Dist. 34, Art. 3, Q. 1
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 34
Articulus III. De defectu ex parte liberi arbitrii.
Consequenter quantum ad tertium articulum quaeritur de defectu sive impedimento, qui venit ex parte liberi arbitrii. Et circa hoc duo quaeruntur. Primo quaeritur de perversitate rationis, quae est in furiosis. Secundo, de subversione1 voluntatis in incestuosis.
Quaestio I. Utrum furia impediat matrimonium.
Quantum ergo ad primum quaeritur, utrum furia impediat matrimonium. Et quod sic, videtur:
1. Quia matrimonium est tantum consentientium, et consensus est ratione utentium; sed furiosi non utuntur ratione: ergo etc.
2. Item, plus tollit consensum stultitia quam error; sed error impedit matrimonium2: ergo multo magis furia.
3. Item, furiosus non potest stare in iudicio nec testificari, ergo nec contractum facere; sed plus est contractum facere ratione sui corporis quam rerum: ergo si matrimonium est contractus respectu proprii corporis, patet etc.
4. Item, furiosus non meretur nec demeretur; sed omnis qui suscipit Sacramentum, suscipit ad meritum, vel demeritum, vel digne, vel indigne: ergo furiosus non potest suscipere Sacramentum, et sic nec matrimonium.
Contra: 1. Matrimonium est ad procreandam prolem ad cultum Dei, ergo qui potest hoc facere potest matrimonium contrahere; sed furiosus potest generare: ergo etc.
2. Item, furia provenit accidentaliter; sed matrimonium est vinculum insolubile: ergo furia non impedit matrimonium.
3. Item, si a furia potest quis liberari, et nemo potest scire, utrum sit perpetua; sed impotentia coeundi non impedit, nisi sit perpetua secundum veritatem, vel probabiliter coniiciatur3: ergo etc.
4. Item, furiosus potest baptizari et recipit Sacramentum baptismi: ergo consimili ratione potest matrimonium contrahere.
Conclusio.
Furia concomitans actu contractionem matrimonii impedit matrimonium, non vero si tantum habitu praecedit, vel si sequatur.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod circa hoc distinguendum est, quia furia aut concomitatur, aut praecedit, vel sequitur. Si concomitatur; tunc, quia furiosus non habet potestatem consentiendi, et impedit matrimonium et nullum est; si autem praecedit, et ille habet lucida intervalla, vel sequitur; matrimonium non impedit4. — Rationes ergo probantes, quod impedit, procedunt ea via, qua furia est tempore consensus et secundum actum; si vero non esset actu furiosus, sed habitu; etiam si haberet lucidum intervallum, non deberet contrahere propter periculum, quia talis prolem nescit educare nec cum uxore debite cohabitare; tamen si contraheret, contractum esset.
Ad obiecta in contrarium:
Ad 1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod potest procreare prolem; dicendum, quod secundum statum furiae5 non potest, quia nescit, quis sit Dei cultus; nescit etiam filios educare. Praeterea, si hoc posset, non sequeretur, quia hoc non dicit totum esse matrimonii.
Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod accidentaliter venit et recedit; dicendum, quod etsi matrimonium sit contractum per furiam, non6 solvitur, sed impediri potest, ut non contrahatur; et si etiam contrahatur, nihil fit, nisi postmodum consentiat, cum habuit intervalla lucida.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potest liberari a furia; dicendum, quod non est simile de furia et de impotentia coeundi: quia furia impedit ratione consensus, et consensus est in uno actu et in modico tempore; et ideo, si tunc sit furia, cum tollat consensum, impedit matrimonium. Sed impotentia coeundi est contra matrimonii usum, non contra consensum; et quia usus totum tempus vitae concernit, ideo non est impedimentum, nisi protendatur per totam vitam. Et sic patet illud.
Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de baptismo, dicendum, quod non est simile: quia baptismus est Sacramentum contra originale, quod quia aliunde contractum est, sufficit alienus consensus, nec oportet intervenire proprium; non sic in proposito, immo oportet, quod contrahens consentiat1.
I. Ad 1. quaestionem communiter respondetur cum eisdem distinctionibus: S. Thom., hic a. 4; Suppl. q. 58. a. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 11. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 5. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 1.
II. Seq. (2.) quaestio spectat ad impedimentum affinitatis, de quo infra d. 41. a. 1. plura dicuntur. Cum autem, matrimonio iam contracto, incestuosa copula cum consanguineis coniugis primi et secundi gradus puniatur speciali poena, scilicet ut reus iure petendi debitum privetur; ideo hic specialiter de hac poena agitur. Communiter docetur, nescientem hanc Ecclesiae legem poenalem non subiacere poenae memoratae. De 2. quaestione: S. Thom., locis citt. a. 5. et 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 12. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 6. — Richard. a Med., loc. cit. q. 2.
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Article III. On the defect on the part of free choice.
Next, as regards the third article, inquiry is made concerning the defect or impediment that comes on the part of free choice. And concerning this two things are asked. First it is asked concerning the perversity of the reason, which is in the mad. Secondly, concerning the subversion1 of the will in the incestuous.
Question I. Whether madness impedes marriage.
As, then, to the first, it is asked whether madness impedes marriage. And that it does, seems [to be shown]:
1. Because marriage belongs only to those consenting, and consent belongs to those using reason; but the mad do not use reason: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, folly takes away consent more than error [does]; but error impedes marriage2: therefore much more [does] madness.
3. Likewise, a madman cannot stand in judgment nor give testimony, therefore neither make a contract; but it is a greater thing to make a contract by reason of one's own body than [by reason] of things: therefore if marriage is a contract with respect to one's own body, it is clear etc.
4. Likewise, a madman neither merits nor demerits; but everyone who receives a Sacrament receives [it] unto merit, or demerit, either worthily or unworthily: therefore a madman cannot receive a Sacrament, and thus neither marriage.
On the contrary: 1. Marriage is for procreating offspring for the worship of God, therefore he who can do this can contract marriage; but a madman can beget: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, madness comes about accidentally; but marriage is an indissoluble bond: therefore madness does not impede marriage.
3. Likewise, if someone can be freed from madness, and no one can know whether it be perpetual; but impotence of intercourse does not impede unless it be perpetual in truth, or be conjectured probably [to be so]3: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, a madman can be baptized and receives the Sacrament of baptism: therefore for a like reason he can contract marriage.
Conclusion.
Madness accompanying in act the contracting of marriage impedes marriage, but not if it only precedes [it] in disposition, or if it follows [after].
I respond: It must be said that concerning this a distinction must be made, since madness either accompanies, or precedes, or follows. If it accompanies; then, because the madman does not have the power of consenting, it both impedes the marriage and it is null; but if it precedes, and that man has lucid intervals, or if it follows; it does not impede the marriage4. — The reasons, therefore, proving that it impedes proceed by that way in which the madness is at the time of consent and according to act; but if he were not mad in act, but in disposition; even if he were to have a lucid interval, he ought not to contract [marriage] on account of the danger, because such a person does not know how to raise offspring nor to cohabit duly with a wife; nevertheless, if he did contract, it would be contracted [validly].
To the objections on the contrary side:
To 1. As to that indeed which is objected on the contrary, that he can procreate offspring; it must be said that according to the state of madness5 he cannot, because he does not know what the worship of God is; he does not know, moreover, how to raise children. Besides, if he could do this, it would not follow, because this does not state the whole being of marriage.
To 2. As to that which is objected, that it comes and recedes accidentally; it must be said that although a marriage be contracted through madness, it is not6 dissolved, but it can be impeded, so that it is not contracted; and even if it be contracted, nothing comes about, unless afterward he consent, when he has had lucid intervals.
To 3. As to that which is objected, that one can be freed from madness; it must be said that the case is not alike as to madness and as to impotence of intercourse: because madness impedes by reason of consent, and consent is in a single act and in a brief time; and therefore, if there be madness then, since it takes away consent, it impedes the marriage. But impotence of intercourse is against the use of marriage, not against consent; and because the use concerns the whole time of life, therefore it is not an impediment unless it extend through the whole of life. And thus that [argument] is clear.
To 4. As to that which is objected concerning baptism, it must be said that the case is not alike: because baptism is a Sacrament against original [sin], which, since it was contracted from elsewhere, another's consent suffices, nor is it necessary that one's own intervene; not so in the case at hand, but rather it is necessary that the one contracting consent1.
I. To the first question the common response is given with the same distinctions: St. Thomas, here a. 4; Supplement q. 58, a. 3. — Blessed Albert, here a. 11. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 5. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 4, q. 1.
II. The following (second) question pertains to the impediment of affinity, concerning which more is said below at d. 41, a. 1. But since, when matrimony has already been contracted, incestuous intercourse with blood-relatives of the spouse of the first and second degree is punished by a special penalty — namely that the guilty party be deprived of the right of demanding the debt — therefore this penalty is here treated of specifically. It is commonly taught that one ignorant of this penal law of the Church is not subject to the aforesaid penalty. On the second question: St. Thomas, at the cited places, a. 5 and 4. — Blessed Albert, here a. 12. — Peter of Tarentaise, at the cited place, a. 6. — Richard of Middleton, at the cited place, q. 2.
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- 1Cod. G perversitate, quod etiam infra in ipsa quaest. idem cod. pro perversione substituit.Cod. G [reads] perversitate, which reading the same codex also substitutes below, in the question itself, for perversione.
- 2Cfr. supra d. 30. q. 1.Cf. above, d. 30, q. 1.
- 3Ut ostensum est supra a. 2. q. 1. et 2. — In maiori secunda manus in codd. E I delevit si.As was shown above, a. 2, q. 1 and 2. — In the major [premise] a second hand in codd. E I deleted si.
- 4Vide Glossam in C. Neque furiosus (26.), C. 32. q. 7. — Post vel cod. U repetit si.See the Gloss on the canon Neque furiosus (c. 26), Causa 32, q. 7. — After vel cod. U repeats si.
- 5Pro furiae, quod alii codd. et ed. 1 omittunt, codd. IK illum. Subinde pro quis codd. A G K quid.For furiae, which other codices and the first edition omit, codd. IK [read] illum. Thereupon, for quis, codd. A G K [read] quid.
- 6Edd. non tamen. Mox pro fit cod. A facit.The editions [read] non tamen. Presently, for fit, cod. A [reads] facit.
- 1Cfr. supra d. 4. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. ad 1. pro parte affirm. — Cod. aa supplet actu propriae voluntatis. Superius pro aliunde, quod habent codd. E G L U, codd. I K aliene, cod. O per consensum alienum, alii codd. alienum, edd. per alium.Cf. above, d. 4, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, ad 1, on the affirmative side. — Cod. aa supplies actu propriae voluntatis [by the act of one's own will]. Above, for aliunde, which codd. E G L U have, codd. I K [read] aliene, cod. O per consensum alienum, other codices alienum, the editions per alium. ---