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Dist. 35, Art. 1, Q. 3

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 35

Textus Latinus
p. 777

Quaestio III. Utrum donum intellectus simul consistat in contemplatione Creatoris et creaturae.

Tertio quaeritur de actu et obiecto ipsius doni intellectus, et est quaestio, utrum donum intellectus simul consistat in contemplatione Creatoris et creaturae. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Primo auctoritate Magistri in littera1: «Intelligentia vero non modo de aeternis est, sed etiam de rebus invisibilibus et spiritualibus temporaliter exortis».

2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per Dionysium ad Titum2, qui dicit, quod «impossibile est, quamdiu in via sumus, relucere nobis divinum radium nisi circumvelatum»: si ergo illud est velamen creaturae, videtur, quod intellectus non possit Deum nisi in creatura cognoscere: ergo si est ad cognitionem Creatoris, necesse est, quod sit simul ad cognitionem creaturae.

3. Item, non est perfectus habitus amoris, nisi ametur Deus et in se et in sua imagine3: ergo similiter non erit perfectum donum intellectus, nisi Deus per illud cognoscatur et quantum ad conditiones suas et quantum ad conditiones creaturarum, quae sunt ei similes: ergo videtur, quod donum intellectus sit ad contemplanda temporalia et aeterna.

4. Item, de eisdem habet esse intellectus, de quibus habet esse fides, secundum quod dicit Gregorius4, quod «Deus intellectum dat, dum de auditis mentem illustrat»; sed fides non tantummodo respicit divinam essentiam in se, verum etiam in comparatione ad creaturam: videtur ergo, quod actus doni intellectus ordinetur ad illa duo contemplanda.

Sed contra: 1. Dono sapientiae cognoscuntur aeterna, dono scientiae cognoscuntur temporalia, sicut dicit Augustinus, et habetur in littera5: ergo aut donum intellectus superfluit, duobus donis habitis, aut circa illa duo actus eius praecipuus non consistit.

2. Item, sapientia et scientia differunt et sunt diversa dona per hoc, quod unum eorum est circa temporalia, aliud vero circa aeterna: ergo si donum intellectus est unum, videtur, quod non possit esse circa illa duo.

3. Item, aut donum intellectus consistit in cognoscendo tantum, aut in cognoscendo et afficiendo. Si consistit in cognoscendo tantum: ergo non videtur, quod sit donum gratuitum, cum actus pure cognitivus non sit meritorius. Si in cognoscendo et afficiendo: ergo doni intellectus est aeterna cognoscere et circa illa affici; sed iste est actus doni sapientiae: ergo aut donum intellectus non est circa aeterna, aut si est, non differt ab ipsa sapientia.

4. Item, sicut contingit Deum cognoscere et contemplari in imagine, ita contingit Deum cognoscere et contemplari in eius vestigio: ergo sicut donum intellectus est ordinatum ad cognitionem ipsius creaturae spiritualis6, ita ad cognitionem creaturae corporalis; sed non dirigit ad cognitionem corporalis creaturae: ergo pari ratione non videtur, donum intellectus ordinari ad cognitionem alicuius creaturae.

5. Item, dona, quae sibi invicem correspondent et ad se combinantur, ad idem et circa idem versantur; sed donum intellectus et sapientiae combinantur ad invicem7: ergo cum donum sapientiae sit circa aeterna, et non circa creata; videtur, quod et donum intellectus.

6. Item, si simul est circa Creatorem et creaturam: ergo videtur, quod donum intellectus intelligat et cognoscat Deum per speculum8: ergo non videtur differre a cognitione fidei.

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Conclusio.

Donum intellectus attenditur in contemplatione tum Creatoris tum spiritualis creaturae.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cognitio de Deo sub ratione veri potest haberi secundum triplicem modum: uno modo habetur cognitio de Deo per simplicem assensum; alio modo per rationis adminiculum; tertio modo per simplicem contuitum. Primum est virtutis fidei, cuius est assentire; secundum est doni intellectus, cuius est credita per rationem intelligere; tertium est beatitudinis munditiae cordis, cuius est Deum videre9. Quoniam ergo rationes, secundum quas iuvamur ad credita intelligenda, accipiuntur non solum a conditionibus Creatoris, sed etiam a conditionibus creaturae spiritualis, quae inter creaturas habet proximiorem assimilationem ad Creatorem; hinc est, quod donum intellectus — cuius actus est in contemplationem summi Veri elevare per lumen, quod non solum facit assentire, sed etiam per congruas rationes credita intelligere — non solum attenditur in contemplatione creatricis essentiae, sed etiam spiritualis creaturae10.

Et ex hoc patet, quis sit actus et obiectum proprium ipsius doni intellectus: quoniam obiectum eius est ipsum Verum aeternum, in quantum intelligibile, non solum secundum proprias conditiones, sed etiam secundum proprietates creaturarum sibi similium, secundum quod dicit Magister in littera11. Actus vero eius est contemplari ipsum verum creditum, ut devotius credatur et ardentius diligatur. Et ita donum intellectus consistit in contemplatione rationali Creatoris et spiritualis creaturae, sicut ostendunt rationes, quae ad istam partem sunt inductae.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod donum sapientiae ordinatur ad cognitionem Creatoris, et donum scientiae ad cognitionem creaturae; dicendum, quod aliter et aliter sunt illa duo dona ad cognitionem illorum duorum quam donum intellectus: quia donum sapientiae est ad cognitionem aeternorum, secundum tamen quod illae aeternae rationes sunt via ad gustum et experimentalem cognitionem divinae suavitatis, ita quod cognitio illa gustui est annexa; donum vero intellectus negotiatur circa aeterna secundum rationes aeternas, quae sunt via ad cognitionem veritatis. Et hinc est, quod Bernardus12 appropriat donum intellectus fidei, quae assentit summae Veritati propter se; donum vero sapientiae appropriat caritati, cuius est disponere ad gustandum Deum. — Per hunc etiam modum est differentias invenire inter intellectum et scientiam: quia scientia negotiatur circa creaturas secundum rationes creatas; unde negotiari habet non solum circa creaturas spirituales, quae habent rationem imaginis, sed etiam circa sensibiles et corporales, quae habent rationem vestigii. Donum vero intellectus, etsi negotiatur circa creaturas, hoc tamen est secundum rationes aeternas; et ideo solum est circa creaturas spirituales, in quibus rationes aeternae relucent magis expresse. — Et sic patet, quod quia13 alio et alio modo est intellectus circa Creatorem et creaturam quam sapientia et scientia; hinc est, quod illis habitis, non superfluit.

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2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod donum sapientiae et scientiae distinguuntur, quia hoc est circa temporalia, et illud circa aeterna etc.; iam patet responsio, quia non est simile. Sapientia enim negotiatur circa aeterna secundum rationes aeternas; scientia vero circa creata secundum rationes creatas; et quia14 habent diversa obiecta etiam secundum rationem movendi et dirigendi: hinc est, quod sunt dona diversa. Intellectus vero, sive circa creaturam sive circa Creatorem negotietur, semper refertur ad rationes aeternas, ad quas per creaturas etiam elevat contemplandas; et ideo unum solum donum est, quamvis illa sint plura. Et ex hoc colligi potest, quod donum intellectus est infra sapientiam et supra scientiam.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod donum intellectus aut est in simpliciter speculando, aut in speculando et afficiendo; dicendum, quod est cognitio experientiae, quae attenditur secundum gustum, et ista est doni sapientiae acquisitae; et est cognitio speculationis extensae, quae quodam modo via est ad gustum, sicut cognitio fidei ad delectationem15 caritatis; et haec est doni intellectus, quae quidem viam praebet ad usum doni sapientiae; quae ideo gratuita est, quoniam super assensum fidei fundatur et ulterius ordinat ad sapientiae gustum. Nihilominus tamen in ipso actu intellectus est quaedam delectatio, sed longe inferior quam in dono sapientiae. Delectatur enim quis in cognitione veritatis, sed non sic, sicut in gustu summae suavitatis.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sicut contingit Deum cognoscere in imagine, sic et in vestigio; dicendum, quod non est omnimoda similitudo. In imagine enim, quia magis appropinquat, magis clare habet cognosci; in vestigio vero, quia multum distat, sub maiori obscuritate et aenigmate. Et quia ad donum intellectus spectat contemplatio clarior et excellentior, quam sit cognitio fidei; hinc est, quod ad donum illud non spectat cognoscere Deum in quacumque creatura, sed in ea, quae est eius imago et similitudo expressa, sicut dictum est supra.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod donum intellectus combinatur dono sapientiae; dicendum, quod quia donum sapientiae consistit in gustu, donum vero intellectus consistit in lumine rationis; et amplius ascendit affectio quam ratio, et unio quam cognitio, secundum quod vult Dionysius16: hinc est, quod donum sapientiae in actu suo non sic indiget adminiculo creaturae, secundum quod donum intellectus. Et ideo donum sapientiae in actu suo versatur solum circa aeterna, donum vero intellectus non solum circa aeterna, sed etiam circa creata. Cum ergo dicit, quod dona, quae ad invicem combinantur, debent habere idem obiectum; hoc verum est de obiecto principali, non autem de eo quod habet rationem adminiculantis.

6. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod intellectus videt per speculum, sicut et fides; dicendum, quod in visione per speculum sunt multi gradus secundum maiorem et minorem depurationem ab obscuritate aenigmatis; et secundum hoc alio et alio modo habet illuminari et habilitari. Unde fides habilitat ad assentiendum Deo in articulis, quos, etsi non videat in se, tamen videt in creatura, cognoscendo, «quid est quod per nomen dicitur17»; numquam enim cognoscit aliquis credens, quid sit Trinitas, nisi quia videt, quid sit ternarius in creatura. Sed ulterius donum intellectus illuminat ad intelligendum non solum, «quid est quod per nomen dicitur», sed etiam ad videndam rationem, quod Trinitas debeat in Deo esse, per hoc quod videt in ipsa imagine egressum verbi a mente per viam generationis, et amoris ab utroque per viam connexionis18. Ex his patet, quod etsi fides et intellectus sint per speculum, tamen in modo speculandi differunt, et ideo sunt diversi habitus; patet etiam similiter cum hoc, quis sit actus doni intellectus, et quod obiectum, et quae differentia ipsius respectu aliorum habituum.

Scholion

I. Multa in hac quaestione sunt notatu digna. Ipsa quaestio praecise in hac formula ab aliis non tractatur, sed doctrina in ea exposita a P. Thom. (hic q. 2. a. 2; S. II. II. q. 8. a. 1-8.) passim tangitur. In assignando obiecto doni intellectus S. Bonav. sequitur Magistrum (hic c. 2.), qui hoc ex Augustino sumsisse videtur (cfr. pag. 771, nota 6.). Eandem simili modo tangunt: B. Albert., hic a. 11. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2.

II. In seq. (4.) quaestione S. Bonav. virtuti prudentiae tribuit dirigere in operabilibus secundum regulam iuris naturalis, dono vero consilii dirigere secundum regulam iuris divini et in rebus arduis. Quibus verbis idem re videtur exprimere, quod S. Thom. docet, scilicet prudentiam in istis dirigere «modo humano», consilium vero «supra humanum modum» (hic q. 2. a. 4. quaestiunc. 2.), vel clarius, illam dirigere «secundum ea quae ratio comprehendere potest», hoc vero «quasi consilio a Deo accepto» (S. II. II. q. 52. a. 1. ad 1.), et «in quantum ratio a Spiritu S. movetur» (ibid. ad 3.). De hac quaestione cfr.: S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 4. quaestiunc. 1-3; S. loc. cit. a. 1. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 6. 7. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 5.

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English Translation
p. 777

Question III. Whether the gift of understanding consists at once in the contemplation of the Creator and of the creature.

Thirdly there is inquiry concerning the act and object of the gift of understanding itself, and the question is whether the gift of understanding consists at once in the contemplation of the Creator and of the creature. And that it does [seem] so [is shown]:

1. First, by the authority of the Master in the [his] text1: "But intelligence is not only of eternal things, but also of invisible and spiritual things temporally arisen."

2. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow] through Dionysius to Titus2, who says that "it is impossible, so long as we are on the way, for the divine ray to shine forth to us except veiled about": if therefore that is the veil of the creature, it seems that the intellect cannot know God except in the creature: therefore if it is for the cognition of the Creator, it is necessary that it be at the same time for the cognition of the creature.

3. Likewise, the habit of love is not perfect unless God be loved both in himself and in his image3: therefore likewise the gift of understanding will not be perfect unless God be known through it both as to his own conditions and as to the conditions of the creatures which are like him: therefore it seems that the gift of understanding is for contemplating things temporal and eternal.

4. Likewise, understanding is concerned with the same things as faith is concerned with, according as Gregory says4, that "God gives understanding when he illumines the mind concerning the things heard"; but faith regards not only the divine essence in itself, but also in comparison to the creature: it seems therefore that the act of the gift of understanding is ordered to contemplating those two.

On the contrary: 1. By the gift of wisdom eternal things are known, by the gift of knowledge temporal things are known, as Augustine says, and as is had in the [Master's] text5: therefore either the gift of understanding is superfluous, when the two gifts are had, or its chief act does not consist concerning those two.

2. Likewise, wisdom and knowledge differ and are diverse gifts by this, that one of them is concerned with temporal things, the other with eternal: therefore if the gift of understanding is one, it seems that it cannot be concerned with those two.

3. Likewise, either the gift of understanding consists in knowing only, or in knowing and affecting. If it consists in knowing only: then it does not seem to be a gratuitous gift, since a purely cognitive act is not meritorious. If in knowing and affecting: then it belongs to the gift of understanding to know eternal things and to be affected concerning them; but this is the act of the gift of wisdom: therefore either the gift of understanding is not concerned with eternal things, or, if it is, it does not differ from wisdom itself.

4. Likewise, just as it happens that God is known and contemplated in the image, so it happens that God is known and contemplated in his vestige: therefore just as the gift of understanding is ordered to the cognition of the spiritual creature itself6, so [it would be ordered] to the cognition of the corporeal creature; but it does not direct toward the cognition of the corporeal creature: therefore by parity of reasoning it does not seem that the gift of understanding is ordered to the cognition of any creature.

5. Likewise, gifts which correspond to one another and are combined together are occupied with the same thing and concerning the same thing; but the gift of understanding and [the gift] of wisdom are combined with one another7: therefore since the gift of wisdom is concerned with eternal things, and not with created things, it seems that the gift of understanding is too.

6. Likewise, if it is at once concerned with the Creator and the creature: then it seems that the gift of understanding understands and knows God through a mirror8: therefore it does not seem to differ from the cognition of faith.

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Conclusion.

The gift of understanding is regarded in the contemplation both of the Creator and of the spiritual creature.

I respond: It must be said that the cognition of God under the formal character of the true can be had according to a threefold mode: in one mode the cognition of God is had through simple assent; in another mode through the support of reason; in a third mode through simple intuition. The first belongs to the virtue of faith, whose [office] is to assent; the second belongs to the gift of understanding, whose [office] is to understand by reason the things believed; the third belongs to the beatitude of cleanness of heart, whose [office] is to see God9. Since therefore the reasons by which we are aided to understand the things believed are taken not only from the conditions of the Creator, but also from the conditions of the spiritual creature, which among creatures has the closer assimilation to the Creator; hence it is that the gift of understanding — whose act is to elevate into the contemplation of the highest True by a light which not only makes [one] assent, but also through fitting reasons [makes one] understand the things believed — is regarded not only in the contemplation of the creating essence, but also of the spiritual creature10.

And from this it is clear what is the proper act and object of the gift of understanding itself: since its object is the eternal True itself, insofar as intelligible, not only according to its own conditions, but also according to the properties of the creatures like it, according as the Master says in the [his] text11. But its act is to contemplate the believed truth itself, that it may be more devoutly believed and more ardently loved. And so the gift of understanding consists in the rational contemplation of the Creator and of the spiritual creature, as the reasons which have been adduced for this part show.

1. To that therefore which is first objected to the contrary, that the gift of wisdom is ordered to the cognition of the Creator, and the gift of knowledge to the cognition of the creature; it must be said that those two gifts are [ordered] otherwise and otherwise to the cognition of those two than the gift of understanding [is]: because the gift of wisdom is for the cognition of eternal things, yet according as those eternal reasons are a way to the taste and experimental cognition of the divine sweetness, so that that cognition is annexed to the taste; but the gift of understanding is occupied concerning eternal things according to the eternal reasons, which are a way to the cognition of the truth. And hence it is that Bernard12 appropriates the gift of understanding to faith, which assents to the highest Truth for its own sake; but he appropriates the gift of wisdom to charity, whose [office] is to dispose toward tasting God. — In this mode too the differences are to be found between understanding and knowledge: because knowledge is occupied concerning creatures according to created reasons; whence it has to be occupied not only concerning spiritual creatures, which have the character of the image, but also concerning sensible and corporeal ones, which have the character of the vestige. But the gift of understanding, although it is occupied concerning creatures, this is nonetheless according to the eternal reasons; and therefore it is only concerned with spiritual creatures, in which the eternal reasons shine forth more expressly. — And thus it is clear that because13 the intellect is concerned with the Creator and the creature in one mode and another than wisdom and knowledge; hence it is that, when these are had, it is not superfluous.

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2. To that which is objected, that the gift of wisdom and [the gift] of knowledge are distinguished because this is concerned with temporal things, and that with eternal things, etc.; the response is already clear, because it is not alike. For wisdom is occupied concerning eternal things according to eternal reasons; but knowledge concerning created things according to created reasons; and because14 they have diverse objects even according to the character of moving and directing: hence it is that they are diverse gifts. But the intellect, whether it be occupied concerning the creature or concerning the Creator, is always referred to the eternal reasons, to the contemplation of which it elevates [us] even through creatures; and therefore it is only one gift, although those things [contemplated] be many. And from this it can be gathered that the gift of understanding is below wisdom and above knowledge.

3. To that which is objected, that the gift of understanding either is in simply speculating, or in speculating and affecting; it must be said that there is a cognition of experience, which is regarded according to taste, and this belongs to the gift of acquired wisdom; and there is a cognition of extended speculation, which is in a certain way a way to the taste, as the cognition of faith [is a way] to the delight15 of charity; and this belongs to the gift of understanding, which indeed furnishes the way to the use of the gift of wisdom; which therefore is gratuitous, because it is founded upon the assent of faith and further orders [it] toward the taste of wisdom. Nevertheless in the very act of understanding there is a certain delight, but far inferior to that in the gift of wisdom. For one is delighted in the cognition of truth, but not so as in the taste of the highest sweetness.

4. To that which is objected, that just as it happens that God is known in the image, so also in the vestige; it must be said that there is not an altogether [equal] likeness. For in the image, because it approaches more nearly, [God] has to be known more clearly; but in the vestige, because it stands far off, under greater obscurity and enigma. And because to the gift of understanding there belongs a clearer and more excellent contemplation than the cognition of faith is; hence it is that to that gift it does not belong to know God in any creature whatsoever, but in that which is his image and express likeness, as was said above.

5. To that which is objected, that the gift of understanding is combined with the gift of wisdom; it must be said that since the gift of wisdom consists in taste, but the gift of understanding consists in the light of reason; and affection ascends higher than reason, and union [higher] than cognition, according as Dionysius wills16: hence it is that the gift of wisdom in its act does not so need the support of the creature, as does the gift of understanding. And therefore the gift of wisdom in its act is occupied only concerning eternal things, but the gift of understanding not only concerning eternal things, but also concerning created things. When therefore he says that gifts which are combined with one another ought to have the same object; this is true of the principal object, but not of that which has the character of supporting.

6. To that which is lastly objected, that understanding sees through a mirror, as does faith also; it must be said that in vision through a mirror there are many grades according to the greater and lesser purgation from the obscurity of enigma; and according to this it has to be illumined and enabled in one mode and another. Whence faith enables [one] to assent to God in the articles, which, even though it does not see them in themselves, it nonetheless sees in the creature, knowing "what is that which is signified by the name17"; for one who believes never knows what the Trinity is, except because he sees what a ternary is in the creature. But further the gift of understanding illumines [one] to understand not only "what is that which is signified by the name," but also to see the reason why the Trinity must be in God, by this, that he sees in the image itself the going-forth of the word from the mind by way of generation, and of love from both by way of connection18. From these things it is clear that, even though faith and understanding are [both] through a mirror, nonetheless they differ in the mode of speculating, and therefore are diverse habits; it is likewise clear together with this what is the act of the gift of understanding, and what the object, and what is its difference with respect to the other habits.

Scholion

I. Many things in this question are worthy of note. The question itself, precisely in this formula, is not treated by others, but the doctrine set forth in it is touched upon throughout by P[ater] Thomas (here q. 2, a. 2; S. II. II. q. 8, a. 1–8). In assigning the object of the gift of understanding S. Bonaventure follows the Master (here c. 2), who seems to have taken this from Augustine (cf. p. 771, note 6). The same [matter] is touched upon in a similar mode by: Bl. Albert, here a. 11. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 2.

II. In the following (4th) question S. Bonaventure attributes to the virtue of prudence to direct in things to be done according to the rule of natural law, but to the gift of counsel to direct according to the rule of divine law and in arduous things. By which words he seems to express in substance the same thing that S. Thomas teaches, namely that prudence directs in these things "in a human mode," but counsel "above the human mode" (here q. 2, a. 4, quaestiuncula 2), or more clearly, that prudence directs "according to those things which reason can comprehend," but counsel as it were "by a counsel received from God" (S. II. II. q. 52, a. 1, ad 1), and "insofar as reason is moved by the Holy Spirit" (ibid., ad 3). On this question cf.: S. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 4, quaestiunculae 1–3; S. loc. cit. a. 1, 2. — Bl. Albert, here a. 6, 7. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 5.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Hic c. 2.
    Here c. 2.
  2. Sive Epist. 9, ubi tamen dictum hic allatum sententialiter tantum habetur; invenitur ad verbum in Caelest. Hierarch. c. 1. § 2, ubi pro nisi circumvelatum in translatione Scoti Erigenae legitur nisi varietate sacrorum velaminum anagogice circumvelatum.
    Or Epistle 9, where however the saying here adduced is had only in substance; it is found word for word in the Celestial Hierarchy c. 1, § 2, where for nisi circumvelatum in the translation of Scotus Erigena it reads nisi varietate sacrorum velaminum anagogice circumvelatum ("except veiled about anagogically by the variety of the sacred coverings").
  3. Cfr. supra d. 28. q. 1. seqq. — Inferius pro conditiones creaturarum cod. K conditiones naturales creatas.
    Cf. above d. 28, q. 1 ff. — Below, for conditiones creaturarum codex K [reads] conditiones naturales creatas.
  4. Libr. I. Moral. c. 32. n. 44: Intellectus in die suo conscium parat, quia in eo quod audita penetrat, reficiendo cor tenebras eius illustrat. Cfr. supra pag. 474, nota 2, ubi et alios locos habes. — Cod. A dum auditus mentis illustrat.
    Morals book I, c. 32, n. 44: "Understanding prepares the conscious [mind] on its own day, because, in penetrating the things heard, by refreshing the heart it illumines its darknesses." Cf. above p. 474, note 2, where you also have other passages. — Codex A [reads] dum auditus mentis illustrat.
  5. Hic c. 1. et 2.
    Here c. 1 and 2.
  6. Cfr. supra d. 28. q. 1. seqq. — Inferius pro conditiones creaturarum cod. K conditiones naturales creatas.
    Cf. above d. 28, q. 1 ff. — Below, for conditiones creaturarum codex K [reads] conditiones naturales creatas. [Printed p.778 n.1, anchoring arg 4's creaturae spiritualis near the page seam.]
  7. Cfr. supra d. 34. p. I. a. 2. q. 2.
    Cf. above d. 34, p. I, a. 2, q. 2. [Printed p.778 n.2, anchoring arg 5's combinantur ad invicem.]
  8. Respicitur I. Cor. 13, 12. — In fine arg. pro fidei cod. K sub ratione verae fidei.
    Reference is to 1 Corinthians 13:12. — At the end of the argument, for fidei codex K [reads] sub ratione verae fidei.
  9. Cfr. supra pag. 737, nota 3. — Nomen intellectus (derivatur ab intus legere) generalim importat quandam intimam cognitionem; quare Aristot. per intellectum designat vel potentiam, quae non, ut sensus, accidentia externa, sed ipsam rei essentiam percipit (III. de Anima, text. 9. seqq. et text. 26); vel habitum principiorum (II. Poster. c. ult. et VI. Ethic. c. 6.). August., Enarrat. in Ps. 32, 15. enarrat. 2. serm. 2. n. 22. ait: Qui intelligit omnia opera eorum. Intelligit, quid est? Secretius et interius videt... Occultus visus intellectus vocatur... intus enim intelligit et intus agnoscit [Deus], fines ipsorum videt etc. Et in libro de Utilitate credendi, c. 11. n. 25. docet, intelligere idem esse atque aliquid mentis certa ratione tenere.
    Cf. above p. 737, note 3. — The name intellectus (it is derived from intus legere, "to read within") generally imports a certain intimate cognition; whence Aristotle by "intellect" designates either the potency which, not like sense, [perceives] external accidents, but perceives the very essence of the thing (On the Soul III, text. 9 ff. and text. 26); or the habit of principles (Posterior [Analytics] II, c. ult., and Ethics VI, c. 6). Augustine, Enarration on Psalm 32:15, enarr. 2, serm. 2, n. 22, says: "Who understands all their works. He understands, what is it? He sees more secretly and more inwardly... It is called the hidden sight of the intellect... for [God] inwardly understands and inwardly recognizes, sees their ends, etc." And in the book On the Usefulness of Believing, c. 11, n. 25, he teaches that to understand is the same as to hold something of the mind by a certain reasoning. [Anchors the Respondeo's Deum videre.]
  10. Auctor libri de Spiritu et anima, c. 11, sic de intellectu, sumto pro naturali potentia, scribit: Intellectus ea vis animae est, quae invisibilia percipit, sicut Angelos, daemones, animas et omnem spiritum creatum. Intelligentia ea vis animae est, quae immediate supponitur Deo, cernit siquidem ipsum summum Verum et vere incommutabilem. Sic igitur anima sensu percipit corpora, imaginatione corporum similitudines, ratione corporum naturas, intellectu spiritum creatum, intelligentia spiritum increatum. — Paulo superius pro elevare edd. substituunt elevari.
    The author of the book On the Spirit and the Soul, c. 11, writes thus of the intellect, taken as a natural potency: "Intellect is that power of the soul which perceives invisible things, such as Angels, demons, souls, and every created spirit. Intelligence is that power of the soul which is immediately set under God, since it discerns the highest True itself and the truly unchangeable. Thus therefore the soul by sense perceives bodies, by imagination the likenesses of bodies, by reason the natures of bodies, by intellect created spirit, by intelligence uncreated spirit." — A little above, for elevare the editions substitute elevari. [Anchors the Respondeo-conclusion's spiritualis creaturae.]
  11. Hic c. 2. — Pro similium cod. A consimilium. Paulo inferius pro rationali nonnulli codd. rationabili, et deinde pro sunt inductae plurimi codd. fuerant inductae, aliqui fuerunt inductae.
    Here c. 2. — For similium codex A [reads] consimilium. A little below, for rationali some codices [read] rationabili, and then for sunt inductae very many codices [read] fuerant inductae, some fuerunt inductae. [Anchors secundum quod dicit Magister in littera.]
  12. Serm. in Cantic. serm. 8. n. 5. seq.; Serm. 14. de Diversis, n. 5; de Diligendo Deo, c. 11. n. 33; Serm. 2. in festo Annuntiat. B. M. V. n. 4. seq. Cfr. Gilberti abbatis Serm. 4. in Cantic. n. 2. (inter opera Bernardi).
    Sermon on the Canticle, serm. 8, n. 5 f.; Sermon 14 on Divers [Matters], n. 5; On Loving God, c. 11, n. 33; Sermon 2 on the Feast of the Annunciation of the Blessed Virgin Mary, n. 4 f. Cf. abbot Gilbert's Sermon 4 on the Canticle, n. 2 (among the works of Bernard).
  13. Cod. A magis congrue omittit quia.
    Codex A more fittingly omits quia.
  14. Cod. A quia haec, et paulo inferius pro refertur, quod habent codd. A H I L U Z aa bb, in aliis et edd. refert, ac verbis ex hoc cod. U praemittit idem.
    Codex A [reads] quia haec, and a little below, for refertur, which codices A H I L U Z aa bb have, in the others and in the editions [it reads] refert, and to the words ex hoc codex U prefixes idem.
  15. Ita edd. 1, 2, codd. dilectionem, Vat. delectationem sive dilectionem. Inferius pro ideo, quod habet cod. U, in aliis codd. et edd. parum congrue a Deo vel adeo; cod. V est a Deo.
    Thus editions 1, 2; the codices [read] dilectionem ("love"), the Vatican [edition] delectationem sive dilectionem ("delight or love"). Below, for ideo, which codex U has, in the other codices and editions less fittingly a Deo or adeo; codex V [reads] est a Deo.
  16. Cfr. supra pag. 689, nota 4.
    Cf. above p. 689, note 4.
  17. Vel aliis verbis: definitionem nominalem. Cfr. supra pag. 491, nota 4. — De gradibus cognitionis vide I. Sent. d. 2. dub. 1, d. 3. p. I. q. 2. ad 4; II. Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 3. in corp.
    Or in other words: the nominal definition. Cf. above p. 491, note 4. — On the grades of cognition see I Sent. d. 2, dub. 1; d. 3, p. I, q. 2, ad 4; II Sent. d. 23, a. 2, q. 3, in the body.
  18. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 2. q. 1, d. 3. p. II. a. 1. et 2, d. 5, d. 9. et d. 10. — Paulo inferius pro similiter cum hoc codd. A T U simul cum hoc.
    Cf. I Sent. d. 2, q. 1; d. 3, p. II, a. 1 and 2; d. 5, d. 9, and d. 10. — A little below, for similiter cum hoc codices A T U [read] simul cum hoc.
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