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Dist. 35, Art. 1, Q. 5

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 35

Textus Latinus
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Quaestio V. Utrum actus doni fortitudinis consistat principaliter circa passiones tolerandas, an circa cupiditates reprimendas.

Quinto quaeritur, quis sit actus proprius doni fortitudinis, et quod eius obiectum; et est quaestio, utrum actus doni fortitudinis principaliter consistat circa passiones tolerandas, an circa cupiditates reprimendas. Et quod principaliter sit circa passiones tolerandas, videtur:

1. Primo per Gregorium1, qui dicit super principium Iob, quod fortitudinis-doni est dare trepidanti confidentiam; sed trepidatio maxime est, quando imminet periculum passionum: ergo videtur, quod circa huiusmodi maxime consistat actus fortitudinis-doni.

2. Item, fortitudo, sive dicatur donum sive virtus, respicit potentiam irascibilem tanquam proprium subiectum2; sed potentia irascibilis magis proprie respicit passionum sustinentiam quam cupiditatum repressionem et abstinentiam: videtur ergo, quod actus principalis doni fortitudinis consistat circa passionum tolerantiam.

3. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per comparationem ad eius oppositum: quia, sicut largitas opponitur avaritiae et cupiditati, sic fortitudo opponitur pusillanimitati3; sed pusillanimitas attenditur circa fugam passionum: ergo videtur econtra, quod fortitudo-donum consistat circa passionum sustinentiam.

4. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per comparationem ad habitum fortitudinis-virtutis: quia fortitudo-donum actum et obiectum debet habere in maiori, vel saltem in tanta excellentia et arduitate, quantam est reperire circa fortitudinem-virtutem; sed maxima arduitas consistit circa passiones: ergo cum circa illas consistat fortitudo-virtus4, videtur multo fortius, quod actus doni fortitudinis attendatur, vel consistat in aggressione et tolerantia passionum.

5. Item, inter omnes actus meritorios maxima est difficultas circa passiones sustinendas, et magis ad hoc inepti et infirmi sumus: ergo si dona data sunt nobis ad expediendum et contra infirmitates

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retardantes nos ad bonum5, videtur, quod aliquod donum debeat nobis dari ad passionum sustinentiam. Sed non est aliud assignare quam donum fortitudinis: ergo etc.

Sed contra: 1. Augustinus in libro de Anima et spiritu6: «Fortitudinis est non tantum terrenas cupiditates reprimere, sed penitus oblivisci»; sed hoc non est fortitudinis-virtutis: ergo est fortitudinis-doni: videtur ergo, quod actus doni fortitudinis consistat in repressione cupiditatum.

2. Item, Augustinus in libro de Doctrina christiana7, ubi loquitur de donis, dicit, quod «fortitudinis est ab omni transeuntium mortifera iucunditate se ipsum sequestrare»: ergo videtur, quod actus doni fortitudinis principaliter consistat in delectationum repressione.

3. Item, Augustinus8 adaptat septem dona septem beatitudinibus, ita quod fortitudo et esuries et sitis iustitiae sibi correspondent; sed esuries et desiderium iustitiae non oritur in nobis nisi per mortificationem desideriorum et voluptatum: ergo videtur, quod circa huiusmodi principaliter consistat actus fortitudinis.

4. Item, fortitudo-donum respondet dono consilii, sicut exsequens regulanti9; sed donum consilii maxime dirigit ad divinorum consiliorum impletionem; divina autem consilia praecipue consistunt circa repressionem desideriorum et occasionum ei adhaerentium, sicut patet in castitate, obedientia et paupertate: ergo videtur, quod circa talium desideriorum repressionem actus fortitudinis-doni principaliter consistat.

5. Item, fortitudo-donum aut habet actum alterius generis quam fortitudo-virtus, aut si in eodem genere habet, necesse est, quod habeat excellentiorem; sed in eodem genere non potest habere excellentiorem, cum fortitudo-virtus consistat circa terribilia, quae inducunt mortem, sicut dicit Philosophus10: ergo necesse est, quod habeat actum alterius generis. Cum ergo actus fortitudinis-virtutis consistat circa passiones tolerandas, videtur, quod actus fortitudinis-doni non circa passiones, sed circa delectationes refrenandas consistat.

Est igitur quaestio, quis sit actus, et quod obiectum doni fortitudinis, et quare eodem nomine cum habitu virtutis nominatur, quod quidem in nullo aliorum donorum reperitur.

Conclusio.

Doni fortitudinis actus principalis consistit circa promptam tolerantiam passionum secundum libertatem consilii et imitationem Christi.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod fortitudo, quantum est de sua prima ratione, attenditur respectu ardui. Arduum autem dicitur aliquid dupliciter: aut quia laboriosum et difficile, quodam modo excellens et aggravans facultatem ipsius potentiae; aut quia est ultra necessitatem et excedit statum communem. Et fortitudo habet attendi respectu utriusque, sed respectu primi attenditur et ordinatur secundum necessitatem praecepti, respectu secundi secundum libertatem consilii. Et primum spectat ad fortitudinem-virtutem, secundum vero ad fortitudinem-donum. — Quoniam autem arduitas maxime attenditur circa excellentiam passionum; hinc est, quod tam fortitudinis-doni quam fortitudinis-virtutis est habilitare secundum principalem sui ordinationem ad sufferentiam passionum, sed aliter et aliter: quia sustinere et aggredi passiones potest aliquis aut propter iustitiae et honestatis conservationem, aut propter perfectam Christi imitationem; ita quod primum spectat ad dictamen iuris naturalis et honestatis moralis, secundum vero spectat ad consilium Dei. Et quoniam imitatio Christi attenditur in crucifixione sui, secundum quod ipse dicit Matthaei decimo sexto11: Qui vult venire post me, abneget semetipsum etc.; hinc est, quod actus fortitudinis-doni attenditur circa promptam et expeditam passionum tolerantiam, per hoc quod quodam modo nos mundo et mundum nobis crucifigit, iuxta illud quod dicit Apostolus ad Galatas ultimo12: Mihi mundus crucifixus est, et ego mundo. Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus in libro de Doctrina christiana: «Assurgant deinceps ad fortitudinem, ut mundus eis crucifigatur, et ipsi mundo, et ut in huius vitae perversitate et abundantia iniquitatis non refrigescat caritas». — Et sic patet, quod fortitudinis-doni actus consistit circa passionum tolerantiam secundum imitationem Christi; et hic est eius actus principalis, sicut rationes ad primam partem inductae ostendunt, quae verum concludunt, et ideo concedendae sunt.

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1. 2. 3. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod est circa delectationum repressionem, per auctoritates Augustini; dicendum quod Augustinus in illis auctoritatibus non assignat proprium et principalem actum ipsius fortitudinis-doni, sed quasi praeambulum. Nemo enim promptus est et expeditus ad passionum tolerantiam secundum imitationem Christi, nisi qui carnem suam cum vitiis et concupiscentiis crucifixit13.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod fortitudo exsequitur ea, ad14 quae consilium dirigit; dicendum, quod etsi donum consilii dirigat ad divina consilia implenda, in quibus consistit perfectio religionis, principaliori tamen intentione dirigit ad ea, in quibus plus est de ratione arduitatis; maioris autem arduitatis est Christum imitari in passionibus quam in actionibus: et ideo circa huiusmodi tam consilium quam donum fortitudinis principaliter habet consistere.

5. Ad illud quod ulterius obiicitur, quod donum fortitudinis non potest esse excellentiori modo circa passiones quam virtus fortitudinis; dicendum, quod falsum est, quia excellentiori modo sustinet passiones et excellentiori habitu qui sustinet secundum Christi imitationem, quam15 propter iustitiae conservationem, et qui sustinet secundum consilii supererogationem, quam secundum praecepti obligationem. In uno enim istorum rectificatur, scilicet in actu virtutis fortitudinis; in alio autem non solum rectificatur, sed etiam altius elevatur et expeditur, scilicet in actu fortitudinis-doni.

Et per hoc patet illud quod ultimo quaerebatur, videlicet de differentia reali fortitudinis-doni et fortitudinis-virtutis, et de convenientia in nomine. Re enim differunt propter diversitatem modorum habilitandi et ordinandi ad tolerantiam passionum; nomine vero conveniunt, pro eo quod ad eadem passionum genera ordinant16. Fortitudo enim virtus ordinat ad sustinenda qualiacumque et quantacumque tormenta, antequam bonum virtutis et honestatem derelinquat, non tamen ita excellenter et prompte sicut fortitudo-donum. Unde inter omnes virtutes propter excellentiam et arduitatem ex parte obiecti virtus fortitudinis appropinquat donis; et propterea habitus virtutis et doni magis quam alia dona eodem nomine habent censeri, licet differant differentia reali, quia minor est inter illos habitus differentia. — Ex his patet, quis sit actus fortitudinis-doni, et quod obiectum, et quae sit differentia eius respectu aliorum habituum.

Scholion

I. «Sicut duplex est actus fortitudinis-virtutis, coordinatus tamen, unde [duplex actus] non diversificat habitum fortitudinis secundum speciem, id est aggredi ardua et sustinere terribilia; ita duplex est actus fortitudinis-doni. Sed fortitudo-virtus negotiatur in arduis et terribilibus, quae proportionantur humanae virtuti nec eam excedunt; fortitudo vero donum in iis quae supergredi videntur vires humanae naturae; praesumit enim de divina virtute, non de sua; sua quippe virtus determinata est ad aliquod genus arduorum et terribilium, sed divina virtus sufficiens est ad omne» (ita Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2.). — Ab hac communi doctrina recedit Richard. a Med. (hic a. 3. q. 1.) docens «secundum aliquos», quod «donum fortitudinis non est respectu ardui cuiuscumque, sed tantum respectu ardui mali poenae extremum tenentis in arduitate, cuiusmodi est mortem sustinere pro fidei vel morum veritate promovenda aut defendenda». — S. Bonav. communi doctrinae superaddit, quod actus huius doni principalis versetur circa passionum tolerantiam secundum imitationem Christi. De eadem quaestione praeter laudatos: S. Thom., III. Sent. d. 34. q. 3. a. 1; S. II. II. q. 139. a. 1. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 11-13.

II. Actus pietatis varii communiter a Scholasticis assignantur secundum doctrinam Augustini hic in arg. 3. ad oppos. relatam. S. Thom. in Comment. (loc. cit. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2.) docet, quod donum pietatis «dirigat in communicationibus omnibus, quae ad alterum sunt»; sed in S. (II. II. q. 121. a. 1.) addit, quod proprie secundum ipsum exhibemus cultum et officium Deo ut patri. Similiter dicit Richard. a Med. (hic a. 3. q. 2.), hoc donum esse «principaliter respectu Dei sub ratione summi patris», sub qua ratione cultus ei exhibeatur. S. Bonav. autem vult, quod principaliter et proprie idem donum attendatur in benevolentia respectu proximi, quatenus gerit imaginem Dei. Similiter dicit B. Albert. (hic a. 16.), quod actus principalis eiusdem sit «benevolenter et sine querela bonum optare et facere omnibus imagine Dei insignitis». Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 3. a. 1.) dicit generaliter, hoc donum esse in iis «quae exhibentur Deo, vel homini ad promotionem fidei in se, vel in altero».

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English Translation
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Question V. Whether the act of the gift of fortitude consists principally in enduring passions, or in repressing desires.

Fifthly there is inquiry as to what is the proper act of the gift of fortitude, and what its object; and the question is whether the act of the gift of fortitude consists principally in enduring passions, or in repressing desires. And that it is principally about enduring passions, seems [thus]:

1. First, by Gregory1, who says, on the beginning of Job, that it belongs to the gift of fortitude to give confidence to the trembling; but trembling is greatest when the danger of passions threatens: therefore it seems that the act of the gift of fortitude consists chiefly about such [dangers].

2. Likewise, fortitude, whether it be called a gift or a virtue, regards the irascible power as its proper subject2; but the irascible power more properly regards the enduring of passions than the repression and abstinence from desires: it seems therefore that the principal act of the gift of fortitude consists about the endurance of passions.

3. Likewise, this same thing is shown by comparison to its opposite: for, as liberality is opposed to avarice and desire, so fortitude is opposed to pusillanimity3; but pusillanimity is attended to about the flight from passions: therefore it seems conversely that the gift of fortitude consists about the endurance of passions.

4. Likewise, this same thing is shown by comparison to the habit of fortitude-as-virtue: for the gift of fortitude ought to have its act and object in a greater, or at least in as great, excellence and difficulty as is to be found about fortitude-as-virtue; but the greatest difficulty consists about the passions: therefore since fortitude-as-virtue consists about them4, it seems much more strongly that the act of the gift of fortitude is attended to, or consists, in the attacking and endurance of passions.

5. Likewise, among all meritorious acts the greatest difficulty is about enduring passions, and toward this we are more unfit and infirm: therefore if gifts are given to us for our expediting and against the infirmities

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holding us back from the good5, it seems that some gift ought to be given to us for the endurance of passions. But there is no other to assign than the gift of fortitude: therefore etc.

On the contrary: 1. Augustine in the book On the Soul and the Spirit6: "It belongs to fortitude not only to repress earthly desires, but to forget them utterly"; but this does not belong to fortitude-as-virtue: therefore it belongs to fortitude-as-gift: it seems therefore that the act of the gift of fortitude consists in the repression of desires.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the book On Christian Doctrine7, where he speaks of the gifts, says that "it belongs to fortitude to sequester oneself from all the deadly delight of transient things": therefore it seems that the act of the gift of fortitude consists principally in the repression of delights.

3. Likewise, Augustine8 adapts the seven gifts to the seven beatitudes, so that fortitude and the hunger and thirst for justice correspond to each other; but the hunger and desire for justice does not arise in us except through the mortification of desires and pleasures: therefore it seems that the act of fortitude consists principally about such [mortification].

4. Likewise, the gift of fortitude corresponds to the gift of counsel, as the one executing to the one regulating9; but the gift of counsel directs chiefly to the fulfillment of the divine counsels; and the divine counsels consist principally about the repression of desires and of the occasions adhering to them, as is plain in chastity, obedience, and poverty: therefore it seems that the act of the gift of fortitude consists principally about the repression of such desires.

5. Likewise, the gift of fortitude either has an act of another genus than fortitude-as-virtue, or, if it has [one] in the same genus, it is necessary that it have a more excellent one; but in the same genus it cannot have a more excellent one, since fortitude-as-virtue consists about terrible things which bring on death, as the Philosopher says10: therefore it is necessary that it have an act of another genus. Since therefore the act of fortitude-as-virtue consists about enduring passions, it seems that the act of fortitude-as-gift consists not about passions, but about restraining delights.

There is therefore the question, what is the act, and what the object, of the gift of fortitude, and why it is named by the same name as the habit of virtue, which indeed is found in none of the other gifts.

Conclusion.

The principal act of the gift of fortitude consists about the prompt endurance of passions according to the liberty of counsel and the imitation of Christ.

I respond: It must be said that fortitude, as far as concerns its first ground, is attended to with respect to the difficult. But something is called difficult in two ways: either because it is laborious and difficult, in a certain manner exceeding and burdening the faculty of the power itself; or because it is beyond necessity and exceeds the common state. And fortitude has to be attended to with respect to each, but with respect to the first it is attended to and ordered according to the necessity of the precept, with respect to the second according to the liberty of counsel. And the first pertains to fortitude-as-virtue, but the second to fortitude-as-gift. — But since difficulty is most of all attended to about the excellence of the passions; hence it is that it belongs to the gift of fortitude as much as to fortitude-as-virtue to enable [the soul], according to its principal ordering, for the suffering of passions, but in one way and another: for someone can endure and attack passions either for the conservation of justice and honor, or for the perfect imitation of Christ; so that the first pertains to the dictate of natural law and of moral honor, but the second pertains to the counsel of God. And since the imitation of Christ is attended to in the crucifixion of oneself, according as he himself says in Matthew 1611: Whoever wishes to come after me, let him deny himself etc.; hence it is that the act of the gift of fortitude is attended to about the prompt and expedited endurance of passions, through this, that in a certain manner it crucifies us to the world and the world to us, according to that which the Apostle says to the Galatians, in the last [chapter]12: The world is crucified to me, and I to the world. And this is what Augustine says in the book On Christian Doctrine: "Let them rise up thereafter to fortitude, so that the world may be crucified to them, and they to the world, and that in the perversity of this life and the abundance of iniquity charity may not grow cold." — And so it is plain that the act of the gift of fortitude consists about the endurance of passions according to the imitation of Christ; and this is its principal act, as the reasons adduced for the first part show, which conclude the truth, and therefore are to be conceded.

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1. 2. 3. But to that which is objected, that it is about the repression of delights, by the authorities of Augustine; it must be said that Augustine, in those authorities, does not assign the proper and principal act of the gift of fortitude itself, but as it were a preamble. For no one is prompt and expedited for the endurance of passions according to the imitation of Christ, except him who has crucified his flesh with its vices and concupiscences13.

4. To that which is objected, that fortitude executes those things to which14 counsel directs; it must be said that, although the gift of counsel directs to the fulfilling of the divine counsels, in which the perfection of religion consists, yet with a more principal intention it directs to those things in which there is more of the character of difficulty; but it is of greater difficulty to imitate Christ in passions than in actions: and therefore about such [passions] both counsel and the gift of fortitude have principally to consist.

5. To that which is further objected, that the gift of fortitude cannot be in a more excellent mode about passions than the virtue of fortitude; it must be said that this is false, because he endures passions in a more excellent mode and by a more excellent habit who endures according to the imitation of Christ, than15 [he who endures] for the conservation of justice, and he who endures according to the supererogation of counsel, than [he who endures] according to the obligation of the precept. For in one of these he is set right, namely in the act of the virtue of fortitude; but in the other he is not only set right, but is also more highly elevated and expedited, namely in the act of the gift of fortitude.

And through this is made plain that which was lastly asked, namely concerning the real difference of the gift of fortitude and fortitude-as-virtue, and concerning their agreement in name. For in reality they differ on account of the diversity of the modes of enabling and ordering toward the endurance of passions; but in name they agree, for this reason, that they order toward the same kinds of passions16. For the virtue of fortitude orders toward enduring whatever and however great torments, before it would abandon the good of virtue and honor, yet not so excellently and promptly as the gift of fortitude. Whence among all the virtues, on account of excellence and difficulty on the part of the object, the virtue of fortitude approaches the gifts; and therefore the habit of virtue and of gift, more than the other gifts, are reckoned under the same name, although they differ by a real difference, because there is less difference between those habits. — From these things it is plain what is the act of the gift of fortitude, and what its object, and what is its difference with respect to the other habits.

Scholion

I. "Just as the act of fortitude-as-virtue is twofold, yet coordinate, whence [the twofold act] does not diversify the habit of fortitude according to species, namely to attack difficult things and to endure terrible things; so the act of fortitude-as-gift is twofold. But fortitude-as-virtue is occupied in difficult and terrible things which are proportioned to human virtue and do not exceed it; but fortitude-as-gift [is occupied] in those things which seem to surpass the powers of human nature; for it presumes upon divine power, not upon its own; for its own power is determined to some genus of difficult and terrible things, but divine power is sufficient for everything" (so Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 2, sub-question 2). — From this common doctrine Richard of Mediavilla departs (here a. 3, q. 1), teaching "according to some," that "the gift of fortitude is not with respect to any difficult thing whatever, but only with respect to the difficult evil of penalty holding the extreme in difficulty, of which kind is to endure death for the truth of faith or morals to be promoted or defended." — St. Bonaventure superadds to the common doctrine, that the principal act of this gift is occupied about the endurance of passions according to the imitation of Christ. On the same question, besides those praised [cited above]: St. Thomas, III Sent. d. 34, q. 3, a. 1; S. II.II q. 139, a. 1, 2. — Bl. Albert, here a. 11-13.

II. The various acts of piety are commonly assigned by the Scholastics according to the doctrine of Augustine reported here in arg. 3 to the contrary. St. Thomas in his Commentary (loc. cit. a. 2, sub-question 2) teaches that the gift of piety "directs in all the communications which are toward another"; but in the Summa (II.II q. 121, a. 1) he adds that properly, according to it, we render worship and office to God as to a father. Similarly Richard of Mediavilla says (here a. 3, q. 2) that this gift is "principally with respect to God under the character of the highest father," under which character worship is rendered to him. But St. Bonaventure holds that principally and properly this same gift is attended to in benevolence with respect to one's neighbor, inasmuch as he bears the image of God. Similarly Bl. Albert says (here a. 16) that the principal act of the same is "benevolently and without complaint to wish and to do good to all those marked with the image of God." Peter of Tarentaise (here q. 3, a. 1) says generally that this gift is in those things "which are rendered to God, or to man for the promotion of faith in oneself, or in another."

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Libr. I. Moral. c. 32. n. 44, super Iob 1, 4, ait: Fortitudo in die suo convivium facit, quia, dum adversa non metuit, trepidanti menti cibos confidentiae apponit. — Pro super principium Iob codd. H K Z super primum Iob.
    [Gregory,] Morals book I, c. 32, n. 44, on Job 1:4, says: "Fortitude makes a banquet on its day, because, while it does not fear adversities, it sets before the trembling mind the food of confidence." — For super principium Iob (on the beginning of Job) codices H K Z [read] super primum Iob (on the first [book of] Job).
  2. Cfr. supra d. 34. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. in corp. (via quarta) et d. 33. q. 4. in corp. (primus modus) nec non d. 26. a. 2. q. 5, ubi et minor insinuatur. — In fine arg. pro consistat multi codd. consistit.
    Cf. above d. 34, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, in the body (the fourth way) and d. 33, q. 4, in the body (the first mode), and also d. 26, a. 2, q. 5, where the minor [premise] too is intimated. — At the end of the argument, for consistat many codices [read] consistit.
  3. Vide supra pag. 736, nota 8. — In fine arg. pro sustinentiam edd. tolerantiam.
    See above p. 736, note 8. — At the end of the argument, for sustinentiam the editions [read] tolerantiam.
  4. Cfr. supra d. 33. dub. 3. — Pro sed maxima edd. sed maxime, cod. M sed magis, et superius pro quantam est cod. A N quanta est.
    Cf. above d. 33, dub. 3. — For sed maxima the editions [read] sed maxime, codex M sed magis, and above, for quantam est codices A N [read] quanta est.
  5. Videsis supra d. 34. p. I. a. 1. q. 1.
    See above d. 34, p. I, a. 1, q. 1.
  6. Cap. 20.
    [On the Soul and the Spirit,] c. 20.
  7. Libr. II. c. 7. n. 10, ubi pro se ipsum sequestrare legitur sese extrahit. — Pro ab omni, quod et textus origin. exhibet, non ponunt codd. ab omnium.
    [On Christian Doctrine,] book II, c. 7, n. 10, where for se ipsum sequestrare there is read sese extrahit. — For ab omni, which the original text also exhibits, the codices do not set down ab omnium.
  8. Libr. I. de Serm. Domini in monte, c. 3. n. 10. et c. 4. n. 11, ubi et minor insinuatur. De numero septenario beatitudinum, quae hic ponitur pro octonario, cfr. scholion ad d. 36. q. 2. — Pro correspondent cod. A correspondeant.
    [Augustine,] book I On the Lord's Sermon on the Mount, c. 3, n. 10, and c. 4, n. 11, where the minor [premise] too is intimated. On the sevenfold number of the beatitudes, which here is set down for the eightfold, cf. the scholion to d. 36, q. 2. — For correspondent codex A [reads] correspondeant.
  9. Vide supra d. 34. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. in corp. (via tertia in fine). — Quoad minorem vide quaest. praeced.
    See above d. 34, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, in the body (the third way, at the end). — As to the minor [premise], see the preceding question.
  10. Libr. III. Ethic. c. 6. seq. Cfr. supra pag. 876, nota 1. — Inferius pro refrenandas edd. rescindendas. Deinde post consistat cod. S addit immo cum nihil sit terribilius morte, et aggredi mortem est actus fortitudinis-virtutis, et ita im- [possibile est, donum fortitudinis habere actum praecellentem actum virtutis ei correspondentis. Et si habeat].
    [Aristotle,] Ethics book III, c. 6 f. Cf. above p. 876, note 1. — Below, for refrenandas the editions [read] rescindendas. Then after consistat codex S adds "nay, since nothing is more terrible than death, and to attack death is an act of fortitude-as-virtue, and so it is impossible for the gift of fortitude to have an act excelling the act of the virtue corresponding to it. And if it should have [one]."
  11. Vers. 24. — Paulo superius pro consilium Dei edd. consilii donum.
    Verse 24. — A little above, for consilium Dei (the counsel of God) the editions [read] consilii donum (the gift of counsel).
  12. Vers. 14. — Augustini sententia (in qua respicitur Gal. 6, 14. et Matth. 24, 12.) non habetur in libro de Doctrina christ. (cfr. hic arg. 2. ad oppos.), sed in Serm. 347. (alias 17. de Sanctis), c. 3. n. 3. — Cod. A Assurgat... ei crucifigatur. Idem cod. A paulo inferius pro passionum tolerantiam substituit passionem tolerandam.
    Verse 14. — The saying of Augustine (in which Gal. 6:14 and Matt. 24:12 are regarded) is not found in the book On Christian Doctrine (cf. here arg. 2 to the contrary), but in Sermon 347 (otherwise 17 On the Saints), c. 3, n. 3. — Codex A [reads] Assurgat... ei crucifigatur. The same codex A, a little below, for passionum tolerantiam substitutes passionem tolerandam.
  13. Codd. A G U crucifigit.
    Codices A G U [read] crucifigit (crucifies).
  14. In codd. G N P Q V deest ad.
    In codices G N P Q V ad (to) is lacking.
  15. Cod. M bene supplet qui sustinet; edd. hic et paulo inferius post quam supplent qui. Proxime post, cod. A voci iustitiae praefigit Christi. Idem cod. A in principio solut. pro ulterius habet ultimo.
    Codex M rightly supplies qui sustinet (who endures); the editions, here and a little below, after quam supply qui (who). Immediately after, codex A prefixes Christi to the word iustitiae. The same codex A, at the beginning of the solution, for ulterius has ultimo.
  16. Plurimi codd. et edd. 1, 2 ordinantur. In fine solut. cod. B adiicit et sic patent obiecta.
    Very many codices and editions 1, 2 [read] ordinantur (are ordered). At the end of the solution codex B adds et sic patent obiecta (and thus the objections are made clear).
← Dist. 35, Art. 1, Q. 4Dist. 35, Art. 1, Q. 6→