Dist. 14, Art. 2, Q. 1
Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 14
## ARTICULUS II. ### De cognitione, quam anima Christi habuit in Verbo.
Consequenter quaeritur de cognitione, quam anima Christi habuit in Verbo. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria.
Primo quaeritur, utrum eodemp306-3 habitu cognoscat Verbum et alia in Verbo.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum anima Christi cognoscat actu in Verbo quae cognoscit habitu.
Tertio quaeritur, utrum in Verbo noscat omnia, quaecumque novit Verbum.
Quaestio I. Utrum anima Christi eadem cognitione, qua cognoscit Verbum, cognoscat alias res in Verbo.
Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum anima Christi eadem cognitione, qua cognoscit Verbum, cognoscat alias res in Verbo. Et quod eadem, videtur.
1. Augustinus super Genesim ad litteramp306-4 dicit, quod Angeli tripliciter cognoverunt res, videlicet in Verbo, in se ipsis, in proprio genere: ergo cognitio, quam Angelus habet in Verbo de re, distincta est a cognitione, quam Angelus habet de re in se ipso; sed Angelus in se ipso cognoscit res per speciem aliquam sibi datam: ergo videtur, quod ea cognitione, quae est in Verbo, cognoscat res non mediante aliqua similitudine ipsius rei, praeter illam quae est in Verbo: ergo eadem cognitione, qua cognoscit Verbum, cognoscit rem aliam in Verbo.
2. Item, Verbum est sufficiens ratio cognoscendi omnia alia a Verbop307-1 — tanquam exemplar est ratio cognoscendi exemplatum — sed cognoscere sufficientem rationem alterius, hoc non est aliud quam cognoscere ipsam rem; eadem enim est cognitio rationis cognoscendi et ipsius rei cognitae: ergo eadem cognitione, qua anima cognoscit Verbum, cognoscit res alias a Verbo.
3. Item, melius cognoscitur res in divino exemplari, quam cognoscatur in se, melius etiam cognoscitur per divinum exemplar, quam cognoscatur per propriam similitudinemp307-2; sed eadem cognitione, qua quis cognoscit similitudinem rei, cognoscit ipsam rem: ergo etc.
4. Item, si similitudo rei in speculo nullo modo differret ab ipso speculo, eadem cognitione, qua cognosceretur ipsum speculum, cognosceretur ipsa similitudo rei et ipsa res: ergo cum in Verbo aeterno non differat similitudo rei ab ipso — nam ipsum est exemplar et ratio cognoscendi — videtur, quod eadem cognitione, qua quis novit Verbum, cognoscit et res in Verbo: igitur anima Christi per eundem habitum cognitionis cognoscit Verbum et alia in ipso.
5. Item, si anima Christi cognosceret rem in Verbo per alium habitum et aliam similitudinem, quam cognoscat ipsum Verbum; aut illa similitudo esset una, aut multae. Una non potest esse, quia unaquaeque res creata habet similitudinem sibi propriam in genere creaturae. Si multae: ergo cum non sit status in multis, sed in unop307-3, cognitio aliarum rerum a Verbo in ipso Verbo non spectaret ad cognitionem gloriae, in qua est status et quies: igitur si hoc est inconveniens, restat, quod eodem habitu cognitionis, quo cognoscitur ipsum Verbum, cognoscantur et alia in Verbo, tam ab anima Christi quam ab alia anima beata.
Sed contra: 1. Sicut materia se habet ad formam, ita intellectus possibilis se habet ad res, quas cognoscitp307-4; sed impossibile est, quod summum ens det esse ipsi materiae nisi imprimendo aliquam formam creatam ipsi materiae, diversam a se: ergo impossibile est, quod summum lumen faciat, intellectum possibilem aliquid actu intelligere, nisi imprimat ei speciem et similitudinem ipsius rei cognitae: ergo cognitio aliarum rerum a Verbo in ipso Verbo aliquid plus exigit quam cognitionem ipsius Verbi, et est per aliam rationem cognoscendi, quam sit cognitio ipsius Verbi.
2. Item, ad hoc, quod intellectus aliquid intelligat, necesse est, ipsum assimilari rei cognitaep307-5: ergo cum cognoscit alia a Verbo, necesse est, ipsum assimilari non solum ipsi Verbo, sed etiam aliis a Verbo; sed aliis a Verbo non potest assimilari nisi per susceptionem similitudinum aliarum: ergo ad hoc, quod intellectus aliquis creatus, sive Christi, sive alius, cognoscat alias res in Verbo, non sufficit cognoscere ipsum Verbum.
3. Item, si aspicerem ad aliquam rem, aggeneraretur in me similitudo illius rei: similiter, si aspicerem ad speculum, non solum aggeneraretur in me similitudo speculi, sed etiam similitudo reip307-6: ergo si Verbum aeternum continet in se ideas rerum omnium, ita generabuntur similitudines rerum in anima aspiciente ipsum, sicut si anima contueretur ipsas res: ergo videtur, quod res in Verbo non tantum cognoscitur ab intellectu creato per ipsum Verbum, sed etiam per similitudines impressas: ergo per cognitionem aliam et aliam.
4. Itemp307-7, contingit cognoscere ipsum Verbum ut lucem, et contingit cognoscere ipsum ut exemplar — tunc autem cognoscitur Verbum ut lux, quando cognoscitur in se; tunc autem cognoscitur ut exemplar, quando in ipso cognoscuntur alia — sed impossibile est cognoscere ipsum Verbum — lucem, quin infundatur nobis lumen, quod facit nos conformes ipsi luci: ergo impossibile est ipsum cognoscere ut exemplar, quin infundatur nobis cognitio, quae facit nos conformes ipsis aeternis ideis et rationibus: ergo nec anima Christi alio modo quam isto cognovit. Si tu dicas, quod idem est etp307-8 quod assimilatur ipsi Verbo ut luci, et Verbo ut exemplari; contra: possibile est cognoscere ipsum Verbum, et tamen non cognosceretur res, cuius Verbum est exemplar: ergo videtur, quod alia sit ratio, per quam quis conformatur ipsi Verbo ut luci, et ipsi Verbo ut exemplari.
5. Item, intelligamus, quod aliquis in Verbo cognoscat rem aliquam videndo ipsum Verbum, et post desinat videre, sicut fuit in raptu Paulip308-1; possibile est, talem, postquam desiit videre ipsam Verbi essentiam, habere memoriam eius quod vidit in Verbo; hoc autem non esset, nisi res in Verbo cognosceretur alia cognitione quam ipsum Verbum: ergo anima Christi et omnis alia anima, si cognoscit res in Verbo, hoc non est per eandem cognitionem, sed per cognitionem aliam et aliam.
Conclusio.
Anima Christi eodem habitu, quo cognoscit Verbum, cognoscit res in Verbo, existente sola differentia quoad respectum.
Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod habitus cognitionis numerari habet penes rationem cognoscendip308-2. Quoniam ergo Verbum aeternum est sufficientissima ratio cognoscendi omnia alia a se — quod patet, quia se ipso cognoscit omnia — ad hocp308-3, quod aliquis cognoscat res in Verbo, non oportet in ipso esse geminam cognitionem ipsius Verbi et ipsius rei cognitae; geminam, dico, quantum ad habitum cognoscendi, propter hoc, quod habens deiformitatem gloriae, per quam cognoscit ipsum Verbum, habet unde assimiletur ipsi Verbo, quod est perfecta ratio cognoscendi omnia alia, et ita, cognoscendo Verbum, habet habitum, quo possit cognoscere alia, ita quod habitus ille, prout dicitur esse Verbi et aliorum a Verbo, non differt nisi sola comparatione. — Per idem enim, quod ipsum Verbum aeternum est lux et veritas in se, est exemplar aliarum rerum; et ideo, qui habet unde conformetur ipsi summae veritati, habet unde conformetur rationi cognoscendi omnia. Quoniam ergo Verbum aeternum per idem est ratio cognoscendi se et alia; ideo dico, quod anima Christi eodem habitu, quo cognoscit ipsum Verbum, cognoscit res in Verbo, existente sola differentia quantum ad comparationem sive respectum. — Concedendae igitur sunt rationes, quae hoc ostendunt.
1. Ad illud quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod necesse est, intellectum possibilem formari ad similitudinem rei intellectae etc.; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia, quamvis Deus nullius possit esse forma perfectiva, potest tamen esse forma exemplaris et ratio cognoscendi; ideo, quamvis non perficiat materiam per se ipsump308-4, dando ei esse et complementum, potest tamen per se ipsum intellectum facere cognoscere aliud quodcumque creatum. Et si tu obiicias, quod necesse est adhuc, intellectum possibilem aliquo modo formari, ad hoc quod aliquid intelligat in actu; dicendum, quod sic est in proposito. Formatur enim ab aliquo, sed hoc non est aliud quam ipsa influentia luminis aeterni, per quam efficitur deiformis et conformis ipsi Verbo, quod est ratio cognoscendi alia; et ideo per consequens efficitur in actu respectu aliorum cognoscibilium a Verbo, et per similitudinem Verbi, quod quidem Verbum est similitudo omnium, efficitur quodam modo similis omnibus. Ideo non oportet, ei dari novum habitum ad cognoscendum.
2. Et per hoc patet responsio ad sequens, quod obiicit, quod necesse est, cognoscens assimilari cognoscibili; quoniam assimilatio, quae sufficit ad cognitionem, non tantum est per speciem acceptam a rep308-5, vel etiam per speciem appropriatam ipsi rei, verum etiam per assimilationem ad illud quod est ratio cognoscendi cetera.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si aspicerem ad rem, aggeneraretur in me similitudo rei, et similiter, si ad speculum, aggeneraretur in me similitudo speculi et ipsius rei; dicendum, quod si in speculo non differret similitudo rei ab ipsa forma speculi, non oporteret, quod in me aggeneraretur alia similitudo cognoscendi respectu ipsius speculi et respectu ipsius rei relucentis in speculo; et sic intelligendum est in proposito, quoniam idea in Deo nihil aliud est quam ipsa veritas aeterna, sicut ostensum fuit in primo librop308-6.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod impossibile est, me lucem cognoscere aeternam, quin fiam ei conformis per influentiam luminis; dicendum, quod hoc verum est; sed quia Deus per idem ipsum, quod estp308-7 lux in se, est exemplar aliarum rerum; ideo non oportet, quod per aliud et aliud fiam conformis ipsi, ut est lux, et ut est exemplar, sed per idem alio modo se habens. Idem enim lumen gloriae habilitat ipsam animam ad cognoscendum ipsum Verbum aeternum, in quantum lumen comparatur ad ipsum Verbum sub ratione lucis; idem etiam habilitat ipsam animam ad cognoscendum alia a Verbo in ipso Verbo, in quantum comparatur ad ipsum Verbum, ut est exemplar aliorum. — Et quia Verbum est exemplar voluntarie repraesentans, ideo lumen illud non comparatur nisi ad illa quae ipsum divinum exemplar repraesentat voluntarie; hinc est, quod per illud lumen, etsip308-8 cognoscat Verbum, non oportet, quod cognoscat omnia alia a Verbo, quorum ipsum Verbum est exemplar. — Et si tu obiicias, quod quamvis in Deo idem sit sapientia et bonitas, tamen aliud et aliud est in me, per quod ego conformor divinae sapientiae et bonitati: ergo pari ratione aliudp308-9 erit, per quod conformatur intellectus ipsi Verbo, secundum quod lux, et secundum quod exemplar;
dicendum, quod non est simile, quoniam ratio veritatis et exemplaritatis in eodem est differens sola comparatione. Ipsum enim exemplar non est aliud quam veritas aeterna, ut est ratio cognoscendi alia.
5. Ad illud quod obiicitur ultimo de memoria, quae remanet; dicendum, quod si aliquis intellectus videtp309-1 aliqua in Verbo cognitione gloriae et desinat videre Verbum, non memoratur de cognitione illarum rerum, nisi eatenus, quatenus memoratur de cognitione Verbi, nisi alias habueritp309-2 cognitionem illarum rerum impressam, vel nisi Deus ei dispensative imprimeret; tunc hoc non esset opportunum. Sed, sicut dictum est, ad hoc, quod aliquis intellectus creatus cognoscat res in Verbo, sive Christi, sive alius, sufficit, quod habeat deiformitatem gloriae, per quam sit similis ipsi Verbo; nec oportet, ei dari rerum similitudines, aut habitus particulares, quia magis sibi sufficit ipsa summa veritas ad cognoscendum omnia, quam omnes rerum similitudines speciales. Unde limpidius cognoscit Angelus, et etiam anima Christi, res in Verbo, quam cognoscat in se, vel in proprio genere.
I. Secundum communem doctrinam res, quae in proprio genere habent esse creatum et limitatum, modo eminentissimo dicuntur esse in Deo, in quo «tripliciter sunt, videlicet ut in principio producente, et sic sunt in ratione potentiae; ut in exemplari exprimente, et sic sunt in ratione notitiae; et ut in fine conservante, in ratione voluntatis» (1. Sent. d. 36. a. 2. q. 4; cfr. ibid. q. 2.). Hoc rerum esse eminens, quatenus idem est ac esse divinum, sine dubio videtur ab eo qui videt immediate essentiam divinam. Hic autem quaeritur de creaturis secundum earum esse formale et proprium, et communiter conceditur, quod etiam ad hoc terminetur scientia Beatorum, quam habent in Verbo. Quoad modum autem huius cognitionis Occam cum suis Nominalibus recedit a communi aliorum doctorum sententia docens, res cognosci a Beatis in Deo non immediate, sed causaliter, cum actus has videndi totaliter causetur a Deo, intellectus se habeat pure passive, et visio utriusque obiecti sit alia et alia (explicationem vide apud Biel, hic q. unica). — Sed alii magistri in hoc consentiunt, quod Beati eodem lumine vel habitu et actu in essentia divina vel (appropriate loquendo) in Verbo ut in primo obiecto cognito cognoscant etiam res creatas. Assertionem tamen, quod eodem actu obiectum primarium et secundarium videatur, S. Bonav. restringit docens, quod actualis visio seu consideratio creaturarum non se extendat ad omnia creata et possibilia nisi successive; unde secundum ipsum actus videndi horum aliqua separari potest ab unico et permanente actu videndi divinam essentiam; tamen si actu haec videntur, tunc videntur non alio et distincto actu ab eo, quo videtur ipsa essentia (cfr. hic q. 2. ad 4. et explicatio fundamenti ultimi et scholion ad seq. quaest.). — Haec cognitio rerum in Deo vocatur ab Augustino matutina, quae distinguitur a vespertina (cfr. II. Sent. d. 4. a. 3.). — Doctrina communis nititur duobus fundamentis, scilicet quod ipsa essentia divina Beatis sit ratio cognoscendi, et quod eadem ut prima et summa veritas non tantum exprimat se ipsam, sed etiam perfectissime omnia alia omnemque veritatem participatam, sicut bene explanatur hic, praesertim in solutionibus oppositorum. Supponuntur autem hic plura, quae in 1. libro Sent. dicta sunt de veritate (d. 8. p. I. q. 1.), de ideis (d. 35. per totam), de scientia divina (d. 39.); haec principia, ex multis locis contracta, leguntur in scholio ad d. 35. q. 1. Hic tria tantum observamus.
1. «Unaquaeque res creata habet similitudinem sibi propriam in genere creaturae» (hic 5. fundam.), quae intellectui est ratio intelligendi eam. Nam res, sicut habet esse a Deo, ita etiam virtutem se ipsam exprimendi ut veritas quaedam participata. Haec tamen proprietas duplicem limitationem vel imperfectionem habet annexam, nempe quod proprie non nisi se ipsam ad notitiam pariendam exprimere potest, et quod ne hoc quidem totaliter et perfecte praestare valet.
2. Haec limitatio et imperfectio prorsus removenda est a modo, quo divina essentia se sibi exprimit; unde tenendum est, quod ipsa ut summa et increata Veritas infinito et perfectissimo modo se sibi manifestat, simulque exemplar est omnis veritatis participatae, in ipsa relucentis et expressae.
3. Hinc eadem divina essentia, quae est lux et veritas in se, est etiam perfectissima et illimitata ratio cognoscendi tum Deum tum omnia alia a Deo, quae secundum triplicem causalitatem (ut supra loc. cit. dictum est) in ipso sunt (hic solut. ad 4.). Quia enim essentia divina eminentissime continet omne esse creatum, ideo etiam eminenter continet rationem formalem cognoscendi illud; unde altiore modo est ratio motiva intellectus ad cognoscendum, quam esse possit propria rei ratio sive species impressa. Nam divinum exemplar importat «assimilationem extra genus» (1. Sent. d. 36. a. 3. q. 2.), scilicet supra causam universalem et particularem, et supra similitudinem communem et propriam, ita ut minime arctata se extendat una ad omnia, et tamen distinctissime exprimat quemlibet effectum quoad omnes conditiones. Hoc praeclare docetur 1. Sent. d. 35. q. 2. ad 2. 3. 4.
II. Pro intelligentia duarum seqq. quaestionum praecipue notanda sunt quae hic (solut. ad 2.) dicuntur de triplici modo, quo cognoscens assimilari potest cognoscibili; item (ad 3.), de differentia speculi increati a speculo creato (cfr. etiam 1. Sent. d. 3. p. 1. q. 2. 3.); denique (ad 4.), quod Verbum est speculum voluntarie repraesentans.
III. Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 13. m. 5. a. 1. — Scot., de hac et 2. seqq. qq. in utroque Scripto hic q. 2. — S. Thom., hic a. 1. quaestiunc. 4; S. III. q. 10. a. 2; de Verit. q. 20. a. 4, q. 8. a. 4. — B. Albert., de hac et seqq. qq. hic a. 1.2. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 2. quaestiunc. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2. — Durand., de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 2. — Biel, loc. cit.
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## ARTICLE II. ### On the knowledge which Christ's soul had in the Word.
Consequently inquiry is made concerning the knowledge which Christ's soul had in the Word. And concerning this three things are asked.
First it is asked whether by the samep306-3 habit it knows the Word and other things in the Word.
Secondly it is asked whether Christ's soul knows in act, in the Word, what it knows in habit.
Thirdly it is asked whether in the Word it knows all things, whatsoever the Word knows.
Question I. Whether Christ's soul, by the same knowledge by which it knows the Word, knows other things in the Word.
Concerning the first one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether Christ's soul, by the same knowledge by which it knows the Word, knows other things in the Word. And that [it knows them] by the same [knowledge], it seems.
1. Augustine, On Genesis according to the letterp306-4, says that the angels knew things in a threefold way, namely in the Word, in themselves, in their proper genus: therefore the knowledge which an angel has of a thing in the Word is distinct from the knowledge which an angel has of a thing in itself; but an angel in itself knows things through some species given to it: therefore it seems that by that knowledge which is in the Word it knows things without the mediation of any likeness of the thing, besides that which is in the Word: therefore by the same knowledge by which it knows the Word, it knows another thing in the Word.
2. Likewise, the Word is the sufficient ground for knowing all things other than the Wordp307-1 — as an exemplar is the ground for knowing what is exemplified — but to know the sufficient ground of something else is nothing other than to know the thing itself; for the knowledge of the ground-of-knowing and of the known thing itself is the same: therefore by the same knowledge by which the soul knows the Word, it knows things other than the Word.
3. Likewise, a thing is better known in the divine exemplar than it is known in itself, and it is also better known through the divine exemplar than it is known through its proper likenessp307-2; but by the same knowledge by which one knows the likeness of a thing, one knows the thing itself: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, if the likeness of a thing in a mirror in no way differed from the mirror itself, then by the same knowledge by which the mirror itself would be known, the likeness of the thing itself and the thing itself would be known: therefore since in the eternal Word the likeness of a thing does not differ from itself — for it is the exemplar and ground of knowing — it seems that by the same knowledge by which one knows the Word, one knows also things in the Word: therefore Christ's soul, by the same habit of knowledge, knows the Word and other things in it.
5. Likewise, if Christ's soul knew a thing in the Word through another habit and another likeness than that by which it knows the Word itself; either that likeness would be one, or [there would be] many. It cannot be one, because each created thing has its own proper likeness in the genus of creature. If [there are] many: then, since there is no rest in many but in onep307-3, the knowledge of things other than the Word in the Word itself would not pertain to the knowledge of glory, in which there is rest and repose: therefore if this is unfitting, it remains that by the same habit of knowledge by which the Word itself is known, other things too are known in the Word, both by Christ's soul and by any other beatified soul.
On the contrary: 1. As matter is related to form, so the possible intellect is related to the things which it knowsp307-4; but it is impossible that the highest being give being to matter itself except by impressing on the matter some created form, distinct from itself: therefore it is impossible that the highest light make the possible intellect actually understand anything, except by impressing on it the species and likeness of the known thing itself: therefore the knowledge of things other than the Word, in the Word itself, demands something more than the knowledge of the Word itself, and is through a ground of knowing other than is the knowledge of the Word itself.
2. Likewise, in order that the intellect understand something, it is necessary that it be assimilated to the known thingp307-5: therefore when it knows things other than the Word, it is necessary that it be assimilated not only to the Word itself, but also to things other than the Word; but it cannot be assimilated to things other than the Word except through the reception of other likenesses: therefore in order that some created intellect, whether Christ's or another's, know other things in the Word, it does not suffice to know the Word itself.
3. Likewise, if I were to gaze upon some thing, the likeness of that thing would be generated in me: likewise, if I were to gaze upon a mirror, not only would the likeness of the mirror be generated in me, but also the likeness of the thingp307-6: therefore if the eternal Word contains in itself the ideas of all things, the likenesses of things will be generated in the soul gazing upon it, just as if the soul beheld the things themselves: therefore it seems that a thing in the Word is known by a created intellect not only through the Word itself, but also through impressed likenesses: therefore through one knowledge and another.
4. Likewisep307-7, it happens that the Word itself is known as light, and it happens that it is known as exemplar — now the Word is known as light when it is known in itself; and it is known as exemplar when other things are known in it — but it is impossible to know the Word itself as light without a light being infused into us which makes us conformed to that light: therefore it is impossible to know it as exemplar without a knowledge being infused into us which makes us conformed to those eternal ideas and grounds: therefore neither did Christ's soul know in any other mode than this. If you should say that that which is assimilated to the Word as light, and to the Word as exemplar, is the samep307-8; on the contrary: it is possible to know the Word itself, and yet the thing whose exemplar the Word is would not be known: therefore it seems that the ground by which one is conformed to the Word as light, and to the Word as exemplar, is different.
5. Likewise, let us suppose that someone in the Word knows some thing by seeing the Word itself, and afterward ceases to see, as was the case in the rapture of Paulp308-1; it is possible that such a one, after he has ceased to see the essence of the Word itself, has a memory of what he saw in the Word; but this would not be, unless the thing in the Word were known by a knowledge other than the Word itself: therefore Christ's soul and every other soul, if it knows things in the Word, [knows them] not through the same knowledge, but through one knowledge and another.
Conclusion.
Christ's soul, by the same habit by which it knows the Word, knows things in the Word, there being only a difference as to relation.
I respond: For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that the habit of knowledge is to be enumerated according to the ground of knowingp308-2. Since therefore the eternal Word is the most sufficient ground of knowing all things other than itself — which is clear, because by itself it knows all things — for thisp308-3, that someone know things in the Word, there need not be in him a twofold knowledge, of the Word itself and of the known thing itself; twofold, I say, as to the habit of knowing, on account of this, that one having the deiformity of glory, by which he knows the Word itself, has that whereby he is assimilated to the Word itself, which is the perfect ground of knowing all other things, and so, in knowing the Word, he has the habit by which he can know other things, so that that habit, insofar as it is said to be of the Word and of things other than the Word, differs only by relation. — For by the same thing by which the eternal Word is light and truth in itself, it is the exemplar of other things; and therefore he who has that whereby he is conformed to the highest truth itself has that whereby he is conformed to the ground of knowing all things. Since therefore the eternal Word is by the same [thing] the ground of knowing itself and other things; therefore I say that Christ's soul, by the same habit by which it knows the Word itself, knows things in the Word, there being only a difference as to comparison or relation. — The arguments which show this are therefore to be conceded.
1. To that which is first objected to the contrary, that it is necessary that the possible intellect be formed to the likeness of the understood thing, etc.; it must be said that it is not alike, because, although God can be the perfecting form of nothing, he can nevertheless be the exemplary form and the ground of knowing; therefore, although he does not perfect matter through himselfp308-4, by giving it being and completion, he can nevertheless through himself make the intellect know any other created thing. And if you object that it is still necessary that the possible intellect be in some way formed, in order that it understand something in act; it must be said that thus it is in the matter proposed. For it is formed by something, but this is nothing other than the very influx of the eternal light, through which it becomes deiform and conformed to the Word itself, which is the ground of knowing other things; and therefore consequently it becomes in act with respect to the other things knowable by the Word, and through the likeness of the Word — which Word indeed is the likeness of all things — it becomes in a certain way similar to all things. Therefore there is no need that a new habit be given to it for knowing.
2. And through this is clear the answer to the following [objection], which objects that it is necessary that the knower be assimilated to the knowable; for the assimilation which suffices for knowledge is not only through a species received from the thingp308-5, or even through a species appropriated to the thing itself, but also through an assimilation to that which is the ground of knowing the rest.
3. To that which is objected, that if I were to gaze upon a thing, the likeness of the thing would be generated in me, and likewise, if [I gazed] upon a mirror, the likeness of the mirror and of the thing itself would be generated in me; it must be said that if in the mirror the likeness of the thing did not differ from the very form of the mirror, there would be no need that another likeness of knowing be generated in me with respect to the mirror itself and with respect to the thing itself shining in the mirror; and thus it must be understood in the matter proposed, for the idea in God is nothing other than the eternal truth itself, as was shown in the first bookp308-6.
4. To that which is objected, that it is impossible for me to know the eternal light without my being made conformed to it through the influx of light; it must be said that this is true; but because God, by the very same [thing] by which he isp308-7 light in himself, is the exemplar of other things; therefore there is no need that I be made conformed to him by one thing and another, as he is light and as he is exemplar, but by the same [thing] standing in another mode. For the same light of glory enables the soul itself to know the eternal Word itself, insofar as the light is compared to the Word itself under the formal character of light; the same also enables the soul itself to know things other than the Word in the Word itself, insofar as it is compared to the Word itself, as it is the exemplar of other things. — And because the Word is an exemplar representing voluntarily, therefore that light is not compared except to those things which the divine exemplar itself voluntarily represents; hence it is that through that light, althoughp308-8 it knows the Word, there is no need that it know all other things than the Word, of which the Word itself is the exemplar. — And if you object that, although in God wisdom and goodness are the same, yet that by which I am conformed to the divine wisdom and goodness is in me one thing and another: therefore by parity of reasoning there will be anotherp308-9 [thing] by which the intellect is conformed to the Word itself, according as it is light, and according as it is exemplar;
it must be said that it is not alike, because the formal character of truth and of exemplarity in the same [thing] differs only by comparison. For the exemplar itself is nothing other than the eternal truth, as it is the ground of knowing other things.
5. To that which is objected last concerning the memory which remains; it must be said that if some intellect seesp309-1 certain things in the Word by the knowledge of glory and ceases to see the Word, he does not remember the knowledge of those things, except insofar as he remembers the knowledge of the Word, unless he had otherwisep309-2 an impressed knowledge of those things, or unless God should impress [it] on him dispensatively; [but] then this would not be fitting. But, as has been said, in order that some created intellect, whether Christ's or another's, know things in the Word, it suffices that it have the deiformity of glory, by which it is similar to the Word itself; nor is it necessary that likenesses of things, or particular habits, be given to it, because the highest truth itself suffices it more for knowing all things than all the special likenesses of things. Hence the angel, and also Christ's soul, knows things more limpidly in the Word than it knows [them] in themselves, or in their proper genus.
I. According to the common teaching, things which in their proper genus have created and limited being are said to be in God in a most eminent mode, in whom they «are in a threefold way, namely as in the producing principle, and thus they are under the character of power; as in the expressing exemplar, and thus they are under the character of knowledge; and as in the conserving end, under the character of will» (1. Sent. d. 36. a. 2. q. 4; cfr. ibid. q. 2.). This eminent being of things, inasmuch as it is the same as the divine being, is without doubt seen by him who immediately sees the divine essence. But here inquiry is made concerning creatures according to their formal and proper being, and it is commonly conceded that the knowledge of the Blessed, which they have in the Word, is terminated at this too. As to the mode of this knowledge, however, Ockham with his Nominalists departs from the common opinion of the other doctors, teaching that things are known by the Blessed in God not immediately, but causally, since the act of seeing these is wholly caused by God, the intellect being purely passive, and the vision of each object being one and another (see the explanation in Biel, here the single question). — But the other masters agree in this, that the Blessed by the same light or habit and act in the divine essence, or (speaking by appropriation) in the Word as in the first known object, know also created things. The assertion, however, that by the same act the primary and secondary object is seen, St. Bonaventure restricts, teaching that the actual vision or consideration of creatures does not extend to all created and possible things except successively; hence according to him the act of seeing some of these can be separated from the single and permanent act of seeing the divine essence; yet if these are seen in act, then they are seen by no other and distinct act than that by which the essence itself is seen (cfr. here q. 2 ad 4 and the explanation of the last fundamentum and the scholion to the following question). — This knowledge of things in God is called by Augustine morning [knowledge], which is distinguished from evening [knowledge] (cfr. II. Sent. d. 4. a. 3.). — The common doctrine rests on two fundamenta, namely that the divine essence itself is for the Blessed the ground of knowing, and that the same, as the first and highest truth, not only expresses itself, but also most perfectly all other things and every participated truth, as is well explained here, especially in the solutions of the opposing [arguments]. But many things are supposed here which were said in the first book of the Sentences concerning truth (d. 8. p. I. q. 1.), concerning the ideas (d. 35 throughout), concerning the divine knowledge (d. 39.); these principles, drawn together from many places, are read in the scholion to d. 35. q. 1. Here we observe only three things.
1. «Each created thing has its own proper likeness in the genus of creature» (here, the 5th fundamentum), which is for the intellect the ground of understanding it. For a thing, just as it has being from God, so also [has] the power of expressing itself as a certain participated truth. This property, however, has a twofold limitation or imperfection annexed, namely that properly it can express nothing but itself for the bringing-forth of knowledge, and that it cannot supply even this totally and perfectly.
2. This limitation and imperfection must be wholly removed from the mode by which the divine essence expresses itself to itself; hence it must be held that it, as the highest and uncreated Truth, manifests itself to itself in an infinite and most perfect mode, and is at once the exemplar of every participated truth, shining and expressed in it.
3. Hence the same divine essence, which is light and truth in itself, is also the most perfect and unlimited ground of knowing both God and all things other than God, which according to a threefold causality (as was said above in the cited place) are in it (here, the solution to [objection] 4). For since the divine essence most eminently contains all created being, therefore it also eminently contains the formal character of knowing it; hence in a higher mode it is the moving ground of the intellect for knowing than the thing's own character or impressed species could be. For the divine exemplar imports an «assimilation outside the genus» (1. Sent. d. 36. a. 3. q. 2.), namely above the universal and particular cause, and above the common and proper likeness, so that, being in no way constrained, it extends one [exemplar] to all things, and yet most distinctly expresses each effect as to all its conditions. This is admirably taught in 1. Sent. d. 35. q. 2. ad 2. 3. 4.
II. For the understanding of the two following questions, what is here said (in the solution to [objection] 2) concerning the threefold mode by which the knower can be assimilated to the knowable is especially to be noted; likewise (at [objection] 3), concerning the difference of the uncreated mirror from the created mirror (cfr. also 1. Sent. d. 3. p. 1. q. 2. 3.); finally (at [objection] 4), that the Word is a mirror representing voluntarily.
III. Alex. of Hales, Summa p. III. q. 13. m. 5. a. 1. — Scotus, concerning this and the 2 following questions, in both Scripta, here q. 2. — St. Thomas, here a. 1. quaestiuncula 4; Summa III. q. 10. a. 2; de Veritate q. 20. a. 4, q. 8. a. 4. — Bl. Albert, concerning this and the following questions, here a. 1.2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 2. quaestiuncula 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2. q. 2. — Durandus, concerning this and the following questions, here q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, concerning this and the following questions, here q. 2. — Biel, in the cited place.
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- Non pauci codd. nec non edd. 1, 2 voculae eodem praefigunt in, et mox omittunt Christi. Deinde iidem codd. etiam voci actu praemittunt in, et cod. U pro noscat exhibet cognoscat.Not a few codices, as well as editions 1 and 2, prefix in to the word eodem, and shortly after omit Christi. Then the same codices also place in before the word actu, and codex U gives cognoscat for noscat.
- Libr. II. c. 8. n. 16. seqq., IV. c. 23. n. 40. seq. et c. 29. n. 46. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 1, ubi quaestio solvitur de Angelorum cognitione per species innatas; et d. 4. a. 3. q. 1. seq., ubi agitur de eorum cognitione in Verbo et de relatione, quae est inter cognitionem matutinam et vespertinam.Book II c. 8 n. 16 ff., IV c. 23 n. 40 f. and c. 29 n. 46. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 1, where the question of the angels' knowledge through innate species is resolved; and d. 4. a. 3. q. 1 f., where their knowledge in the Word is treated, and the relation which is between the morning and the evening knowledge.
- Vide I. Sent. d. 6. q. 3, d. 27. p. II. q. 2. De propositione subnexa cfr. ibid. d. 35. q. 1. seqq. et d. 36. a. 2. q. 1. seq., ubi etiam principia argg. seqq. insinuantur. — Vat. ante tanquam interiicit et. In fine arg. pro a Verbo cod. R in Verbo.See I. Sent. d. 6. q. 3, d. 27. p. II. q. 2. Concerning the proposition subjoined, cfr. ibid. d. 35. q. 1. ff. and d. 36. a. 2. q. 1. f., where also the principles of the following arguments are insinuated. — The Vatican [edition] inserts et before tanquam. At the end of the argument, for a Verbo (from the Word) codex R [reads] in Verbo (in the Word).
- Cod. O addit sicut melius cognoscitur res per speculum quam per propriam similitudinem.Codex O adds just as a thing is better known through a mirror than through its proper likeness.
- Nam, ut Aristot., II. de Caelo et mundo, text. 22. (c. 4.) ait, «prius natura in unoquoque genere est unum multis, et simplex composito».For, as Aristotle says, On the Heavens and the World II, text 22 (c. 4), «prior in nature in each genus is the one to the many, and the simple to the composite».
- Cfr. Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 17. seq. (c. 3.). Cfr. etiam II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 4. De minori vide ibid. d. 12. a. 1. q. 1. — Aliquanto inferius pro et similitudinem codd. E I L N U V X Z aa in similitudinem.Cfr. Aristotle, On the Soul III, text 17 f. (c. 3). Cfr. also II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 4. On the minor [premise] see ibid. d. 12. a. 1. q. 1. — Somewhat below, for et similitudinem codices E I L N U V X Z aa [read] in similitudinem.
- Aristot., VI. Ethic. c. 1: Si quidem ex similitudine quadam et affinitate cognitio existit ipsis (scil. potentiis animae). Cfr. August., IX. de Trin. c. 11. n. 16. — Paulo inferius post similitudinum aliarum cod. A supplet rerum. Subinde pro alias res cod. U alia.Aristotle, Ethics VI c. 1: if indeed from a certain likeness and affinity knowledge arises in them (namely, in the powers of the soul). Cfr. Augustine, On the Trinity IX c. 11 n. 16. — A little below, after similitudinum aliarum codex A supplies rerum. Thereafter, for alias res codex U [reads] alia.
- Simul audi: in speculo repraesentatae. — Subinde pro ergo cod. U ergo sicut.At the same time understand: represented in the mirror. — Thereafter, for ergo codex U [reads] ergo sicut.
- Codd. M O T Z Item Gregorius.Codices M O T Z [read] Likewise Gregory.
- Codd. M O omittunt et, pro quo Vat. cum cod. cc substituit per. Mox pro et tamen edd. etsi. Mallemus ut tamen.Codices M O omit et, for which the Vatican [edition] with codex cc substitutes per. Shortly, for et tamen the editions [read] etsi. We should prefer ut tamen.
- Epist. II. Cor. 12, 2. seqq. — Circa finem arg. pro si cognoscit edd. si cognoscat.Epistle 2 Cor. 12:2 ff. — Toward the end of the argument, for si cognoscit the editions [read] si cognoscat.
- Cfr. Aristot., VI. Ethic. c. 3. seqq.Cfr. Aristotle, Ethics VI c. 3 ff.
- Edd. ideo ad hoc. Paulo superius pro Quoniam ergo codd. F G I L N Z aa Unde ergo.The editions [read] ideo ad hoc. A little above, for Quoniam ergo codices F G I L N Z aa [read] Unde ergo.
- Non pauci codd. non recte se ipsam. Paulo inferius pro aliud edd. cum cod. cc substituunt aliquod et mox omittunt adhuc. Subinde pro in actu cod. K actu.Not a few codices, incorrectly, [read] se ipsam. A little below, for aliud the editions with codex cc substitute aliquod and shortly omit adhuc. Thereafter, for in actu codex K [reads] actu.
- Cod. K ab ipsa re.Codex K [reads] ab ipsa re (from the thing itself).
- Dist. 35. q. 1.Distinction 35, q. 1.
- Edd. 1, 2 per ideam ipsam, quae est.Editions 1 and 2 [read] per ideam ipsam, quae est (through the idea itself, which is).
- Supple: anima.Supply: anima (the soul).
- Cod. F aliud et aliud.Codex F [reads] aliud et aliud (one and another).
- Codd. F U videret.Codices F U [read] videret (would see).
- Ita codd. C H N T bb, in aliis et edd. habuit. Mox post vel cod. U subiicit etiam. Deinde pro tunc hoc non esset opportunum [i. e. tunc non oporteret memorari de cognitione Verbi] non pauci codd. tunc hoc [cod. A tunc hoc tamen] non est opportunum. Paulo inferius substituimus ex codd. G H I L V Z aa bb Christi pro Christus. Demum pro per quam sit cod. G et edd. 1, 2 per quam fit, et pro ei dari cod. G solus ei dare.Thus codices C H N T bb; in the others and the editions, habuit. Shortly, after vel codex U adds etiam. Then, for tunc hoc non esset opportunum [i.e. then there would be no need to remember the knowledge of the Word] not a few codices [read] tunc hoc [codex A: tunc hoc tamen] non est opportunum. A little below, we substitute from codices G H I L V Z aa bb Christi for Christus. Finally, for per quam sit codex G and editions 1 and 2 [read] per quam fit, and for ei dari codex G alone [reads] ei dare.