Dist. 34, Art. 1, Q. 2
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 34
Quaestio II. De numero et sufficientia impedimentorum.
Secundo quaeritur de numero et sufficientia impedimentorum matrimonii. Et quod sint multa, videtur:
1. Quia impedimenta sunt propter privationem vel defectum boni matrimonii; sed defectus boni malum est et, ut dicit Dionysius1, «malum est infinitis modis, quamvis bonum sit uno modo»: ergo infinitis modis videtur quod possit impediri.
2. Item, impedimenta matrimonii accipiuntur secundum accidentia personarum; sed, ut vult Philosophus2, accidentia sunt infinita: ergo et impedimenta. Maior patet discurrendo in singulis; minor patet per Philosophum.
3. Item, impedimenta matrimonii respiciunt matrimonii conditionem, et illud respicit personas singulares; sed «singularia sunt infinita3» et indeterminata: ergo et matrimonii impedimenta.
Contra: 1. Nihil impedit matrimonium nisi secundum institutionem Dei vel Ecclesiae; sed institutio Dei et Ecclesiae quantum ad matrimonium est in determinatis conditionibus: ergo etc.
2. Item, impossibile est scire legem matrimonii et vinculum, nisi sciantur illa quae illud vinculum solvunt; sed lex matrimonii est nobis determinata, ergo et impedimenta: ergo sunt in numero definito.
3. Item, hoc ipsum probatur per hoc quod Magister4 de huiusmodi determinat et doctrinam dat; sed si non essent in numero determinato, non daret: ergo etc.
Conclusio. Duplici via numerus et sufficientia impedimentorum ostenditur.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod hoc Sacramentum habet impedimenta plura; sed quaedam impediunt ex congruitate, et ista dicuntur impedire contrahendum, sed non dirimere iam contractum, ut est Ecclesiae interdictum et tempus feriatum, quia talia respiciunt solemnitatem matrimonii5. Quaedam impediunt de necessitate, quia non stat cum eis Sacramentum; unde dicuntur impedire contrahendum et dirimere iam contractum; quia, quamvis esset contractum de facto, tamen in veritate non fuit Sacramentum nec matrimonium verum. — Impedimenta
p. 769 autem illa his versibus continentur, de quibus omnibus infra6 habebitur singillatim.
Error, conditio, votum, cognatio, crimen, Cultus disparitas, vis, ordo, ligamen, honestas; Si sis affinis, si forte coire nequibis: Haec facienda vetant connubia, iuncta retractant.
De sufficientia ergo impedimentorum dicendum, quod impedimentum fit sive potest fieri ex quadruplici causa. — Nam ex efficiente causa provenire possunt tria. Efficiens causa est consensus; ad consensum autem concurrit ratio et voluntas7. Contra rationis actum est error; contra actum voluntatis vis vel violentia; contra actum utriusque conditio servitutis, quae impedit partim propter defectum libertatis, partim propter errorem.
Ex parte causae materialis tria: quia matrimonium est coniunctio voluntarie introducta, ergo est prius naturaliter disparatorum8, coniuncti ergo proximitate sunt inepti ad matrimonium. Sed coniuncti possunt esse tripliciter: consanguinitate, affinitate, iustitia publicae honestatis, quae contrahitur ex sponsalibus per verba de praesenti; et sic sunt alia tria impedimenta.
Ex parte causae formalis tria: quia matrimonium est vinculum, in quo est mutua potestas viri et uxoris; impedimentum autem contra hoc est, quando non potest dare sui corporis potestatem. Et hoc potest esse tripliciter: aut quia tradidit alteri, qui adhuc vivit, et sic est ligatio; aut quia se dedicavit Deo, et sic est sacer ordo; aut quia Deo et praelato, et sic est votum, quando quis vovet ingredi religionem, vel continentiam solemnem.
Ex parte finis similiter tria: quia matrimonium est ad procreandam prolem ad cultum Dei, vel saltem in remedium honestatis. Contra rationem procreandi, vel remedii est impotentia coeundi; contra cultum Dei, qui est in fide, est disparitas cultus; qui9 est in moribus, est criminis enormitas. — Ita sunt duodecim impedimenta. Similiter aliqua recipiunt divisionem, ut impotentia coeundi et crimen, sicut melius patebit infra10.
Posset tamen aliter horum impedimentorum sumi sufficientia. In matrimonio enim considerantur personae, quae iunguntur, et ipsum vinculum, et illud per quod vinciuntur, et illud ad quod vinciuntur: quod vincitur, et vinculum, et ad quod, et per quod. Personae, quae vinciuntur, debent aliquo modo convenire in cultu Dei et fide, sed distare vinculo naturali et consimili, propter hoc quod natura abhorret, personas multum consimiles in actu illo sociari. Multum igitur distant, quando sunt dispares in cultu; multum appropinquant, quando sunt iuncti cognatione, vel affinitate, vel publicae honestatis iustitia. Propinquitas consanguinitatis est ex fructu matrimonii, sed affinitatis ex actu; iustitia publicae honestatis tenet medium inter utrumque. Et sic sunt quatuor impedimenta, scilicet cultus disparitas, cognatio, affinitas et publicae honestatis iustitia. — Consideratur iterum ipsum vinculum, quo vinciuntur individualiter; et ob hoc11 non possunt coniungi vel vinciri qui sunt aliis obligati. Obligari autem alii est dupliciter: aut Deo, aut homini. Et homini dupliciter: aut per matrimonium, et sic ligamen; aut per servitutem, et sic conditio. Obligari autem Deo est dupliciter: aut per votum, aut per illud quod habet annexum votum, ut sacer ordo. Et sic sunt alia quatuor: ligamen, conditio, votum et ordo. — Tertio circa matrimonium consideratur illud, per quod contrahitur, et sic est consensus; et hic respicit actum rationis, et contra hunc est error; et actum voluntatis, et contra hunc est violentia. Et sic sunt duo. — Quarto consideratur12 usus matrimonii, et hic dupliciter impeditur: aut per impossibilitatem utendi, et sic impotentia coeundi; aut per abusum, et sic enormitas criminis. — Et sic patet numerus et sufficientia horum impedimentorum, et quod sunt in numero determinato, scilicet duodecim.
Ad opposita: 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod malum est modis infinitis; dicendum, quod Dionysius loquitur de malo, quantum est de se, quia privatio et non-ens est et caret fine et determinatione. Si autem loquamur de malo, prout ei substernitur actus, vel per comparationem ad bonum, quod privat; sic ponitur in genere per reductionem et species determinatas habet, sicut patet in vitiis13. — Verumtamen illud non valet ad propositum, quia impedimenta matrimonii non sunt defectus vel mala, sed et aliqua bona huic incompossibilia.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur secundo penes accidentia, dicendum, quod non penes quaecumque accidentia, utpote quod sit albus, vel niger, sed penes
p. 770 accidentia, quae directe respiciunt matrimonium quantum ad aliquod bonum; et ita sunt in numero determinato.
3. Ad illud, quod sunt circa singularia; dicendum, quod sicut operationes virtutum sunt circa singularia, tamen sermo et cognitio est de eis, prout reducuntur ad aliquod universale — primo modo non habet certitudinem, secundo modo habet14 — sic in proposito casus emergentes sunt multi et innumerabiles circa speciales personas; tamen omnes sub hac generalitate impedimentorum comprehenduntur. Et sic patet totum15.
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Question II. On the number and sufficiency of the impediments.
Secondly it is asked concerning the number and sufficiency of the impediments of marriage. And that they are many, it seems:
1. Because impediments exist on account of the privation or defect of the good of marriage; but the defect of the good is an evil, and, as Dionysius says1, «evil is in infinite ways, although the good is in one way»: therefore it seems that [marriage] can be impeded in infinite ways.
2. Likewise, the impediments of marriage are taken according to the accidents of persons; but, as the Philosopher holds2, accidents are infinite: therefore so also [are] the impediments. The major is plain by running through them one by one; the minor is plain through the Philosopher.
3. Likewise, the impediments of marriage regard the condition of marriage, and that regards singular persons; but «singulars are infinite3» and indeterminate: therefore so also [are] the impediments of marriage.
On the contrary: 1. Nothing impedes marriage except according to the institution of God or of the Church; but the institution of God and of the Church, as regards marriage, [consists] in determinate conditions: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, it is impossible to know the law of marriage and the bond, unless those things be known which dissolve that bond; but the law of marriage is determinate for us, therefore so also [are] the impediments: therefore they are in a definite number.
3. Likewise, this same thing is proved by the fact that the Master4 determines concerning such matters and gives a teaching [about them]; but if they were not in a determinate number, he would not give [it]: therefore etc.
Conclusion. By a twofold way the number and sufficiency of the impediments is shown.
I respond: It must be said that this Sacrament has many impediments; but some impede from fittingness, and these are said to impede the contracting, but not to annul what is already contracted, as is the interdict of the Church and a festal season, because such things regard the solemnity of marriage5. Some impede from necessity, because the Sacrament does not stand together with them; whence they are said to impede the contracting and to annul what is already contracted; because, although it were contracted in fact, yet in truth it was not a Sacrament nor a true marriage. — But those impediments
p. 769 are contained in these verses, concerning all of which it will be treated below6 one by one.
Error, condition, vow, kinship, crime, Disparity of worship, force, [holy] order, [prior] bond, [public] decency; If you be a kinsman by affinity, if perchance you be unable to have intercourse: These things when done forbid marriages, and when joined undo them.
Concerning the sufficiency, therefore, of the impediments it must be said that an impediment comes about, or can come about, from a fourfold cause. — For from the efficient cause three can arise. The efficient cause is consent; and to consent there concur reason and will7. Against the act of reason is error; against the act of will [is] force or violence; against the act of both [is] the condition of servitude, which impedes partly on account of the defect of liberty, partly on account of error.
From the side of the material cause, three: because marriage is a union voluntarily introduced, therefore it is prior [as a union] of things naturally disparate8, and therefore those joined by [too great] proximity are unfit for marriage. But those joined can be [so] in three ways: by consanguinity, affinity, [and] the justice of public decency, which is contracted from a betrothal by words of the present [tense]; and thus there are another three impediments.
From the side of the formal cause, three: because marriage is a bond, in which there is a mutual power of the husband and of the wife; but the impediment against this is when one cannot give the power of one's own body. And this can be in three ways: either because he has handed [it] over to another, who is still living, and thus it is a [prior] bond; or because he has dedicated himself to God, and thus it is holy order; or because [he is bound] to God and to a prelate, and thus it is a vow, when one vows to enter religion, or solemn continence.
From the side of the end likewise three: because marriage is for the procreating of offspring for the worship of God, or at least as a remedy for decency. Against the ground of procreating, or of the remedy, is impotence for intercourse; against the worship of God, which consists in faith, is disparity of worship; [and against that worship] which consists in morals, is the enormity of crime9. — Thus there are twelve impediments. Likewise some admit of a division, as impotence for intercourse and crime, as will better appear below10.
Yet the sufficiency of these impediments could be taken otherwise. For in marriage there are considered the persons who are joined, and the bond itself, and that by which they are bound, and that unto which they are bound: that which is bound, and the bond, and that unto which, and that by which. The persons who are bound ought in some way to agree in the worship of God and in faith, but to stand apart by a natural and like bond, on account of this, that nature abhors that persons very like [one another] be associated in that act. Much, therefore, do they stand apart, when they are disparate in worship; much do they draw near, when they are joined by kinship, or by affinity, or by the justice of public decency. Nearness of consanguinity is from the fruit of marriage, but [that] of affinity from the act; the justice of public decency holds the middle between the two. And thus there are four impediments, namely disparity of worship, kinship, affinity, and the justice of public decency. — Again there is considered the bond itself, by which they are bound individually; and on account of this11 those who are bound to others cannot be joined or bound [again]. But to be bound to others is [so] in two ways: either to God or to a man. And to a man in two ways: either through matrimony, and thus [it is] a [prior] bond; or through servitude, and thus [it is] condition. But to be bound to God is in two ways: either through a vow, or through that which has a vow annexed, as holy order. And thus there are another four: [prior] bond, condition, vow, and order. — Thirdly, concerning marriage there is considered that by which it is contracted, and thus it is consent; and this regards the act of reason, and against this is error; and the act of will, and against this is violence. And thus there are two. — Fourthly there is considered12 the use of marriage, and this is impeded in two ways: either through the impossibility of using [it], and thus [it is] impotence for intercourse; or through abuse, and thus [it is] the enormity of crime. — And thus the number and sufficiency of these impediments is plain, and that they are in a determinate number, namely twelve.
To the objections: 1. To that, then, which is objected, that evil is in infinite ways; it must be said that Dionysius is speaking of evil, insofar as it is in itself, because it is a privation and non-being, and lacks end and determination. But if we speak of evil, insofar as an act underlies it, or by comparison to the good which it deprives; thus it is placed in a genus by reduction and has determinate species, as is plain in the vices13. — Nevertheless that does not avail for the point at issue, because the impediments of marriage are not defects or evils, but also certain goods incompatible with this [marriage].
2. To that which is objected secondly by way of accidents, it must be said that [they are taken] not by way of just any accidents, such as that [someone] be white or black, but by way of
p. 770 accidents which directly regard marriage as to some good; and thus they are in a determinate number.
3. To that [objection], that they are about singulars; it must be said that just as the operations of the virtues are about singulars, yet speech and knowledge are of them insofar as they are reduced to some universal — in the first way [knowledge] does not have certitude, in the second way it does14 — so in the matter at hand the emerging cases are many and innumerable concerning particular persons; yet all are comprehended under this generality of impediments. And thus the whole [matter] is plain15.
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- 1De Div. Nom. c. 4. § 31. seq. Verba magis respondent dicto Aristot. allegato tom. II. pag. 653, nota 3. Cfr. ibid. pag. 811, nota 4.[Dionysius,] On the Divine Names c. 4, §31 ff. The words correspond rather to the saying of Aristotle cited in vol. II, p. 653, note 3. Compare ibid., p. 811, note 4.
- 2Libr. IV. Metaph. text. 12. (III. c. 4.): Impossibile namque est accidentia, cum infinita sint, percurrere. Cfr. ibid. XI. c. 7. (X. c. 8.). Libr. II. Phys. text. 30. (c. 3.): Infinita enim uni accidunt.[Aristotle,] Metaphysics Book IV, text 12 (III, c. 4): "For it is impossible to run through the accidents, since they are infinite." Compare ibid. XI, c. 7 (X, c. 8). Physics Book II, text 30 (c. 3): "For infinite things are accidental to one [thing]."
- 3Aristot., III. Metaph. text. 12. et XI. c. 2. (II. c. 4. et X. c. 2.).Aristotle, Metaphysics III, text 12, and XI, c. 2 (II, c. 4, and X, c. 2).
- 4Hic in lit. c. 1. generaliter impedimenta recenset, quae in seqq. dist. explicantur.Here in the text [of Lombard], c. 1, he enumerates the impediments in general, which are explained in the following distinctions.
- 5Cfr. supra pag. 740, nota 6. — Superius pro non dirimere nonnulli codd. vel dirimunt, vel dirimitur. Post interdictum cod. V addit si est ut clanculo, edd. legunt si fiat clanculo et tempore feriato.Compare above, p. 740, note 6. — Above, for non dirimere ("not to annul") some codices [read] either dirimunt ("they annul") or dirimitur ("it is annulled"). After interdictum ("interdict") codex V adds si est ut clanculo ("if it is, as it were, in secret"); the editions read si fiat clanculo et tempore feriato ("if it be done in secret and in a festal season").
- 6Art. 2. huius dist. usque ad dist. 43. — Duodecim impedimentis, quae in seqq. versibus continentur, Concilium Tridentinum adiunxit alia duo his versibus expressa: Si parochi et duplicis desit praesentia testis, / Raptave sit mulier nec parti reddita tutae. Cfr. Glossa in Gratian. introductionem C. 27, et Petr. Blesens., Epist. 115. — Pro facienda Vat. socianda.[From] article 2 of this distinction up to distinction 43. — To the twelve impediments, which are contained in the following verses, the Council of Trent added two others expressed in these verses: "If there be lacking the presence of the parish priest and of a double witness, / Or if the woman have been abducted and not restored to a safe place." Compare the Gloss on Gratian, introduction to C. 27, and Peter of Blois, Letter 115. — For facienda the Vatican [edition reads] socianda.
- 7Vide locos supra pag. 707, nota 1. allegatos.See the places cited above, p. 707, note 1.
- 8Codd. PQ disiunctorum, edd. legunt est personarum naturaliter disparatarum.Codices PQ [read] disiunctorum ("of things disjoined"); the editions read est personarum naturaliter disparatarum ("[it is a union] of persons naturally disparate").
- 9Cod. K contra honestatem, quae pro qui.Codex K [reads] contra honestatem ("against decency"), which [stands] for qui ("[that worship] which").
- 10Art. seq. q. 1. 2. et d. 37. a. 2. q. 3. et dub. 3. — Pro Similiter aliqua (scil. impedimenta) edd. Similiter aliquam, et pro divisionem nonnulli codd. divisiones. Mox pro aliter cod. U melius.The following article, qq. 1–2, and d. 37, a. 2, q. 3, and dubium 3. — For Similiter aliqua (namely, impediments) the editions [read] Similiter aliquam, and for divisionem some codices [read] divisiones. Next, for aliter codex U [reads] melius.
- 11Permulti codd. et hoc (ablativus).Very many codices [read] et hoc (in the ablative) [for ob hoc].
- 12In cod. E secunda manus addidit ad quod est, et sic est.In codex E a second hand added ad quod est, et sic est ("that unto which it is, and thus it is").
- 13Cfr. II. Sent. d. 42. a. 3. q. 1. et dub. 2. — Inferius post sed cod. M supplet sunt, qui etiam subinde cum codd. L P Y (E a secunda manu) et ed. 1 praebet huic, pro quo alii codd. vel habent (Vat. habet), vel habuit (habent huic?). Pro aliqua bona multi codd. et ed. 1 alia bona.Compare Sentences II, d. 42, a. 3, q. 1, and dubium 2. — Below, after sed ("but") codex M supplies sunt ("[they] are"); which [codex] also thereupon, together with codices L P Y (E by a second hand) and edition 1, gives huic ("to this"), for which other codices [read] either habent ("they have"; Vat. habet, "it has"), or habuit ("it had"; habent huic?). For aliqua bona ("certain goods") many codices and edition 1 [read] alia bona ("other goods").
- 14Vide supra d. 20. p. II. dub. 3. — Si cod. A ultimo poneret non habet, lectio eius non esset reprobanda; legit enim: primo modo habet incertitudinem, secundo modo habet; plures codd. primo modo non habet incertitudinem etc., perperam. In principio solut. post Ad illud in codd. E G L aa additur quod obiicitur. Mox post sic in proposito cod. K (I a secunda manu) addit est intelligendum; nam.See above, d. 20, part II, dubium 3. — If codex A were to put non habet ("does not have") at the end, its reading would not be to be rejected; for it reads: primo modo habet incertitudinem, secundo modo habet ("in the first way it has uncertainty, in the second way it has [it]"); several codices [read] primo modo non habet incertitudinem ("in the first way it does not have uncertainty"), etc., wrongly. At the beginning of the solution, after Ad illud ("To that") in codices E G L aa there is added quod obiicitur ("which is objected"). Next, after sic in proposito ("so in the matter at hand") codex K (I by a second hand) adds est intelligendum; nam ("it is to be understood; for").
- 15Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.See the scholion on the preceding question.