Dist. 34, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 34
Articulus I. De impedimentis matrimonii in generali.
Quaestio I. Utrum matrimonium habeat impedimentum.
Quantum ergo ad primum ostenditur, quod matrimonium non habeat impedimentum:
1. Quia matrimonium est remedium contra morbum concupiscentiae: ergo si ille morbus ad omnes se extendit, nullo impediente; videtur similiter, quod matrimonium, cum medicina debeat ex opposito respondere morbo1, et ita, quod matrimonium in omnibus esse possit, nullo impediente.
2. Item, nullum aliud Sacramentum habet impedimentum, quin, si aliquis suscipiat de facto, susceptum sit: ergo similiter videtur in matrimonio, quod qualiscumque sit aliquis, tamen, si de facto contrahit, suscipit matrimonii Sacramentum.
3. Item, matrimonium est insolubile vinculum, ut est supra2 probatum: ergo si contrahatur, nunquam dirimitur: ergo nullum est impedimentum, quod dirimat iam contractum.
4. Item, matrimonium, cum sit Sacramentum, operatur Deus, unde coniuncti matrimonialiter dicuntur coniuncti a Deo3; sed divina operatio non habet impedimentum, cum Deus sit agens nobilissimus; ergo matrimonium nullum habet impedimentum.
Contra: 1. Matrimonium institutum est in officium4; sed multi sunt inepti ad officium, ut puta ad generandum per coitum: ergo multi sunt non idonei ad matrimonium: ergo etc.
2. Item, matrimonium institutum est in remedium; sed multi sunt, quibus non potest esse in remedium, quia non possunt convenire: ergo etc.
3. Item, multi sunt, qui non possunt unquam sine peccato actum illum exercere, ut puta qui voverunt continentiam, vel quibus est prohibitum coniungi ab eo qui potest; sed omne Sacramentum potest venire in usum sine peccato, cum ordinet5 ad salutem: ergo aliqui sunt inepti ad matrimonium.
4. Item, nihil est sacrum, quod fit contra divinum mandatum; sed Sacramentum est sacrum signum: ergo nihil est Sacramentum, quod fit contra praeceptionem divinam; sed divinum praeceptum, Levitici decimo octavo6, prohibet matrimonium fieri inter multa genera personarum: ergo si contrahant de facto, non est Sacramentum: ergo habet impedimenta.
Conclusio.
Sacramentum matrimonii multa habet impedimenta.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Sacramentum matrimonii habet impedimentum multiplex, sicut ostendunt rationes ad hoc inductae. — Ratio autem, quare hoc Sacramentum magis habet impedimenta quam alia, est duplex. Una est ratione causae efficientis, quia, quamvis omnia Sacramenta sint a divina institutione et humana dispensatione, tamen hoc Sacramentum maxime consistit in humana dispensatione, quia per consensum contrahentium oritur nec habet dispensatorem determinatum7. — Alia ratio est ratione finis, quia, cum omnia Sacramenta sint in remedium, istud non tantum est in remedium, sed etiam in officium; et cum alia sint spiritualia, huic coniuncta est actio carnalis, scilicet coniunctio, quae est per coitum. Et ideo facilius recipit impedimenta. — Ex his patent obiecta.
1. Quod enim obiicitur, quod nullus excluditur a morbo concupiscentiae; dicendum, quod morbus ille aliter remediabilis est quam per matrimonium, ut puta per continentiam.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod alia Sacramenta se extendunt ad omnes; patet responsio, quia non est simile de hoc et de aliis, ut visum est.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est vinculum insolubile; dicendum, quod verum est, ex quo ligat; sed possibile est, aliquos ineptos esse, ita ut hoc vinculo non vinciantur.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod divina operatio non potest impediri; dicendum, quod verum est, ubi Deus operatur ut tota causa; sed non est sic in matrimonio, immo necesse est, intervenire consensum legitimum. Praeterea, operatio ista praesupponit materiam in qua.
I. Concil. Trident. (Sess. XXIV. can. 4.) anathemate ferit docentes, «Ecclesiam non potuisse constituere impedimenta matrimonii dirimentia, vel in iis constituendis errasse». Duodecim impedimentis dirimentibus, ab auctore nostro enumeratis idem Concil. (Sess. XXIV. de Reform. c. 6.) addidit duo alia, scilicet raptus et clandestinitatis, de quibus cfr. auctores theologiae moralis et canonum. De utraque huius articuli quaestione: Scot., infra d. 42. n. 7. seqq. — S. Thom., hic a. 1; Suppl. q. 50. — B. Albert., hic a. 1-3. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. 2. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.
II. Quoad 1. quaestionem 2. articuli valet principium ab omnibus approbatum, quod quamvis usus matrimonii non sit matrimonio essentialis, tamen potentia ad usum essentialiter requiratur ad illud contrahendum. Cfr. de utraque quaestione hic dub. 3-6, et de furiosis dub. 7. De hoc impedimento: Scot., hic q. unica n. 1-3. — S. Thom., hic a. 2; Suppl. q. 58. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 4-7. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 2. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. 2. — De hac et seq. q. Durand., hic q. 2; Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.
III. Opinio 1. in seq. (2.) quaestione relata reiicitur ab omnibus antiquis theologis, et conclusiones circa hoc impedimentum sunt communes. Solummodo disputatur quoad impotentiam tantum respectivam (quae est tantum respectu determinatae personae, non vero omnium), utrum scilicet eadem possit simul esse perpetua et naturalis, et per consequens, utrum etiam in frigidis, sicut in maleficiatis, secundum matrimonium validum esse possit. S. Bonav. (in fine corporis) hoc generatim negat cum S. Thoma (loc. cit. a. 2. ad. 3.), Petro a Tar., aliisque, cum in iure canonico detur licentia cum altera muliere contrahendi maleficiato, non vero frigido. Alii autem multi cum Scoto (loc. cit. n. 3.), Durando et Dionys. Carth. censent, praesumtionem iuris, non dari naturaliter impotentiam tantum respectivam, fallere posse, et si hoc probari possit, tunc praesumtionem illam elidi, et secundum matrimonium valere. De 2. quaestione: S. Thom., locis citt. a. 3 et a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 8-10. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 4. — Richard. a Med., a. 3. q. 1. 2.
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Article I. On the impediments of marriage in general.
Question I. Whether marriage has any impediment.
As to the first point, then, it is shown that marriage does not have any impediment:
1. Because marriage is a remedy against the disease of concupiscence: therefore if that disease extends itself to all, with nothing impeding; it seems likewise that marriage, since as a medicine it ought to answer over against its opposite to the disease1, and so that marriage may exist in all, with nothing impeding.
2. Likewise, no other Sacrament has an impediment such that, if someone receives it in fact, it is not [thereby] received: therefore it seems likewise in marriage that, whatever sort a person may be, nevertheless, if he contracts in fact, he receives the Sacrament of marriage.
3. Likewise, marriage is an insoluble bond, as was proved above2: therefore if it be contracted, it is never dissolved: therefore there is no impediment which dissolves what has already been contracted.
4. Likewise, marriage, since it is a Sacrament, God works [it], whence those joined in marriage are said to be joined by God3; but the divine operation has no impediment, since God is the most noble agent; therefore marriage has no impediment.
On the contrary: 1. Marriage is instituted for a duty4; but many are unfit for the duty, as for instance for generating by intercourse: therefore many are not suited to marriage: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, marriage is instituted for a remedy; but there are many for whom it cannot be a remedy, because they cannot come together: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, there are many who can never exercise that act without sin, as for instance those who have vowed continence, or those who are forbidden to be joined by him who has the power; but every Sacrament can come into use without sin, since it is ordered5 to salvation: therefore some are unfit for marriage.
4. Likewise, nothing is sacred which is done against a divine command; but a Sacrament is a sacred sign: therefore nothing is a Sacrament which is done against the divine precept; but the divine precept, in Leviticus eighteen6, forbids marriage to be made among many kinds of persons: therefore if they contract in fact, it is not a Sacrament: therefore it has impediments.
Conclusion.
The Sacrament of marriage has many impediments.
I respond: It must be said that the Sacrament of marriage has a manifold impediment, as the reasons adduced for this show. — But the reason why this Sacrament has impediments more than the others is twofold. One is by reason of the efficient cause, because, although all the Sacraments are from divine institution and human dispensation, nevertheless this Sacrament consists most of all in human dispensation, because it arises through the consent of the contracting parties and has no determinate dispenser7. — The other reason is by reason of the end, because, since all the Sacraments are for a remedy, this one is not only for a remedy, but also for a duty; and since the others are spiritual, to this one a carnal action is joined, namely the union which is through intercourse. And therefore it more easily receives impediments. — From these things the objections are clear.
1. For as to what is objected, that no one is excluded from the disease of concupiscence; it must be said that that disease is remediable otherwise than by marriage, as for instance by continence.
2. To that which is objected, that the other Sacraments extend to all; the response is clear, because it is not the same with this one and with the others, as has been seen.
3. To that which is objected, that it is an insoluble bond; it must be said that it is true, from the moment it binds; but it is possible that some are unfit, so that they are not bound by this bond.
4. To that which is objected, that the divine operation cannot be impeded; it must be said that it is true where God operates as the whole cause; but it is not so in marriage, nay it is necessary that legitimate consent intervene. Moreover, that operation presupposes matter in which [it works].
I. The Council of Trent (Sess. XXIV, can. 4.) strikes with anathema those who teach «that the Church could not establish diriment impediments of marriage, or that it erred in establishing them». To the twelve diriment impediments enumerated by our author the same Council (Sess. XXIV, de Reform. c. 6.) added two others, namely of abduction and of clandestinity, concerning which cf. the authors of moral theology and of the canons. On both questions of this article: Scotus, below d. 42, n. 7. seqq. — St. Thomas, here a. 1; Suppl. q. 50. — Bl. Albert, here a. 1-3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1. q. 1. 2. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Denys the Carthusian, here q. 1.
II. As to the 1st question of the 2nd article, the principle approved by all holds good, that although the use of marriage is not essential to marriage, nevertheless the potency for use is essentially required for contracting it. Cf. on both questions here dub. 3-6, and on the insane dub. 7. On this impediment: Scotus, here q. unica n. 1-3. — St. Thomas, here a. 2; Suppl. q. 58. a. 1. — Bl. Albert, here a. 4-7. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 2. 3. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 2. q. 1. 2. — On this and the following question Durandus, here q. 2; Denys the Carthusian, here q. 2.
III. Opinion 1, reported in the following (2nd) question, is rejected by all the ancient theologians, and the conclusions concerning this impediment are common. Only this is disputed, as regards merely relative impotence (which is only in respect of a determinate person, and not of all), namely whether the same can at once be perpetual and natural, and consequently, whether even in the cold [frigidi], as in the bewitched [maleficiati], a second marriage can be valid. St. Bonaventure (at the end of the body) denies this in general, together with St. Thomas (loc. cit. a. 2. ad 3.), Peter of Tarentaise, and others, since in canon law license is granted to contract with another woman to one bewitched, but not to one cold. But many others, with Scotus (loc. cit. n. 3.), Durandus, and Denys the Carthusian, hold that the presumption of law — that merely relative impotence is not given naturally — can fail, and if this can be proved, then that presumption is set aside, and the second marriage holds good. On the 2nd question: St. Thomas, in the places cited a. 3 and a. 2. — Bl. Albert, here a. 8-10. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 4. — Richard of Middleton, a. 3. q. 1. 2.
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- 1Vide supra pag. 37, nota 4. — Immediate post ex cod. P posuimus et ita, pro quo cod. O et ideo videtur, edd. cum paucis codd. ergo videtur.See above, p. 37, note 4. — Immediately after, from codex P, we put et ita ("and so"), for which codex O [reads] et ideo videtur ("and therefore it seems"), the editions with a few codices ergo videtur ("therefore it seems").
- 2Dist. 27. a. 3. q. 1. et 2.[Above,] Distinction 27, a. 3, q. 1 and 2.
- 3Matth. 19, 6: Quod ergo Deus coniunxit etc.Matthew 19:6: What therefore God has joined together, etc.
- 4Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. XXVI. c. 2, ubi etiam maior seq. arg. insinuatur. — Inferius pro non idonei codd. H Y inepti, cod. K (I a secunda manu) qui non sunt idonei.Cf. above, the text of the Master, d. XXVI, c. 2, where also the major [premise] of the following argument is intimated. — Below, for non idonei ("not suited") codices H Y [read] inepti ("unfit"), codex K (I by a second hand) qui non sunt idonei ("who are not suited").
- 5Cod. O ordinetur.Codex O [reads] ordinetur ("let it be ordered").
- 6Vers. 6. seqq. — Inferius pro Sacramentum cod. U contractum.[Leviticus 18,] vv. 6 ff. — Below, for Sacramentum, codex U [reads] contractum ("what is contracted").
- 7Cfr. supra d. 27. a. 2. q. 1.Cf. above, d. 27, a. 2, q. 1. ---