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Dist. 3, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 3

Textus Latinus
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Articulus unicus. De cognoscibilitate Dei.

Quaestio I. Utrum Deus sit cognoscibilis a creatura.

Circa primum, quod non sit Deus cognoscibilis a creatura, ostenditur

1. Per auctoritatem Dionysii de Divinis Nominibus1: « Deum neque dicere neque intelligere possibile est. »

2. Item ostenditur ratione per quadruplicem suppositionem, quam necesse est esse in cognitione, scilicet proportionem, unionem sive receptionem, iudicium et2 informationem. Intellectus enim non intelligit nisi quod est sibi proportionabile, et quod sibi aliquo modo unitur, et de quo iudicat, et a quo acies intelligentiae informatur.

Ex prima suppositione arguitur sic: necesse est, esse proportionem cognoscentis ad cognoscibile3; sed Dei ad intellectum non est proportio, quia Deus

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est infinitus, et intellectus finitus: ergo etc. Praeterea, si est aliqua proportio, videtur quod non sit sufficiens, quia plus distat verum increatum ab intellectu humano, quam quodlibet creatum intelligibile a sensu4. Sed sensus, qui est perceptivus sensibilis, nunquam elevatur ad cognitionem intelligibilis creati: ergo nec intellectus unquam elevabitur ad cognitionem intelligibilis increati.

3. Item, ex secunda suppositione sic: necesse est, esse unionem cognoscibilis ad cognoscentem, ita quod unum sit in altero5; sed cognoscens non est in cognoscibili, sed e converso; sed impossibile est, infinitum capi ab ipso finito: ergo impossibile est esse in illo: ergo Deum esse in intellectu est impossibile, cum sit infinitus.

4. Item, ex tertia suppositione sic: ad cognitionem necesse est, esse in cognoscente iudicium de cognito; sed omne iudicans habet posse super iudicatum6; finitum autem non habet posse super infinitum: ergo de illo non iudicat; sed ad cognitionem requirebatur iudicium: ergo intellectus finitus non cognoscit Deum infinitum, super quem non habet posse.

5. Item, ex quarta sic: necesse est, intellectum cognoscentem informari a cognito7; sed omne quod alterum informat, aut informat per essentiam, aut per similitudinem; sed Deus non informat per essentiam, quia nulli unitur ut forma, nec per similitudinem abstractam, quia similitudo abstracta est spiritualior eo a quo abstrahitur; Deo autem nihil est spiritualius nec potest esse: ergo etc.

Contra:

1. Anima rationalis est ad imaginem Dei. Sed sicut dicit Augustinus in libro de Trinitate, et est in littera praesentis distinctionis8: « Eo mens est imago Dei, quo capax Dei est et particeps esse potest ». Capere autem non est secundum substantiam vel essentiam, quia sic est in omnibus creaturis: ergo per cognitionem et amorem: ergo Deus potest cognosci a creatura.

2. Item, ratione ostenditur sic: omnis cognitio spiritualis fit ratione lucis, et ratione lucis increatae, ut dicit Augustinus in Soliloquiis9; sed lux est maxime cognoscibilis, et Deus est summa lux: ergo maxime est cognoscibilis ipsi animae: ergo etc.

3. Item, cum sit10 cognitio aliquorum per praesentiam, aliquorum per similitudinem, illa cognoscuntur verius, quae cognoscuntur per praesentiam, ut dicit Augustinus11; sed Deus est unitus ipsi animae per praesentiam: ergo Deus verius cognoscitur quam alia, quae cognoscuntur per similitudinem.

4. Item, sicut se habet summa bonitas ad dilectionem, sic summa veritas ad cognitionem; sed summa bonitas est summe amabilis ab affectu: ergo12 summa veritas est summe cognoscibilis ab intellectu.

5. Item, unumquodque efficacius potest in id ad quod naturaliter ordinatur13; sed intellectus noster naturaliter ordinatur ad cognitionem summae lucis:

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ergo illa maxime cognoscibilis ab intellectu.

Conclusio. Deus, in se summe cognoscibilis, etiam nobis esset summe cognoscibilis, si non esset defectus ex parte intellectus nostri.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Deus in se tanquam summa lux est summe cognoscibilis; et tanquam lux summe intellectum nostrum complens14, et quantum est de se, esset summe cognoscibilis etiam nobis, nisi esset aliquis defectus a parte virtutis cognoscentis; qui quidem non tollitur perfecte nisi per deiformitatem gloriae. Concedendae sunt igitur rationes15, quod Deus sit cognoscibilis a creatura et etiam clarissime cognoscibilis, quantum est de se, nisi aliquid esset impediens vel deficiens ex parte intellectus, sicut post patebit16.

Ad obiecta in contrarium:

1. Ad primum dicendum, quod est cognitio per comprehensionem et per apprehensionem. Cognitio per apprehensionem consistit in manifestatione veritatis rei cognitae; cognitio vero comprehensionis consistit in inclusione totalitatis17. Ad primam cognitionem requiritur proportio convenientiae; et talis est in anima respectu Dei, quia « quodam modo est anima omnia »18, per assimilationem ad omnia, quia nata est cognoscere omnia, et maxime est capax Dei per assimilationem, quia est imago et similitudo Dei. Quantum ad cognitionem comprehensionis requiritur proportio aequalitatis et aequiparantiae; et talis non est in anima respectu Dei, quia anima est finita, sed Deus est infinitus; et ideo hanc non habet; et de hac intelligit Dionysius, et de illa currit19 obiectio, de alia vero non.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de distantia intelligibilis et sensibilis; dicendum, quod20 est distantia secundum rationem entis, et secundum rationem cognoscibilis. Primo modo est maior distantia; secundo modo non, quia utrumque est intelligibile, scilicet Deus et anima. Non sic est de intellectu et sensu; quia sensus est potentia determinata21, sed intellectus non.

3. Ad illud, quod infinitum non capitur a finito; dicunt aliqui, quod capere infinitum est dupliciter, scilicet quantum ad essentiam; et sic capitur; et quantum ad virtutem22; et sic non capitur, sicut punctus a linea totus attingitur secundum substantiam, sed non totaliter secundum virtutem. Sed ista solutio non videtur solvere, quia in Deo idem est essentia quod virtus, et utraque est infinita.

Ideo dicendum, quod duplex est infinitum: unum, quod se habet per oppositionem ad simplex; et tale non capitur a finito, quale est infinitum molis; aliud est, quod habet infinitatem cum simplicitate, ut Deus; et tale infinitum, quia simplex, est ubique totum, quia infinitum, in nullo sic est, quin extra illud sit. Sic intelligendum est in cognitione Dei. Et ideo non sequitur, quod si cognoscitur totus, quod comprehendatur, quia intellectus eius totalitatem non includit, sicut nec creatura23 immensitatem.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur: Iudicans habet posse etc.; dicendum, quod iudicare de aliquo est dupliciter: primo24 modo discernendo, utrum sit vel non sit; et hoc modo convenit iudicium omni intellectui cognoscenti respectu omnis obiecti; alio modo approbando vel reprobando, utrum ita debeat esse; et sic non iudicat de veritate, sed secundum ipsam de aliis, sicut dicit Augustinus de Vera Religione25, quod « iudex non iudicat de lege, sed secundum ipsam iudicat de aliis ». Et de hoc modo verum est quod dicit Augustinus, quod « nullus de illa veritate iudicat, nullus tamen sine illa iudicat ». Et de hoc secundo26 modo verum est quod opponit, quod iudicans potest super iudicatum; de primo vero non est verum, quod possit super; potest tamen dirigi ut in obiectum adminiculo illius.

5. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur de informatione;

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dicendum, quod Deus est praesens ipsi animae et omni intellectui per veritatem; ideo non est necesse, ab ipso abstrahi similitudinem, per quam cognoscatur; nihilominus tamen27, dum cognoscitur ab intellectu, intellectus informatur quadam notitia, quae est velut similitudo quaedam non abstracta, sed impressa, inferior Deo, quia in natura inferiori est, superior tamen anima, quia facit ipsam meliorem. Et hoc dicit Augustinus nono de Trinitate, capitulo undecimo28: « Quemadmodum, cum per sensus corporum discimus corpora, fit eorum aliqua similitudo in animo nostro: ita cum Deum novimus, fit aliqua similitudo Dei; illa notitia tamen inferior est, quia in inferiore natura est ».

Scholion

I. Verba S. Doctoris in 2 fund., quod ratione lucis increatae fit omnis spiritualis cognitio, et infra ad 5, quod Deus est praesens omni intellectui per veritatem, aliaque similia plurima, quae praesertim in Itinerario mentis in Deum et in Hexaemeron leguntur, a Malebranche aliisque multis ita intellecta sunt, ut S. Bonaventuram cum ipsis docere putaverint, intellectum humanum videre res intelligibiles obscure quidem, sed immediate in Verbo sive in rationibus aeternis. Sed haec sententia, sicut non potest conciliari cum Decreto S. Congr. Inquisitionis (18. Sept. 1861), quo reprobatur propositio: « Immediata Dei cognitio, habitualis saltem, intellectui humano essentialis est, ita ut sine ea nihil cognoscere possit, siquidem est ipsum lumen intellectuale »; ita etiam manifeste contradicit exploratae nostri Doctoris doctrinae. Ipse enim docet, nec hominem in statu innocentiae, nec ipsos Angelos naturalibus suis viribus immediatam aliquam Dei visionem sive cognitionem habere posse. Quoad Angelos cfr. II. S. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 2, ubi inter alia dicit: « Divina lux propter sui eminentiam est inaccessibilis viribus omnis creaturae »; quoad homines in statu integritatis cfr. II. Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 3, qui locus est omnino peremptorius. Reiectis enim variis opinionibus, diffuse ibi docetur, in solo statu gloriae videri Deum immediate et in sui substantia et sine obscuritate; « in statu vero innocentiae et naturae lapsae videtur Deus mediante speculo, sed differenter, quia in statu innocentiae videbatur Deus per speculum clarum; nulla enim erat in anima peccati nebula; in statu vero miseriae videtur per speculum obscuratum per peccatum primi hominis; et ideo nunc videtur per speculum et in aenigmate ». Reprobatur ibi etiam sententia eorum, qui saltem « extra » quendam gradum immediate Deum videndi viris contemplativis pro hac vita a Deo concedi putarunt. Concludit his verbis valde notandis: « Unde si quae auctoritates illud dicere inveniantur, quod Deus in praesenti ab homine videtur et cernitur, non sunt intelligendae, quod videatur in sua essentia, sed quod in aliquo effectu, inferiori cognoscitur » etc. — Idem docetur III. Sent. d. 14. a. 1. q. 3. et simul refutatur distinctio, quam quidam faciunt inter claritatem Dei eiusque naturam, quia « ipsa natura est claritas et claritas natura », et « non differt essentia luminis et actus lucendi ». Et q. 2. dicitur, quod Deus, si immediate cognoscitur, « iam non secundum partem, sed totus cognoscitur ». Cfr. etiam I. Sent. d. 17. p. I. dub. 2. aliique loci passim. Plura vide apud Em. Card. Zigliara: Della Luce intellettuale II. c. 14-18; P. Lepidi: Examen philos. theol. de Ontologismo c. 17; et ex nostris, P. Ludovicus a Castroplanio: Seraphicus Doctor S. Bonaventurae, Romae 1874. p. 61. et seqq.

S. Doctor omnino contrarius est etiam errori Averroistarum, qui unitatem Intellectus agentis in omnibus hominibus statuebant. Affirmat enim, quod « hic error destruit totum ordinem vivendi et agendi » (Serm. de Dono intellectus, Supplem. Bonelli, t. III. col. 475.), et manifestissime docet, in anima humana, quae ad imaginem Dei creata est, essentialiter esse potentiam intellectualem, quae propriam et activam virtutem ad eliciendos varios actus intellectuales habet; unde lumen quoddam creatum apte vocari potest. Hoc docet II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 4; et p. II. a. 1. q. 1. in corp., ubi dicit, quod « ratio superior non solum habet iudicare secundum leges aeternas, sed etiam habet iudicare secundum lumen proprium et secundum lumen sibi ab inferiori acquisitum ». Cfr. d. 17. a. 1. q. 1. ad 6; Hexaem. Serm. 12, et passim; cfr. etiam Alex. Hal., S. p. III q. 27. m. 1. a. 2. et p. II. q. 69. m. 2. a. 3.

Licet ergo immediatum et proximum principium actuum intellectualium sit animae potentia, sive lumen creatum naturaliter menti inditum, tamen iuxta sententiam scholasticorum communem veritas, certitudo et infallibilitas cognitionis humanae refundi debet in primam et increatam veritatem, quae est omnium rerum et intellectuum prima causa efficiens, exemplaris et finalis. Unde recte dicitur, quod intellectus creatus omnia vera cognoscat in rationibus aeternis, non ut in obiecto prius cognito, sed ut in cognitionis principio, sive ut verbis Alex. Hal. (S. p. I. q. 2. m. 3. a. 1. ad 1.) utamur, non in rationibus, sed per eas. Ita S. Thom., S. I. q. 84. a. 5; q. 88. a. 3. ad 1; q. 12. a. 11. ad 3; q. 16. a. 6. ad 1; IV. Sent. d. 49. q. 2. a. 7. ad 9; S. c. Gent. III. c. 47; de Veritate q. 1. a. 4; q. 10. a. 11. ad 12; Quodl. 10. q. 4. a. 7. et alibi. — Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 27. m. 1. a. 2. ad 1. — Scot., I. Sent. d. 3. q. 4. praesertim n. 18-23. — Richard. a Med., II. Sent. d. 24. a. 2. q. 4; aliique multi.

Fundamentalis huius doctrinae ratio, quae communiter ab antiquis scholasticis proponitur, haec est, quod increatae Veritatis lux secundum similitudinem refulget in veritate creata, sive haec accipiatur in sensu obiectivo, sive subiectivo. De veritate creata in sensu obiectivo dicit S. Bonav. (Hexaem. Serm. 12.): « In qualibet creatura est refulgentia divini exemplaris, sed cum tenebris permixta ». In sensu subiectivo veritas creata est ipsum mentis lumen creatum, quod est impressio quaedam primae veritatis, cuius similitudo refulget in intellectu nostro, qui, ut imago Dei, « fert in se a sua origine lumen vultus divini » (S. Bonav. II. Sent. d. 16. a. 1. q. 1; cfr. S. Thom. Expos. in Psal. 34; S. I. q. 105. a. 3.).

Ratio secunda est, quod Deus non tantum lumen intellectus ad exemplar divinum creat et conservat, sed etiam ad actus eiusdem concurrit, dum immediate eum movet et dirigit. Etiam hac ratione actus intellectuales a Deo dependere et in eum debere aliquo modo refundi, est sententia communis antiquorum scholasticorum; cfr. S. Thom., S. I. q. 105. a. 3; I. II. q. 10. a. 4. — Scot., pluribus in locis, collectis ab Hieron. de Montefortino in Sum. Scoti, Romae, 1728, p. I. q. 105. a. 3-5. — Iste concursus divinus non immerito quaedam illuminatio Dei immediata vocari potest, uti bene docent Em. Card. Zigliara in opere: Della Luce intellettuale IV. c. 12. et P. Kleutgen in libro: Philosophie der Vorzeit t. I. 1. Abth. n. 60; cfr. etiam S. Thom. in Ioan. c. 1. lect. 3. n. 2; S. III. q. 9. a. 4. ad 2; S. I. q. 79. a. 4; Quaest. unica de anima a. 5. ad 9; Opusc. 73 supra Boeth. q. 1. a. 4. et alibi.

Hanc cooperationem divinam sive illuminationem multum urgent et S. August. et S. Bonav. Mens Doctoris Seraphici de hac re, sexcenties breviter expressa, fuse declaratur anecdota quadam quaestione disputata, a P. Fidele a Fanna reperta et quoad partem principalem in lucem edita (Ratio novae collectionis etc. Taurini, 1874, p. 222). Hanc quaestionem integram, additis aliis documentis ineditis tum ipsius Bonav., tum trium eiusdem discipulorum, nempe Matthaei ab Aquasparta, Ioan. Pecchami et cuiusdam Eustachii, Deo favente, libro speciali proxime in lucem dabimus, quo tum sententia S. Doctoris penitus declarabitur, tum demonstrabitur, B. Albertum M. aliosque antiquos omnino cum ipso Seraphico consentire, nec S. Thom. in re principali contrarium docere.

II. His praesuppositis, verba: « Deus est praesens omni intellectui per veritatem », nullam faciunt difficultatem, praesertim cum ab ipso S. Doctore interpretatio Ontologistarum explicite reprobetur (II. Sent. d. 10. a. 1. q. 1. ad 1, et ibid. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 2. ad 3. 4.). Egregie sinceram suam sententiam explicat infra d. 17. p. I. q. 4 in corp., ubi cum S. August. distinguit cognitionem per speciem a rebus materialibus abstractam ab illa cognitione, quae fit per veritatem, id est « per similitudinem infusam vel innatam »; et addit: « Utraque autem, quae sic cognoscuntur, dicuntur ab Augustino cognosci in veritate ». De similitudine vel habitu innato cfr. II. Sent. d. 39. a. 1. q. 2. — Recte S. Doctor (ad 5.) negat, Deum cognosci per similitudinem ab ipso abstractam, quia de Deo non habemus conceptum nisi analogum et aliunde formatum. Etiam S. Thom. (I. Sent. d. 3. q. 1. a. 1. ad 3.) docet: « Non dicimur cognoscere ea (Deum et Angelos) per abstractionem, sed per impressionem in intelligentias nostras ». Consentiunt B. Albert. (hic a. 2. ad 2.) et Petr. a Tar. (hic a. 1. ad 4.).

III. In solut. ad 5. verba: « Intellectus noster informatur quadam notitia, quae est velut similitudo quaedam non abstracta, sed impressa », explicari possunt de specie sive impressa sive expressa, quam intellectus format ex veritate creata et animae essentialiter impressa, de qua S. Doctor loquitur infra d. 17. p. II. q. 4. Non tamen excluditur, quod sub voce notitia intelligi possit etiam illa illuminatio divina, de qua supra locuti sumus. Hoc insinuare videntur alii loci S. Bonav., imprimis II. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 2. ad 4, ubi loquendo de cognitione Angelorum, sic concludit: « Adhuc est tertius modus cognoscendi, scil. per effectus visibiles et per substantias spirituales et per influentiam luminis connaturalis potentiae cognoscenti, quod est similitudo quaedam Dei non abstracta, sed infusa, inferior Deo, quia in inferiori natura » etc. Cfr. etiam quae de scientia Christi dicit III. Sent. d. 14. a. 2. q. 1. ad 1. 2. In hoc sensu istum locum S. Augustini, a S. Bonav. hic laudatum, intelligit Fr. Eustachius, discipulus S. Bonav., Doctor Parisiensis saec. XIII., uti colligitur ex quadam quaestione anecdota ipsius proxime a nobis in libro supra memorato edenda.

IV. Hanc et sequentem quaestionem mire illustrat S. Bonav. in Itiner. mentis in Deum, et Hexaem. Serm. 5. 10. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 2. m. 1. seqq. — Scot., hic q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 12. a. 12. — B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 1. a. 15; S. p. I. tr. 3. q. 13. m. 1. et q. 14. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic p. I. a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 33. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, I. Sent. d. 2. q. 9. et d. 3.

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English Translation

Sole Article. On the knowability of God.

Question I. Whether God is knowable by a creature.

Concerning the first, that God is not knowable by a creature, it is shown:

1. By the authority of Dionysius, On the Divine Names1: "It is possible neither to speak nor to understand God."

2. Likewise it is shown by reason through a fourfold presupposition, which must be present in cognition, namely proportion, union or reception, judgment, and2 information. For the intellect does not understand except what is proportionable to it, and what is in some way united to it, and concerning which it judges, and by which the edge of intelligence is informed.

From the first presupposition it is argued thus: it is necessary that there be a proportion of the knower to the knowable3; but there is no proportion of God to the intellect, because God

is infinite, and the intellect is finite: therefore etc. Moreover, if there is any proportion, it seems that it is not sufficient, because the uncreated truth is more distant from the human intellect than any created intelligible is from sense4. But sense, which is perceptive of the sensible, is never elevated to the cognition of a created intelligible: therefore neither will the intellect ever be elevated to the cognition of the uncreated intelligible.

3. Likewise, from the second presupposition thus: it is necessary that there be a union of the knowable to the knower, such that one is in the other5; but the knower is not in the knowable, but conversely; but it is impossible that the infinite be grasped by the finite: therefore it is impossible that it be in it: therefore that God be in the intellect is impossible, since He is infinite.

4. Likewise, from the third presupposition thus: for cognition it is necessary that there be in the knower a judgment about the known; but every judging thing has power over the thing judged6; but the finite does not have power over the infinite: therefore it does not judge concerning it; but for cognition a judgment was required: therefore the finite intellect does not know the infinite God, over whom it has no power.

5. Likewise, from the fourth thus: it is necessary that the knowing intellect be informed by the thing known7; but everything that informs another either informs by essence or by likeness; but God does not inform by essence, because He is united to nothing as form, nor by abstracted likeness, because an abstracted likeness is more spiritual than that from which it is abstracted; but nothing is more spiritual than God, nor can be: therefore etc.

On the contrary:

1. The rational soul is to the image of God. But as Augustine says in the book On the Trinity, and as is in the letter [of the Master] of the present distinction8: "The mind is the image of God in this, that it is capable of God and can be partaker [of Him]." But to be capable [of Him] is not according to substance or essence, because thus He is in all creatures: therefore [it is] through cognition and love: therefore God can be known by a creature.

2. Likewise, it is shown by reason thus: every spiritual cognition occurs by reason of light, and by reason of uncreated light, as Augustine says in the Soliloquies9; but light is most knowable, and God is the highest light: therefore He is most knowable to the soul itself: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, since there is10 cognition of some things through presence and of others through likeness, those things are more truly known which are known through presence, as Augustine says11; but God is united to the soul itself through presence: therefore God is more truly known than other things, which are known through likeness.

4. Likewise, as the highest goodness stands to love, so the highest truth to cognition; but the highest goodness is supremely lovable by affection: therefore12 the highest truth is supremely knowable by the intellect.

5. Likewise, each thing can more effectively [act] in that to which it is naturally ordered13; but our intellect is naturally ordered to the cognition of the highest light:

therefore that [light] is most knowable by the intellect.

Conclusion. God, in Himself supremely knowable, would also be supremely knowable to us, were there no defect on the part of our intellect.

I respond: It must be said that God in Himself, as the highest light, is supremely knowable; and as light supremely filling our intellect14, and so far as concerns Himself, would be supremely knowable also to us, unless there were some defect on the part of the power of the knower; which indeed is not perfectly taken away except through the deiformity of glory. Therefore the reasons15 are to be granted, that God is knowable by a creature and also most clearly knowable, so far as concerns Himself, unless there were something impeding or deficient on the part of the intellect, as will afterwards be made clear16.

To the objections to the contrary:

1. To the first it must be said that there is cognition through comprehension and through apprehension. Cognition through apprehension consists in the manifestation of the truth of the thing known; but cognition of comprehension consists in the inclusion of totality17. For the first cognition a proportion of fittingness is required; and such there is in the soul with respect to God, because "in a certain way the soul is all things"18, through assimilation to all things, since it is born to know all things, and is most capable of God through assimilation, because it is the image and likeness of God. As to the cognition of comprehension, a proportion of equality and parity is required; and such there is not in the soul with respect to God, because the soul is finite, but God is infinite; and therefore [the soul] does not have this; and of this Dionysius understands, and the objection runs19 concerning this, but concerning the other it does not.

2. To that which is objected concerning the distance of the intelligible and the sensible; it must be said that20 there is distance according to the account of being and according to the account of the knowable. In the first mode there is greater distance; in the second mode not, because each is intelligible, namely God and the soul. It is not so with the intellect and sense; because sense is a determinate power21, but the intellect is not.

3. To that which says that the infinite is not grasped by the finite; some say that to grasp the infinite is twofold, namely as to essence — and thus it is grasped; and as to power22 — and thus it is not grasped, just as a point is wholly reached by a line according to substance, but not totally according to power. But this solution does not seem to solve [the matter], because in God essence is the same as power, and each is infinite.

Therefore it must be said that the infinite is twofold: one, which stands by opposition to the simple — and such is not grasped by the finite, as is the infinite of mass; the other is that which has infinity together with simplicity, as God; and such an infinite, since it is simple, is everywhere whole, [and] since it is infinite, is in no thing in such a way that it is not beyond it. So it is to be understood in the cognition of God. And therefore it does not follow that if He is wholly known, He is comprehended, because the intellect does not include His totality, just as neither does a creature23 [include His] immensity.

4. To that which is objected: "The judging thing has power" etc.; it must be said that to judge concerning something is in two ways: in the first24 mode by discerning whether [a thing] is or is not; and in this mode judgment belongs to every knowing intellect with respect to every object; in the other mode by approving or reproving, whether [a thing] ought so to be; and thus it does not judge concerning truth, but according to it [judges] concerning other things, as Augustine says On True Religion25, that "the judge does not judge concerning the law, but according to it judges concerning other things." And concerning this mode it is true what Augustine says, that "no one judges concerning that truth, yet no one judges without it." And concerning this second26 mode it is true what the objection sets forth, that the judging thing has power over the thing judged; but concerning the first it is not true that it has power over it; nevertheless it can be directed as to [its] object by the support of that [truth].

5. To that which is finally objected concerning information;

it must be said that God is present to the soul itself and to every intellect through truth; therefore it is not necessary that a likeness be abstracted from Him through which He may be known; nevertheless27, while He is known by the intellect, the intellect is informed by a certain notice [notitia], which is as it were a certain likeness, not abstracted but impressed, inferior to God because it is in an inferior nature, yet superior to the soul, because it makes it better. And this Augustine says in the ninth [book] On the Trinity, chapter eleven28: "Just as, when through the senses of bodies we learn bodies, some likeness of them is made in our mind: so when we know God, some likeness of God is made; that notice, however, is inferior, because it is in an inferior nature."

Scholion

I. The words of the holy Doctor in the second fundamentum, that every spiritual cognition occurs by reason of uncreated light, and below to [the reply to] 5, that God is present to every intellect through truth, and very many other similar things, which are read especially in the Itinerary of the Mind into God and in the Hexaemeron, have been so understood by Malebranche and many others that they thought St. Bonaventure taught with them that the human intellect sees intelligible things — obscurely indeed, but immediately — in the Word or in the eternal reasons. But this opinion, as it cannot be reconciled with the Decree of the Sacred Congregation of the Inquisition (18 September 1861), by which the proposition is condemned: "Immediate cognition of God, at least habitual, is essential to the human intellect, so that without it it could know nothing, since it is the intellectual light itself"; so also manifestly contradicts the ascertained doctrine of our Doctor. For he himself teaches that neither man in the state of innocence nor the very Angels can by their natural powers have any immediate vision or cognition of God. As to the Angels, cf. II Sent. d. 3 p. II a. 2 q. 2, where among other things he says: "The divine light, on account of its eminence, is inaccessible to the powers of every creature"; as to men in the state of integrity, cf. II Sent. d. 23 a. 2 q. 3, which passage is altogether decisive. For, various opinions being rejected, it is there taught at length that only in the state of glory is God seen immediately and in His own substance and without obscurity; "but in the state of innocence and of fallen nature God is seen by means of a mirror, but differently, because in the state of innocence God was seen through a clear mirror, for there was no cloud of sin in the soul; but in the state of misery He is seen through a mirror darkened by the sin of the first man; and therefore now He is seen through a mirror and in an enigma." There too the opinion of those is reproved who thought that at least "to a certain extent" some degree of immediately seeing God is granted by God to contemplative men in this life. He concludes with these words very much to be noted: "Hence if any authorities are found to say that God is in the present life seen and discerned by man, they are not to be understood as meaning that He is seen in His essence, but that He is known in some lesser effect" etc. — The same is taught III Sent. d. 14 a. 1 q. 3, where there is at the same time refuted the distinction which some make between the clarity of God and His nature, because "the very nature is clarity and clarity nature," and "the essence of light and the act of shining do not differ." And in q. 2 it is said that God, if He is immediately known, "is then no longer known in part, but wholly." Cf. also I Sent. d. 17 p. I dub. 2 and other places throughout. See further in Em. Card. Zigliara, Della Luce intellettuale II. c. 14-18; P. Lepidi, Examen philos. theol. de Ontologismo c. 17; and among ours, P. Ludovicus a Castroplanio, Seraphicus Doctor S. Bonaventurae, Rome 1874, p. 61 ff.

The holy Doctor is also altogether contrary to the error of the Averroists, who established the unity of the Agent Intellect in all men. For he affirms that "this error destroys the whole order of living and acting" (Serm. de Dono intellectus, Supplem. Bonelli, t. III col. 475), and most manifestly teaches that in the human soul, which is created to the image of God, there is essentially an intellectual power which has its own and active virtue for eliciting various intellectual acts; whence it can fittingly be called a certain created light. This he teaches II Sent. d. 24 p. I a. 2 q. 4; and p. II a. 1 q. 1 in corp., where he says that "the higher reason not only has to judge according to the eternal laws, but also has to judge according to its own light and according to the light acquired by it from below." Cf. d. 17 a. 1 q. 1 ad 6; Hexaem. Serm. 12, and passim; cf. also Alex. Hal., S. p. III q. 27 m. 1 a. 2 and p. II q. 69 m. 2 a. 3.

Although therefore the immediate and proximate principle of intellectual acts is the power of the soul, or the created light naturally placed in the mind, nevertheless according to the common opinion of the scholastics the truth, certitude, and infallibility of human cognition must be referred back to the first and uncreated truth, which is the first efficient, exemplary, and final cause of all things and intellects. Hence it is rightly said that the created intellect knows all true things in the eternal reasons, not as in an object previously known, but as in a principle of cognition, or to use the words of Alex. Hal. (S. p. I q. 2 m. 3 a. 1 ad 1), not in the reasons, but through them. So St. Thomas, S. I q. 84 a. 5; q. 88 a. 3 ad 1; q. 12 a. 11 ad 3; q. 16 a. 6 ad 1; IV Sent. d. 49 q. 2 a. 7 ad 9; S. c. Gent. III c. 47; de Veritate q. 1 a. 4; q. 10 a. 11 ad 12; Quodl. 10 q. 4 a. 7, and elsewhere. — Alex. Hal., S. p. III q. 27 m. 1 a. 2 ad 1. — Scotus, I Sent. d. 3 q. 4 especially nn. 18-23. — Richard. a Med., II Sent. d. 24 a. 2 q. 4; and very many others.

The fundamental ground of this doctrine, which is commonly proposed by the ancient scholastics, is this: that the light of uncreated Truth shines forth according to likeness in created truth, whether this be taken in an objective or in a subjective sense. Concerning created truth in the objective sense St. Bonav. says (Hexaem. Serm. 12.): "In every creature there is a refulgence of the divine exemplar, but mixed with darknesses." In the subjective sense created truth is the very created light of the mind, which is a certain impression of the first truth, whose likeness shines forth in our intellect, which, as image of God, "bears in itself from its origin the light of the divine countenance" (S. Bonav. II Sent. d. 16 a. 1 q. 1; cf. S. Thom. Expos. in Psal. 34; S. I q. 105 a. 3).

The second ground is that God not only creates and conserves the light of the intellect according to the divine exemplar, but also concurs in its acts, while immediately moving and directing it. That for this reason also intellectual acts depend on God and ought in some way to be referred back to Him is the common opinion of the ancient scholastics; cf. S. Thom. S. I q. 105 a. 3; I-II q. 10 a. 4. — Scotus, in many places, collected by Hieron. de Montefortino in Sum. Scoti, Rome 1728, p. I q. 105 a. 3-5. — This divine concurrence can not unfittingly be called a certain immediate illumination of God, as Em. Card. Zigliara well teaches in the work Della Luce intellettuale IV. c. 12, and P. Kleutgen in the book Philosophie der Vorzeit t. I 1. Abth. n. 60; cf. also S. Thom. in Ioan. c. 1 lect. 3 n. 2; S. III q. 9 a. 4 ad 2; S. I q. 79 a. 4; Quaest. unica de anima a. 5 ad 9; Opusc. 73 supra Boeth. q. 1 a. 4, and elsewhere.

This divine cooperation or illumination is much urged by both St. Augustine and St. Bonaventure. The mind of the Seraphic Doctor concerning this matter, briefly expressed six hundred times over, is set out at length in a certain unpublished disputed question, discovered by P. Fidele a Fanna and as to the principal part brought to light (Ratio novae collectionis etc., Turin 1874, p. 222). This question in its entirety, with other unpublished documents added — both of Bonaventure himself and of three of his disciples, namely Matthew of Aquasparta, John Pecham, and a certain Eustace — God favoring, we shall shortly bring to light in a special book, in which the opinion of the holy Doctor will be both thoroughly set forth and it will be shown that Bl. Albert the Great and other ancients agree wholly with the Seraphic [Doctor], and that St. Thomas does not teach the contrary in the principal matter.

II. These things being presupposed, the words "God is present to every intellect through truth" present no difficulty, especially since the interpretation of the Ontologists is explicitly reproved by the holy Doctor himself (II Sent. d. 10 a. 1 q. 1 ad 1, and ibid. d. 3 p. II a. 2 q. 2 ad 3, 4). He admirably explains his sincere opinion below at d. 17 p. I q. 4 in corp., where with St. Augustine he distinguishes the cognition through a species abstracted from material things from that cognition which takes place through truth, that is, "through an infused or innate likeness"; and he adds: "Both things, however, which are thus known, are said by Augustine to be known in truth." Concerning an innate likeness or habit, cf. II Sent. d. 39 a. 1 q. 2. — Rightly does the holy Doctor (in [the reply to] 5.) deny that God is known through a likeness abstracted from Himself, because we have no concept of God except an analogous one and one formed from elsewhere. So too St. Thomas (I Sent. d. 3 q. 1 a. 1 ad 3) teaches: "We are not said to know them (God and the Angels) through abstraction, but through impression upon our intelligences." Bl. Albert (here a. 2 ad 2) and Peter of Tarentaise (here a. 1 ad 4) agree.

III. In the solution to [the reply to] 5, the words "Our intellect is informed by a certain notice, which is as it were a certain likeness, not abstracted but impressed," can be explained of the species, either impressed or expressed, which the intellect forms from created truth essentially impressed on the soul, concerning which the holy Doctor speaks below at d. 17 p. II q. 4. Yet it is not excluded that under the word notitia there can also be understood that divine illumination of which we have spoken above. Other places of St. Bonav. seem to suggest this, especially II Sent. d. 3 p. II a. 2 q. 2 ad 4, where speaking of the cognition of the Angels he concludes thus: "There is still a third mode of knowing, namely through visible effects and through spiritual substances and through the influence of a light connatural to the knowing power, which is a certain likeness of God not abstracted but infused, inferior to God because it is in an inferior nature" etc. Cf. also what he says of the knowledge of Christ III Sent. d. 14 a. 2 q. 1 ad 1, 2. In this sense that place of St. Augustine cited here by St. Bonav. is understood by Fr. Eustace, disciple of St. Bonav., Doctor of Paris in the 13th century, as is gathered from a certain unpublished question of his to be edited shortly by us in the book mentioned above.

IV. This and the following question St. Bonav. illustrates marvelously in the Itinerary of the Mind into God, and Hexaem. Serm. 5, 10. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I q. 2 m. 1 ff. — Scotus, here q. 1. — S. Thom., here q. 1 a. 1; S. I q. 12 a. 12. — Bl. Albert, I Sent. d. 1 a. 15; S. p. I tr. 3 q. 13 m. 1 and q. 14 m. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1 a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here p. I a. 1 q. 1. — Aegid. R., here 1. princ. q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, S. a. 33. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1. — Biel, I Sent. d. 2 q. 9 and d. 3.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Cap. 1. circa medium: Quem neque intelligere possibile est neque dicere (ed. Migne iuxta transl. Scoti Erigenae).
    [Dionysius, De Divinis Nominibus,] c. 1, near the middle: "Whom it is possible neither to understand nor to speak" (Migne ed., according to the translation of Scotus Eriugena).
  2. Omittitur contra codd. et ed. 1 in Vat. et.
    Et is omitted in the Vatican edition against the codices and ed. 1.
  3. Aristot., VI. Ethic. c. 1: Si quidem ex similitudine quadam et affinitate cognitio existit ipsis (scil. potentiis animae). — Paulo infra post intellectum subaudi creaturae sive humanum. Mox codd. et edd. inter se dissident; multi codd. ut AFGKMSTWXZ bb ee post infinitus omittunt minus bene et intellectus finitus; plures ut HY ff cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 ponunt sed pro et, cod. R vero; tandem cod. ee post intellectus addit noster; nihil duximus immutandum. — Aristot., I. de Caelo, text. 82. (c. 6.): Ratio autem nulla est infiniti ad finitum.
    Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VI, c. 1: "For if cognition exists in them (namely the powers of the soul) from a certain likeness and affinity." — A little further on, after intellectus, supply of a creature or human. Then the codices and editions disagree; many codices, as AFGKMSTWXZ bb ee, less suitably omit after infinitus the words et intellectus finitus; several, as HY ff with editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, put sed for et, and codex R vero; finally codex ee adds noster after intellectus; we have judged that nothing should be changed. — Aristotle, De Caelo I, text 82 (c. 6): "There is no ratio of the infinite to the finite."
  4. Ex mss. IXZ pro sensibili, quod Vat. cum plurimis mss. habet, substituimus sensu, quod contextui magis correspondet formamque argumenti completiorem reddit ac confirmatur ex Richardo a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. et Petro a Tar., hic q. 1, qui idem argumentum eodem modo proponunt. Paulo ante cod. K creato pro humano. — De propositione minore huius argumenti cfr. Boeth., V. de Consol. Prosa 4.
    From mss. IXZ, for sensibili, which the Vat. with most mss. has, we have substituted sensu, which corresponds better to the context and renders the form of the argument more complete, and is confirmed from Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1 q. 1, and Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, who propose the same argument in the same way. A little before, codex K [reads] creato for humano. — Concerning the minor proposition of this argument, cf. Boethius, De Consolatione V, Prose 4.
  5. Colligitur ex eo, quod cognitio sit actio immanens, de qua vide Aristot., IX. Metaph. text. 16. (VIII. 8.); et supponitur ab Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 6. et 37-39. (c. 4. et 8.), ubi dicit, animam esse locum formarum, ipsam cognoscendo quodammodo esse omnia, in ipsa non esse ipsas res, sed formas earum intellectumque esse formam formarum.
    It is gathered from the fact that cognition is an immanent action, concerning which see Aristotle, Metaphysics IX, text 16 (VIII. 8.); and it is presupposed by Aristotle, De Anima III, text 6 and 37-39 (c. 4 and 8), where he says that the soul is the place of forms, that by knowing it is somehow all things, that in it are not the things themselves but their forms, and that the intellect is the form of forms.
  6. August., de Vera Relig. c. 29. n. 53: Iudicare de corporibus non sentientis tantum vitae, sed etiam ratiocinantis etc., iam vero illud videre facillimum est, praestantiorem esse iudicantem, quam illa res est, de qua iudicatur. — Cod. X hic addit sicut dicit Augustinus.
    Augustine, On True Religion c. 29 n. 53: "To judge concerning bodies belongs not only to sentient life, but also to ratiocinating [life]," etc., "now it is most easy to see that he who judges is more excellent than the thing concerning which he judges." — Codex X here adds "as Augustine says."
  7. Textus Aristot. de hac re vide supra in arg. ex secunda suppositione. — De duplici modo informationis, scil. per essentiam et per similitudinem cfr. infra fundam. 3. — Mox post Deus non informat supple cum cod. R intellectum.
    For the text of Aristotle on this matter, see above in the argument from the second presupposition. — On the twofold mode of information, namely by essence and by likeness, cf. below fundam. 3. — Then after Deus non informat supply with codex R intellectum.
  8. Cap. 2. circa initium. In ipso textu Augustini mss. cum ed. 1 habent et pro eiusque, quod habet Vat. cum originali. — Paulo infra post autem cod. 0 addit hic.
    [Augustine, De Trinitate,] c. 2, near the beginning. In the very text of Augustine the mss. with ed. 1 have et for eiusque, which the Vat. has with the original. — A little further on, after autem, codex 0 adds hic.
  9. Sensus, non verba Augustini allegantur ex I. Soliloq. c. 8, ubi sic habetur: Credendum est, ea (intelligibilia disciplinarum spectamina) non posse intelligi, nisi ab alio quasi suo sole illustrentur (qui sol, ut ex ibi sequentibus patet, ipse secretissimus Deus est). — Vat. hoc argumentum mutilate exhibet, omittendo scilicet in propositione maiore et ratione lucis, et in minore et Deus est summa lux, ergo maxime est cognoscibilis.
    The sense, not the words, of Augustine are alleged from Soliloquies I c. 8, where it is thus held: "It must be believed that these (intelligible objects of the disciplines) cannot be understood unless they are illuminated by another as by their own sun" (which sun, as appears from what follows there, is the most hidden God Himself). — The Vat. presents this argument mutilated, namely by omitting in the major proposition et ratione lucis, and in the minor et Deus est summa lux, ergo maxime est cognoscibilis.
  10. Substituimus ope mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 sit pro fiat.
    We have substituted, with the aid of the mss. and editions 1, 2, 3, sit for fiat.
  11. Forte respiciuntur illa quae X. de Trin. c. 8-11. habentur, ubi ostenditur, animam eo ipso, quod sibi sit praesens, certiorem cognitionem habere de se quam de rebus exterioribus, quas per imagines sive similitudines percipit; vel etiam haec VIII. de Trin. c. 8. n. 12: Ecce iam potest notiorem Deum habere, quam fratrem; plane notiorem, quia praesentiorem, notiorem, quia interiorem, notiorem, quia certiorem. Quae verba S. Bonaventura infra d. 17. p. I. dub. 2. tali explicat modo, qui sensum huius argumenti illustrat. Cfr. etiam libr. de Magistro, c. 12. n. 39. 40. et de Videndo Deo, c. 16. n. 38, ubi et duplex cognoscendi modus, scilicet per praesentiam et per similitudinem proponitur. — Plures antiquiorum mss. ut CIMSTVY etc. post cognoscuntur, licet non falso, tamen propter argumenti formam minus bene per essentiam loco per praesentiam; melius codd. LO per essentiam vel praesentiam. Paulo post cod. Y illa pro alia.
    Perhaps reference is made to those things in De Trinitate X, c. 8-11, where it is shown that the soul, by the very fact that it is present to itself, has more certain cognition of itself than of exterior things, which it perceives through images or likenesses; or also these things in De Trinitate VIII, c. 8 n. 12: "Behold, it can now have God as better known than its brother; plainly better known, because more present, better known, because more interior, better known, because more certain." Which words St. Bonaventure below at d. 17 p. I dub. 2 explains in such a way as illustrates the sense of this argument. Cf. also the book de Magistro, c. 12 nn. 39, 40, and de Videndo Deo, c. 16 n. 38, where the twofold mode of knowing, namely through presence and through likeness, is also proposed. — Several of the more ancient mss., as CIMSTVY etc., after cognoscuntur, though not falsely, yet less well for the form of the argument, [read] per essentiam in place of per praesentiam; better are codd. LO per essentiam vel praesentiam. A little after, codex Y [reads] illa for alia.
  12. Ed. 1 satis bene addit particulam et.
    Ed. 1 fittingly enough adds the particle et.
  13. Cfr. Boeth., III. de Consol. Prosa 11. — Cod. C hanc propositionem ita exhibet: unumquodque est efficacius, quando potest in id. In fine argumenti cod. X addit ipsi animae; melius placeret intellectui nostro.
    Cf. Boethius, De Consolatione III, Prose 11. — Codex C presents this proposition thus: "each thing is more effective when it can [act] in that." At the end of the argument codex X adds ipsi animae; intellectui nostro would please better.
  14. Hoc est, illuminando perficiens. — Immediate post Vat., reluctantibus mss. et sex primis edd., omittit et, sed minus bene; et paulo post substituit deiformationem pro deiformitatem.
    That is, perfecting by illuminating. — Immediately after, the Vat., against the mss. and the first six editions, omits et, but less well; and a little after it substitutes deiformationem for deiformitatem.
  15. Supple cum codd. NV quae probant. Paulo infra Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 aliud loco aliquid, sed minus apte.
    Supply with codices NV quae probant ["which prove (it)"]. A little further on, the Vat., contrary to the witness of the mss. and ed. 1, [reads] aliud in place of aliquid, but less aptly.
  16. In duabus seqq. qq. et II. Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 3.
    In the two following questions, and in II Sent. d. 23 a. 2 q. 3.
  17. August., de Videndo Deo, c. 9. n. 21. ait: Aliud est enim videre, aliud est totum videndo comprehendere. Quandoquidem id videtur, quod praesens utcumque sentitur: totum autem comprehenditur videndo, quod ita videtur, ut nihil eius lateat videntem, aut cuius fines circumspici possunt.
    Augustine, On Seeing God, c. 9 n. 21, says: "For it is one thing to see, another to comprehend the whole by seeing. For that is seen which is in some way sensed as present: but that is comprehended by seeing which is seen in such a way that nothing of it is hidden from the seer, or whose limits can be looked round about."
  18. Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 37. (c. 8.).
    Aristotle, De Anima III, text 37 (c. 8.).
  19. Ex mss. et ed. 1 substituimus currit pro certat.
    From the mss. and ed. 1 we have substituted currit for certat.
  20. Praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 hic addit Vat. duplex.
    Contrary to the witness of the mss. and ed. 1, the Vat. here adds duplex.
  21. Hoc est, propter alligationem ad organum seu propter materialitatem est ad unum obiectorum genus percipiendum limitata. De hac sensus et intellectus differentia vide Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 3-6. (c. 4.).
    That is, on account of its binding to an organ or on account of its materiality, it is limited to the perceiving of one genus of objects. On this difference between sense and intellect, see Aristotle, De Anima III, text 3-6 (c. 4.).
  22. Vat. contra codd. et ed. 1 virtuositatem.
    The Vat., against the codices and ed. 1, [reads] virtuositatem.
  23. Cod. R hic addit eius.
    Codex R here adds eius.
  24. Ed. 1 uno. Mox cod. 0 post non sit addit et quod hoc sit.
    Ed. 1 [reads] uno. Then codex 0 after non sit adds et quod hoc sit.
  25. Cap. 31. n. 58: Sicut in istis temporalibus legibus, quamquam de his homines iudicent, cum eas instituunt, tamen cum fuerint institutae atque firmatae, non licebit iudici de ipsis iudicare, sed secundum ipsas. — Loco citato inveniuntur etiam verba, quae immediate post S. Doctor ex Augustino affert: Ut enim nos et omnes animae rationales secundum veritatem de inferioribus recte iudicamus, sic de nobis, quando ei cohaeremus, sola ipsa veritas iudicat... ita etiam quantum potest lex ipsa, etiam ipse (homo spiritualis et Deo coniunctus) fit, secundum quam iudicat omnia, et de qua iudicare nullus potest. — Plures codd. ut HWY, omissa particula de, legunt Et hoc modo.
    [De Vera Religione,] c. 31 n. 58: "Just as in these temporal laws, although men judge concerning these when they establish them, nevertheless once they have been established and confirmed, it will not be permitted to the judge to judge concerning them, but according to them." — In the place cited there are also found the words which immediately afterwards the holy Doctor adduces from Augustine: "For just as we and all rational souls rightly judge according to truth concerning inferior things, so concerning us, when we cleave to it, the truth itself alone judges... so also as far as the law itself can, he himself also (the spiritual man joined to God) becomes [such], according to which he judges all things, and concerning which no one can judge." — Several codices, as HWY, with the particle de omitted, read Et hoc modo.
  26. Posuimus in textu hoc secundo modo et paulo post de primo modo non est verum, licet alii codd. ut DGHY etc. pro hoc secundo modo habeant de hoc primo modo, alii ut FT bb de primo modo, alii ut A cum Vat. de hoc modo et paulo post omnes codd. legant de secundo vero non est verum. Ex contextu siquidem constat, lectiones codicum esse erroneas; quod confirmatur etiam ex Augustino loc. cit. circa finem, ubi iisdem fere verbis eadem proponit ac S. Bonaventura. Scriptores in errorem videntur esse inducti ex eo, quod isti duo numeri ponendi sint ordine inverso. — Codd. aa bb satis bene posse habet loco potest. Circa finem huius responsionis post dirigi supplevimus ex mss. et sex primis edd. ut.
    We have put in the text hoc secundo modo and a little after de primo modo non est verum, although other codices, as DGHY etc., for hoc secundo modo have de hoc primo modo, others as FT bb de primo modo, others as A with the Vat. de hoc modo; and a little after all codices read de secundo vero non est verum. For it is established from the context that the readings of the codices are erroneous; which is also confirmed from Augustine in the place cited near the end, where in nearly the same words he proposes the same things as St. Bonaventure. Writers seem to have been led into error from the fact that these two numbers ought to be placed in inverted order. — Codices aa bb fittingly enough have posse in place of potest. Near the end of this response, after dirigi, we have supplied from the mss. and the first six editions ut.
  27. Ex mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 adiecimus tamen.
    From the mss. and editions 1, 2, 3, 6 we have added tamen.
  28. Num. 16; in quo textu plures codd. ut AGITYZ aa bb edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 discutimus, codd. FKX discernimus loco discimus, ac mox plurimi codd. ut ACFGHKLORSTU VWY aa ee ff similitudine pro similitudo Dei.
    [De Trinitate IX, c. 11,] n. 16; in which text several codices, as AGITYZ aa bb, editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, [read] discutimus, codices FKX discernimus in place of discimus; and then very many codices, as ACFGHKLORSTU VWY aa ee ff, [read] similitudine in place of similitudo Dei.
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