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Dist. 34, Art. 2, Q. 1

Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 34

Textus Latinus
p. 770

Articulus II. De impedimento impotentiae coeundi.

Consequenter quantum ad secundum articulum quaeritur de impotentia coeundi. Et circa hoc duo quaeruntur. Primo quaeritur, utrum impotentia naturalis coeundi sit impedimentum matrimonii. Secundo quaeritur de impotentia coeundi accidentali, quae est per maleficium.

Quaestio I. Utrum impotentia naturalis coeundi sit impedimentum matrimonii.

Quantum ergo ad primum ostenditur, quod naturalis impotentia coeundi non impediat matrimonium:

1. Quia verum matrimonium est matrimonium sine carnali coitu3; sed quandocumque aliquid habet perfectum esse sine aliquo, non impeditur per defectum illius: ergo etc.

2. Item, voluntas continendi in utroque coniugum non solvit matrimonium, ergo nec necessitas continendi pari ratione; sed ubi est impotentia4 etc.

3. Item, matrimonium est vinculum insolubile; sed possibile est, impotentiam coeundi accidentalem5 contrahi: ergo si perpetuum non impeditur accidentali, nec matrimonium impeditur impotentia coeundi.

4. Item, naturalis impotentia venit ex frigiditate in viro; sed frigiditas est accidens: ergo potest expelli per caliditatem: ergo et talis impotentia. Sed accidens cito transiens non solvit vinculum perpetuum: ergo etc. Similiter obiicitur de arctatione ex parte mulieris.

Contra: 1. Extra, libro quarto6, de Frigidis et maleficiatis: «Sicut puer, qui non potest reddere debitum, non est aptus coniugio; sic qui impotentes sunt minime apti ad contrahenda matrimonia reputantur».

2. Item, in matrimonio obligatur homo ad reddendum debitum; sed nullus potest se obligare ad impossibile7; sed impotens coire non potest debitum reddere: ergo non potest matrimonium contrahere.

3. Item, in matrimonio transit potestas corporis viri in mulierem, et e converso; sed quando alter est impotens, non transit potestas, quia «nemo dat quod non habet8»: ergo etc.

4. Item, si matrimonium est in remedium9, ergo inter personas, inter quas nec officium nec remedium potest esse, non potest esse matrimonium; sed hoc est per impotentiam: ergo etc.

5. Item, ad hoc est auctoritas iuris, Causa trigesima tertia, quaestione prima10, quae dat licentiam contrahendi alteri personarum in casu isto: ergo non est matrimonium.

Conclusio.

Impotentia coeundi naturalis et perpetua impedit matrimonium contrahendum et dirimit contractum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod impotentia coeundi naturalis aut est temporalis, aut perpetua. Si tem- p. 771 poralis, non impedit; si perpetua, tunc impedit contrahendum et dirimit contractum; et si alter coniugum petat separationem, separandi sunt; si autem velint mutuo cohabitare, possunt, ut qui non potest mulierem habere ut uxorem, habeat ut sororem1. — Sed quia dubium est, utrum impotentia talis sit perpetua; ideo Ecclesia utrique adhibet debitam diligentiam ad sciendam perpetuitatem et indicit cohabitare per tres annos et experiri actum illum et remedia, si qua possunt esse contra talem impotentiam. — Ad sciendum autem, quod praecesserit, creditur iuramento septem testium, vel etiam inspectioni claustrorum; alioquin statur verbo viri. Decipitur tamen aliquando Ecclesia, et cum constat de deceptione, iubet, eos quos separaverat, ad priora iura redire. — Concedendum est igitur, quod impotentia coeundi, quae venit ex naturali frigiditate, matrimonium impedit, si sit perpetua secundum veritatem. Qualiter autem cognoscatur eius perpetuitas, et quae sit diligentia adhibenda; hoc est inferioris scientiae determinare, ut iuristarum, aut medicorum.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod verum matrimonium est sine copula carnali; dicendum, quod verum est; sed non est sine ordinabilitate ad carnalem copulam, quia, sicut supra2 dictum fuit, necesse est consentire in mutuam corporum potestatem; hic autem consensus nullus est, nec talis obligatio in eo qui non habet posse exercendi actum illum. Et ideo argumentum non valet, quia potentia coeundi quantum ad legitimitatem personae contrahentis est de essentia, non sic actus.

2. Per hoc patet responsio ad sequens, quod voluntas continendi non impedit matrimonium, quoniam adhuc manet ordinabilitas ad actum cum voluntate; quia non necesse est, esse perpetuam, pro eo quod voluntas potest verti; et ideo non est simile de impotentia et voluntate.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est vinculum insolubile; dicendum, quod istud verum est, postquam contractum est legitime; et ex tunc, si superveniat illegitimitas, non solvit matrimonium; sed si praevenit, impedit contractionem: et adeo impedit, quod etsi videatur matrimonium contrahi secundum faciem hominum, tamen secundum veritatem non contrahitur. Et ideo dicitur dirimere iam contractum, non quia illud vinculum infringat, sed tantum est impedimentum, quod etsi de facto consummetur in facie hominum, nullam tamen soliditatem habeat.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod frigiditas est accidens etc.; dicendum, quod frigiditas duplex est: quaedam accidentaliter, quaedam complexionaliter et per naturam. Illa quae est in homine accidentaliter, potest ut plurimum expelli, pro eo quod non est a prima complexione. Sed frigiditas, quae est ex complexione et naturaliter inest — sicut in his qui sunt insensibiles per naturam, vel per malam dispositionem membri alicuius ad hoc ordinati, ut arctitudo in muliere, si tanta est, quod nullum remedium adhiberi possit secundum iudicium bonarum matronarum — haec est quae impedit, et haec est inseparabilis et perpetua; et de hac non valet ratio. Quod enim dicitur, «contrarium expelli per contrarium»: verum est, ut dicit Philosophus3, «nisi alterum insit per naturam».

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English Translation

Article II. On the impediment of impotence for intercourse.

Consequently, as to the second article, inquiry is made concerning impotence for intercourse. And concerning this two things are asked. First it is asked whether natural impotence for intercourse is an impediment to marriage. Secondly, inquiry is made concerning accidental impotence for intercourse, which is through sorcery.

Question I. Whether natural impotence for intercourse is an impediment to marriage.

As to the first point, then, it is shown that natural impotence for intercourse does not impede marriage:

1. Because a true marriage is a marriage without carnal intercourse3; but whenever something has its perfect being without a certain thing, it is not impeded by the lack of that thing: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the will to abstain in both spouses does not dissolve marriage, therefore neither does the necessity of abstaining, by parity of reasoning; but where there is impotence4 etc.

3. Likewise, marriage is an insoluble bond; but it is possible for accidental impotence for intercourse5 to be contracted: therefore if a perpetual [bond] is not impeded by an accidental [impotence], neither is marriage impeded by impotence for intercourse.

4. Likewise, natural impotence comes from coldness in the man; but coldness is an accident: therefore it can be driven out by heat: therefore so too can such impotence. But an accident quickly passing away does not dissolve a perpetual bond: therefore etc. A like objection is made concerning constriction on the woman's part.

On the contrary: 1. In the Decretals [Extra], Book Four6, on the frigid and the bewitched: «Just as a boy, who cannot render the debt, is not fit for marriage, so those who are impotent are reckoned least fit to contract marriages».

2. Likewise, in marriage a man is bound to render the debt; but no one can bind himself to the impossible7; but one impotent to have intercourse cannot render the debt: therefore he cannot contract marriage.

3. Likewise, in marriage the power over the body of the man passes over to the woman, and conversely; but when one party is impotent, the power does not pass over, because «no one gives what he does not have8»: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, if marriage is for a remedy9, then between persons among whom there can be neither duty nor remedy, there can be no marriage; but this is [the case] through impotence: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, to this effect there is the authority of the law, Cause thirty-three, question one10, which grants license to one of the persons to contract in this case: therefore it is no marriage.

Conclusion.

Natural and perpetual impotence for intercourse impedes marriage from being contracted and annuls the contract.

I respond: It must be said that natural impotence for intercourse is either temporary or perpetual. If tempo- rary, it does not impede; if perpetual, then it impedes the contracting and annuls the contract; and if one of the spouses seeks separation, they are to be separated; but if they wish to live together by mutual consent, they may, so that he who cannot have the woman as a wife may have her as a sister1. — But because it is doubtful whether such impotence is perpetual, therefore the Church applies due diligence to each party for ascertaining its perpetuity, and enjoins them to cohabit for three years and to try out that act and the remedies, if any there can be against such impotence. — But for ascertaining what has gone before, credence is given to the oath of seven witnesses, or also to the inspection of the private parts; otherwise the man's word is accepted. Yet the Church is sometimes deceived, and when the deception is established, it orders those whom it had separated to return to their former rights. — It must be granted, therefore, that impotence for intercourse which comes from natural coldness impedes marriage, if it be perpetual in truth. But in what way its perpetuity may be known, and what diligence is to be applied — this is for a lower science to determine, such as that of the jurists or of the physicians.

1. To that, then, which is objected, that a true marriage is without carnal union; it must be said that this is true; but it is not without an orderability toward carnal union, because, as was said above2, it is necessary to consent to a mutual power over [each other's] bodies; but here there is no such consent, nor any such obligation in one who does not have the ability to exercise that act. And therefore the argument does not hold, because the power for intercourse, as regards the legitimacy of the contracting person, belongs to the essence [of marriage], but not so the act.

2. By this the response to the following [objection] is clear, [namely] that the will to abstain does not impede marriage, since the orderability to the act still remains together with the will; because it is not necessary that it be perpetual, since the will can be turned; and therefore the case of impotence and of the will is not alike.

3. To that which is objected, that it is an insoluble bond; it must be said that this is true after it has been contracted legitimately; and from then on, if illegitimacy supervenes, it does not dissolve the marriage; but if it precedes, it impedes the contracting: and it impedes to such a degree that, although marriage may seem to be contracted according to the appearance of men, yet in truth it is not contracted. And therefore it is said to annul what has already been contracted, not because it breaks that bond, but [because] it is only an impediment, such that even if it be consummated in fact in the sight of men, it nevertheless has no solidity.

4. To that which is objected, that coldness is an accident etc.; it must be said that coldness is twofold: one [kind] accidentally, another by complexion and by nature. That which is in a man accidentally can for the most part be driven out, inasmuch as it is not from his first complexion. But the coldness which is from the complexion and is naturally present — as in those who are insensible by nature, or by a bad disposition of some member ordered to this [act], as constriction in a woman, if it be so great that no remedy can be applied according to the judgment of good matrons — this is what impedes, and this is inseparable and perpetual; and against this the argument does not hold. For what is said, that «a contrary is driven out by its contrary»: this is true, as the Philosopher says3, «unless the one is present by nature».

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. 3
    Cfr. supra d. 26. a. 2. q. 3. — Deinde ex codd. I U substituimus aliquid pro aliquis.
    Cf. above, d. 26, a. 2, q. 3. — Then, following codices I U, we have substituted aliquid ("something") for aliquis ("some").
  2. 4
    In cod. bb secunda manus supplet: ibi est necessitas continendi: ergo.
    In codex bb a second hand supplies: ibi est necessitas continendi: ergo ("there is the necessity of abstaining: therefore").
  3. 5
    Cod. E L Y accidentaliter.
    Codices E L Y [read] accidentaliter ("accidentally").
  4. 6
    Tit. 15. C. Quod sedem (2.).
    [Decretals of Gregory IX, Bk. IV,] title 15, the canon Quod sedem (2).
  5. 7
    Cfr. supra pag. 234, nota 6.
    Cf. above, p. 234, note 6.
  6. 8
    Secundum Aristot., II. Elench. c. 3. (c. 22.). — Pro nemo plurimi codd. et ed. I nihil.
    According to Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations II, c. 3 (c. 22). — In place of nemo ("no one") very many codices and ed. I [read] nihil ("nothing").
  7. 9
    Secunda manus in cod. E bene posuit est in officium, et in remedium (vide supra August., qui in lit. Magistri, d. XXVI. c. 2. allegatur). Inferius pro per impotentiam cod. U inter personas tales.
    A second hand in codex E rightly put est in officium, et in remedium ("it is for a duty, and for a remedy") — see above Augustine, who is cited in the text of the Master, d. XXVI, c. 2. Further down, for per impotentiam ("through impotence") codex U [reads] inter personas tales ("among such persons").
  8. 10
    Can. Quod autem interrogasti (I.). Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.
    The canon Quod autem interrogasti (1). Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 2.
  9. 1
    Secundum Gregor., hic in lit. Magistri, c. 2, et in C. Laudabilem (5.), X. de Frigidis etc. (lib. IV. tit. 15.), ubi etiam de triennio et iuramento septem testium (cfr. infra dub. 4.). — Inferius pro utrique adhibet codd. L Y statuit, ut uterque adhibeat.
    According to Gregory, here in the text of the Master, c. 2, and in the canon Laudabilem (5), X, on the frigid etc. (Bk. IV, tit. 15), where there is also treatment of the three-year period and the oath of seven witnesses (cf. below, dub. 4). — Further down, for utrique adhibet ("applies to each") codices L Y [read] statuit, ut uterque adhibeat ("determines that each should apply").
  10. 2
    Dist. 28. q. 6.
    [Above,] Distinction 28, q. 6.
  11. 3
    De Praedicam. c. de Oppositis. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 182, nota 9. — Vide scholion ad I. praecedentis articuli quaest.
    [Aristotle,] Categories, the chapter on Opposites. Cf. vol. II, p. 182, note 9. — See the scholion on question I of the preceding article. ---
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