Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 34, Art. 2, Q. 2

Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 34

Textus Latinus

p. 771

Articulus II. De impotentia coeundi.

Quaestio II. Utrum impotentia coeundi accidentalis, quae est per maleficium, impediat matrimonium.

Secundo quaeritur de impotentia coeundi accidentali, quae est per maleficium, utrum impediat matrimonium. Et quod sic, istud probatur:

1. Causa trigesima tertia, quaestione prima⁴: «Si per sortiarias vel maleficas, occulto, sed nunquam nisi iusto Dei iudicio permittente, et diabolo praeparante, concubitus non sequitur; hortandi sunt» etc.; et post: «Si sanari non poterunt, separari valebunt».

2. Item, Extra, libro quarto⁵, de Frigidis et maleficiatis in decretali Honorii: Litterae vestrae, ubi est quaestio de eo qui alias mulieres poterat cognoscere, sed non propriam uxorem, in fine decretalis infertur: «Ipsis cum septima manu propinquorum iuramento firmantibus, se commisceri carnaliter nequisse, proferatis sententiam divortii inter eos».

3. Item, ubicumque talis causa, ibi talis effectus; sed frigiditas, vel arctitudo impediebat et dirimebat propter impotentiam reddendi debitum⁶: ergo cum talis causa sit in maleficiatis, videtur etc.

4. Item, maius periculum est in his qui possunt coniungi aliis et non sibi, quam in his qui nullis possunt coniungi, quia potest esse multis occasio adulterii et homicidii etc.: si ergo separantur propter impotentiam coeundi cum qualibet propter p. 772 naturalem defectum, pari ratione propter impotentiam coeundi cum una propter maleficium.

5. Item, maleficia fiunt arte et potestate daemonum, sicut dicitur in auctoritate canonis prius proposita¹; sed diabolus est potentior et versutior, quam sit homo: si ergo homo potest alterum omnino reddere inhabilem ad actum matrimonii vel castrando vel secando per violentiam, vel dando medicinam, vel per virtutem lapidis aliquam occultam, sicut aliqui medici narrant; videtur, quod multo fortius hoc diabolus possit: ergo per maleficium poterit praestari efficax impedimentum.

Contra: 1. Huiusmodi sortilegium est diabolicum maleficium, sed matrimonium est remedium et divinum beneficium; sed potentius est divinum beneficium quam diabolicum maleficium: ergo potius matrimonium solvit maleficium, quam maleficium excludat matrimonium.

2. Item, nihil impedit matrimonium, quod sit temporaneum; sed maleficium omne est dissolubile: ergo per maleficium non impeditur matrimonium. Quod autem sit dissolubile, probatur ex parte eius qui facit et cui fit et modi faciendi. Ex parte eius cui fit: quia talia maleficia fiunt per diabolica commercia, quae non habent posse super viros sanctos, quia ipsi sunt triumphatores diaboli: ergo solum super peccatores; sed iste potest desinere esse peccator: ergo etc. — Ex parte modi, quo fit: quia «omnis res, ut dicit Chrysostomus², per easdem res destruitur, per quas componitur»: ergo si hoc factum est per maleficium vel maleficia: ergo per illud vel illa potest destrui. — Ex parte eius, per quem fit: quia per diabolum; sed virtus diaboli expellitur ab homine per exorcismos, etiam quando obsidet corpora: ergo videtur, quod similiter quantum ad effectum maleficii.

3. Item, videtur, quod ista maleficia nullius vigoris sint, quia qua ratione habent effectum in actum illum, eadem ratione in actum omnem: ergo si per maleficia possunt impedire coitum, ita possent comestionem et gressum, et sic perimere totum mundum per suum sortilegium: quod credere est sacrilegium.

4. Item, si maleficium impedit, aut debilitando vim generativam, aut auferendo facultatem exeundi in actum. Si primo modo: ergo cum illa vis aequaliter se habeat ad omnes, si impedit coitum quantum ad unam, impedit quantum ad omnes: si ergo non impedit quantum ad omnes, ergo videtur, quod quantum ad nullam, et ita nihil videtur dicere, quod possit cognoscere alias mulieres et non suam. Similiter argue de secundo modo, scilicet auferendo facultatem exeundi in actum³.

Conclusio.

Impotentia coeundi accidentalis, quae est per maleficium, contractum matrimonii impedit, quando est perpetua et praecedit.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod aliqui dixerunt, quod maleficium nihil erat in mundo nec alicuius vis nisi in sola aestimatione hominum, qui multos naturales defectus attribuunt maleficiis daemonum propter fidei defectum. — Sed ista positio derogat iuri et derogat opinioni vulgi, et quod maius est, experimento; et ideo istud non habet aliquam stabilitatem.

Fuerunt et alii, qui dixerunt, quod maleficium vere impedit coitum ad tempus, sed tamen nullum est perpetuum, quia quodlibet dissolvi potest vel per diabolum, vel per maleficium⁴, vel per divinum auxilium; et dixerunt illud capitulum primo propositum abrogatum. — Sed certe adhuc istud est contra experimentum et contra ius novum: quia decretalis Honorii praecipit, in talibus fieri divortium, cum experimento probatum sit, multos habitasse simul per longum tempus et adhibuisse operam magnam et quaesiisse multa remedia, et nihil omnino valuisse; et ideo per experientiam coniicit Ecclesia, tale maleficium aliquando esse perpetuum. — Rursus, quia multi sunt, qui remedium invenerunt; coniicit, non semper esse perpetuum; et ideo hoc maleficium aliquando impedit, aliquando non.

Propterea secundum communem doctorum opinionem distinguendum est, quod impotentia coeundi accidentalis, quae venit per maleficium, aut est temporalis, aut perpetua. Si temporalis, non impedit. Tunc autem praesumitur esse temporalis, quando infra spatium trium annorum cohabitantes et quam possunt operam dantes sive per ecclesiastica Sacramenta, sive per alia remedia, sanari possunt. Si autem non sanantur aliquo remedio, ex tunc praesumitur esse perpetua. — Haec autem impotentia perpetua aut praecedit contractionem matrimonii, aut sequitur. Si praecedit, facit personam illegitimam, ita quod impedit contrahendum et dirimit iam contractum; si sequitur, non impedit, sicut etiam de sectis dicitur Causa trigesima secunda, quaestione p. 773 septima, ubi tale capitulum inscribitur et in littera¹ ponitur: «Illi qui matrimonium sani contraxerunt, et uni ex duobus aut amentia, aut furor, aut aliqua infirmitas accedit, ob hanc causam coniugia talium solvi non possunt. Similiter intelligendum de his qui ab adversariis excaecantur, aut membris truncantur, aut a barbaris secti sunt». Et sic concedendum, quod — sicut sectio, quae reddit impotentem ad coitum — facit personam illegitimam, si praecedat contractionem, non facit, si sequatur, quia matrimonium non potest solvi nisi per mortem vel spiritualem, vel carnalem; unde Extra, de Conversione coniugatorum², Ex parte tua, ubi dicit Innocentius: «Ex quo matrimonium inter legitimas personas per verba de praesenti contrahitur, in nullo potest casu dissolvi, ut vivente reliquo, alter possit ad secunda vota transire». Si igitur sequatur contractionem, non impedit, si vero praecedat, impedit, si sit perpetua³.

Dupliciter autem fit maleficium perpetuum: aut respectu omnis mulieris, et sic reddit inhabilem ad omnem; aut respectu uxoris, et sic reddit inhabilem ad illam, sed non ad omnes; et tunc tales separati secundum iura possunt aliis copulari. Non sic est de frigidis, quia, si copulantur aliis, scit Ecclesia, se esse deceptam, et ideo retractat devortii sententiam. — Concedendae igitur sunt rationes ostendentes, quod maleficium praestat impedimentum matrimonio.

1. Ad illud ergo, quod obiicitur, quod potentius est Dei beneficium; dicendum, quod verum est quoad id, contra quod ordinatur, ut matrimonium, quam morbus concupiscentiae, quia morbus non vitiat matrimonium, sed matrimonium excusat vitium⁴. Sed matrimonium non est ordinatum ad restituendam potentiam coeundi, et ideo maleficium non vincit nec expellit; nec ex hoc sequitur, quod maleficium sit potentius.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod dissolvi potest per causam etc.; dicendum, quod omne tale maleficium dissolvi potest per Deum, dissolvi etiam potest per diabolum; sed non omne dissolvi potest per maleficium, vel humanum consilium, quia malefici, sicut per confessionem eorum scitur, aliqua maleficia sciunt facere, quae ipsi, ad poenitentiam conversi, non possunt destruere, nec homines sciunt consilium adhibere, propter hoc quod industria diabolica superexcellit humanam. Et quoniam humanum consilium deficit, et Deus propter⁵ meritum peccati praeteriti frequenter non exaudit, et diabolus ad hoc non debet invocari, nec eius patrocinium implorari; hinc est, quod tale maleficium dicitur esse perpetuum.

Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de culpa, dicendum, quod non semper remotio poenae sequitur remotionem culpae. — Et similiter ex parte facientis multa possunt destrui, quae non possunt construi⁶; et similiter ex parte exorcismi; non enim semper habet efficaciam in expulsionem diaboli, permittente iusto iudicio Dei.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sortilegium nullum aufert potentiam comedendi; dicendum, quod sicut diabolo permissa est a Deo potestas super serpentes magis quam super alia animalia in prioris facti memoriam — unde plus per incantationes serpentes quam aves capiuntur⁷ — sic, quia actus ille vitiosus est et quodam modo foetens, et ut plurimum coniunguntur homines ad illum actum libidinose: ideo diabolus plus habet ibi posse, et plus ei permittitur. Et hoc probatur exemplo Scripturae et auctoritate, quoniam dicitur in Tobia⁸, quod daemonium, nomine Asmodaeus, septem viros in lecto interfecit, non in convivio.

4. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod aequaliter se habet vis illa ad omnes; dicendum breviter, quod verum est; et si impediretur naturali impedimento, aequaliter impediretur quantum ad omnes; sed quia daemoniaco impeditur — qui assistit et se obiicit secundum petitionem sortilegae mulieris, impetrante hoc merito infidelitatis, sicut fides impetrat, ut Deus assistat ad facienda miracula — cum⁹ sortiaria respectu personae determinatae facit sortilegium, diabolus in actu illo praesto est et non in aliis; et tunc vel propria virtute, vel per herbam, vel lapidem, vel naturam occultam vim impedit, ne in actum exeat, non respectu alterius mulieris, quia ad hoc invitatus non fuit, aut quia Dominus non permittit; occultum enim Dei iudicium hic latet, sicut patet in uxore Tobiae¹⁰.

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English Translation

p. 771

Article II. On impotence for intercourse.

Question II. Whether accidental impotence for intercourse, which is through sorcery, impedes marriage.

Secondly it is asked concerning accidental impotence for intercourse, which is through sorcery, whether it impedes marriage. And that it does, this is proved:

1. Cause thirty-three, question one⁴: «If through sorceresses or witches — secretly, yet never save by the just judgment of God permitting it and the devil preparing it — intercourse does not follow, they are to be exhorted» etc.; and afterward: «If they cannot be healed, they will be permitted to be separated».

2. Likewise, in the Extra, book four⁵, On the Cold and the Bewitched, in the decretal of Honorius: Litterae vestrae [Your letter], where there is a question about one who could know other women but not his own wife, at the end of the decretal it is inferred: «When they, with the seventh hand of kinsmen confirming it by oath, [affirm] that they were unable to be joined carnally, you shall pronounce the sentence of divorce between them».

3. Likewise, wherever there is such a cause, there is such an effect; but cold or constriction impeded and dissolved [marriage] on account of the impotence of rendering the debt⁶: therefore, since such a cause is present in the bewitched, it seems etc.

4. Likewise, there is greater danger in those who can be joined to others but not to each other, than in those who can be joined to none, because it can be for many an occasion of adultery and homicide etc.: if therefore they are separated on account of the impotence of intercourse with anyone whatever by reason of a p. 772 natural defect, by parity of reasoning [they are separated] on account of the impotence of intercourse with one [woman] by reason of sorcery.

5. Likewise, acts of sorcery are done by the art and power of demons, as is said in the authority of the canon set forth above¹; but the devil is more powerful and more cunning than man is: if therefore a man can render another altogether unfit for the act of marriage, whether by castrating or by cutting by violence, or by giving a medicine, or by some hidden power of a stone, as certain physicians relate, it seems that the devil can do this much more strongly: therefore through sorcery an efficacious impediment can be furnished.

On the contrary: 1. This kind of sorcery is a diabolical maleficence, but marriage is a remedy and a divine benefit; but a divine benefit is more powerful than a diabolical maleficence: therefore marriage rather dissolves sorcery than sorcery excludes marriage.

2. Likewise, nothing impedes marriage that is temporary; but every sorcery is dissoluble: therefore through sorcery marriage is not impeded. That it is dissoluble is proved from the side of him who does it, of him to whom it is done, and of the manner of doing. From the side of him to whom it is done: because such acts of sorcery are done through diabolical dealings, which have no power over holy men, since these are the triumphers over the devil: therefore only over sinners; but this one can cease to be a sinner: therefore etc. — From the side of the manner in which it is done: because «every thing, as Chrysostom says², is destroyed by the same things by which it is composed»: therefore if this has been done through sorcery or sorceries: therefore through it or them it can be destroyed. — From the side of him through whom it is done: because [it is done] through the devil; but the power of the devil is expelled from a man by exorcisms, even when it besets bodies: therefore it seems that [it is expelled] likewise as to the effect of the sorcery.

3. Likewise, it seems that these acts of sorcery are of no force, because by whatever reasoning they have an effect upon that act, by the same reasoning [they have it] upon every act: therefore if through acts of sorcery they can impede intercourse, so they could [impede] eating and walking, and thus destroy the whole world by their sorcery: which to believe is a sacrilege.

4. Likewise, if sorcery impedes, [it does so] either by weakening the generative power, or by removing the faculty of going forth into the act. If in the first way: then, since that power stands equally toward all, if it impedes intercourse as to one woman, it impedes as to all: if therefore it does not impede as to all, then it seems that [it impedes] as to none, and thus it seems to mean nothing to say that he can know other women and not his own. Argue similarly of the second way, namely by removing the faculty of going forth into the act³.

Conclusion.

Accidental impotence for intercourse, which is through sorcery, impedes the contract of marriage, when it is perpetual and precedes [it].

I respond: It must be said that some have said that sorcery was nothing in the world, nor was there any power in it save only in the estimation of men, who attribute many natural defects to the sorceries of demons on account of a defect of faith. — But that position derogates from the law and derogates from the opinion of the common people, and, what is greater, from experience; and therefore it has no stability.

There were also others who said that sorcery truly impedes intercourse for a time, but yet none is perpetual, because anything whatever can be dissolved either through the devil, or through sorcery⁴, or through divine aid; and they said that the chapter first set forth was abrogated. — But surely this too is against experience and against the new law: for the decretal of Honorius commands that in such cases a divorce be made, since it has been proved by experience that many have dwelt together for a long time and have applied great effort and sought many remedies, and nothing at all has availed; and therefore by experience the Church infers that such sorcery is sometimes perpetual. — Again, because there are many who have found a remedy, it infers that it is not always perpetual; and therefore this sorcery sometimes impedes, sometimes not.

Therefore, according to the common opinion of the doctors, a distinction must be made, that accidental impotence for intercourse, which comes through sorcery, is either temporal or perpetual. If temporal, it does not impede. And it is presumed to be temporal when, within the space of three years, dwelling together and giving as much effort as they can, whether through the ecclesiastical Sacraments or through other remedies, they can be healed. But if they are not healed by any remedy, from then on it is presumed to be perpetual. — And this perpetual impotence either precedes the contracting of marriage or follows it. If it precedes, it makes the person illegitimate, so that it impedes the contracting and dissolves what is already contracted; if it follows, it does not impede, just as also is said concerning the amputated in Cause thirty-two, question p. 773 seven, where such a chapter is entitled and set down in the text¹: «Those who contracted marriage while sound, and to one of the two either madness, or fury, or some infirmity comes on, for this cause the marriages of such persons cannot be dissolved. The same is to be understood of those who are blinded by adversaries, or have their members cut off, or have been cut by barbarians». And so it must be granted that — just as amputation, which renders one impotent for intercourse — makes the person illegitimate if it precede the contracting, [but] does not make [it so] if it follow, because marriage cannot be dissolved save through death, either spiritual or carnal; whence in the Extra, On the Conversion of the Married², Ex parte tua [On your part], where Innocent says: «From the time that marriage is contracted between legitimate persons by words of the present, it can in no case be dissolved, so that, while one is living, the other could pass to second vows». If therefore it follow the contracting, it does not impede; but if it precede, it impedes, if it be perpetual³.

In two ways, however, sorcery is made perpetual: either with respect to every woman, and thus it renders [him] unfit for every one; or with respect to the wife, and thus it renders [him] unfit for her but not for all; and then such separated persons may, according to the laws, be joined to others. It is not so with the cold, because, if they are joined to others, the Church knows itself to have been deceived, and therefore it retracts the sentence of divorce. — Therefore the arguments showing that sorcery furnishes an impediment to marriage are to be granted.

1. To that, then, which is objected, that God's benefit is more powerful; it must be said that this is true as regards that against which it is ordained, namely marriage, [being more powerful] than the disease of concupiscence, because disease does not vitiate marriage, but marriage excuses the vice⁴. But marriage is not ordained to restore the power of intercourse, and therefore sorcery does not conquer nor expel [it]; nor from this does it follow that sorcery is more powerful.

2. To that which is objected, that it can be dissolved through the cause etc.; it must be said that every such sorcery can be dissolved through God, and can also be dissolved through the devil; but not every one can be dissolved through sorcery or human counsel, because sorcerers — as is known through their confession — know how to do certain acts of sorcery which they themselves, once converted to penance, cannot destroy, nor do men know how to apply counsel, on account of this, that diabolical cunning surpasses the human. And since human counsel fails, and God, on account of⁵ the merit of past sin, frequently does not hearken, and the devil ought not to be invoked for this, nor his patronage implored; hence it is that such sorcery is said to be perpetual.

To that, then, which is objected concerning fault, it must be said that the removal of the penalty does not always follow the removal of fault. — And likewise on the side of the doer, many things can be destroyed which cannot be constructed⁶; and likewise on the side of the exorcism; for it does not always have efficacy for the expulsion of the devil, the just judgment of God permitting [it].

3. To that which is objected, that sorcery removes no power of eating; it must be said that, just as power over serpents was granted to the devil by God more than over other animals in memory of the first deed — whence more serpents are caught by incantations than birds⁷ — so, because that act is vicious and in a certain manner foul, and for the most part men are joined to that act lustfully: therefore the devil has more power there, and more is permitted to him. And this is proved by the example of Scripture and by authority, since it is said in Tobit⁸ that a demon, by name Asmodeus, killed seven husbands in the bed, not at the banquet.

4. To that which is objected last, that that power stands equally toward all; it must be said briefly that this is true; and if it were impeded by a natural impediment, it would be impeded equally as to all; but because it is impeded by a demonic [impediment] — [the devil] who assists and sets himself against [it] according to the petition of the sorceress-woman, this being obtained by the merit of infidelity, just as faith obtains that God assist for the working of miracles — since⁹ the sorceress performs the sorcery with respect to a determinate person, the devil is present in that act and not in others; and then, whether by his own power, or through a herb, or a stone, or a hidden nature, he impedes the power, that it may not go forth into act, not with respect to another woman, because he was not invited to this, or because the Lord does not permit [it]; for the hidden judgment of God lies concealed here, as is manifest in the wife of Tobit¹⁰.

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Apparatus Criticus

4
Can. 4. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 3.
Canon 4. See here the text of the Master [Peter Lombard], c. 3.
5
Tit. 15. c. 7.
Title 15, c. 7.
6
Ex quaest. praeced. — De maiori cfr. supra pag. 78, nota 8.
From the preceding question. — On the greater [danger], cf. above, p. 78, note 8.
1
In fundam. 1. — In fine arg. codd. L Y addunt matrimonio.
In fundamentum 1. — At the end of the argument codices L Y add matrimonio [to marriage].
2
Vide supra pag. 682, nota 1. — Pro modi, quo fit cod. K (I a secunda manu) modi faciendi, alii codd. eius, a quo fit, et mox non pauci codd. per illum vel illam pro per illud vel illa, in qua lectione fortasse substituendum esset per maleficum vel maleficam pro maleficium vel maleficia. Aliquanto superius pro qui facit edd. et per quem.
See above, p. 682, note 1. — For the manner in which it is done codex K (I by a second hand) [reads] the manner of doing, other codices of him by whom it is done, and shortly after not a few codices [read] through him or her for through it or them, in which reading perhaps one ought to substitute through the sorcerer or the sorceress for the sorcery or the sorceries. Somewhat above, for who does it the editions [read] and through whom.
3
In pluribus codd. desideratur haec ult. propositio.
In many codices this last proposition is lacking.
4
Codd. A B C D F P bene maleficum. — Haec et seq. opinio refertur in Glossa super C. Fraternitatis (6.), X. de Frigidis etc. (lib. IV. tit. 13.) ad verba divinum miraculum.
Codices A B C D F P rightly [read] maleficum [the sorcerer]. — This and the following opinion are reported in the Gloss on the canon Fraternitatis (6), X, On the Cold etc. (bk. IV, tit. 13), at the words divine miracle.
1
Cap. 4, ubi allegatur Nicolai Papae C. Hi qui matrimonium (25.). De sensu vocis excaecantur cfr. Forcellini Lexicon.
Chapter 4, where the canon of Pope Nicholas Hi qui matrimonium (25) is cited. On the sense of the word excaecantur [are blinded], cf. Forcellini's Lexicon.
2
Libr. III. tit. 32. c. 14. Post contrahitur textus originalis addit illis viventibus.
Book III, tit. 32, c. 14. After is contracted the original text adds while they are living.
3
Ita cod. Z (supple: impotentia); in aliis et edd. perpetuum, minus bene, quia non facile suppletur: maleficium. Inferius pro et tunc, quod non pauci codd. omittunt, cod. Q (E a secunda manu) unde, ed. 1 cum nonnullis codd. Chrysostomus. Subinde pro separati, quod praebent codd. F L, alii codd. et edd. separari, incongrue, nisi cum cod. I (a secunda manu) post possunt addatur et.
So codex Z (supply: impotence); in others and in the editions perpetuum [perpetual, neuter], less well, since maleficium [sorcery] is not easily supplied. Below, for and then, which not a few codices omit, codex Q (E by a second hand) [reads] whence, edition 1 with several codices Chrysostom. Then for separated, which codices F L give, other codices and the editions [read] to be separated, incongruously, unless — with codex I (by a second hand) — and be added after possunt.
4
Cfr. supra d. 31. a. 2. q. 1. et dub. 5.
Cf. above, d. 31, a. 2, q. 1, and dub. 5.
5
Codd. T U X propter peccatum et propter. Pro Et quoniam codd. L Y Nam aliquando.
Codices T U X [read] on account of sin and on account of. For And since codices L Y [read] For sometimes.
6
Cfr. supra pag. 19, nota 7.
Cf. above, p. 19, note 7.
7
August., XI. de Gen. ad litt. c. 28. n. 33, dicit, quod «hoc magis habeat usus, serpentes moveri carminibus hominum, quam ullum aliud genus animantium. Etiam haec enim non parva testatio est, naturam primitus humanam serpentis seductam esse colloquio. Gaudent enim daemones, hanc sibi potestatem dari, ut ad incantationem hominum serpentes moveant, ut quolibet modo fallant quos possunt. Hoc autem permittuntur ad primi facti memoriam commendandam, quod sit eis quaedam cum hoc genere familiaritas». Cfr. Ps. 57, 5. seq.
Augustine, On Genesis according to the Letter, XI, c. 28, n. 33, says that «usage holds this more — that serpents are moved by the charms of men than any other kind of animal. For this too is no small testimony that human nature was first seduced by the serpent's conversation. For the demons rejoice that this power is granted them, that at the incantation of men they may move serpents, so that by any means they may deceive whom they can. And they are permitted this for the commemoration of the first deed, that there may be for them a certain familiarity with this kind [of creature]». Cf. Ps. 57:5 ff.
8
Cap. 3, 8. — Superius post permittitur cod. U addit in illo actu quam in alio.
Chapter 3, [verse] 8. — Above, after is permitted codex U adds in that act than in another.
9
Edd. sic cum, inferius post sortilegium addito quia cod. bb sicut cum. Superius post daemoniaco Vat. subiungit ministerio.
The editions [read] sic cum [thus... when], with quia added below after sortilegium; codex bb [reads] sicut cum [just as when]. Above, after daemoniaco [demonic] the Vatican [edition] adjoins ministerio [by ministry].
10
Vide scholion ad 1. praecedentis articuli quaestionem.
See the scholion on question 1 of the preceding article. ---

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