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Dist. 39, Art. 3, Q. 3

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 39

Textus Latinus
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Quaestio III. Utrum iuramentum incautum sit obligatorium.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum iuramentum incautum sit obligatorium. Iuramentum autem incautum dico, quod vergit in exitum malum, vel in exitum minus bonum1. Et quod iuramentum incautum, quod vergit in exitum malum, sit obligatorium, probatur:

1. Primo per exemplum Iosue, de quo dicit Ambrosius in libro de Officiis2: « Iosue pacem, quam dederat, revocandam non censuit, quia firmata erat sacramenti religione, ne dum alienam perfidiam redargueret, suam fidem solveret »: tenebatur ergo Iosue iuramentum, quod fecerat, observare; sed illud iuramentum fuit incautum et vergebat in exitum malum, quia contra Dei praeceptum, quo praeceperat Dominus, ne cum gentibus illis foedus iniret3: ergo videtur, quod tale iuramentum sit obligatorium.

2. Item, Augustinus4 dicit, quod meretrix iurans, se servaturam fidem suo leccatori, peior est, si non servat fidem, quam si observaret; sed iuramentum illud habet malum exitum, et tamen obligat, alioquin non esset peior in non observando quam in observando: ergo iuramentum, quod simpliciter vergit in exitum malum, est obligatorium.

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3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur de iuramento, quod vergit in exitum minus bonum, utpote qui iurat, se non intraturum religionem5, quia aliquis per matrimonii vinculum potest se obligare, ut non intret religionem, ita quod matrimonium illud vere est obligatorium: ergo pari ratione videtur, quod et per ipsum iuramentum.

4. Item, licitum est alicui nolle intrare religionem, et quod licitum est nolle licitum est confirmare, et quod licitum est confirmare licitum est iurare; sed iuramentum licitum est iuramentum obligatorium: videtur ergo, quod cum aliquis iuret, se non intraturum religionem, quod per illud iuramentum obligatur. Sed tale est iuramentum incautum, quod vergit in exitum minus bonum: ergo videtur, quod iuramentum illud sit obligatorium.

Sed contra: 1. Beda dicit, et Magister adducit in littera6: « Si quid nos incautius iurare contigerit, quod observatum peiorem vergat in exitum, libere illud salubriori consilio mutandum noverimus »: ergo secundum hoc iuramentum incautum, quod vergit in exitum malum, vel minus bonum, non est obligatorium.

2. Item, Isidorus7: « Non est observandum sacramentum, quo malum incaute promittitur ». Si tu dicas, quod auctoritas ista intelligitur solum, quando quis iurat quod est malum et iniustum, sed non, quando quis iurat, se non facturum bonum perfectum, ad quod non tenetur; obiicitur contra hoc: quia nullum iuramentum est iustum, quod impugnat iustitiae perfectionem8; sed iuramentum, quo quis iurat, se non intraturum religionem nec aggressurum perfectionem, est perfectae iustitiae impugnativum: ergo et iuramentum iniquum. Sed nullum tale est obligatorium: ergo videtur, quod nullus obligetur per iuramentum incautum, quod vergit in exitum minus bonum.

3. Item, nullum iuramentum est discretum, quod est contra Spiritus sancti consilium; sed cum quis iurat, se non intraturum religionem, iuramentum illud est contra Spiritus sancti consilium; sed nullum tale iuramentum habet in comitatu iudicium, et nullum tale est obligatorium9: ergo idem quod prius.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur, si quis iurat, se nunquam recepturum praelationem, utrum per tale iuramentum obligetur. Et quod sic, videtur: quia licitum est praelationem fugere: ergo licitum est, quod quis iuret eam non recipere10. In contrarium est, quod maioris perfectionis est, ut communiter dicitur, status praelationis quam religionis, et bono privato praeferenda est utilitas communis.

Conclusio. Iuramentum incautum, quod vergit in salutis detrimentum, vel directe in perfectionis impedimentum, non est obligatorium.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod multipliciter contingit iuramentum esse incautum: primo modo, quando iuratur aliquid, quod simpliciter vergit in salutis detrimentum, sicut cum aliquis iurat, se facturum aliquid, quod non potest sine peccato mortali consummari. Secundo modo dicitur iuramentum esse incautum, cum quis iurat aliquid, quod vergit in salutis suae dispendium et perfectionis impedimentum, ut puta cum iurat quis, se nunquam intraturum religionem. Tertio modo dicitur iuramentum incautum, cum quis iurat aliquid in omnem eventum, quod uno casu contingente, vergit in salutis dispendium, alio casu contingente, vergit in salutis profectum; sicut cum iurat aliquis, se nunquam recepturum praelationem, quod quidem est in salutis dispendium, si utilis sit et canonice eligatur et a maiori sibi iniungatur; tunc autem vergit in salutis profectum, si sit persona inutilis sibi et aliis ad statum illum promoveri.

Si ergo loquamur de iuramento11 primo modo, sic absque dubio non est licitum nec obligatorium, immo qui ipsum observat committit peccatum. — Si vero loquamur de iuramento incauto secundo modo, sic nec est licitum nec obligatorium, licet ipsum observare non sit peccatum, quia non est peccatum non intrare religionem; grave tamen peccatum est iurare, se nunquam ascensurum ad gradum perfectionis, quia in hoc quodam modo impugnat ipsius iustitiae perfectionem et Spiritus sancti inspirationem12. — Si vero loquamur de iuramento tertio modo, sic, uno casu contingente, est observandum, videlicet quando vergit in salutis profectum; alio vero casu contingente, est illicitum et non observandum, videlicet cum vergit in salutis detrimentum. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam. Concedendum est enim, quod iuramentum incautum, quod vergit in salutis detri-

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mentum, vel quod directe vergit in perfectionis impedimentum, non est obligatorium, sicut rationes ad hanc partem inductae ostendunt13.

Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:

Ad 1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium de Iosue, dicendum, quod iuramentum illud observatum non vergebat in malum exitum, immo in bonum. Triplex enim ratio fuit, quare Gabaonitae fuerunt reservati et non interfecti. Una videlicet litteralis, quia melius erat, ut damnarentur perpetua servitute, quam punirentur morte, maxime cum prompti essent servire et mortem sustinere, sicut ex ipso textu14 apparet. — Alia vero ratio est moralis, quia in hoc significatur, quod quantumcumque Deus minetur alicui et indignetur in praesenti vita; si tamen ad ipsum revertatur toto corde, non claudit misericordiae viscera. — Tertia vero ratio est figuralis, quia in hoc significatur, quod semper in nobis duo sunt populi, secundum quod duo fuerunt in terra promissionis, videlicet Amorrhaeorum et filiorum Israel, hoc est motuum rationalium et brutalium; secundum quod dicit Bernardus15: « Quantumcumque labores, necesse est, ut intra fines tuos habitet Iebusaeus ». — Unde multiplici ratione observatio iuramenti illius non vergebat in exitum malum, sed potius in bonum. — Et quod obiicitur de mandato Domini, quod Dominus praeceperat, quod cum eis foedus non iniret16; dicendum, quod hoc intelligendum est quantum ad eos qui erant incorrigibiles.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de meretrice, quae iurat leccatori suo fideliter adhaerere; dicendum, quod in iuramento est duo considerare: unum, quod meretrix iurat, se consensuram in nefarium actum cum suo leccatore; aliud, quod iurat, se17 alteri non daturam. Et primum quidem est illicitum, et ad hoc non obligatur; secundum quidem licitum, et quantum ad hoc obligatur. Et ideo dicit Augustinus, quod peior est non servando, quam si iuramentum servaret. Per hunc etiam modum intelligendum est, si aliquis latro iuraret alii, se praedam cum illo divisurum, et postea retineret totum.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de eo qui iurat, se nunquam religionem intraturum, quod licite potest iurare, sicut licite potest contrahere matrimonium; dicendum, quod non est simile hinc et inde, duplici ex causa. Prima est, quia matrimonium non tantummodo dicit privationem boni, quin potius dicat18 boni positionem; sed iuramentum, quo quis iurat, se nunquam religionem intraturum, de sua principali intentione est boni perfecti privatorium et impeditivum; ideo non est iudicandum obligatorium, sed potius illicitum et iniquum. — Alia etiam ratio est, quia qui matrimonium contrahit, sive ex consensu uxoris, sive ex morte, potest aliquando aggredi perfectionem. Qui autem iurat, se nunquam religionem intraturum, quantum est de se, reddit se in sempiternum inhabilem.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod licitum est nolle intrare religionem, ergo et iuramento firmare19; dicendum, quod non sequitur: quia nolle intrare religionem est imperfectionis, sed hoc iuramento firmare est cuiusdam obstinationis et impugnationis gratiae Spiritus sancti, quae de tepidis et negligentibus facit fervidos et perfectos. Et ideo, quamvis illud sit licitum, istud tamen est illicitum.

Ad quaestionem incidentem. Ad illud quod quaeritur ulterius de eo qui iurat, se non recepturum praelationem; iam patet responsio per illud quod iam dictum est: quia iuramentum illud in casu obligat, videlicet cum vergit in damnum proprium et alienum: in casu vero non, videlicet cum non tantum est persona sibi utilis, verum etiam aliis. — Attamen si iuramentum praecesserit, non debet quis se auctoritate propria a vinculo eius absolvere, sed superioris voluntatem, mandatum et auctoritatem super hoc requirere20, cuius voluntati magis quam propriae debet in hoc casu obedire21.

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English Translation

Question III. Whether an incautious oath is binding.

Thirdly it is asked, whether an incautious oath is binding. Now by an incautious oath I mean one that tends toward an evil outcome, or toward a less good outcome1. And that an incautious oath which tends toward an evil outcome is binding, is proved:

1. First, by the example of Joshua, of whom Ambrose says in his book On Duties2: « Joshua judged that the peace which he had given should not be revoked, because it had been confirmed by the religion of an oath, lest while he reproved another's treachery he should break his own faith »: therefore Joshua was bound to keep the oath which he had made; but that oath was incautious and tended toward an evil outcome, because it was against the precept of God, by which the Lord had commanded that he should not enter into a covenant with those nations3: therefore it seems that such an oath is binding.

2. Likewise, Augustine4 says that a harlot who swears that she will keep faith with her seducer is worse if she does not keep faith than if she were to observe it; but that oath has an evil outcome, and yet it binds, otherwise she would not be worse in not observing than in observing: therefore an oath which simply tends toward an evil outcome is binding.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems [to hold] concerning an oath that tends toward a less good outcome, as for one who swears that he will not enter religion5, because someone can bind himself by the bond of matrimony so that he does not enter religion, so that that matrimony is truly binding: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems [to hold] also of the oath itself.

4. Likewise, it is lawful for someone to be unwilling to enter religion, and what is lawful to be unwilling [to do] it is lawful to confirm, and what is lawful to confirm it is lawful to swear; but a lawful oath is a binding oath: therefore it seems that when someone swears that he will not enter religion, he is bound by that oath. But such is an incautious oath, which tends toward a less good outcome: therefore it seems that that oath is binding.

On the contrary: 1. Bede says, and the Master adduces in the text6: « If it should happen that we swear something rather incautiously, which when kept would tend toward a worse outcome, let us know that it is to be freely changed by a more wholesome counsel »: therefore according to this an incautious oath, which tends toward an evil outcome or a less good one, is not binding.

2. Likewise, Isidore7: « A sacrament by which an evil is incautiously promised is not to be kept ». If you say that this authority is to be understood only when someone swears what is evil and unjust, but not when someone swears that he will not do a perfect good, to which he is not bound; against this it is objected: because no oath is just which assails the perfection of justice8; but an oath by which someone swears that he will not enter religion nor undertake perfection is destructive of perfect justice: therefore [it is] also an iniquitous oath. But no such [oath] is binding: therefore it seems that no one is bound by an incautious oath which tends toward a less good outcome.

3. Likewise, no oath is discreet which is against the counsel of the Holy Spirit; but when someone swears that he will not enter religion, that oath is against the counsel of the Holy Spirit; but no such oath has judgment in its company, and no such [oath] is binding9: therefore the same as before.

Connected with this it is asked, if someone swears that he will never accept a prelacy, whether he is bound by such an oath. And that he is, it seems: because it is lawful to flee a prelacy: therefore it is lawful that someone should swear not to accept it10. On the contrary is the fact that the state of prelacy is of greater perfection than that of religion, as is commonly said, and the common usefulness is to be preferred to the private good.

Conclusion. An incautious oath, which tends toward the detriment of salvation, or directly toward the impediment of perfection, is not binding.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that an oath happens to be incautious in many ways: in the first way, when something is sworn which simply tends toward the detriment of salvation, as when someone swears that he will do something which cannot be carried out without mortal sin. In the second way an oath is said to be incautious when someone swears something which tends toward the loss of his salvation and the impediment of perfection, as for instance when someone swears that he will never enter religion. In the third way an oath is said to be incautious when someone swears something in every event, which, in one contingency, tends toward the loss of salvation, and in another contingency, tends toward the advancement of salvation; as when someone swears that he will never accept a prelacy, which indeed is to the loss of salvation, if he is useful and is canonically elected and it is enjoined upon him by a superior; but then it tends toward the advancement of salvation, if he is a person useless to himself and to others for being promoted to that state.

If therefore we speak of an oath11 in the first way, then without doubt it is neither lawful nor binding, indeed whoever keeps it commits sin. — But if we speak of an incautious oath in the second way, then it is neither lawful nor binding, although to keep it is not a sin, because it is not a sin not to enter religion; yet it is a grave sin to swear that one will never ascend to a grade of perfection, because in this he in a certain way assails the perfection of justice itself and the inspiration of the Holy Spirit12. — But if we speak of an oath in the third way, then, in one contingency, it is to be observed, namely when it tends toward the advancement of salvation; but in the other contingency, it is unlawful and not to be observed, namely when it tends toward the detriment of salvation. — And by this the response to the proposed question is clear. For it must be granted that an incautious oath, which tends toward the detriment of salvation,

or which directly tends toward the impediment of perfection, is not binding, as the reasons brought in for this side show13.

To the arguments for the affirmative side:

To 1. To that which is first objected on the contrary concerning Joshua, it must be said that that oath, when kept, did not tend toward an evil outcome, but rather toward good. For there was a threefold reason why the Gibeonites were spared and not slain. One, namely, literal, because it was better that they should be condemned to perpetual servitude than punished with death, especially since they were ready to serve and to undergo death, as appears from the text itself14. — But another reason is moral, because in this it is signified that however much God may threaten someone and be indignant in the present life, yet if he turns back to Him with his whole heart, He does not close the bowels of mercy. — But the third reason is figural, because in this it is signified that there are always two peoples in us, just as there were two in the land of promise, namely of the Amorites and of the children of Israel, that is, of rational and of brutish motions; according to what Bernard says15: « However much you labor, it is necessary that the Jebusite dwell within your borders ». — Whence for many reasons the keeping of that oath did not tend toward an evil outcome, but rather toward good. — And as to what is objected concerning the command of the Lord, that the Lord had commanded that he should not enter into a covenant with them16; it must be said that this is to be understood with respect to those who were incorrigible.

To 2. To that which is objected concerning the harlot, who swears to cleave faithfully to her seducer; it must be said that in the oath there are two things to consider: one, that the harlot swears that she will consent to a wicked act with her seducer; the other, that she swears that she17 will not give herself to another. And the first indeed is unlawful, and to this she is not bound; but the second indeed is lawful, and as to this she is bound. And therefore Augustine says that she is worse by not keeping than if she kept the oath. In this same way it is to be understood, if some robber were to swear to another that he would divide the spoil with him, and afterward retained the whole.

To 3. To that which is objected concerning him who swears that he will never enter religion, that he can lawfully swear, just as he can lawfully contract matrimony; it must be said that the case is not alike on either side, for a twofold reason. The first is, because matrimony does not only state a privation of good, but rather states18 a positing of good; whereas an oath by which someone swears that he will never enter religion is, of its principal intention, depriving of and impeditive of the perfect good; therefore it is not to be judged binding, but rather unlawful and iniquitous. — There is also another reason, because he who contracts matrimony, whether by the consent of his wife, or by death, can sometimes undertake perfection. But he who swears that he will never enter religion, so far as is in him, renders himself perpetually unfit.

To 4. To that which is objected, that it is lawful to be unwilling to enter religion, therefore also to confirm it by an oath19; it must be said that it does not follow: because to be unwilling to enter religion is [a matter] of imperfection, but to confirm this by an oath is [a matter] of a certain obstinacy and of an assailing of the grace of the Holy Spirit, which makes the lukewarm and negligent fervent and perfect. And therefore, although that [former] is lawful, this [latter] nevertheless is unlawful.

To the incidental question. To that which is further asked concerning him who swears that he will not accept a prelacy; the response is now clear from what has already been said: because that oath binds in [one] case, namely when it tends toward one's own harm and another's: but in [another] case it does not, namely when the person is useful not only to himself, but also to others. — Nevertheless, if the oath has gone before, one ought not to absolve himself from its bond by his own authority, but to require for this the will, command, and authority of a superior20, to whose will rather than his own he ought in this case to be obedient21.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. P. 878, not. 7. Vide infra in fundam. I. verba Bedae.
    P. 878, note 7. See below, in fundamentum I, the words of Bede.
  2. P. 878, not. 8. Libr. III. c. 10. n. 69: Iesus tamen pacem etc. Cfr. Iosue 9, 15. seqq.
    P. 878, note 8. [Ambrose,] bk. III, c. 10, n. 69: Jesus [= Joshua] nevertheless [judged] the peace etc. Cf. Joshua 9, 15 ff.
  3. P. 878, not. 9. Cfr. supra pag. 666, nota 6.
    P. 878, note 9. Cf. above, p. 666, note 6.
  4. P. 878, not. 10. De Bono coniugali, c. 4. n. 4, sententialiter. Allegatur etiam a Gratiano, C. Mulier si, c. 22. q. 4. — Inferius pro leccatori Vat. hic et in solutione tocatori. Immediate post codd. B D F G L O T V aa, verbis male transpositis, peior est, si servat fidem, quam si non observaret.
    P. 878, note 10. On the Good of Marriage, c. 4, n. 4, in substance. It is cited also by Gratian, C. Mulier si, c. 22, q. 4. — Below, for leccatori (her seducer) the Vatican edition reads here and in the solution tocatori. Immediately after, codices B D F G L O T V aa, with the words badly transposed, [read] she is worse if she keeps faith than if she did not observe it.
  5. P. 879, not. 1. Cfr. Gratian., C. Innocens credit, c. 22. q. 4. § 6.
    P. 879, note 1. Cf. Gratian, C. Innocens credit, c. 22, q. 4, § 6.
  6. P. 879, not. 2. Hic c. 9.
    P. 879, note 2. Here, c. 9.
  7. P. 879, not. 3. Libr. II. Sent. c. 31. n. 9; cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 9. — Cum textu originali et codd. A F H K L T V ac bb substituimus sacramentum pro iuramentum.
    P. 879, note 3. [Isidore,] bk. II Sentences, c. 31, n. 9; cf. here the text of the Master, c. 9. — With the original text and codices A F H K L T V and bb, we have substituted sacramentum (sacrament) for iuramentum (oath).
  8. P. 879, not. 4. Cfr. supra pag. 875, nota 2. — Codd. A H aa perfectioni. In fine arg. post incautum cod. Z addit et indiscretum.
    P. 879, note 4. Cf. above, p. 875, note 2. — Codices A H aa [read] perfectioni. At the end of the argument, after incautum codex Z adds et indiscretum.
  9. P. 879, not. 5. Cfr. supra pag. 875, nota 2. — Superius pro discretum cod. O obligatorium.
    P. 879, note 5. Cf. above, p. 875, note 2. — Above, for discretum codex O reads obligatorium.
  10. P. 879, not. 6. Cfr. C. Archidiaconum Florentinum, dist. 85, ubi Gregorius iubet inquiri, num ille qui episcopus fuerat electus, « tactis sacrosanctis Evangeliis (sicut nobis nuntiatum est), iusiurandum praebuerit, nunquam se ad episcopatum accedere ». — Inferius post praeferenda est (cfr. supra pag. 652, nota 4.) codd. F G L T V W aa addunt tamen.
    P. 879, note 6. Cf. C. Archidiaconum Florentinum, dist. 85, where Gregory orders inquiry to be made whether that man who had been elected bishop « had given an oath, with the holy Gospels touched (as has been reported to us), that he would never come to the episcopate ». — Below, after praeferenda est (cf. above, p. 652, note 4) codices F G L T V W aa add tamen.
  11. P. 879, not. 7. In edd. additur incauto.
    P. 879, note 7. In the editions incauto (incautious) is added.
  12. P. 879, not. 8. Cod. A repugnat ipsius iustitiae perfectioni et Spiritus S. inspirationi.
    P. 879, note 8. Codex A [reads] it is repugnant to the perfection of justice itself and to the inspiration of the Holy Spirit.
  13. P. 880, not. 1. Cfr. Gratian., C. Innocens credit, c. 22. q. 4. § 4. seqq. — Superius pro Et per hoc cod. K Et sic.
    P. 880, note 1. Cf. Gratian, C. Innocens credit, c. 22, q. 4, § 4 ff. — Above, for Et per hoc codex K reads Et sic.
  14. P. 880, not. 2. Iosue 9, 21. seqq. — Ambros., III. de Offic. c. 10. n. 69: Mulctavit tamen eos viliori obsequio ministerii. Clementior sententia, sed diuturnior; manet etiam officiis poena veteris astutiae, hereditario in hunc diem ministerio deputata. Cfr. Glossa ordinaria apud Strabum et Lyranum, quae continet expositionem Origenis, August. (q. 12. et 13.) et Isidor. (c. 11.) in hunc locum. Pro servire et mortem sustinere edd. servire magis quam mortem sustinere.
    P. 880, note 2. Joshua 9, 21 ff. — Ambrose, III On Duties, c. 10, n. 69: He punished them, however, with the baser service of ministry. A milder sentence, but more lasting; the penalty of the old cunning remains also in [their] offices, assigned by inheritance to this day as a ministry. Cf. the Glossa ordinaria in Strabo and Lyra, which contains the exposition of Origen, Augustine (qq. 12 and 13), and Isidore (c. 11) on this passage. For to serve and to undergo death the editions read to serve rather than to undergo death.
  15. P. 880, not. 3. Serm. in Cantic., serm. 58. n. 10: Velis, nolis, intra fines tuos habitat Iebusaeus (Iudic. 1, 21.); subiugari potest, sed non exterminari. — Aliquanto superius pro significatur codd. A U figuratur.
    P. 880, note 3. Sermons on the Song of Songs, serm. 58, n. 10: Like it or not, the Jebusite dwells within your borders (Judg. 1, 21); he can be subjugated, but not exterminated. — Somewhat above, for significatur codices A U read figuratur.
  16. P. 880, not. 4. Ita plures codd. cum edd., in aliis inirent, cod. A iniretur, cod. N haberent.
    P. 880, note 4. So most codices with the editions; in others inirent, codex A iniretur, codex N haberent.
  17. P. 880, not. 5. Edd. addunt fidem. In fine solut. pro se praedam cod. K se praedandum et, plures alii codd. incongrue se praedandum.
    P. 880, note 5. The editions add fidem (faith). At the end of the solution, for se praedam codex K [reads] se praedandum et, several other codices incongruously se praedandum.
  18. P. 880, not. 6. Permulti codd. et edd. 1, 2 dicit. Pro quin cod. K quia.
    P. 880, note 6. Very many codices and editions 1, 2 [read] dicit. For quin codex K reads quia.
  19. P. 880, not. 7. Cod. K confirmare.
    P. 880, note 7. Codex K [reads] confirmare.
  20. P. 880, not. 8. Cod. A inquirere.
    P. 880, note 8. Codex A [reads] inquirere.
  21. P. 880, not. 9. Vide scholion ad 1. huius articuli quaest.
    P. 880, note 9. See the scholion to question 1 of this article.
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