Dist. 39, Dubia
Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 39
DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.
Dub. I.
In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Advertendum est, quod iusiurandum tres habet comites: veritatem, iustitiam et iudicium. Videtur enim, quod ibi sit superfluitas. Quicumque enim iurat cum iudicio discretionis, vere et iuste iurat: ergo ex quo ponitur ibi iudicium, superfluit veritas et iustitia. — Item, cum omnia opera nostra debeant fieri cum
discretione et rectitudine et veritate, quaeritur: quare potius iuramentum dicitur habere tres comites quam aliud verbum nostrum1 et factum?
Iuxta hoc quaeritur: penes quid accipitur numerus istorum trium comitum?
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod iuramentum comparatur ad tria, videlicet ad iurantem, a quo procedit, ad rem, de qua fit, et ad causam, pro qua. Secundum comparationem ad eum, a quo egreditur, debetur sibi iudicium; secundum comparationem ad rem, de qua fit, debetur sibi veritas, ut sit adaequatio rei et sermonis2. Secundum vero comparationem ad causam, pro qua fit, debetur sibi iustitia, ut pro iusta causa fiat. Et quoniam omne iuramentum habet istas tres comparationes, ideo omne rectum iuramentum habet istos tres comites. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad illud quod ultimo quaeritur.
Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod ubi est unum, videlicet iudicium, ibi sunt reliqua, ergo alia sunt superflua; dicendum, quod illa ratio non valet. Deficit enim talis modus loquendi in his quae se habent per connexionem; quia enim virtutes connexae sunt, si una habetur, habentur et omnes; et tamen non sequitur, quod si una habetur, quod ceterae superfluant3. — Alibi etiam deficit, videlicet cum aliqua se habent per additionem. Posito enim posteriori, ponitur et prius, sicut posita rationali potentia in homine, ponitur sensibilis et vegetabilis4; et tamen, ex quo rationalis habetur, non propter hoc aliae superfluunt. Sic et in proposito intelligendum est. Quoddam enim iuramentum fit iuste, quod tamen non fit vere; et aliquod fit iuste et vere, et tamen non discrete, quia sine praemeditatione. Et ideo ratio illa non valet.
Ad illud, quod quaeritur: quare magis iuramentum habet istos comites quam alius actus noster? dicendum, quod hoc est, quia iuramentum est in assertione nostri sermonis; sermo autem noster dubietatem habet, secundum quod dicitur Sapientiae nono5: Cogitationes mortalium timidae, et incertae providentiae nostrae. Ideo ad hoc, quod sermo noster per divinam Veritatem confirmetur directe et
convenienter, indiget comitibus ipsum regentibus, ne inveniatur dissimilis Veritati invocatae6.
Dub. II.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod magis tenetur qui iurat per Deum, quam qui iurat per creaturas, vel per Evangelium. Et rationem huius assignat, quia tanto firmius7 est iuramentum, quanto sanctius est illud, per quod iuratur. Sed contra: iurans per creaturam non iurat nisi per Deum, quia non intendit invocare creaturam testem, sed Creatorem: si ergo idem est utrobique, per quod iurat8, ergo eadem est obligatio et uniformis: ergo unum non est maius altero. — Item, quanto solemnius est iuramentum, tanto transgrediens est infamior, et tanto obligatio maior; sed cum maiori solemnitate consuevit fieri iuramentum, quod fit per Evangelium, quam quod fit per Deum: ergo etc. — Item, maius est contemnere plura bona quam unum; sed qui iurat per creaturam, si peierat, contemnit Creatorem simul et creaturam; qui vero iurat per Deum et peierat contemnit alterum tantum9: ergo iuramentum, quod fit per creaturam, est magis obligatorium quam iuramentum, quod fit per Deum.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod responsio Magistri et confirmatio Chrysostomi10 regulariter vera est, quia, quanto sanctius est per quod iuratur, tanto iuramentum est magis obligatorium; et hoc dico ceteris paribus, ubi solemnitas observatur. Unde, sicut dicit Chrysostomus, magis obligatorium est iuramentum, quod fit per Deum11, quam quod fit per creaturam.
Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod iurando per creaturam iurat homo per Deum; dicendum, quod cum quis iurat per creaturam, intentio fertur ad Deum, sed hoc tantum habitualiter12; cum vero quis iurat per Deum, non tantum fertur habitualiter, sed etiam actualiter. Et quia amplior est conversio actualis quam habitualis, hinc est, quod secundum ipsam maior attenditur obligatio, et maioris culpae est ipsa transgressio.
Ad illud, quod obiicitur de iuramento facto per Evangelium, quod est solemnius; responderi potest dupliciter: primo, quia non tantum fit iuramentum per Evangelia, sed per Evangelia Dei; ita quod non tantummodo conversio fit ad ipsum habitualis ratione sui effectus, sed etiam actualis in se et ad assumtam humanitatem et ad propalatam veritatem; et ideo tale iuramentum rationabiliter debet fieri cum maiori solemnitate et ampliorem inducit obligationem. — Alio modo potest dici, quod hoc accidit propter solemnitatem superadditam, quam omnes in forma illa observant.
Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod plus est contemnere duo quam unum; dicendum, quod creatura comparatione Creatoris nihil est, unde quasi nihil addit supra divinam excellentiam13, et per hoc nec contemptus eius super contemptum Dei. Praeterea, non adeo contemnitur Deus in creatura, sicut contemnitur in se ipso.
Dub. III.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod iurare per Deum, hoc est adhibere testem Deum. Si enim hoc verum est, tunc videtur, quod forma ista iurandi: Deus mihi testis est, et iuro per Deum, non sint diversae formae iurandi.
Iuxta hoc quaeritur: cum aliquando iuremus per hanc praepositionem per, aliquando per hanc praepositionem in, secundum quod dicit Apostolus ad Romanos nono14: Veritatem dico in Christo Iesu et non mentior, quae sit inter has differentia. — Item, quaeritur: cum in veteri Testamento iuraretur hoc modo: Vivit Dominus, et hoc mihi faciat et hoc addat15, in primitiva vero Ecclesia hoc modo: Testis est mihi Deus, et in tempore moderno iuretur per Deum; unde veniat ista formarum differentia secundum diversa tempora.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod in forma iuramenti introducitur ipsa Veritas in testimonium. Et hoc potest esse multipliciter: aut in quantum tenet rationem principiantis16, et sic iuratur per Deum, ita quod per importat habitudinem principii; aut in quantum importat habitudinem principiantis et cognoscentis, et sic est ista forma: Testis est mihi Deus, sive scit Deus17, quod idem est; aut in quantum importat habitudinem retribuentis respectu bonorum, et sic iuratur: Vivit Deus, qui vitam aliis tribuit; aut in quantum importat habitudinem retribuentis respectu malorum, et sic iuratur hac forma: Hoc faciat mihi Deus et hoc addat. — Et quoniam ipsa Veritas nunc manifeste adducitur ad confirmationem veritatis18 tanquam omnis veritatis principium et exemplar; hinc est, quod in nova Lege dupliciter iuratur. Et quia tempore primitivae Ecclesiae Veritas nondum erat manifesta, sed indigebat maiori evidentia; hinc est, quod tenebatur tunc ista forma: Testis est mihi Deus. Quia vero in veteri Testamento consideratur19 divina Veritas ut vindicans et ulciscens, quia sub ratione severitatis et aequitatis; hinc est, quod duplicem formam in veteri Testamento servabant, scilicet vivit Deus, et hoc faciat mihi Deus et hoc addat. — Et ex hoc patet praedictarum differentiarum distinctio et sufficientia et usus earum secundum diversa tempora.
Ad illud quod quaeritur: quae differentia importatur per hanc praepositionem per, et per hanc praepositionem in? dicendum, quod per magis dicit ipsam Veritatem sub ratione testificantis et principiantis, haec autem praepositio in importat habitudinem20 divinae Veritatis sub ratione testificantis et exemplantis. Unde secundum rem idem est iurare in Deo et per Deum et dicere: Testis est mihi Deus, licet sit differentia ex parte modi dicendi21.
Dub. IV.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Sine dubitatione minus malum est per deos falsos iurare veraciter, quam per Deum verum fallaciter. Sed contra: maius peccatum est idololatria quam periurium, sive verum, sive falsum est; idololatra22 in iurando committit idololatriam, quia idolum veneratur per ipsum iurando: ergo qui iurat verum per falsos deos magis peccat, quam qui iurat falsum per verum Deum.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod in iuramento illo, quo quis iurat23 per falsos deos, duo sunt, videlicet illud quod asseritur, et illud, per quod asseritur. Respiciendo illud quod asseritur, sic est minus malum, et sic loquitur Augustinus24, quia ex illa parte asseritur verum, et ex alia parte falsum. Respiciendo vero ad illud, per quod iuratur, maius malum est iurare verum per falsos deos, quam falsum per verum Deum; et secundum istam viam procedit obiectio25.
DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.
Doubt I.
In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked about that which he says: It must be noted that an oath has three companions: truth, justice, and judgment. For it seems that there is a redundancy here. For whoever swears with the judgment of discretion swears truly and justly: therefore, given that judgment is set down there, truth and justice are superfluous. — Likewise, since all our works ought to be done with
discretion and rectitude and truth, it is asked: why rather is an oath said to have three companions than any other word1 and deed of ours?
In connection with this it is asked: with respect to what is the number of these three companions taken?
I respond: It must be said that an oath is compared to three things, namely to the one swearing, from whom it proceeds, to the thing about which it is made, and to the cause for which it is made. According to its comparison to him from whom it issues, judgment is owed to it; according to its comparison to the thing about which it is made, truth is owed to it, that there may be a conformity of the thing and the speech2. But according to its comparison to the cause for which it is made, justice is owed to it, that it may be made for a just cause. And since every oath has these three comparisons, therefore every right oath has these three companions. — And by this is made plain the answer to that which is asked last.
But to that which is objected, that where one is present, namely judgment, there are the rest, and therefore the others are superfluous; it must be said that that reasoning is invalid. For such a manner of speaking fails in things that are related by connection; for since the virtues are connected, if one is had, all are had; and yet it does not follow that, if one is had, the rest are superfluous3. — In another case too it fails, namely when some things are related by addition. For when the posterior is posited, the prior is posited too, just as, when the rational power is posited in man, the sensible and the vegetable are posited4; and yet, from the fact that the rational is had, the others are not on that account superfluous. So too it must be understood in the matter at hand. For a certain oath is made justly, which nevertheless is not made truly; and another is made justly and truly, and yet not discreetly, because without premeditation. And therefore that reasoning is invalid.
To that which is asked: why does an oath rather have these companions than any other act of ours? it must be said that this is because an oath is in the assertion of our speech; but our speech has uncertainty, according to what is said in Wisdom 95: The thoughts of mortals are fearful, and our foresight is uncertain. Therefore, in order that our speech may be confirmed by the divine Truth directly and
fittingly, it needs companions governing it, lest it be found unlike the Truth invoked6.
Doubt II.
Likewise it is asked about that which he says, that he is more bound who swears by God than he who swears by creatures, or by the Gospel. And he assigns the reason for this, that an oath is the firmer7 in proportion as that by which one swears is the holier. On the contrary: one swearing by a creature swears only by God, since he does not intend to invoke the creature as witness, but the Creator: if therefore that by which one swears is the same in both cases8, then the obligation is the same and uniform: therefore one is not greater than the other. — Likewise, the more solemn an oath is, the more infamous is the transgressor, and the greater the obligation; but an oath which is made by the Gospel is wont to be made with greater solemnity than one which is made by God: therefore etc. — Likewise, it is greater to despise many goods than one; but he who swears by a creature, if he perjures himself, despises the Creator and the creature together; whereas he who swears by God and perjures himself despises one only9: therefore an oath which is made by a creature is more obligatory than an oath which is made by God.
I respond: It must be said that the answer of the Master and the confirmation of Chrysostom10 is generally true, because the holier that is by which one swears, the more obligatory is the oath; and I say this all else being equal, where solemnity is observed. Hence, as Chrysostom says, more obligatory is the oath which is made by God11 than that which is made by a creature.
But to that which is objected, that in swearing by a creature a man swears by God; it must be said that when one swears by a creature, the intention is borne to God, but only habitually12; whereas when one swears by God, it is borne not only habitually, but also actually. And since the actual turning is fuller than the habitual, hence it is that according to it a greater obligation is reckoned, and the transgression itself is of greater fault.
To that which is objected concerning the oath made by the Gospel, which is more solemn; it can be answered in two ways: first, because an oath is made not only by the Gospels, but by the Gospels of God; so that not only is a habitual turning made to him by reason of its effect, but also an actual one in itself and toward the assumed humanity and toward the manifested truth; and therefore such an oath ought reasonably to be made with greater solemnity and induces a fuller obligation. — In another way it can be said that this happens on account of the superadded solemnity which all observe in that form.
To that which is objected, that it is greater to despise two than one; it must be said that a creature in comparison with the Creator is nothing, whence it adds, as it were, nothing above the divine excellence13, and through this neither does contempt of it exceed contempt of God. Furthermore, God is not despised in a creature so much as he is despised in himself.
Doubt III.
Likewise it is asked about that which he says, that to swear by God is to call God to witness. For if this is true, then it seems that this form of swearing: God is my witness, and I swear by God, are not different forms of swearing.
In connection with this it is asked: since we sometimes swear by this preposition by, sometimes by this preposition in, according to what the Apostle says to the Romans 914: I speak the truth in Christ Jesus and I do not lie, what is the difference between these. — Likewise, it is asked: since in the Old Testament one swore in this manner: The Lord lives, and may he do this to me and add this15, but in the primitive Church in this manner: God is my witness, and in the present time one swears by God; whence comes this difference of forms according to the diverse times.
I respond: It must be said that in the form of an oath the very Truth is introduced into testimony. And this can be in many ways: either insofar as it holds the character of originating principle16, and thus one swears by God, so that by imports the relation of a principle; or insofar as it imports the relation of originating principle and of knower, and thus is that form: God is my witness, or God knows17, which is the same; or insofar as it imports the relation of rewarder with respect to goods, and thus one swears: God lives, who gives life to others; or insofar as it imports the relation of rewarder with respect to evils, and thus one swears with this form: May God do this to me and add this. — And since the very Truth is now manifestly brought forward for the confirmation of truth18 as the principle and exemplar of all truth; hence it is that in the new Law one swears in two ways. And because in the time of the primitive Church the Truth was not yet manifest, but needed greater evidence; hence it is that there was then held that form: God is my witness. But because in the Old Testament the divine Truth is considered19 as avenging and punishing, since under the aspect of severity and equity; hence it is that they kept a twofold form in the Old Testament, namely God lives, and may God do this to me and add this. — And from this is plain the distinction of the aforesaid differences and their sufficiency and their use according to the diverse times.
To that which is asked: what difference is imported by this preposition by, and by this preposition in? it must be said that by rather expresses the very Truth under the aspect of one testifying and originating, but this preposition in imports the relation20 of the divine Truth under the aspect of one testifying and exemplifying. Hence in reality it is the same to swear in God and by God and to say: God is my witness, although there is a difference on the part of the manner of speaking21.
Doubt IV.
Likewise it is asked about that which he says: Without doubt it is a lesser evil to swear truthfully by false gods than to swear deceitfully by the true God. On the contrary: idolatry is a greater sin than perjury, whether it be true or false; the idolater22 in swearing commits idolatry, since he venerates the idol by the very act of swearing by it: therefore he who swears truly by false gods sins more than he who swears falsely by the true God.
I respond: It must be said that in that oath by which someone swears23 by false gods there are two things, namely that which is asserted, and that by which it is asserted. Regarding that which is asserted, in this way it is a lesser evil, and thus Augustine speaks24, because on that side the truth is asserted, and on the other side falsehood. But regarding that by which one swears, it is a greater evil to swear truly by false gods than falsely by the true God; and along this path the objection proceeds25.
- Edd. omittunt nostrum, pro quo non pauci codd. verum. Mox pro et factum codd. A K N V et falsum. Inferius pro accipitur Vat. cum pauci codd. accipiatur.The editions omit of ours, for which not a few codices read true. Shortly, for and deed codices A K N V read and falsehood. Below, for is taken the Vatican edition with a few codices reads let it be taken.
- Cfr. dist. praeced. q. I. in corp. — Mox pro pro qua edd. et non pauci codd. de qua.Cf. the preceding distinction, q. I, in the body. — Shortly, for for which the editions and not a few codices read about which.
- Vide supra d. 36. q. I. seqq.See above, d. 36, q. I and following.
- Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 31. (c. 3.): Similiter autem se habent ei quod est de figuris, et quae circa animam sunt. Semper enim in eo quod est consequenter, est potentia quod prius est, et in figuris et in animatis, ut in quadrato quidem triangulus est, in sensitivo autem vegetativum etc. — Superius pro Alibi codd. W Z Aliter, et pro additionem codd. K aa adiectionem, codd. G H I T V adductionem.Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 31 (c. 3): "It holds similarly with that which pertains to figures and the things that are about the soul. For always in that which comes consequently there is potentially that which is prior, both in figures and in living things, as in the square there is the triangle, and in the sensitive the vegetative, etc." — Above, for In another case codices W Z read Otherwise, and for addition codices K aa read adjection, codices G H I T V adduction.
- Vers. 11. — Aliquanto superius post istos codd. \ N subiungunt tres. Inferius pro divinam Veritatem, quod exhibent codd. X Y bb, codd. \ \\ Dei misericordiam et veritatem, alii codd. et edd. divinam voluntatem.Verse 11. — Somewhat above, after these codices \ N subjoin three. Below, for the divine Truth, which codices X Y bb give, codices \ \\ read the mercy and truth of God, other codices and editions the divine will.
- Cfr. de hoc dubio Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 31. m. 1. a. 1; B. Albert., hic a. 2; S. Thom., hic a. 2. quaestiunc. 3; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. quaestiunc. 3.Cf. on this doubt Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. III, q. 31, m. 1, a. 1; Bl. Albert, here a. 2; St. Thomas, here a. 2, little-question 3; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 2, little-question 3.
- Edd. minus, quae etiam mox omittunt quanto... iuratur. — Ratio Magistri invenitur hic c. 8. in fine.The editions read less, which also shortly omit in proportion as ... one swears. — The Master's reasoning is found here, c. 8, at the end.
- Respicitur illud Aristot., III. Topic. c. 2: Ubi unum propter alterum, utrobique tantum unum. Cfr. tom. II. pag. 639, nota 2. — Inferius edd. obiectionem seq. cum hac coniungentes substituunt et pro Item.Reference is to that of Aristotle, Topics III, c. 2: "Where one thing is on account of another, in both cases there is only one." Cf. vol. II, p. 639, note 2. — Below, the editions, joining the following objection with this one, substitute and for Likewise.
- Cfr. Gratian., C. Moveat te, c. 22. q. I. § 3: Dupliciter enim reus est qui per creaturas iurat mendaciter etc.Cf. Gratian, C. Moveat te, c. 22, q. I, § 3: "For he who swears by creatures deceitfully is guilty in two ways," etc.
- Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 6.See here the text of the Master, c. 6.
- Cod. F Creatorem, Vat., verbis male transpositis, creaturam, et mox per Deum pro per creaturam.Codex F reads the Creator, the Vatican edition, with the words wrongly transposed, the creature, and shortly by God for by a creature.
- Edd. hic et in seqq. habitudinaliter.The editions here and in what follows read relationally.
- Cfr. supra d. 9. dub. 3. — Idem dub. solvit Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 31. m. 3. a. 3. § 2; B. Albert., hic a. 6; S. Thom., hic circa lit.; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 3; Richard. a Med., hic a. I. q. 2.Cf. above, d. 9, dub. 3. — The same doubt is resolved by Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. III, q. 31, m. 3, a. 3, § 2; Bl. Albert, here a. 6; St. Thomas, here on the text; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 3; Richard of Mediavilla, here a. I, q. 2.
- Vers. I.Verse I.
- Iud. 8, 19; I. Reg. 14, 44. et III. 2, 23, ubi Vulgata bis haec pro hoc. Seq. textus est Rom. 1, 9.Judges 8:19; 1 Kings 14:44 and 3 Kings 2:23, where the Vulgate twice reads these for this. The following text is Rom. 1:9.
- Ita codd. A K X Z bb, alii cum edd. praecipientis, sed contra subnexa. Idem recurrit paulo inferius, dum circa finem dubii fere omnes codd. et edd. 1, 2 exhibent principiantis.So codices A K X Z bb; others with the editions read of one commanding, but contrary to what follows. The same recurs a little below, when toward the end of the doubt nearly all codices and editions 1, 2 give of one originating.
- Epist. II. Cor. 12, 2. et 3. Cfr. ibid. 11, 31.Epistle 2 Cor. 12:2 and 3. Cf. ibid. 11:31.
- Edd. omittunt veritatis.The editions omit of truth.
- Edd. considerabatur. Inferius pro vivit Deus cod. A vivit Dominus.The editions read was considered. Below, for God lives codex A reads the Lord lives.
- Edd. habitum. Paulo superius pro importatur cod. X importetur.The editions read the having. A little above, for is imported codex X reads let it be imported.
- Vide de hoc dubio Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 31. m. 3. a. I. seqq.; S. Thom., hic a. I; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. I.See on this doubt Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. III, q. 31, m. 3, a. I and following; St. Thomas, here a. I; Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. I.
- Codd. D O bb subnectunt autem, edd. praemittunt et, quae etiam paulo inferius pro ergo qui substituunt ergo si.Codices D O bb subjoin however, the editions prefix and, which also a little below substitute therefore if for therefore he who.
- Cod. A iurat verum.Codex A reads swears truly.
- In ipso textu huius dubii.In the very text of this doubt.
- Codd., excepto cod. A, et edd. 1, 2 omittunt obiectio, pro quo Vat. ratio. — Cfr. de hoc dubio Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 31. m. 3. a. 2. § 3; B. Albert., hic a. 6. ad 3; Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.The codices, except codex A, and editions 1, 2 omit the objection, for which the Vatican edition reads the reason. — Cf. on this doubt Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. III, q. 31, m. 3, a. 2, § 3; Bl. Albert, here a. 6, ad 3; Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text.