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Dist. 35, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 35

Textus Latinus
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Quaestio II. Utrum actus praecipuus doni scientiae consistat in actione, vel in speculatione.

Secundo quaeritur de actu et obiecto doni scientiae, et est quaestio, utrum actus praecipuus doni scientiae consistat in actione, vel in consideratione1.

Et quod consistat in actione, videtur:

1. Primo auctoritate Augustini, duodecimo de Trinitate, quae habetur in littera4; distinguens enim inter sapientiam et scientiam, dicit, quod sapientia spectat ad contemplationem, et scientia ad actionem.

2. Item, secundum Philosophum5, «scire quod non est coniunctum operationi, parum aut nihil prodest ad virtutem»: si ergo scientia, quae est Spiritus sancti donum, multum prodest ad meritum, videtur, quod actus eius circa agenda praecipue sit constitutus.

3. Item, fides sine operibus mortua est6, ergo pari ratione et scientia; sed ipsa scientia, quae est donum Spiritus sancti, non est mortua, sed gratuita: ergo videtur, quod actus eius praecipuus consistat circa agenda.

4. Item, donum scientiae comparatur ad pietatem, sicut dirigens ad exsequens; sed pietatis, secundum quod dicit Gregorius in Moralibus7, est opera misericordiae exhibere: ergo actus scientiae est circa talia opera dirigere: ergo actus eius consistit in agendis.

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5. Item, actus doni scientiae, secundum quod dicit Magister in littera8, «est conversari in medio nationis pravae et perversae»; sed bona conversatio respicit actiones exteriores: ergo actus doni scientiae circa agenda versatur praecipue.

Sed contra: 1. Augustinus decimo quarto de Trinitate9: «Huic scientiae tribuo non quidquid humanae curiositatis et vanitatis est, sed quo fides saluberrima gignitur, nutritur et roboratur»: si ergo actus doni scientiae est ad generandum fidem, videtur, quod magis sit circa fidem quam circa mores.

2. Item, in eodem libro dicitur, et Magister dicit in littera10, quod cognitio divinitatis in Christo spectat ad sapientiam, cognitio vero humanitatis in eodem spectat ad scientiam; sed cognitio humanitatis Christi non est cognitio operativa, sed potius contemplativa: si ergo haec est doni scientiae, videtur etc.

3. Item, in agendis sufficienter dirigimur per virtutem prudentiae11: aut ergo donum scientiae superfluit, aut eius actus praecipuus non ad hoc, sed ad aliud ordinatur.

4. Item, intelligentia Scripturae spectat ad donum scientiae, secundum quod Augustinus innuit in libro de Doctrina christiana12, ubi ostendit, quod per pietatem et mititatem pervenitur ad intelligentiam sacrae Scripturae: si ergo huiusmodi intelligentia non consistit in actione, sed in speculatione; videtur, quod actus eius magis consistat in contemplatione quam in actione.

Item, iuxta hoc quaeritur: cum unius habitus unus sit actus, quomodo doni scientiae habent tam diversi actus assignari? Innuit enim Magister in littera13, quod actus doni scientiae est fidem nutrire et defendere; et ulterius, quod eiusdem actus est conversari in medio nationis pravae et perversae; et postremo, quod actus eius est Christum cognoscere.

Conclusio.

Doni scientiae praecipuus actus est dirigere circa actionem, sed ex consequenti etiam nosse ea quae sunt fidei, et humanitatem Christi.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod scientiae quadruplex est differentia14. Quaedam est, quae consistit in intellectu pure speculativo; et haec est fundata super principia rationis15, et haec est scientia acquisita de quacumque creatura, sicut scientia humanae philosophiae. — Quaedam autem est, quae consistit in intellectu inclinato ab affectu16; et haec est fundata super principia fidei, quae quidem sunt articuli, et nihilominus acquisita; et haec est scientia sacrae Scripturae, quam nullus habere potest, nisi saltem habeat fidem informem. — Quaedam autem est, quae consistit in intellectu sive ratione, in quantum inclinat affectum ad operationem; et haec fundata est super principia iuris naturalis, quae ordinatur ad rectitudinem et honestatem vitae; et huiusmodi est scientia prudentiae-virtutis. — Quaedam autem scientia est, quae consistit in intellectu, secundum quod est inclinatus et inclinans: inclinatus, inquam, a fide, et inclinans ad bonam operationem: et haec fundatur super principia fidei et habet ortum a dono gratiae; et talis est scientia, quae est donum Spiritus sancti.

Et ex hoc patet, quis sit actus proprius huius doni. Est enim actus eius dirigere ad agenda secundum praeexigentiam regulae ipsius fidei, cuius est dirigere ad opera misericordiae, ut non tantum bona pro bonis reddat, secundum quod dictat lex naturae, sed etiam bona pro malis, secundum quod dictat lex gratiae17, ad exemplar ipsius Iesu Christi, in quo fuit gratiae abundantia. Et ideo ad ipsam scientiam non solummodo pertinet dirigere in agendis; sed etiam ex consequenti pertinet nosse ea quae sunt fidei tanquam fundamentum suae directionis; et ulterius nosse humanitatem Christi tanquam exemplar sui regiminis; ita quod hic triplex actus convenit ei secundum triplicem respectum: unus videlicet respectu obiecti motivi, alter vero respectu sui fundamenti, et tertius est18 exemplaris excitativi. Et quia principalis actus accipitur ex parte obiecti; hinc est, quod praecipuus actus doni scientiae est dirigere circa actionem, secundum quod dicit Augustinus, et ostendunt rationes ad hoc inductae; et ideo sunt concedendae.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod ipsius scientiae est fidem gignere et roborare; dicendum, quod iste non est actus eius principalis, sed ad principalem ordinatus ea ratione, qua directio doni scientiae in agendis sequitur et fundatur super principia ipsius fidei19.

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2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ipsius doni scientiae est humanitatem et gratiam Christi nosse; iam patet responsio: quia nec hic est actus ipsius scientiae principalis, sed qui ad principalem habet ordinari; sicut cognitio exempli utilis est ad evidentiorem cognitionem rei, quae secundum exemplar illud debet fieri.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod per prudentiam sufficienter dirigitur homo in agendis; iam patet responsio: quia prudentia dirigit secundum principia iuris naturalis ad ea quae honesta sunt; sed scientia-donum dirigit per principia fidei et iuris divini ad ea quae sunt sancta20; unde et quodam modo altior est actus ipsius doni scientiae quam virtutis prudentiae, et super principia magis elevata fundari habet; et propter hoc, habita virtute prudentiae, non superfluit donum scientiae.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod intelligentia Scripturarum spectat ad donum scientiae; dicendum, quod sicut prius tactum fuit de cognitione eorum quae sunt fidei, quod non principaliter spectant ad donum ipsius scientiae, sed quodam modo antecedenter et quasi praesuppositive; sic etiam intelligendum est de intelligentia sacrae Scripturae.

Ad illud quod ultimo quaeritur de diversitate actuum, iam patet responsio per ea quae dicta sunt: quoniam unus est eius actus principalis, duo vero annexi; et simul cum hoc patet, quid sit obiectum ipsius doni scientiae, et quomodo etiam differat a virtute prudentiae et ab habitu cuiuslibet alterius scientiae21.

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English Translation
p. 775

Question II. Whether the chief act of the gift of knowledge consists in action or in speculation.

Secondly there is inquiry concerning the act and object of the gift of knowledge, and the question is whether the chief act of the gift of knowledge consists in action or in consideration1.

And that it consists in action seems [so]:

1. First, by the authority of Augustine, in the twelfth book of On the Trinity, which is had in the [Master's] text4; for distinguishing between wisdom and knowledge, he says that wisdom regards contemplation, and knowledge action.

2. Likewise, according to the Philosopher5, "to know what is not conjoined to operation profits little or nothing toward virtue": if therefore knowledge, which is a gift of the Holy Spirit, profits much toward merit, it seems that its act is chiefly constituted concerning things to be done.

3. Likewise, faith without works is dead6, therefore by parity of reasoning so too is knowledge; but knowledge itself, which is a gift of the Holy Spirit, is not dead, but gratuitous: therefore it seems that its chief act consists concerning things to be done.

4. Likewise, the gift of knowledge is compared to piety as the directing to the executing; but it belongs to piety, according as Gregory says in the Morals7, to exhibit works of mercy: therefore the act of knowledge is to direct concerning such works: therefore its act consists in things to be done.

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5. Likewise, the act of the gift of knowledge, according as the Master says in the [his] text8, "is to converse in the midst of a depraved and perverse nation"; but good conversation regards exterior actions: therefore the act of the gift of knowledge is occupied chiefly concerning things to be done.

On the contrary: 1. Augustine in the fourteenth book of On the Trinity9: "To this knowledge I attribute not whatever is of human curiosity and vanity, but that by which the most salutary faith is begotten, nourished, and strengthened": if therefore the act of the gift of knowledge is for generating faith, it seems that it is concerned rather with faith than with morals.

2. Likewise, in the same book it is said, and the Master says in his text10, that the cognition of the divinity in Christ regards wisdom, but the cognition of [his] humanity in the same regards knowledge; but the cognition of Christ's humanity is not an operative cognition, but rather a contemplative one: if therefore this belongs to the gift of knowledge, it seems etc.

3. Likewise, in things to be done we are sufficiently directed by the virtue of prudence11: therefore either the gift of knowledge is superfluous, or its chief act is not ordered to this but to something else.

4. Likewise, the understanding of Scripture regards the gift of knowledge, according as Augustine intimates in the book On Christian Doctrine12, where he shows that through piety and meekness one comes to the understanding of sacred Scripture: if therefore such understanding consists not in action but in speculation; it seems that its act consists rather in contemplation than in action.

Likewise, according to this it is asked: since of one habit there is one act, how can acts so diverse be assigned to the gift of knowledge? For the Master intimates in his text13 that the act of the gift of knowledge is to nourish and defend faith; and further, that of the same [gift] the act is to converse in the midst of a depraved and perverse nation; and lastly, that its act is to know Christ.

Conclusion.

The chief act of the gift of knowledge is to direct concerning action, but consequently also to know the things which are of faith, and the humanity of Christ.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that there is a fourfold difference of knowledge14. There is a certain [knowledge] which consists in the purely speculative intellect; and this is founded upon the principles of reason15, and this is the knowledge acquired about any creature whatsoever, as the knowledge of human philosophy. — But there is a certain [knowledge] which consists in the intellect inclined by affect16; and this is founded upon the principles of faith, which indeed are the articles, and is nonetheless acquired; and this is the knowledge of sacred Scripture, which no one can have unless he have at least unformed faith. — But there is a certain [knowledge] which consists in the intellect or reason, insofar as it inclines the affect to operation; and this is founded upon the principles of natural law, which is ordered to the rectitude and honesty of life; and of this kind is the knowledge of prudence-as-virtue. — But there is a certain knowledge which consists in the intellect, according as it is inclined and inclining: inclined, I say, by faith, and inclining to good operation: and this is founded upon the principles of faith and has its origin from the gift of grace; and such is the knowledge which is a gift of the Holy Spirit.

And from this it is clear what is the proper act of this gift. For its act is to direct toward things to be done according to the prerequisite of the rule of faith itself, whose [office] is to direct toward works of mercy, so that one render not only good for good, according as the law of nature dictates, but also good for evil, according as the law of grace dictates17, after the exemplar of Jesus Christ himself, in whom was the abundance of grace. And therefore to this knowledge it pertains not only to direct in things to be done; but also consequently it pertains to know the things which are of faith as the foundation of its direction; and further to know the humanity of Christ as the exemplar of its governance; so that here a threefold act belongs to it according to a threefold respect: one namely with respect to the motive object, another with respect to its foundation, and the third is18 with respect to the exciting exemplar. And because the principal act is taken on the side of the object, hence it is that the chief act of the gift of knowledge is to direct concerning action, according as Augustine says, and as the reasons adduced for this show; and therefore they are to be conceded.

1. To that therefore which is first objected to the contrary, that it belongs to knowledge to beget and strengthen faith; it must be said that this is not its principal act, but one ordered to the principal for this reason, that the direction of the gift of knowledge in things to be done follows upon and is founded upon the principles of faith itself19.

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2. To that which is objected, that it belongs to the gift of knowledge to know the humanity and grace of Christ; the response is already clear: because neither is this the principal act of knowledge, but one that has to be ordered to the principal; just as the cognition of an example is useful for the more evident cognition of the thing which ought to be done according to that exemplar.

3. To that which is objected, that man is sufficiently directed in things to be done by prudence; the response is already clear: because prudence directs according to the principles of natural law toward those things which are honorable; but knowledge-as-gift directs through the principles of faith and divine law toward those things which are holy20; whence the act of the gift of knowledge is in a certain way higher than that of the virtue of prudence, and has to be founded upon more elevated principles; and on account of this, when the virtue of prudence is had, the gift of knowledge is not superfluous.

4. To that which is objected, that the understanding of the Scriptures regards the gift of knowledge; it must be said that just as it was touched on before concerning the cognition of the things which are of faith, that they do not principally regard the gift of knowledge itself, but in a certain way antecedently and as it were presuppositively; so too it must be understood concerning the understanding of sacred Scripture.

To that which is lastly asked concerning the diversity of acts, the response is already clear through the things which have been said: since one is its principal act, but two are annexed; and together with this it is clear what is the object of the gift of knowledge, and how also it differs from the virtue of prudence and from the habit of any other knowledge whatsoever21.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 10. a. 2. q. 1. ad 3; d. 15. p. II. q. 2. et d. 27. p. II. q. 3. in corp. — In plurimis codd. et in edd. 1, 2 deest quid. Paulo ante pro non habetur cod. aa non sequitur, edd. non sequitur et habetur; edd. etiam superius omittunt per ante experimentum.
    Cf. I Sent. d. 10, a. 2, q. 1, ad 3; d. 15, p. II, q. 2, and d. 27, p. II, q. 3, in the body. — In very many codices and in editions 1, 2 quid is wanting. A little before, for non habetur codex aa [reads] non sequitur, editions [read] non sequitur et habetur; the editions also above omit per before experimentum. [This note combines the printed p.775 nn.1 and 2, which together gloss the opener; rendered as one entry on the single body anchor at the opener.]
  2. Hic c. 1; codd. non bene citant XIV. de Trin.
    Here c. 1; the codices wrongly cite On the Trinity book XIV.
  3. Libr. II. Ethic. c. 1: Ad virtutes autem cognitio parum vel nihil valet; reliqua [eligere et immutabiliter agere] non parum, sed multum ac totum conferunt.
    Ethics book II, c. 1: "But toward the virtues cognition avails little or nothing; the rest [to choose and to act immutably] confer not a little, but much and the whole."
  4. Iac. 2, 20. et 26.
    James 2:20 and 26.
  5. Libr. I. c. 32. n. 44. — De maiori cfr. supra d. 31. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. in corp. (tertia via).
    [Morals] book I, c. 32, n. 44. — On the greater [point] cf. above d. 31, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, in the body (the third way).
  6. Hic c. 1. Respicitur Phil. 2, 13. — Subinde pro actiones cod. A operationes.
    Here c. 1. Reference is to Philippians 2:13. — Thereupon for actiones codex A [reads] operationes.
  7. Cap. 1. n. 3. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. — In testimonio allato Vat. post nutritur inserit defenditur, quod et in textu origin. invenitur. — Mox pro ad generandum codd. A I L N T ad aggenerandum, codd. O bb ad roborandam.
    [On the Trinity book XIV] c. 1, n. 3. Cf. here the Master's text, c. 1. — In the testimony adduced the Vatican [edition] inserts defenditur after nutritur, which is also found in the original text. — Presently for ad generandum codices A I L N T [read] ad aggenerandum, codices O bb [read] ad roborandam.
  8. Hic c. 1; attamen locus ibi cit. non invenitur in XIV. de Trin., sed in XIII. c. 19. n. 24.
    Here c. 1; yet the passage cited there is not found in On the Trinity book XIV, but in book XIII, c. 19, n. 24.
  9. Aristot., VI. Ethic. c. 5. dicit, quod «prudentia habitus sit vera cum ratione activus circa ea quae et bona et mala homini sunt».
    Aristotle, Ethics book VI, c. 5, says that "prudence is a habit truly active with reason concerning those things which are both good and evil for man."
  10. Libr. II. c. 7. n. 9: Deinde mitescere opus est pietate, neque contradicere divinae Scripturae, sive intellectae, si aliqua vitia nostra percutit, sive non intellectae, quasi nos melius sapere meliusque praecipere possimus; sed cogitare potius et credere, id esse melius et verius quod ibi scriptum est, etiam si lateat, quam id quod nos per nosmetipsos sapere possumus.
    [On Christian Doctrine] book II, c. 7, n. 9: "Then it is necessary to grow gentle by piety, and not to contradict divine Scripture — whether understood, if it strikes some of our vices, or not understood, as though we could be wiser and prescribe better; but rather to think and believe that what is written there is better and truer, even if it lies hidden, than what we are able to know by ourselves."
  11. Hic c. 1.
    Here c. 1.
  12. Vide Aristot., VI. Ethic. c. 3.
    See Aristotle, Ethics book VI, c. 3.
  13. Cfr. supra d. 23. a. 1. q. 2. et d. 24. a. 3. q. 1. seq., nec non pag. 491, nota 6.
    Cf. above d. 23, a. 1, q. 2, and d. 24, a. 3, q. 1 f., and also p. 491, note 6.
  14. Cfr. Matth. 5, 39. seqq., et Rom. 12, 17. seqq.
    Cf. Matthew 5:39 ff., and Romans 12:17 ff.
  15. Codd. A Z respectu. Superius pro suae directionis cod. A summae directionis.
    Codices A Z [read] respectu. Above, for suae directionis codex A [reads] summae directionis.
  16. Vide infra dub. 2. — Pro ea ratione cod. R ea ordinatione rationis.
    See below dubium 2. — For ea ratione codex R [reads] ea ordinatione rationis.
  17. Sap. 10, 10: Dedit illi scientiam sanctorum. — Paulo superius pro secundum codd. B O per.
    Wisdom 10:10: "He gave him the knowledge of the holy ones." — A little above, for secundum codices B O [read] per.
  18. Permulti codd. praesuppositione. In codd. A bb sic legitur: sed quodam modo ad affectum [cod. bb addit antecedunt] et quasi cognitionem praesupponunt.
    Very many codices [read] praesuppositione. In codices A bb it reads thus: but in a certain way they presuppose toward the affect [codex bb adds antecedunt] and as it were the cognition.
  19. Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    See the scholion to the preceding question.
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