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Dist. 35, Art. 1, Q. 4

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 35

Textus Latinus
p. 780

Quaestio IV. Utrum actus ipsius doni consilii sit consiliari.

Quarto quaeritur de actu proprio et obiecto ipsius doni consilii, et est quaestio, utrum actus ipsius doni consilii sit consiliari. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Primo per Sapientis1 exhortationem, qua hortatur nos omnia facere cum consilio; hoc autem fit consiliando de his quae facimus: cum igitur hortetur ad actum doni consilii, videtur, quod actus istius doni sit consiliari.

2. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per Tullii definitionem in primo Rhetoricae2, ubi definiens consilium dicit: «Consilium est aliquid faciendi, vel non faciendi vere excogitata ratio»; sed ista excogitatio de faciendo, vel non faciendo est ipsa consiliatio: ergo proprius actus doni consilii est consiliari.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per Gregorii assignationem. Dicit enim Gregorius super primum Iob3, ubi assignat donorum differentiam, quod «consilium est contra praecipitationem»; sed actus, qui directe opponitur praecipitationi, est consiliari — ideo enim consiliamur, ne praecipitanter aliquid faciamus — ergo etc.

4. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per nominis rationem: quoniam, sicut se habet timere ad timorem, sic se habet consiliari ad consilium; sed actus proprius et principalis ipsius doni timoris est timere: ergo actus proprius4 ipsius doni consilii est consiliari. Si dicas, quod non dicitur consilium a consiliando, sed magis a consulendo, et actus ipsius consilii magis est consulere quam consiliari5; obiicitur contra hoc: quia consulere dupliciter6 dicitur: uno modo consilium ab aliquo quaerere, alio modo consilium dare; sed actus doni consilii non est consilium quaerere — qui enim consilium quaerit eget consilio, et qui eget consilio iam non habet donum consilii — igitur actus istius doni non est consulere, secundum quod consulere idem est quod consilium quaerere. Rursus, consilium dare non est magnae utilitatis nec etiam magnae virtutis, cum multi sciant aliis consulere, qui se ipsos regunt valde miserabiliter; si ergo donum consilii est ordinatum ad propriam utilitatem, videtur, quod actus eius non sit consilium alteri dare nec consilium ab alio accipere, ut prius ostensum est: ergo videtur, quod actus istius doni directe sit ipsum consiliari.

Sed contra: 1. Super illud Psalmi7: Consilium meum iustificationes tuae; ibi Glossa: «Consilium est servare iustificationes»; sed de eo quod servamus, non consiliamur: ergo si actus ipsius doni consilii est iustificationes observare, non videtur, quod actus eius sit consiliari.

2. Item, sicut dicit Damascenus8: «Consilium est ignorantis et dubitantis», unde et «Christo non convenit consiliari»: si ergo donum consilii fuit in Christo et in quolibet alio sapientiae et scientiae dono perfecto, videtur, quod actus ipsius doni non sit consiliari.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione. Sicut se habet addiscere ad scire, sic se habet consiliari ad eligere, quia utrumque est via ad alterum9; sed sicut per scientiam habilitamur ad cognoscendum, sic per consilii donum habilitamur ad eligendum: cum ergo actus ipsius scientiae non sit addiscere, sed magis scire; videtur, quod actus ipsius doni non sit consiliari, sed magis eligere.

4. Item, consilium ordinat et dirigit ad ea quae sunt supererogationis10; sed de istis nemo dubitat, quin sint manifeste bona; de his autem, de quibus nulla est dubitatio, nulla necessaria est consiliatio: cum ergo donum consilii dirigat ad huiusmodi, videtur, quod actus eius non sit consiliari.

5. Item, consiliari est ipsius providentiae, quae

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est pars prudentiae11: ergo aut donum consilii non est nobis opportunum, aut est ad alium actum; sed constat, quod nobis est opportunum: videtur ergo, quod consiliari non sit eius actus proprius.

Conclusio.

Doni consilii actus proprius est dirigere in electione horum quae sunt arduitatis, secundum dictamen iuris divini, et sic consiliari.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sicut intellectus aliquando accipitur pro actu intelligendi, aliquando pro ipso intellecto sive intelligibili, aliquando pro ipso habitu, qui dirigit intellectum in iudicando de veris et falsis12; sic et consilium tripliciter accipi consuevit: aliquando pro ipso actu consiliandi; aliquando pro eo, ad quod terminatur ille actus, sicut quando dicitur: hoc est consilium meum; aliquando vero pro ipso habitu, qui expedit et dirigit animam ad eligendum prosequenda et ad fugiendum vitanda. — Hic autem habitus dirigens ad huiusmodi electionem duplex est secundum diversitatem eligibilium et secundum diversitatem modorum sive rationum eligendi. Nam eligibilia quaedam sunt necessitatis, quaedam vero arduitatis. In primis dirigit prudentia, in secundis vero dirigit donum consilii propter excellentiorem et maiorem difficultatem, quae in eis quae arduitatis sunt, habet reperiri. — Rursus, dirigi in electione potest aliquis vel secundum regulam iuris naturalis, vel secundum regulam iuris divini; et primum quidem est virtutis politicae13, secundum vero spectat ad donum consilii. — Ex his potest elici per quandam circumlocutionem, quis sit actus proprius doni consilii: quoniam actus eius est dirigere in electione agendorum, prosequendorum, vel fugiendorum, quae sunt specialis arduitatis, et hoc secundum regulam iuris divini; et in hoc distinguitur actus eius ab actu prudentiae-virtutis et scientiae-doni14. — Si igitur quaeras, utrum actus doni consilii sit consiliari; dicendum, quod si per verbum consiliandi intelligatur directio secundum regulam et lumen consilii; sic bene potest concedi, quod actus eius sit consiliari. — Sed attendendum est, quod, secundum quod vult Damascenus15, consilium respicit aliquem actum praecedentem et aliquem actum sequentem. Dicit enim, quod «primo homo inquirit et consiliatur, deinde disponit et ordinat, postmodum eligit et consentit». Et secundum hoc intelligendum est, quod dirigi secundum regulam consilii, hoc potest esse dupliciter: aut consilium inquirendo, aut secundum consilium disponendo et eligendo. Primo quidem modo non est actus ipsius consilii principalis et universalis, sed quasi actus eius initialis, et16 in eo, in quo est secundum statum imperfectionis; secundo vero modo actus eius universalis est et principalis. Unde sive per verbum consiliandi, sive per verbum consulendi, sive per quodcumque aliud verbum id significetur, quod est dirigi in electione horum quae sunt arduitatis secundum consilii donum, quod regit secundum dictamen iuris divini; dicendum est, quod hic est actus principalis et proprius doni consilii. — Unde concedi potest, quod consiliari secundum istam acceptionem est eius actus proprius, sicut rationes ad primam partem inductae ostendunt.

Ad illud vero quod ultimo obiicitur de actu consulendi, quomodo spectet ad donum consilii; dicendum, quod consulere, prout respicit alterum, accidit dono consilii; donum enim consilii proprie respicit directionem actus proprii; unde licet actus doni consilii attendatur in dispositione et ordinatione arduorum17 prosequendorum; quia tamen donum illud aliquando est in abundantia, aliquando in defectu, et cum est in abundantia, habet iuvare alios, cum vero est in defectu, habet iuvari ab aliis: hinc est, quod actus consulendi alium, vel consulendi alii dono consilii potest attribui; neuter tamen est actus eius principalis. Unde inter istos duos medius cadit actus consiliandi, ratione cuius et alii habent esse doni consilii. Propter quod non absurde potest dici, quod actus doni consilii est semetipsum regere, et ulterius, cum abundat, scire in consimili alterum adiuvare et dirigere.

1. Ad illud autem quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod consilium est iustificationes observare; dicendum, quod ibi non tangitur actus consilii principalis, sed consequens. Nam doni consilii est dirigere, sed alterius doni18 est exsequi et facere; ideo iustificationum observatio non attribuitur ipsi consilio per se et primo, sed ad iustificationes observandas directio proprie attribuenda est consilii dono. — Verumtamen quod dicit, neminem consiliari de eo quod observat, non habet veritatem: quia nemo recte observat, nisi suam observationem rectitudo in consiliando praecedat vel quantum ad consilii inquisitionem, vel saltem quantum ad consilii dispositionem.

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2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod consiliari est ignorantis, sicut dicit Damascenus; dicendum, quod illud est verum, prout consiliari idem est quod consilium inquirere, non autem prout consiliari idem est quod in arduis eligendis dirigere. Et hoc modo consiliari est actus ipsius consilii et fuit in Christo; et secundum istum modum divina dispositio in his quae secreta sunt, consilium appellatur19.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sicut addiscere se habet ad scire, ita consiliari ad eligere; dicendum, quod verum est, secundum quod consiliatio idem est quod consilii inquisitio; secundum autem quod consiliatio idem est quod discreta et recta dispositio et ordinatio, sic non se habet illo modo, quia talis dispositio regula est et principium recte eligendi, et ideo actus est doni perfecti; et hoc modo accipiendo, non est simile inter consiliari et addiscere.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod consilium ordinat ad ea quae sunt supererogationis; dicendum, quod licet illa quae sunt supererogationis, in se sint bona et magis bona; in eis tamen facilius deficit infirmitas nostra, nisi iuvetur per divinam gratiam tam in expediendo20 quam in eligendo quam etiam in exsequendo; unde multi refugiunt et abhorrent ipsa consilia Iesu Christi, qui tamen esse possunt in statu iustitiae. Et propterea respectu talium opportunum est donum consilii ultra donum scientiae et virtutem prudentiae et regulam fidei.

5. Ad illud vero quod ultimo obiicitur, quod consiliari est actus ipsius prudentiae; iam patet responsio. Aliter enim est ipsius prudentiae tum ratione obiecti tum etiam ratione modi, quam sit ipsius doni consilii. Est enim21 multo excellentiori modo, tum quia ea, circa quae versatur, sunt magis ardua et excellentia, tum etiam quia regere habet secundum principia altiora; et ideo donum illud nomine consilii valde proprie censetur. — Ex his igitur manifestum est, quis sit huius doni actus, et quod obiectum, et quae differentia ipsius respectu aliorum habituum, et quare etiam sic nominetur22.

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English Translation
p. 780

Question IV. Whether the act of the gift of counsel is to take counsel.

Fourthly there is inquiry concerning the proper act and object of the gift of counsel, and the question is whether the act of the gift of counsel is to take counsel. And that it is [so], seems [thus]:

1. First, by the Wise Man's1 exhortation, by which he exhorts us to do all things with counsel; but this is done by taking counsel about the things we do: since therefore he exhorts us to the act of the gift of counsel, it seems that the act of this gift is to take counsel.

2. Likewise, this same thing is shown by Tully's definition in the first book of the Rhetoric2, where, defining counsel, he says: "Counsel is the truly devised reasoning of something to be done or not to be done"; but this devising about doing or not doing is the very act of counseling: therefore the proper act of the gift of counsel is to take counsel.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems [so] by Gregory's assignment. For Gregory says, on the first book of Job3, where he assigns the difference of the gifts, that "counsel is against precipitation"; but the act which is directly opposed to precipitation is to take counsel — for we take counsel precisely lest we do something precipitately — therefore etc.

4. Likewise, this same thing seems [so] by the meaning of the name: for as to fear stands to fear, so to take counsel stands to counsel; but the proper and principal act of the gift of fear is to fear: therefore the proper4 act of the gift of counsel is to take counsel. If you say that counsel is not named from taking counsel (consiliando), but rather from advising (consulendo), and that the act of counsel itself is rather to advise than to take counsel5; it is objected against this: that to advise is said in two ways6: in one way to seek counsel from someone, in another way to give counsel; but the act of the gift of counsel is not to seek counsel — for he who seeks counsel is in need of counsel, and he who is in need of counsel does not yet have the gift of counsel — therefore the act of this gift is not to advise, according as to advise is the same as to seek counsel. Again, to give counsel is not of great utility nor even of great virtue, since many know how to advise others who govern themselves very wretchedly; if therefore the gift of counsel is ordered to one's own utility, it seems that its act is not to give counsel to another nor to receive counsel from another, as was shown before: therefore it seems that the act of this gift is directly to take counsel itself.

On the contrary: 1. Upon that [verse] of the Psalm7: Thy justifications are my counsel; there the Gloss [says]: "Counsel is to keep the justifications"; but concerning what we keep, we do not take counsel: therefore if the act of the gift of counsel is to observe the justifications, it does not seem that its act is to take counsel.

2. Likewise, as Damascene says8: "Counsel belongs to one ignorant and doubting," whence also "it is not fitting for Christ to take counsel": if therefore the gift of counsel was in Christ and in any other [person] perfect in the gift of wisdom and knowledge, it seems that the act of this gift is not to take counsel.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems [so] by reason. As to learn stands to to know, so to take counsel stands to to choose, because each is a way to the other9; but as by knowledge we are enabled for knowing, so by the gift of counsel we are enabled for choosing: since therefore the act of knowledge itself is not to learn, but rather to know; it seems that the act of this gift is not to take counsel, but rather to choose.

4. Likewise, counsel orders and directs toward those things which are of supererogation10; but concerning these no one doubts that they are manifestly good; but concerning those things about which there is no doubt, no taking of counsel is necessary: since therefore the gift of counsel directs toward such things, it seems that its act is not to take counsel.

5. Likewise, to take counsel belongs to providence itself, which

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is a part of prudence11: therefore either the gift of counsel is not opportune for us, or it is for another act; but it is established that it is opportune for us: it seems therefore that to take counsel is not its proper act.

Conclusion.

The proper act of the gift of counsel is to direct in the choice of those things which are of difficulty, according to the dictate of divine law, and thus to take counsel.

I respond: It must be said that just as intellect is sometimes taken for the act of understanding, sometimes for the very thing understood or intelligible, sometimes for the very habit which directs the intellect in judging concerning things true and false12; so too counsel is wont to be taken in three ways: sometimes for the very act of taking counsel; sometimes for that at which that act terminates, as when it is said: this is my counsel; sometimes indeed for the very habit which expedites and directs the soul to choosing things to be pursued and to fleeing things to be avoided. — But this habit directing toward such choice is twofold according to the diversity of the things to be chosen and according to the diversity of modes or grounds of choosing. For some things to be chosen are of necessity, but some are of difficulty. In the first prudence directs, but in the second the gift of counsel directs, on account of the more excellent and greater difficulty which is found in those things which are of difficulty. — Again, one can be directed in choosing either according to the rule of natural law, or according to the rule of divine law; and the first indeed belongs to political virtue13, but the second regards the gift of counsel. — From these things one can elicit, by a certain circumlocution, what is the proper act of the gift of counsel: namely that its act is to direct in the choice of things to be done, to be pursued, or to be fled, which are of special difficulty, and this according to the rule of divine law; and in this its act is distinguished from the act of prudence-as-virtue and of knowledge-as-gift14. — If therefore you ask whether the act of the gift of counsel is to take counsel; it must be said that if by the word taking counsel there is understood the direction according to the rule and light of counsel, then it can well be conceded that its act is to take counsel. — But it must be observed that, according as Damascene holds15, counsel regards a certain act preceding and a certain act following. For he says that "first a man inquires and takes counsel, then he disposes and orders, afterwards he chooses and consents." And according to this it must be understood that to be directed according to the rule of counsel can be in two ways: either by inquiring counsel, or by disposing and choosing according to counsel. In the first way indeed it is not the principal and universal act of counsel itself, but as it were its initial act, and16 in him who is in the state of imperfection; but in the second way its act is universal and principal. Whence whether by the word taking counsel, or by the word advising, or by whatever other word that is signified which is to be directed in the choice of those things which are of difficulty according to the gift of counsel, which governs according to the dictate of divine law; it must be said that this is the principal and proper act of the gift of counsel. — Whence it can be conceded that to take counsel according to that acceptation is its proper act, as the reasons adduced for the first part show.

But as to that which is lastly objected concerning the act of advising, how it regards the gift of counsel; it must be said that to advise, insofar as it regards another, befalls the gift of counsel [accidentally]; for the gift of counsel properly regards the direction of its own proper act; whence although the act of the gift of counsel is attended to in the disposition and ordering of difficult things17 to be pursued; yet because that gift is sometimes in abundance, sometimes in defect, and when it is in abundance, it has [the office of] helping others, but when it is in defect, it has [the office of] being helped by others: hence it is that the act of advising another, or of advising for another, can be attributed to the gift of counsel; yet neither is its principal act. Whence between these two falls in the middle the act of taking counsel, by reason of which the others too come to be of the gift of counsel. On account of which it can not absurdly be said that the act of the gift of counsel is to govern oneself, and further, when it abounds, to know how in a like case to help and direct another.

1. To that, then, which is first objected to the contrary, that counsel is to observe the justifications; it must be said that there the principal act of counsel is not touched, but a consequent one. For it belongs to the gift of counsel to direct, but to another gift18 [it belongs] to execute and to do; therefore the observation of the justifications is not attributed to counsel itself of itself and primarily, but to the observing of the justifications the direction is properly to be attributed to the gift of counsel. — Nevertheless, that which it says, that no one takes counsel concerning what he observes, is not true: because no one rightly observes unless rectitude in taking counsel precede his observation either as to the inquiry of counsel, or at least as to the disposition of counsel.

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2. To that which is objected, that to take counsel belongs to one ignorant, as Damascene says; it must be said that this is true insofar as to take counsel is the same as to inquire counsel, but not insofar as to take counsel is the same as to direct in choosing difficult things. And in this way to take counsel is the act of counsel itself and was in Christ; and according to this mode the divine disposition in those things which are secret is called counsel19.

3. To that which is objected, that as to learn stands to to know, so to take counsel [stands] to to choose; it must be said that it is true, according as taking counsel is the same as the inquiry of counsel; but according as taking counsel is the same as the discreet and right disposition and ordering, it does not stand in that way, because such disposition is the rule and principle of choosing rightly, and therefore it is an act of a perfect gift; and taking [it] in this way, there is no likeness between to take counsel and to learn.

4. To that which is objected, that counsel orders toward those things which are of supererogation; it must be said that although those things which are of supererogation are in themselves good and more good; yet in them our infirmity more easily fails, unless it be helped by divine grace both in expediting20 and in choosing and also in executing; whence many shrink from and abhor the very counsels of Jesus Christ, who nevertheless can be in the state of justice. And therefore with respect to such things the gift of counsel is opportune beyond the gift of knowledge and the virtue of prudence and the rule of faith.

5. But to that which is lastly objected, that to take counsel is the act of prudence itself; the response is already clear. For it belongs to prudence otherwise both by reason of the object and also by reason of the mode than it belongs to the gift of counsel. For it is21 in a much more excellent mode, both because the things about which it is occupied are more difficult and excellent, and also because it has [the office of] governing according to higher principles; and therefore that gift is very properly reckoned under the name of counsel. — From these things, therefore, it is manifest what is the act of this gift, and what its object, and what is its difference with respect to the other habits, and why also it is so named22.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Eccli. 32, 24: Fili, sine consilio nihil facias, et post factum non poenitebis. Ibid. c. 37, 20: Ante omnem actum [praecedat] consilium stabile.
    Sirach 32:24: "Son, do nothing without counsel, and after the deed thou shalt not repent." Likewise c. 37:20: "Before every act [let] a stable counsel [precede]."
  2. Cap. 25. et 11. c. 9. D. Schütz in sua ed. (Augustae Taurin. a. 1823), quae prae manibus est, pro inepta vulgari lectione (ut in notula ibi apposita dicit) aut non faciendi vere ex Alcuino substituit non faciendive.
    [Cicero, De inventione] c. 25; and c. 9. D. Schütz, in his edition (Augsburg–Turin, 1823), which is at hand, for the unsuitable common reading (as he says in the note appended there) substitutes from Alcuin non faciendive in place of aut non faciendi vere.
  3. Vers. 19. — Gregor., 11. Moral. c. 49. n. 77. Cfr. supra pag. 736, nota 8. — De minori dicit Aristot., VI. Ethic. c. 9: Unde aiunt, cito agenda esse quae consultaveris, tarde vero ac diu consulendum.
    Verse 19. — Gregory, Morals book XI, c. 49, n. 77. Cf. above p. 736, note 8. — Concerning the minor [premise] Aristotle says, Ethics book VI, c. 9: "Whence they say that what you have deliberated upon must be done quickly, but the deliberating must be slow and long."
  4. Cod. Y addit et principalis.
    Codex Y adds et principalis (and principal).
  5. Eadmer., de S. Anselmi similitudinibus (inter opera Anselmi), c. 131: Post haec vero consilium fortitudini superaedificat [Spiritus S.], cum mens iam fortis ad operandum, quae pie timendo scit esse facienda, suo experimento didicit Spiritus sancti gratia, quid de his omnibus aliis consulere debeat.
    Eadmer, On the Similitudes of St. Anselm (among the works of Anselm), c. 131: "But after these things [the Holy Spirit] builds counsel upon fortitude, when the mind, now strong for doing the things which by piously fearing it knows are to be done, has learned by its own experience, by the grace of the Holy Spirit, what it ought to advise concerning all these other things."
  6. Videlicet consulere aliquem et consulere alicui. — Mox pro ab aliquo quaerere non pauci codd. ab alio quaerere (cod. II petere).
    Namely to advise someone (consulere aliquem) and to take counsel for someone (consulere alicui). — Presently for ab aliquo quaerere not a few codices [read] ab alio quaerere (codex II petere).
  7. Psalm. 118, 24. — Glossa integra, quae sumta est ex August. et hic ex parte tantum exhibetur, apud Petr. Lombard., in hunc loc., sic sonat: Quasi dicat: Consilium meum est servare iustificationes, in quibus est diligere inimicos. Ecce consilium contra consilium. Consilium sedentium principum fuit inventos martyres perdere; martyrum patientium fuit consilium illos perditos acquirere. — De minori cfr. Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 3.
    Psalm 118:24. — The full Gloss, which is taken from Augustine and is here exhibited only in part, in Peter Lombard on this passage reads thus: "As if to say: My counsel is to keep the justifications, in which is to love enemies. Behold, counsel against counsel. The counsel of the princes sitting [in judgment] was to destroy the martyrs they had found; the counsel of the patient martyrs was to win those destroyers." — On the minor [premise] cf. Aristotle, Ethics book III, c. 3.
  8. Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 22. circa finem. Seq. locus sententialiter ibid. et III. c. 14. circa finem.
    [Damascene,] On the Orthodox Faith book II, c. 22, near the end. The following passage [is found] in substance in the same place and in book III, c. 14, near the end.
  9. Cfr. Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 2. seq. — Edd. addunt addiscere ad scire, consiliari ad eligere.
    Cf. Aristotle, Ethics book III, c. 2 f. — The editions add addiscere ad scire, consiliari ad eligere (to learn [is] to to know, to take counsel [is] to to choose).
  10. Matth. 19, 21: Si vis perfectus esse, vade, vende quae habes etc. Cfr. supra d. 34. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. in corp. — Damascenus, II. de Fide orthod. c. 22: Nemo enim de eo deliberaverit [βουλεύεται], quod exploratum habet.
    Matthew 19:21: "If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell what thou hast" etc. Cf. above d. 34, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, in the body. — Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith book II, c. 22: "For no one deliberates [βουλεύεται] about that which he holds as ascertained."
  11. Cfr. supra pag. 728, nota 6. Aristot., VI. Ethic. c. 5. docet, viri prudentis esse, consultare posse; et c. 7. ait: Prudentis enim id maxime opus esse dicimus, ut recte consultet.
    Cf. above p. 728, note 6. Aristotle, Ethics book VI, c. 5, teaches that it belongs to the prudent man to be able to deliberate; and c. 7 says: "For we say that it is most of all the work of the prudent man that he deliberate rightly."
  12. Cfr. supra pag. 778, nota 4. et pag. 214, nota 4. — Edd. aliquando pro ipso habitu intelligendi, qui dirigit ipsum intellectum etc.
    Cf. above p. 778, note 4, and p. 214, note 4. — The editions [read] aliquando pro ipso habitu intelligendi, qui dirigit ipsum intellectum (sometimes for the very habit of understanding, which directs the intellect itself) etc.
  13. Cfr. supra pag. 730, nota 5. — Vat. prudentiae.
    Cf. above p. 730, note 5. — The Vatican [edition reads] prudentiae (of prudence).
  14. Vide supra q. 2. et d. 33. dub. 2. — Paulo inferius pro quod si permulti codd. quod etsi.
    See above q. 2 and d. 33, dub. 2. — A little below, for quod si very many codices [read] quod etsi.
  15. Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 22. et III. c. 14. — Post attendendum est non pauci codd. omittunt quod.
    [Damascene,] On the Orthodox Faith book II, c. 22, and book III, c. 14. — After attendendum est not a few codices omit quod.
  16. Edd. supplent est.
    The editions supply est (is).
  17. Codd. A U istorum arduorum.
    Codices A U [read] istorum arduorum (of those difficult things).
  18. Scil. fortitudinis. Cfr. supra d. 34. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. in corp. (via tertia). — Mox pro ideo (cod. E et ideo) edd. et. Inferius pro proprie, quod habent codd. DMPRXYZ bb, aliqui pro actu, cod. K pro proprio actu, cod. W proprie pro actu, edd. in actu.
    Namely, of fortitude. Cf. above d. 34, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, in the body (the third way). — Presently for ideo (codex E et ideo) the editions [read] et. Below, for proprie, which codices DMPRXYZ bb have, some [read] pro actu, codex K pro proprio actu, codex W proprie pro actu, the editions in actu.
  19. Eph. 1, 11: In quo etiam et nos sorte vocati sumus, praedestinati secundum propositum eius qui operatur omnia secundum consilium voluntatis suae. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 40. a. 3. q. 1. in corp. — Paulo superius post et secundum bene multi codd. inserunt etiam.
    Ephesians 1:11: "In whom we also are called by lot, predestined according to the purpose of him who works all things according to the counsel of his will." Cf. I Sent. d. 40, a. 3, q. 1, in the body. — A little above, after et secundum a good many codices insert etiam.
  20. Cod. N exponendo, cod. A experiendo. Paulo inferius pro opportunum cod. bb et edd. 1, 2 optimum.
    Codex N [reads] exponendo, codex A experiendo. A little below, for opportunum codex bb and editions 1, 2 [read] optimum.
  21. Cod. Z supplet consilii. Circa finem huius quaest. et pluries in quaest. seq. pro et quod obiectum edd. et quid obiectum.
    Codex Z supplies consilii. Near the end of this question, and several times in the following question, for et quod obiectum the editions [read] et quid obiectum.
  22. Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    See the scholion to the preceding question.
← Dist. 35, Art. 1, Q. 3Dist. 35, Art. 1, Q. 5→