. 153, n. 7) Book II of the Sentences, c. 31, n. 8, and C. quacumque arte (9), n. 22, q. 5. The original text inserts several words; cf. tom. III, p. 874, note 4. — For Isidori (Isidore) codices G 1 read quod ait Glossa super Isaia (as the Gloss on Isaiah says). Above, for non tantum (not only), the Vatican edition and some add non tamen (not however).
8p153
(p. 153, n. 8) Vide infra d. 27. dub. 2.
(p. 153, n. 8) See below d. 27, dubium 2.
1p154
(p. 154, n. 1) Libr. XXVI. c. 10. n. 15; quo ex loco Gratianus hanc sententiam formavit. Cfr. tom. III. pag. 874, nota 8.
(p. 154, n. 1) Book XXVI, c. 10, n. 15; from which passage Gratian formed this sentence. Cf. tom. III, p. 874, note 8.
2p154
(p. 154, n. 2) Pro an aliter cod. E qualiter. Mox post adultus cod. F prosequitur: baptizatur, sic; quia fides etc.
(p. 154, n. 2) For an aliter (whether otherwise) codex E reads qualiter (in what way). Shortly after adultus (adult) codex F continues: baptizatur, sic; quia fides (is baptized, thus; because faith) etc.
3p154
(p. 154, n. 3) Ita codd. K O T U W; codd. A H L omittunt et securioribus, pro quo alii codd. cum edd. et superioribus. Subinde substituimus ex cod. H credo tamen pro credo bene.
(p. 154, n. 3) Thus codices K O T U W; codices A H L omit et securioribus (and safer), for which other codices with the editions read et superioribus (and higher). Thereupon we have substituted from codex H credo tamen (I believe nevertheless) for credo bene (I well believe).