Dist. 29, Divisio Textus
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 29
Commentarius in Distinctionem XXIX.
De consensu quoad defectum interiorem per coactionem.
Oportet autem, consensum coniugalem liberum esse a coactione etc.
Divisio textus.
Supra egit Magister de consensu, qui deficit a parte exteriori. Hic agit de consensu, qui deficit defectu interiori, scilicet a ratione voluntarii; tamen iste et praecedens et interius et exterius deficit, sed hoc per arctationem1 dictum esse intelligendum est.
Consensus autem dupliciter deficit, aut a parte voluntatis per coactionem, aut a parte rationis per errorem. Ideo primo quaerit, utrum consensus coactus faciat matrimonium. Secundo, utrum erroneus, infra distinctione trigesima: Nec solum coactio impedit vel excludit consensum etc.
Prima pars habet tres partes. In prima veritatem determinat. In secunda explanat, ibi: Ex his apparet, coniugia fieri etc. In tertia vero illud quod determinavit circa matrimonium, applicat ad sponsalia, ibi: Consentire autem probatur qui evidenter non contradicit.
Tractatio quaestionum.
Ad intelligentiam praesentis distinctionis tria quaeruntur.
Primo quaeritur, utrum consensus coactus faciat matrimonium.
Secundo, utrum consentiens in renitentem generet sibi praeiudicium.
Tertio, utrum aliquis possit compelli per praeceptum patris ad matrimonium contrahendum.
Articulus unicus.
De consensu coacto.
---
Commentary on Distinction XXIX.
On consent as regards the interior defect, through coercion.
It behooves, moreover, that conjugal consent be free from coercion, etc.
Division of the text.
Above, the Master treated of consent that is lacking on the exterior side. Here he treats of consent that is lacking through an interior defect, namely from the standpoint of the voluntary; yet this defect, as well as the preceding one, fails both interiorly and exteriorly — but this is to be understood as said by way of restriction1.
Consent, moreover, fails in a twofold way: either on the part of the will, through coercion, or on the part of reason, through error. Therefore he first asks whether coerced consent makes a marriage. Second, whether erroneous [consent does] — below, in the thirtieth distinction: "Not only does coercion impede or exclude consent," etc.
The first part has three parts. In the first he determines the truth. In the second he explains, at the point: "From this it appears that marriages come about," etc. In the third, however, he applies what he had determined concerning marriage to betrothals, at the point: "That one consents is proven who does not evidently gainsay it."
Treatment of the questions.
For the understanding of the present distinction three things are asked.
First it is asked whether coerced consent makes a marriage.
Second, whether one who consents in the face of a resisting party thereby brings prejudice upon himself.
Third, whether anyone can be compelled, by a father's command, to contract marriage.
The sole article.
On coerced consent.
---
- 1Notae ad Commentarium. Clarius codd. L Y (F a secunda manu) per appropriationem, codd. P Q per arctationem sive appropriationem.Notes on the Commentary. More clearly, codd. L Y (F by a second hand read) "by appropriation," codd. P Q "by restriction or appropriation."